Patricia Fleishhacker v. Walter Fleishhacker
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-01942-COA
PATRICIA FLEISHHACKER
APPELLANT
v.
WALTER FLEISHHACKER
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
APPELLEE
06/15/2007
HON. TALMADGE D. LITTLEJOHN
LEE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
RICHARD SHANE MCLAUGHLIN
MECHELLE NICOLE MCLAUGHLIN
JOHN A. FERRELL
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
JUDGMENT FOR DIVORCE ENTERED
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED
AND REMANDED IN PART-06/30/2009
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Patricia Fleishhacker appeals the chancellor’s division of the marital assets and award
of alimony. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
¶2.
Patricia and Walter Fleishhacker were married on January 3, 1981. They separated
on February 3, 2001, after Patricia learned that Walter had an affair with another woman.
No children were born to the parties. Patricia and Walter lived a very comfortable and
affluent lifestyle.
¶3.
Prior to 1981, Walter purchased a twenty-five percent interest in the stock of
Northeast Metal Processing, Inc. (“NMP”). NMP is a successful scrap metal business that
is located near Tupelo, Mississippi. NMP was the Fleishhackers’ primary source of income
throughout their marriage.
¶4.
In 1993, Walter bought the remaining seventy-five percent of NMP’s stock. Thus,
he became the sole stockholder of NMP.
¶5.
On April 4, 1996, Walter conveyed an interest in the NMP stock to Patricia. The
stock certificates were then titled to, “Walter Fleishhacker and Patricia Fleishhacker as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship.” On the same day, Walter and Patricia executed an
agreement that related to the stock ownership of NMP. The terms of the agreement will be
discussed in detail later.
¶6.
On April 1, 2004, Patricia filed her complaint for divorce. On April 19, 2004, Walter
filed his answer and cross-complaint for divorce.
¶7.
On June 22, 2004, the chancellor executed an “Agreed Order on Temporary
Features.” In this order, Walter agreed to pay: Patricia the sum of $1,500 per month as
temporary alimony, certain other specified monthly bills, maintain health and accident
insurance coverage for the benefit of Patricia, and paid Patricia’s medical expenses.
¶8.
A trial was held on May 7-12, 2007. On July 6, 2007, the chancellor executed a
judgment for divorce, nunc pro tunc, to June 15, 2007. It is from this judgment that Patricia
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
2
¶9.
Our scope of review in domestic matters is limited. This Court will not disturb the
findings of a chancellor when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused
his or her discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal
standard. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 824 So. 2d 623, 625-26 (¶8) (Miss. 2002).
ANALYSIS
1.
¶10.
Did the chancellor err in the valuation and division of the NMP, Inc.,
stock?
The chancellor determined that Walter owned twenty-five percent of the stock in
NMP “at the time of the marriage of the parties and further [found] these items to be separate
property of [Walter] and thus not marital assets.”
¶11.
Patricia claims this was error, and she makes two separate arguments. First, Patricia
claims that the chancellor erred by determining that twenty-five percent of NMP’s stock was
Walter’s non-marital separate property because Walter commingled the property during the
marriage. Hence, Patricia claims that one hundred percent of the value of NMP should be
subject to equitable division. Second, Patricia argues that even if the chancellor was correct
to determine that twenty-five percent of NMP’s stock was Walter’s non-marital separate
property, the chancellor erred by valuing the separate interest as of the date of the temporary
order rather than the date of the parties’ marriage. Walter argues that the chancellor was
correct on both of these issues. We find that the chancellor was correct in his determination
of the first argument, but we also find that the chancellor committed reversible error on the
second argument.
¶12.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has established guidelines that must be followed for
3
the equitable division of assets. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
Likewise, the court has established guidelines for an award of periodic alimony and an award
of lump-sum alimony. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993)
(periodic alimony); Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So. 2d 435, 438 (Miss. 1988) (lump-sum
alimony).
¶13.
Equitable division of assets begins with the chancellor’s classification of assets as
marital versus non-marital. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 914-15 (Miss. 1994). In
Hemsley, the supreme court held:
We define marital property for the purpose of divorce as being any and all
property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. Assets so acquired or
accumulated during the course of the marriage are marital assets and are
subject to an equitable distribution by the chancellor. We assume for divorce
purposes that the contributions and efforts of the marital partners, whether
economic, domestic or otherwise are of equal value.
Id. at 915. Thus, Hemsley required the chancellor to consider: (a) the assets acquired or
accumulated during the marriage as marital assets, and (b) Patricia’s domestic contributions
and efforts were equal in value to Walter’s economic contributions and efforts.
¶14.
Assets that are “accumulated during [a] marriage are . . . marital property ‘subject to
equitable division unless it can be shown by proof that such assets are attributable to one of
the parties' separate estates prior to the marriage or outside the marriage.’” Johnson v.
Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 914-15).
However, “when an individual commingles non-marital assets with joint marital assets, the
non-marital assets are converted into marital assets, subject to an equitable distribution
unless subject to an agreement to the contrary.” Parsons v. Parsons, 741 So. 2d 302, 308
4
(¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
A.
¶15.
Did the chancellor err by determining that twenty-five percent
of NMP’s stock was Walter’s non-marital separate property?
Patricia and Walter were married in January 1981. Prior to their marriage, Walter
owned twenty-five percent of the stock of NMP. In 1993, Walter acquired the remaining
seventy-five percent of NMP’s stock and became NMP’s sole stockholder. There is no
dispute that the seventy-five percent interest in the stock of NMP is marital property and
subject to equitable division.
¶16. Patricia argues that the chancellor erred when he determined that the twenty-five
percent of the NMP stock would be considered a non-marital asset. She claims that Walter
conveyed her an ownership interest in the stock during the marriage.
¶17.
On April 2, 1996, Walter and Patricia executed an agreement that related to the stock
ownership of NMP. The agreement provided:
Whereas, Walter Fleishhacker owns fifteen (15) shares of the outstanding
stock of Northeast Metal Processors, Inc. (the “Stock”) and Walter
Fleishhacker is currently the sole shareholder of Northeast Metal Processors,
Inc.; and
Whereas, Walter Fleishhacker desires to change the form of ownership of the
Stock from his sole name to “Walter Fleishhacker and Patricia Fleishhacker
as joint tenants with rights of survivorship”; and
Whereas, to induce Walter Fleishhacker to change the form of ownership of
the Stock, Patricia Fleishhacker desires to make certain covenants with respect
to the stock.
Now, therefore, in consideration of the foregoing premises and for other good
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby
acknowledged, it is agreed as follows:
1.
Walter Fleishhacker agrees to have the certificate
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evidencing the Stock reissued in the names of “Walter
Fleishhacker and Patricia Fleishhacker as joint tenants with
rights of survivorship.”
2.
Patricia Fleishhacker agrees to convey her joint
ownership interest in the Stock to Walter Fleishhacker, without
cost, at any time that such transfer is requested by Walter
Fleishhacker.
3.
Patricia Fleishhacker agrees not to transfer or encumber
her interest in the Stock without prior written permission of
Walter Fleishhacker.
4.
Patricia Fleishhacker agrees that in the event of her
divorce or separation from Walter Fleishhacker, then, and in
such event, her joint ownership of the Stock shall not give her
any greater interest in Northeast Metal Processors, Inc., than she
would otherwise have.
5.
This Agreement shall terminate on the death of the first
of Walter Fleishhacker or Patricia Fleishhacker to die or at such
earlier time as the parties may mutually agree.
6.
It is the intention of the parties that title to the Stock shall
vest completely in the survivor by operation of law upon the
death of the first of them to die.
¶18.
On April 4, 1996, Walter conveyed Patricia a joint interest in one hundred percent of
the NMP stock. Walter had the NMP stock certificates reissued, and the ownership of all
the stock was titled in the names of, “Walter Fleishhacker and Patricia Fleishhacker as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship.” The legal effect of this conveyance was that Walter and
Patricia were joint owners of the stock, subject to the terms of the agreement. Upon the
death of either Walter or Patricia, the full and complete ownership of NMP’s stock would
immediately pass to the survivor.
¶19.
Patricia claims that the 1996 conveyance commingled Walter’s twenty-five percent
6
of NMP stock, thereby making it marital property. Patricia cites A&L, Inc. v. Grantham, 747
So. 2d 832 (Miss. 1999), for the proposition that an increased interest in an investment can
transform a premarital interest into a marital asset. In Grantham, the husband owned a
twenty percent interest in a building prior to the marriage and acquired an additional five
percent interest during the marriage. Id. at 840 (¶31). The facts about the interest are sparse,
but the chancellor “noted that it was not proven by [the husband] that the assets claimed to
be separate were not in fact marital” and included the “entire interest . . . in the distribution.”
Id. at 840-41 (¶¶32-33). The supreme court found that the chancellor’s “failure to separate
the portion of the building which was acquired prior to the marriage [was] insufficient to
upset the chancellor's equitable division.” Id. at 841 (¶33).
¶20.
Patricia argues that Walter’s premarital shares of stock and the marital shares of stock
of NMP were commingled because the April 4, 1996 agreement combined all the shares into
one asset. Patricia claims that several marital assets were titled in the name of NMP, and
according to Patricia, both Walter and she participated in the successful operation of NMP
during their marriage. However, Walter minimized Patricia’s role in the business.
¶21.
Assets that are “accumulated during [a] marriage are . . . marital property ‘subject to
equitable division unless it can be shown by proof that such assets are attributable to one of
the parties' separate estates prior to the marriage or outside the marriage.’” Johnson, 650
So. 2d at 1285 (quoting Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 914-15). However, “when an individual
commingles non-marital assets with joint marital assets, the non-marital assets are converted
into marital assets, subject to an equitable distribution unless subject to an agreement to the
contrary.” Parsons, 741 So. 2d at 308 (¶28) (internal quotations omitted).
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¶22.
It is apparent that the chancellor found that Walter’s premarital interest in the NMP
stock should not be included in the marital property. However, neither the chancellor’s
opinion nor judgment gives this Court the benefit of his rationale. Indeed, the chancellor
does not discuss the 1996 agreement or the joint ownership of the stock. However, any
review of the agreement requires the same result.
¶23.
The 1996 agreement and the reissued stock made Patricia a “joint” owner of NMP.
As such, she immediately had full and complete rights as a shareholder. She agreed that she
would not convey, transfer, or encumber her interest in the stock. However, the agreement
specifically provided for what would happen if they were to divorce. Patricia agreed in
paragraph four of the 1996 agreement to the following:
4.
Patricia Fleishhacker agrees that in the event of her divorce or
separation from Walter Fleishhacker, then, and in such event, her joint
ownership of the Stock shall not give her any greater interest in Northeast
Metal Processors, Inc., than she would otherwise have.
(Emphasis added).
¶24.
At trial, Walter testified to the following:
Q.
I asked you relative to this 25 percent that you’re asking the Court to
regard as separate property. Yesterday, introduced into evidence was
Exhibit No. 41 and 42, and [I] ask if you will glance at those two
documents and tell the Court what they are.
A.
One is an agreement that was signed by Patricia in Albert Delgadillo’s
office when the stock was changed in terms of not only the number of
shares available but Patricia’s name was [also] put on the stock.
Q.
All right. Now - -
A.
That agreement - -
Q.
I’m sorry.
8
A.
Q.
Mr. Fleishhacker, that’s not what I’m asking you.
documents that you have - -
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
- - 41 and 42, did you utilize Exhibit No. 41, and more especially 42,
the stock transfer power?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did you utilize those after you and Patricia separated but more
especially after Patricia filed for divorce? Did you meet with your
corporate attorney, Mr. Delgadillo, and cause the stock to be reissued
in just your name?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And currently, are you holding 149,000 shares of [NMP] stock?
A.
¶25.
- - basically gives me the right by request and/or through divorce or
separation to have those shares returned to me. The other document is
a irrevocable stock bond power that was signed at the same time in Mr.
Albert Delgadillo’s office that was not dated because at that point in
time, I did not ask for the stock but put it in her name as well as mine
to avoid a problem that existed in a prior divorce with a will - - that
existed in a prior divorce that indicated my estate would go to my
daughter in the event of my death and it was changed at that time.
I am.
Those two
The effect of the April 2, 1996, agreement could have resulted in the commingling
of the NMP stock as a joint asset of the parties. However, the chancellor determined that the
commingling of the stock was “subject to an agreement to the contrary,” i.e., paragraph 4 of
the April 2, 1996, agreement, and this was sufficient to maintain the non-marital identity of
the premarital shares of the NMP stock. See Parsons, 741 So. 2d at 308 (¶28). It is apparent
that the chancellor agreed with Walter’s argument that the 1996 agreement evidences the
parties’ intent for Walter’s premarital interest in twenty-five percent of the NMP stock to
9
remain Walter’s non-marital separate property.
¶26.
We find no error and affirm on this issue.
B.
¶27.
Did the chancellor err by valuing Walter’s twenty-five percent
of the NMP stock as of the date of the temporary order rather
than the date of the parties’ marriage?
Patricia also argues that even if the chancellor did not err in finding that twenty-five
percent of the NMP stock was Walter’s non-marital separate property, the chancellor erred
by valuing Walter’s separate interest as of the date of the temporary order rather than the
date of the parties’ marriage. Patricia claims that the chancellor should have valued Walter’s
twenty-five percent interest in the NMP stock as of the date of their marriage, January 3,
1981, instead of simply taking twenty-five percent of the value of the NMP stock on June
30, 2004. The essence of this argument is that the appreciation of Walter’s non-marital asset
was marital property.
¶28.
Professor Deborah H. Bell explains the importance of classifying the appreciation of
a non-marital asset during the marriage as active or passive. Deborah H. Bell, Miss. Family
Law § 6.02[3][b] (1st ed. 2005). “If the increase resulted from a spouse’s efforts, the
appreciation is ‘active’ or marital. Appreciation resulting from other causes – passive
appreciation – remains separate.” Id. at § 6.03[4][a].
¶29.
Professor Bell’s explanation is consistent with the holding Craft v. Craft, 825 So. 2d
605 (Miss. 2002). In Craft, the supreme court held that while the wife was not entitled to
the husband's non-marital asset, “she [was] entitled to an equitable distribution of the
accumulated portion or the increase in value of [the asset]” because the appreciation of the
husband’s asset is considered marital property. Id. at 609 (¶14).
10
¶30.
In Hankins v. Hankins, 866 So. 2d 508, 512 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004), this Court
recognized that “the relationship between a wage-earning spouse and a homemaking spouse
is symbiotic” and the presumption “that the efforts of each make the contributions of the
other possible.” We held that the wife was “entitled to an equitable distribution of ‘the
accumulated portion, or the increase in value’ of the business during the course of the
marriage.” Id. (citing Craft, 825 So. 2d at 609 (¶14)).
¶31.
In Grantham, the supreme court addressed the appropriate consideration of the
equitable division of stock of a closely held corporation, when the value of the stock
increases during the term of the marriage. Grantham, 747 So. 2d at 838-39 (¶¶16-25). The
supreme court determined that the increase in the value of the corporation due to the
husband’s managerial efforts, which occurred during the marriage, was a marital asset. Id.
at 839 (¶24).
¶32.
The chancellor simply determined the value of twenty-five percent of the NMP stock
as of June 30, 2004, and concluded that such amount was non-marital separate property.
This deprived Patricia of the appreciation of this interest since the date of the parties’
marriage in 1981. The appreciation of the value of the twenty-five percent of the NMP stock
was clearly a marital asset. Therefore, we find that it was error for the chancellor not to
consider the accumulated value of the NMP stock as a marital asset, subject to equitable
division under Hemsley. Accordingly, we find that the chancellor was manifestly wrong and
clearly erroneous when he determined that the accumulation or increase in value of Walter’s
twenty-five percent interest in the NMP stock, from the date of the parties’ marriage through
the date of the temporary order, was not property accumulated during the marriage. We
11
reverse and remand this case to the chancellor for an equitable division of this appreciated
portion of the fair market value of Walter’s twenty-five percent interest in the NMP stock.
2.
¶33.
Did the chancellor err when he the failed to include the debt owed by
Walter to NMP in the value of the business?
Patricia argues that the loan Walter took from NMP should have been included in the
value of NMP. Walter argues that: (1) the chancellor was correct when he found these loans
were a debt that Walter owed himself, and (2) the money was used to support himself and
Patricia.
¶34.
Patricia’s support for her argument that the debt was erroneously excluded is that
"[t]he cardinal rule of corporate law is that a corporation possesses a legal existence separate
and apart from that of its officers and shareholders." Buchanan v. Ameristar Casino
Vicksburg, Inc., 957 So. 2d 969, 977 (¶27) (Miss. 2007) (citing Gray v. Edgewater Landing,
Inc., 541 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1989)). However, the issue before this Court is whether
the marital distribution was equitable; it does not involve piercing the corporate veil as was
the issue in Buchanan.
¶35.
Walter testified that he frequently took loans from NMP. As of June 30, 2004,
NMP’s books indicated that Walter owed a balance of $1,080,292 on these loans. Two
competing experts testified about the value of NMP on June 30, 2004. Patricia’s expert gave
two valuations of the company: $3,400,000 if Walter’s debt was taken into consideration and
$2,325,000 if his debt was excluded. Walter’s expert valued the company at $1,418,550.
¶36.
Patricia’s expert testified that it “[did not] matter which way you looked at [the
debt];” but rather, it was important to treat it consistently – either as: (1) Walter’s debt and
12
the NMP’s asset or (2) neither a debt nor an asset. The chancellor accepted Patricia’s
valuation of $2,325,000. The chancellor excluded Walter’s debt from the valuation of NMP
because this was debt to Walter himself. As the sole shareholder, the debt was being paid
by Walter to himself.
¶37.
Furthermore, Patricia also enjoyed the benefits of these loans. Walter testified that
he used this money to take care of his mother and brother, to pay his and Patricia’s gambling
debts, and to pay off a $140,000 loan that Patricia owed. We find that the chancellor’s
finding that the debt should be excluded from the value of NMP was supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, we find no error as to this issue.
3.
¶38.
Was it error to use the value of NMP on the date of the temporary
order, not the date of their divorce, for equitable distribution?
Patricia claims that the chancellor should have used the value of NMP at the time of
the divorce for equitable distribution, or in the alternative, any appreciation of the asset
between the time that the temporary order was entered and the divorce was finalized is
marital property. Walter argues that there is no Mississippi case law that supports Patricia’s
claim and that the chancellor was within his discretion when he used the temporary order as
the line of demarcation.
¶39.
Patricia acknowledges in her brief that there is no Mississippi case law that “firmly
establishes whether the appreciation of a going concern remains marital property after a
temporary order is entered.”
¶40.
The supreme court has “held that ‘when equitably dividing marital property upon
divorce, the date of valuation is necessarily within the discretion of the chancellor.’”
13
Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583, 591 (¶25) (Miss. 2002) (quoting MacDonald v.
MacDonald, 698 So. 2d 1079, 1086 (Miss. 1997)). The chancellor used the temporary order
as the date to value NMP, basing his decision on Godwin v. Godwin, 758 So. 2d 384 (Miss.
1999) and Pittman v. Pittman, 791 So. 2d 857 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). In Godwin, the
supreme court held that the order for separate maintenance “create[d] a point of demarcation
with respect to the parties and their estates.” Godwin, 758 So. 2d at 386 (¶6). Furthermore,
the supreme court explained that:
Assets acquired after an order for separate maintenance should be considered
the separate property of the parties, absent a showing of either (1) contribution
to the acquisition of the asset by the other spouse as contemplated in our
decisions in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928-29 (Miss. 1994), and
Magee v. Magee, 661 So. 2d 1117, 1123 (Miss. 1995) or, (2) acquisition of the
asset through the use of marital property.
Id. at 386 (¶7). In Pittman, this Court extended this treatment from separate maintenance
orders to temporary support orders. Pittman, 791 So. 2d at 864 (¶18).
¶41.
The chancellor found that the value of NMP was $2,325,0001 at the time the
temporary order was entered on June 30, 2004. The chancellor did not make findings of fact
about the value of NMP on the date of the divorce, but Patricia’s expert testified that the
value of NMP was $4,475,0002 on October 31, 2006, less than a year before this trial. In two
years and four months, NMP’s value increased approximately $2,100,000. Patricia admits
that this increase in value is not attributable to her efforts.
1
This valuation by Patricia expert witness did not include Walter’s debt to NMP.
2
Patricia’s expert also excluded Walter’s debt from this valuation, so it is comparable
to the chancellor’s finding of the value at the time of the temporary order.
14
¶42.
Patricia argues that we should treat this increase as an exception under Godwin
because this is the acquisition of assets through the use of the marital property. In Godwin,
the supreme court explained that it was “referring to the use of marital property, such as cash
or some other like asset, to purchase property or the use of marital property as collateral or
security for the purchase of property.” Godwin, 758 So. 2d at 386 n.1. NMP does not
qualify under this exception. Here, the asset – NMP – was not used as collateral or security
to acquire another asset. Thus, the chancellor did not err in valuing NMP on the date of the
temporary order.
¶43.
However, our inquiry does not end here. Pittman and Godwin do not address the
issue of passive appreciation after the line of demarcation – here, the date of the temporary
order. This is an issue of first impression. In her book, Professor Bell explains the
importance of differentiating between active and passive appreciation after a line of
demarcation is established. “Appreciation in asset value after a cutoff date is separate if the
appreciation was caused by the active efforts of one spouse. Passive appreciation – caused
by other forces – will take the classification of the underlying asset.” Bell, Miss. Family Law
at § 6.02[3][b].
¶44.
Patricia’s expert witness explained that NMP has “widely varying performance based
on the overall level of scrap prices.” The record reflects that Walter was in sole control of
the business during this time, and the success of the business is dependent on his efforts and
his relationship with a few large customers.
¶45.
We hold that the passive appreciation of NMP from the date of the temporary order
to the date of the divorce is a marital asset to the extent that NMP is a marital asset. We
15
remand this issue with directions for the chancellor to re-evaluate the marital distribution
after he determines and considers the appreciation of the value of NMP caused by the active
efforts of Walter – which is separate property – and the passive appreciation caused by other
forces, such as market forces – which is marital property.3
4.
¶46.
Was Patricia’s jewelry improperly included in the marital property?
Patricia argues that all of her jewelry, which were gifts from Walter, should not have
been included in the marital property. Walter claims that the jewelry was correctly included
in the marital property.
¶47.
The chancellor included both parties’ jewelry in the marital property because “it was
basically an interspousal transfer of property pursuant” citing Myrick v. Myrick, 739 So. 2d
432 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). In Myrick, this Court held that the couple’s marital home was
marital property even though the husband “executed a deed conveying his interest in the
property to” the wife, because “interspousal transfers of marital property during the marriage
may not be used to support a claim that the transfer was a gift intended to deprive the
property of its status as a marital asset.” Id. at 434 (¶5).
¶48.
Here, the chancellor did not have the benefit of our more recent decision in Oswalt
v. Oswalt, 981 So. 2d 993 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007), when he decided this issue. In Oswalt, we
again addressed whether gifts of jewelry between spouses should be considered marital
3
This issue is remanded due to the chancellor’s failure to consider the character of
the appreciation – whether active or passive – that accumulated after the chancellor’s use of
the date of the temporary order as the line of demarcation. The purpose for remand is not,
as the dissent suggests, based on the chancellor’s decision to use the temporary order as the
line of demarcation.
16
property. We held that “[e]ven though acquired during the marriage with marital assets,
personal gifts of this nature are separate personal property of the donee.” Id. at 999 (¶20).
¶49.
It is the chancellor’s responsibility to determine “whether an interspousal gift is a
highly personal one or whether some type of property, i.e., stocks and bonds, may require
something beyond a gift analysis.” Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929.
¶50.
The chancellor found that all of Patricia’s jewelry were gifts from Walter, but he did
not make specific findings about Walter’s jewelry. In light of our holding in Oswalt and the
highly personal nature of the gifts, we reverse the award of marital assets and remand to the
chancery court to re-evaluate the marital distribution consistent herewith.
5.
¶51.
Did the chancellor err when he failed to determine whether the
couple’s memberships in the Old Waverly Golf Club and Cameron
Club were marital property?
Patricia argues that the chancellor committed reversible error when he failed to
classify, value, and distribute the club memberships. Walter claims that the chancellor could
not have classified the memberships because Patricia did not present any proof as to the
value.
¶52.
“[T]he established precedent requires that all marital assets must be considered to
reach an equitable division of those assets.” Hopkins v. Hopkins, 703 So. 2d 849, 850 (¶7)
(Miss. 1997). However, “the foundational step to make an equitable distribution of marital
assets is to determine the value of those assets based on competent proof.” Dunaway v.
Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Ferguson, 639 So. 2d
at 929).
¶53.
Patricia listed both memberships on her Uniform Chancery Court Rule 8.05 financial
17
statement. She testified that both memberships were acquired during the marriage and that
she and Walter had purchased founding memberships in the Cameron Club for $10,000.
Walter presented no evidence of the value of these memberships. Walter retained possession
of the memberships after the divorce.
¶54.
In his “proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,” the chancellor mentioned
the memberships when describing Patricia’s and Walter’s lifestyles during their marriage.
However, the memberships were not classified, valued, or distributed in the judgment for
divorce. Even though the parties did a poor job of valuing these assets, Patricia did testify
about the initial cost of the Cameron Club membership, and Walter did not dispute her
testimony. Therefore, we find that Walter’s argument that the chancellor could not classify,
value, and distribute the memberships because Patricia did not offer any proof as to the value
is without merit.
¶55.
We reverse and remand on this issue so that the chancellor can classify, value, and
distribute these memberships and, if necessary, hear any needed additional evidence to aid
in this decision.
¶56. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF LEE COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS
OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE APPELLANT
AND THE APPELLEE.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., AND ISHEE, J., CONCUR. CARLTON
AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN
OPINION. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MAXWELL, J., AND JOINED IN
PART BY CARLTON, J. BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
IRVING, J., CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART:
18
¶57.
I agree with the majority’s opinion except as to issue number three. I believe that the
majority attempts to evade the clear mandate of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s holding in
Godwin v. Godwin, 758 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1999) regarding the appropriate demarcation point
for valuing a marital estate. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s finding that the
chancellor erred by not taking into consideration the appreciated value of the stock of
Northeast Metal Processors, Inc. (NMP) after the date of the temporary order, as I find that
the date of the temporary order is the proper date for valuing and distributing the marital
estate. I would affirm the chancellor’s judgment on this point.
¶58.
The majority attempts to cast the issue differently by finding that the date of the
temporary order is the proper date for valuing Patricia’s and Walter’s interests in the NMP
stock but that the date of the temporary order is not the appropriate date for valuing any
passive appreciation of NMP’s stock. This argument is incongruent with the principle that
the marital estate should be valued and distributed as of the date of the temporary order. In
other words, it is an oxymoron to say that the marital estate can be valued at both an earlier
and latter date and still be valued at only the earlier date. By definition, if the chancellor
must consider the appreciated value of the marital estate beyond the date of an earlier order,
he will be valuing the estate as of the latter date.
¶59.
In Godwin, the court said:
Assets acquired after an order for separate maintenance should be considered
the separate property of the parties, absent a showing of either (1) contribution
to the acquisition of the asset by the other spouse as contemplated in our
decisions in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928-29 (Miss. 1994), and
Magee v. Magee, 661 So. 2d 1117, 1123 (Miss. 1995) or, (2) acquisition of the
asset through the use of marital property.
19
Id. at 386 (¶7) (footnote omitted). In footnote one, the court explained what it meant by the
use of marital property to acquire an asset stating: “Here we are referring to the use of
marital property, such as cash or some other like asset, to purchase property or the use of
marital property as collateral or security for the purchase of property.” Id. at n.1.
¶60.
It is clear from the quoted passage that the court was announcing that all assets
acquired after an order for separate maintenance has been entered are the separate property
of the party acquiring them unless one of two conditions exist: the other party contributed
to the acquisition of the asset or marital assets were utilized in the acquisition of the asset.
The court’s position on this point was emphasized in the conclusion portion of the Godwin
opinion: “The chancellor’s use of the 1987 separate maintenance agreement as a point of
separation in his equitable distribution of the Godwin[s’] marital property was appropriate.”
Id. at 388 (¶15). The majority erroneously reads the prerequisites for inclusion in the marital
estate of property acquired after the date of an order for separate maintenance as setting forth
some sort of exception for exclusion of the asset, as it asserts that “NMP does not qualify
under this exception. Here, the asset—NMP—was not used as collateral or security to
acquire another asset.” As stated, this interpretation of Godwin misses the mark.
¶61.
The holding in Godwin—that the date of an order for separate maintenance is the
appropriate date of demarcation for distribution of the marital estate—was extended by this
Court in Pittman v. Pittman, 791 So. 2d 857, 864 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) to orders for
temporary relief. Therefore, I find that there is no basis for finding that the chancellor must
consider the date of the divorce as the appropriate date for dividing any appreciation of
marital assets that should have already been valued for distribution purposes at an earlier
20
date. Accordingly, I would affirm the chancellor’s decision on this issue.
MAXWELL, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
OPINION IN PART.
21
CARLTON, J., JOINS THIS
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