Jesse Qualls Stigler, III v. Lisa Elaine Stigler
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-00813-COA
JESSE QUALLS STIGLER, III
APPELLANT
v.
LISA ELAINE STIGLER
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
APPELLEE
04/07/2008
HON. MITCHELL M. LUNDY, JR.
DESOTO COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
JOHN ROBERT WHITE
JERRY WESLEY HISAW
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
FINAL JUDGMENT OF CONTEMPT AND
MODIFICATION ENTERED
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED
AND REMANDED IN PART: 10/13/2009
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND MAXWELL, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Jesse Qualls Stigler III (“Jay”) appeals an order from the Chancery Court of DeSoto
County holding him in contempt of court for the non-payment of child support. Jay claims
that the chancellor committed manifest error by (1) invoking the escalation clause in the
judgment of divorce, (2) placing Jay in continuous contempt of court by requiring him to pay
an unreasonable proportion of his income as child support, (3) miscalculating the interest
owed on the unpaid child support, (4) awarding attorney’s fees without an analysis of the
McKee factors, (5) failing to state the factual findings used to support a child support award
outside of the statutory guidelines, and (6) failing to address the issue of Jay’s request that
his obligation to pay for college expenses be predicated on a minimum grade point average.
Finding error on the part of the chancellor as to issue three, we affirm in part and reverse and
remand in part for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
¶2.
Jay and Lisa Elaine Stigler (“Lisa”) were divorced on December 5, 1994. They have
two children, Jesse Qualls Stigler IV (“Jesse”) and Bailey Amanda Stigler (“Bailey”). At the
time this appeal was filed, Jesse was twenty-one years old, and Bailey was seventeen years
old.
¶3.
In their divorce, Lisa was granted custody of the children. Lisa and Jay entered into
an agreed property settlement and child support order. The order addressed Jay’s obligation
to pay child support as follows:
The [H]usband shall pay child support to the wife in the amount of $1,300.00
per month beginning January 1, 1997, and due and payable the first day of
each month thereafter. During this calendar year and each calendar year
hereafter should [the] Husband’s bonus place the aggregate of [the] Husband’s
adjusted gross income in excess of the minimum guidelines for child support
in effect in the State of Mississippi, the Husband shall pay that amount
necessary to bring his child support payments $3,600.00 in excess of the
minimum amount of child support as provided by the guidelines then [in]
effect for the State of Mississippi based on the Husband’s annual income for
that year.
¶4.
On June 17, 2002, Lisa brought her first petition for modification and motion to
enforce judgment. Lisa asked the chancellor to enforce the escalation clause by adding
$3,600 to Jay’s yearly child support payments. An agreed order was entered in which Jay
2
agreed to provide an automobile for Jesse in exchange for Lisa’s agreement not to pursue
unpaid child support from Jay for the years since the divorce through 2001. The escalation
clause was not addressed in the order.
¶5.
On September 6, 2007, Lisa filed a petition for contempt seeking unpaid child support
for the years 2002 through 2006. She again requested that the escalation clause be enforced.
Jay filed a counterclaim requesting that the chancellor modify his monthly child support
obligation due to a substantial decrease in Jay’s salary.
¶6.
The chancellor found that the escalation clause was enforceable and awarded Lisa
$39,713.28 in unpaid child support, interest, and attorney’s fees. Further, the chancellor
found a material change in circumstances and reduced Jay’s monthly child support obligation
to $690. Jay now appeals from this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7.
“In domestic relations cases, [the appellate court's] scope of review is limited by the
substantial evidence/manifest error rule.” Samples v. Davis, 904 So. 2d 1061, 1063-64 (¶9)
(Miss. 2004) (citing Jundoosing v. Jundoosing, 826 So. 2d 85, 88 (¶10) (Miss. 2002)). “[We]
will not disturb the chancellor's opinion when [it is] supported by substantial evidence unless
the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an
erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. at 1064 (¶9) (quoting Holloman v. Holloman, 691
So. 2d 897, 898 (Miss. 1996)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Amiker v. Drugs for
Less, Inc., 796 So. 2d 942, 945 (¶7) (Miss. 2000).
ANALYSIS
1.
Whether the chancellor committed manifest error by invoking the
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escalation clause in the judgment of divorce.
¶8.
Jay argues that there is no clear and convincing evidence of his contempt because the
chancellor invoked an escalation clause in the divorce decree that was not specific and had
never been previously enforced. He further argues that the escalation clause is void because
it is tied only to increases in his adjusted gross income. Lisa responds that the clause is valid
because it was agreed to by both parties. She further states that the chancellor correctly
interpreted the escalation clause in conformity with the intent of the parties at the time the
agreement was entered.
A.
¶9.
Validity of the Escalation Clause
Jay argues that, according to the supreme court’s decision in Tedford v. Dempsey, 437
So. 2d 410, 419 (Miss. 1983), an escalation clause should be based on the children’s
expenses, the parents’ earning capacities, and the annual inflation rate for that clause to be
enforceable. While such a suggestion was made in the Tedford decision, this Court has since
held that there is a different standard when the parties enter into an agreement. “The parties
may in fact agree of their own volition to do more than the law requires of them. Where such
a valid agreement is made, it may be enforced just as any other contract.” Rogers v. Rogers,
919 So. 2d 184, 189 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 931-32
(Miss. 1986)). Here, Jay and Lisa both agreed to the escalation clause as written; thus, it is
a valid clause in their agreement.
B.
¶10.
Enforcement of the Escalation Clause
Jay further contends that the clause is unenforceable because it was not enforced by
the chancellor’s order following Lisa’s first contempt action in 2002. In her petition, Lisa
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did request that the clause be enforced. However, when the parties appeared before the
chancellor, Jay was not represented by counsel. The chancellor suggested that Jay obtain
counsel before the action proceeded. Instead of following the chancellor’s direction, Jay met
with Lisa and her attorney, and an agreed order was entered. Lisa agreed not to pursue the
unpaid child support from the time of the divorce through 2001. Jay agreed to pay Lisa’s
attorney’s fees. Both parties agreed to give a pickup truck to their son, Jesse.
¶11.
Neither the chancellor nor the agreed order addressed the issue of the escalation
clause. It remained a part of their settlement agreement. As such, we find that the chancellor
in this action did not err by enforcing the clause.
C.
¶12.
Interpretation of the Escalation Clause
Jay’s essential argument on appeal is that the clause is ambiguous; therefore, it cannot
be the basis of the chancellor’s finding of contempt. We quote the escalation clause at issue:
The [H]usband shall pay child support to the wife in the amount of $1,300.00
per month beginning January 1, 1997, and due and payable the first day of
each month thereafter. During this calendar year and each calendar year
hereafter should [the] Husband’s bonus place the aggregate of [the] Husband’s
adjusted gross income in excess of the minimum guidelines for child support
in effect in the State of Mississippi, the Husband shall pay that amount
necessary to bring his child support payments $3,600.00 in excess of the
minimum amount of child support as provided by the guidelines then [in]
effect for the State of Mississippi based on the Husband’s annual income for
that year.
¶13.
Jay primarily claims two crucial ambiguities: (1) the clause contains a condition
precedent in that it requires Jay be awarded a bonus to activate the escalation in child
support, and (2) the term “minimum guidelines for child support” is ambiguous when read
with the child support guidelines in Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101 (Rev.
5
2004).1 Therefore, the question presented by Jay is whether the escalation clause refers to
the minimum income listed in the statute ($5,000) or the percentage of income for two
children under the guidelines (twenty percent). Lisa responds that the clause clearly intends
for the child support to be calculated by taking Jay’s total adjusted gross income (his salary
plus additional compensation), then calculate the statutory amount of child support (twenty
percent for the two children), and then add $3,600.
¶14.
The supreme court stated the following guidance for contract interpretation:
We have delineated a three-tiered process for contract interpretation. First, we
look to the "four corners" of the agreement and review the actual language the
parties used in their agreement. When the language of the contract is clear or
unambiguous, we must effectuate the parties' intent. However, if the language
of the contract is not so clear, we will, if possible, harmonize the provisions in
accord with the parties' apparent intent. Next, if the parties' intent remains
uncertain, we may discretionarily employ canons of contract construction.
Finally, we may also consider parol or extrinsic evidence if necessary.
1
Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101(1) and (4) (Rev. 2004) provides:
(1) The following child support award guidelines shall be a rebuttable
presumption in all judicial or administrative proceedings regarding the
awarding or modifying of child support awards in this state:
Number Of Children
Due Support
1
2
Percentage Of Adjusted Gross Income
That Should Be Awarded For Support
14%
20%
....
(4) In cases in which the adjusted gross income as defined in this section is
more than Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) or less than Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000.00), the court shall make a written finding in the record as to
whether or not the application of the guidelines established in this section is
reasonable.
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The three-tiered approach is not a rigid “step-by-step” process. Indeed,
overlapping of steps is not inconceivable. We further note that, when
examining the contractual provisions of property settlement agreements,
special deference is afforded such agreements. As we have stated:
In property and financial matters between the divorcing spouses
themselves, there is no question, that absent fraud or
overreaching, the parties should be allowed broad latitude.
When the parties have reached agreement and the chancery
court has approved it, we ought to enforce it and take a dim
view of efforts to modify it, as we ordinarily do when persons
seek relief from their improvident contracts.
West v. West, 891 So. 2d 203, 210-11 (¶¶14-15) (Miss. 2004) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
¶15.
In West, the supreme court analyzed a property settlement agreement using this
process. Id. at 211 (¶15). The overall intent of the parties was determined by looking to the
“four corners” of the document. Id. at (¶16). The husband argued that certain portions of the
agreement were ambiguous; however, the supreme court found that the parties’ compliance
with the agreement demonstrated their intent. Id. at (¶18). The supreme court held:
“[h]owever vague, unintelligible, and contrary to his original intent [the husband] may now
try to cast the substantive provisions of the property settlement agreement, the extrinsic
evidence of his compliance with the provisions for nearly a decade eviscerates this argument
of any credibility.” Id. at 211-12 (¶18).
¶16.
We agree with Jay that the clause, on its face, is unclear in some respects. However,
we find it possible to harmonize the provisions of the clause in accord with Lisa’s and Jay’s
intent at the time they entered the agreement. Indeed, we find, as did the chancellor, that the
overall intent of the parties by including this clause was to increase child support payments
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as Jay’s income increased. The parties assumed that Jay’s annual income would be a
minimum of $63,000. As initially written, $1,300 per month was more than the statutory
guideline of twenty percent of $63,000. However, the parties anticipated that Jay’s income
could increase to an amount where $1,300 per month would no longer equal twenty percent
of his income. This escalation clause was intended to provide for such a situation.2
¶17.
The clause is poorly worded and fails to comport with the language used in section
43-19-101 – the statutory child support guidelines which the clause seeks to utilize.
Especially unclear is what the parties intended by the phrase: “adjusted gross income in
excess of the minimum guidelines for child support.” The only minimum adjusted gross
income listed in the statute is $5,000, which is clearly inapplicable here as the agreement
assumed Jay to have a minimum income of $63,000. Although this portion of the clause is
unclear, we are able to deduce its meaning using extrinsic evidence of the parties’
compliance with the agreement.
¶18.
The intent of the parties is evidenced by their actions during the years in question.
The clause is clear that Jay was required to pay Lisa $1,300 per month in child support. By
Jay’s own testimony, he paid $1,400 per month during 2002, 2003, and 2004. He also paid
more than the required $1,300 per month during 2005 and the first half of 2006. Both Lisa
and Jay testified that, at the end of each year, Lisa would calculate the remainder of child
support owed by Jay. Lisa did so by calculating twenty percent of Jay’s adjusted gross
income. Then, Lisa would subtract what Jay had already paid throughout the year and send
2
The parties correctly anticipated an increase in Jay’s income as his adjusted gross
income increased to between $82,986.84 and $130,982.99 during the period of 2002 to 2006.
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Jay the amount due. At that point, the parties would negotiate various credits claimed by Jay
for items such as medical bills and insurance on Jesse’s vehicle.
¶19.
Evidence of the parties’ actions indicates that the intent of the clause was to use the
twenty percent guideline for child support for two children. Jay was required to pay Lisa at
least $1,300 per month. However, at the end of the year, if his income was large enough
such that his payments did not total twenty percent of his income that year, he owed Lisa the
difference.
¶20.
Jay now claims that he never received a bonus that would trigger the escalation clause;
thus, he was only required to pay $1,300 per month. In his testimony before the chancellor,
he tried to distinguish the concept of a bonus from the commissions that he received each
year. However, this argument is contradictory to his intent as shown by his child support
payments. He obviously intended to pay Lisa more than the $1,300 per month because he
paid extra each month and participated in the end-of-year calculation, which was done to
bring Jay’s child support up to twenty percent of his income for that year. Considering the
evidence of Jay’s extra payments, his current argument lacks credibility.
¶21.
The only portion of the clause that was not applied by the parties was the additional
payment of $3,600 per year. While Jay has a valid argument that certain portions of the
clause are unclear, this additional payment is in no way ambiguous. We find that the
chancellor correctly interpreted the clause in accord with the intent of the parties by (1)
calculating Jay’s adjusted gross income, (2) taking twenty percent as annual child support
due, (3) adding the additional $3,600, and (4) subtracting the child support already paid by
Jay. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
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2.
¶22.
Whether the chancellor committed manifest error by placing Jay in
continuous contempt of court.
Jay claims that the chancellor’s order requiring him to pay his child support arrearage
in monthly payments of $1,000 failed to consider his living expenses and places him in
hopeless, continuous contempt of court. Jay cites the supreme court’s decision in Yelverton
v. Yelverton, 961 So. 2d 19, 28 (¶18) (Miss. 2007) as support for his argument. However,
Yelverton involved an initial award of child support and alimony by the chancellor upon the
parties’ divorce. Id. at (¶16). There, the chancellor ordered the husband to pay $10,000 per
month from his $12,000 monthly income. Id. at (¶18). The supreme court found the award
per se unreasonable as it gave the wife “approximately $12,118.65 a month, although her
monthly expenses totaled only $6,000, and [left the husband] with a negative balance of
$4,429 per month.” Id.
¶23.
Such is not the case here. This is not an initial award ordered at the time of the
divorce; instead, it is the repayment of child support arrearage from years in which Jay’s total
income rose as high as $172, 516.11. It is true that his income is now significantly lower due
to the loss of his high-paying job. However, Jay testified that he has put his house on the
market, and he has moved into his fiancée’s house where he pays no rent, utilities, or
expenses. The chancellor considered Jay’s reduction in income and, as a result, significantly
lowered Jay’s monthly child support requirement from $1,300 to $690. His monthly
payment to Lisa of $1,690 amounts to forty-nine percent of his income, and $1,000 of that
payment will terminate once his arrearage has been paid. We find that the chancellor’s
award is reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, this issue has no merit.
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3.
¶24.
Whether the chancellor miscalculated the interest owed on the unpaid
child support.
The supreme court has held that a father may receive credit on his unpaid child
support “where the father proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he has, in fact, paid
the support to the child under circumstances where the support money was used for the child
for the purposes contemplated by the support order, that is, to provide shelter, food, clothing
and other necessities for the child.” Varner v. Varner, 588 So. 2d 428, 435 (Miss. 1991).
Here, the chancellor found that Jay made direct payments to Lisa for the support of the
children. Therefore, Jay was given credit in the amount of $9,057.05.
¶25.
However, this credit was deducted from Jay’s total amount of arrearage which already
included eight percent interest on the unpaid child support. It seems illogical to this Court
that the chancellor would find that Jay was entitled to a credit for amounts that were paid to
Lisa, yet charge interest on those amounts. Accordingly, we remand this issue for the
chancellor to deduct the amount credited to Jay before applying the interest on the total child
support arrearage.
¶26.
We further note that, on remand, the chancellor should correct the calculation of Jay’s
child support arrearage for 2004. The additional $3,600 provided for in the escalation clause
was inadvertently omitted from the 2004 calculation. While this error was not raised on
appeal, “the court may, at its option, notice a plain error not identified or distinctly specified”
in a party's statement of issues. M.R.A.P. 28(a)(3).
4.
¶27.
Whether the chancellor committed manifest error by awarding
attorney’s fees without an analysis of the McKee factors.
Jay argues that the chancellor should not have awarded attorney’s fees to Lisa without
11
first conducting an analysis of the factors set forth in McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764, 767
(Miss. 1982). An award of attorney’s fees in a divorce action is entrusted to the sound
discretion of the chancellor. R.K. v. J.K., 946 So. 2d 764, 778 (¶43) (Miss. 2007).
¶28.
In R.K., the supreme court stated that: “[t]hough this Court has differed previously in
its statements as to the mandatory considerations before a trial court awards attorney's fees,
each standard was followed by an indication that the ultimate decision is within the discretion
of the trial court.” Id. at 779 (¶46). While written findings on the McKee factors is the better
practice, the supreme court concluded that “absent an apparent abuse of discretion, this Court
will assume the chancellor considered the appropriate factors in awarding attorney's fees.”
Id. As such, we find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor’s determination to award Lisa
reasonable attorney’s fees. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
5.
¶29.
Whether the chancellor committed manifest error by failing to state the
factual findings used to support a child support award outside of the
statutory guidelines.
Jay claims that the chancellor erred by deviating from the statutory guidelines for
child support without making the required findings of fact. Jay is correct that Mississippi
Code Annotated section 43-19-101(2) (Rev. 2004) requires that any deviation from the
guidelines must be supported by specific findings of the chancellor. However, such findings
are not required when the child support order is based on the parties’ agreement. See
Williams v. Williams, 810 So. 2d 613, 614 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (addressing an agreed
modification to child support). Here, Jay’s child support obligation was determined by the
parties’ agreement. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
6.
Whether the chancellor committed manifest error by failing to address
12
the issue of Jay’s request that his obligation to pay for college expenses
be predicated on his children maintaining a minimum grade point
average.
¶30.
In his counterclaim for modification and other relief, Jay requested that the chancellor
modify his divorce decree so that Jay would only be responsible for college expenses so long
as the children maintained a 2.0 grade point average. The chancellor failed to address this
issue in his order.
¶31.
The parties’ settlement agreement entered into at the time of the divorce provided that
Jay would maintain a trust fund that would be disbursed to Jesse and Bailey for their college
expenses. Should either child elect to not attend college, their share shall be disbursed to
them at age 30. There was no requirement that the children maintain a certain grade point
average.
¶32.
A settlement agreement approved by the chancellor becomes part of the final divorce
decree for all legal intents and purposes. See Switzer v. Switzer, 460 So. 2d 843, 845 (Miss.
1984).
As such, modification of that agreement requires a material change in the
circumstances of the parties. Tingle v. Tingle, 573 So. 2d 1389, 1391 (Miss. 1990). Further,
that material change must occur after the original decree was entered, and it “must also be
one that could not have been anticipated by the parties at the time of the original decree.”
Id. (citations omitted).
¶33.
Jay has presented no evidence to show such a material change in circumstances.
There was testimony that his son initially had trouble in college, but he has since improved
his grades. Regardless, the fact that his children might not maintain a 2.0 grade point average
while in college is a circumstance that could have been anticipated at the time of the original
13
decree. Jay simply seeks to add additional limiting language that he failed to include in the
settlement agreement. We find that the chancellor’s failure to address this issue does not
amount to reversible error. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
7.
¶34.
Whether Lisa should be awarded attorney’s fees incurred for her
defense of this appeal.
Lisa claims that she is financially unable to pay her attorney’s fees incurred for her
defense of this appeal. In support of her argument, she cites Grant v. Grant, 765 So. 2d
1263, 1268 (¶19) (Miss. 2000) which, in turn, cites the supreme court’s decision in Monroe
v. Monroe, 745 So. 2d 249, 253 (¶18) (Miss. 1999). In Monroe, the supreme court held that:
Attorney fees are appropriate only where a party is financially unable to pay
them. The fee should be fair and should only compensate for services actually
rendered after it has been determined that the legal work charged for was
reasonably required and necessary. Mrs. Monroe presented no evidence,
however, of the fees charged by her attorney or of the amount of work
involved. We therefore find that she is not entitled to attorney fees.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted).
¶35.
Similarly, Lisa has provided no evidence of the fees charged by her attorney or of the
amount of work involved. Accordingly, we deny her request for attorney’s fees for this
appeal.
¶36. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF DESOTO COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF
THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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