Edward Darrell Moorman v. Rebecca Jane Waldo Moorman
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-01723-COA
EDWARD DARRELL MOORMAN
APPELLANT
v.
REBECCA JANE WALDO MOORMAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
04/10/2008
HON. TALMADGE D. LITTLEJOHN
PONTOTOC COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
JOHN G. HOLADAY
MATTHEW DANIEL WILSON
JAMES DAVID MOORE
CIVIL - CUSTODY
PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE MINOR
CHILDREN AND CHILD SUPPORT
AWARDED TO REBECCA WALDO
MOORMAN
AFFIRMED - 11/10/2009
BEFORE LEE, P.J., CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
Edward Darrell Moorman and Rebecca Jane Waldo Moorman were married on
August 21, 1999. Edward and Rebecca had two sons, with one child born on June 15, 2000,
and the other born on December 20, 2001. Edward also had custody of his three sons from
a prior marriage. Rebecca filed a petition for divorce in the Pontotoc County Chancery Court
on January 23, 2003. On February 6, 2003, the chancellor entered a temporary agreed order
giving custody of the minor children to Edward. Edward and Rebecca subsequently
reconciled for a brief period. The temporary agreed order was never rescinded.
¶2.
On January 16, 2004, Edward filed a petition for divorce, alleging adultery and
habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. In the alternative, Edward alleged irreconcilable
differences. Ultimately, Edward withdrew his fault grounds for divorce, and the parties
entered into a joint consent to divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. After a
hearing, the chancellor awarded temporary physical custody of the children to Rebecca,
beginning on March 15, 2004.
¶3.
After numerous continuances, a trial on the matter was held in January 2008 and
continued until April 10, 2008. At that time, the chancellor entered a bench ruling awarding
permanent custody of the minor children to Rebecca.
An order incorporating the
chancellor’s bench opinion was entered on August 13, 2008.
¶4.
Edward now appeals, asserting that the chancellor erred in separating the minor
children from their three older half-brothers without addressing any unusual and compelling
circumstances. Finding no error, we affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5.
The standard of review in child custody cases is quite limited, and in order to reverse
the chancellor’s findings, the chancellor must be manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or
have applied an erroneous legal standard. Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583, 586
(¶7) (Miss. 2002).
DISCUSSION
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¶6.
In his only issue on appeal, Edward argues that the chancellor erred in failing to
address any unusual and compelling circumstances to warrant the separation of the minor
children from their half-brothers. Edward relies upon Sparkman v. Sparkman, 441 So. 2d
1361 (Miss. 1983), to support his position that the chancellor did not act in the best interests
of the minor children in separating them from their half-brothers. In the Sparkman case, the
chancellor separated a brother and a sister. Id at 1362. The supreme court reversed, finding
that the chancellor failed to address any special circumstances necessitating the separation
of the children. Id. at 1363.
¶7.
Edward contends that the chancellor’s failure to specifically address the situation
constitutes reversible error. The chancellor referenced the Sparkman opinion in his decision,
but he never fully addressed the case. Edward would have this Court require chancellors to
specifically address the issue of sibling separation in their rulings much like chancellors are
required to address the Albright factors.1 We decline the invitation to do so. See C.A.M.F.
v. J.B.M., 972 So. 2d 656, 661 (¶¶20-23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). The separation of siblings
is not a separate Albright factor but one factor “which the chancellor may consider along with
the best interest of the child.” Id. This Court in Sumrall v. Sumrall, 970 So. 2d 254, 259
(¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), noted that there was substantial evidence produced at trial that
two half-brothers were close and “to separate them would be harmful, difficult, and not in
their best interests.”
¶8.
In the case at bar, the chancellor did consider the separation of the half-brothers to a
limited extent. The chancellor, noting that the custody of the three half-brothers was not
1
Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983).
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before the court, allowed one of Edward’s older sons to testify as to his relationship with his
younger half-brothers. The chancellor also noted the guardian ad litem’s concerns in
separating the boys. However, the guardian ad litem gave a detailed report justifying her
recommendation that Rebecca retain custody of the minor children. The chancellor gave an
extensive bench opinion wherein he thoroughly reviewed the Albright factors and determined
that it was in the best interests of the minor children to remain with Rebecca. We can find
no error in his decision.
¶9.
Edward also contends that the chancellor erred in failing to consider the half-brothers
in creating a visitation schedule. However, the brothers will see each other during Edward’s
visitations. Furthermore, the supreme court has deemed court-ordered visitation between
half-siblings a matter for the Legislature and has invited the Legislature to expand the rights
set forth to siblings. Scruggs v. Saterfiel, 693 So. 2d 924, 926 (Miss. 1997). We find no
merit to this assignment of error.
¶10. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PONTOTOC COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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