Jeffrey Wayne Yeatman v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2010-CP-00847-COA
JEFFREY WAYNE YEATMAN
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
06/18/2010
HON. JAMES T. KITCHENS JR.
OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JEFFREY WAYNE YEATMAN (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED - 08/09/2011
BEFORE LEE, C.J., MYERS AND MAXWELL, JJ.
LEE, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
Jeffrey Yeatman pleaded guilty in the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court to simple
assault of a law-enforcement officer. Yeatman also pleaded guilty to two counts of felony
driving under the influence (DUI). In the sentencing order for his simple-assault conviction,
Yeatman was ordered to serve five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
Corrections, as well as pay a $5,000 fine in conjunction with one of the felony DUI counts.
¶2.
Yeatman filed a motion for post-conviction relief, which was ultimately denied.
Yeatman now appeals, asserting the following issues: (1) an amendment to his simple-assault
indictment was illegal; (2) his sentence was illegal because the $5,000 fine exceeded the
amount prescribed by statute; and (3) he was illegally sentenced as a habitual offender.
Finding no merit, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶3.
A trial court’s denial of a motion for post-conviction relief will not be reversed absent
a finding that the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 806 So. 2d
1148, 1150 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). However, when issues of law are raised, the proper
standard of review is de novo. Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d 595, 598 (¶6) (Miss. 1999).
DISCUSSION
I. AMENDMENT TO INDICTMENT
¶4.
In his first issue on appeal, Yeatman argues that his indictment was illegally amended.
At some point prior to the guilty-plea hearing, the word “deputy” in the indictment was
struck through and replaced with the words “law enforcement officer.” It is well settled that
a valid guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights, including insufficiencies or defects
in indictments. Conerly v. State, 607 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Miss. 1992). However, a guilty
plea does not waive lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or the failure to charge an essential
element of the crime. Id. Yeatman’s argument does not concern either of these exceptions;
thus, his argument is procedurally barred.
¶5.
Regardless of the procedural bar, it is clear that during the plea colloquy Yeatman was
aware that he was pleading guilty to simple assault upon a law-enforcement officer. Since
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the amendment did not “materially alter facts which are the essence of the offense,” the
amendment was clearly one of form and not substance and, thus, did not violate Yeatman’s
due-process rights. Chandler v. State, 789 So. 2d 109, 111 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). This
issue is without merit.
II. ILLEGAL SENTENCE
¶6.
In his second issue on appeal, Yeatman argues that his sentence was illegal. Yeatman
contends that the trial court ordered him to pay a $5,000 fine on the simple-assault conviction
in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(1) (Supp. 2010). Section 97-3-7
provides for a maximum fine of $1,000 if convicted of simple assault on a law-enforcement
officer. The trial court’s statements during the plea colloquy are confusing and make it
appear that Yeatman was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine on the simple-assault conviction.
However, the sentencing order for the simple-assault conviction states that the $5,000 fine
was ordered to be paid pursuant to Yeatman’s conviction on one of the felony DUI
convictions. Since this particular DUI conviction was a third offense, the fine ordered was
the maximum as prescribed by statute. See Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(2)(c) (Supp. 2010).
This issue is without merit.
III. HABITUAL-OFFENDER STATUS
¶7.
In his final issue on appeal, Yeatman argues that the indictment failed to charge him
as a habitual offender. Prior to the plea colloquy, the State informed the trial court that it had
reached a plea agreement with Yeatman, where Yeatman would plead guilty and, in return,
he would be sentenced as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 9919-81 (Rev. 2007) rather than Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2007).
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Section 99-19-81 orders the maximum sentence for the charged felony, whereas section 9919-83 orders a mandatory life sentence. At that point, the State moved to amend the
indictment to include Yeatman’s prior felony convictions. Yeatman did not object, and the
indictment was amended.
¶8.
Rule 7.09 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court states that indictments
may “be amended to charge the defendant as [a] habitual offender . . . only if the defendant
is afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense and is not unfairly surprised.” The record
is clear that Yeatman was aware that he was being charged as a habitual offender and had no
objection. This issue is without merit.
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO OKTIBBEHA COUNTY.
IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., MYERS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON, MAXWELL AND RUSSELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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