Rita M. Higginbotham v. Lehman Roberts Company
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-00006-COA
RITA M. HIGGINBOTHAM, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS MOTHER AND PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WRONGFUL
DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF HEATHER DAWN
HIGGINBOTHAM, DECEASED
APPELLANT
v.
LEHMAN-ROBERTS COMPANY
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
11/28/2007
HON. ALBERT B. SMITH III
TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
DANA J. SWAN
C. KENT HANEY
MICHAEL N. WATTS
R. BRADLEY BEST
BENJAMIN E. GRIFFITH
MICHAEL S. CARR
CIVIL - WRONGFUL DEATH
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED
AFFIRMED – 05/05/2009
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING AND ROBERTS, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Rita M. Higginbotham (Higginbotham), the administratrix of Heather Higginbotham’s
estate, filed a wrongful death action against Hill Brothers Construction Company (Hill
Brothers), Endevco Company Inc. (Endevco), and Lehman-Roberts Company (Lehman-
Roberts) on June 14, 2002, in the Tunica County Circuit Court. Endevco and Hill Brothers
filed motions for summary judgments, and on November 23, 2004, the circuit court granted
both motions. We affirmed the circuit court’s decision in Higginbotham v. Hill Brothers
Construction Co., 962 So. 2d 46 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (Higginbotham I).
¶2.
On August 31, 2007, Lehman-Roberts filed its motion for summary judgment, and on
December 3, 2007, the circuit court granted the motion. Aggrieved, Higginbotham appeals
and asserts that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of LehmanRoberts.
¶3.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶4.
The underlying facts for today’s case are identical to the underlying facts in
Higginbotham I. In Higginbotham I, we stated the facts as follows:
[On December 12, 1999,] Heather [Higginbotham], traveling south from
Memphis to Clarksdale, lost control of her vehicle on Highway 61 in Tunica
County after hitting a puddle that had formed in the roadway and was thrown
from the vehicle when it subsequently flipped several times. Tina Read, an
eyewitness to the accident, testified in her affidavit that Heather began to
hydroplane when she hit the puddle that was located on what Read called both
a “crossover” and “connecting road.” Read was referring to what is known as
a “temporary connector,” which diverts traffic from a four-lane roadway to a
two-lane roadway. At the time of the accident, two lanes were being added to
Highway 61 to make it a four-lane highway from Clarksdale to Memphis.
North of the temporary connector involved in this fatal accident, Highway 61
consisted of four lanes, but south of the accident scene there were still only
two lanes. The temporary connector on which the puddle accumulated was
moving southbound traffic from the two newly constructed lanes on the
western side of the highway to the eastern two lanes that made up the original
highway. A second temporary connector that was under construction at the
time of the accident intersected with the existing temporary connector making
an “X.” It was designed to eventually move northbound traffic from the new
western side of the highway to the old lanes on the eastern side of the highway
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while the old portion of Highway 61 was being paved south of where the
accident occurred.
In 1996, the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) hired Endevco
to construct an additional two lanes on Highway 61 from the point where
Highway 4 intersects it down to the location of the temporary connector.
Endevco was the prime contractor responsible for the construction of the
temporary connector on which Heather hydroplaned. Endevco also repaved
the original two lanes on this stretch of the highway. Endevco completed the
work according to MDOT’s specifications and was given its “Final
Maintenance Release” on December 8, 1998. After inspecting the work done
by Endevco, MDOT also gave formal notice to the company on September 20,
1999, that the project was satisfactorily completed and officially accepted.
Lehman-Roberts Co. was the paving subcontractor for Endevco on the 1996
project and paved the temporary connector that was completed during that
project.
In July of 1998, MDOT hired Lehman-Roberts as the primary contractor to
pick up where Endevco’s project ended and complete the construction of the
two new lanes and repave the older roadway 11.7 miles down to the place
where Highway 49 intersects Highway 61 in Coahoma County. LehmanRoberts was responsible for the construction of the second temporary
connector that intersected with the original temporary connector that Endevco
had built.
Lehman-Roberts hired Hill Brothers Construction Co., primarily as a
“subgrade” subcontractor. Hill Brothers was also responsible for drainage in
connection with the second temporary connector. Although Higginbotham
argues to the contrary, all evidence contained in the record reflects that Hill
Brothers had absolutely no responsibility for the first temporary connector,
which was the connector involved in Heather’s fatal accident[.] Hill[] Brothers
did not construct or contribute in anyway to the construction of the first
temporary connector, and, the company was never responsible for ongoing
maintenance or drainage of that connector.
....
On December 10, 2002, Rita Higginbotham, the administratrix of Heather’s
estate, filed an amended complaint in the Circuit Court of Tunica County for
the wrongful death of her daughter against multiple defendants, including Hill
Brothers and Endevco. Higginbotham alleged that the negligence of Hill
Brothers, Endevco[,] and other defendants involved in the road construction
process directly and proximately caused or contributed to the car wreck and
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eventual death of her daughter. More specifically, Higginbotham alleged that
the defendants were negligent in many respects including: failure to properly
drain the temporary connector, failure to properly construct the temporary
connector so as to prevent rainwater from ponding, and failure to warn the
traveling public about an extremely hazardous condition about which they had
actual knowledge. Hill Brothers and Endevco filed motions for summary
judgment, which were granted by the trial court on November, 17, 2004.
Id. at 49-51 (¶¶2-7).
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
¶5.
It is well settled that in reviewing a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for
summary judgment, the standard of review is de novo. Todd v. First Baptist Church, 993 So.
2d 827, 829 (¶9) (Miss. 2008) (citing Harmon v. Regions Bank, 961 So. 2d 693, 697 (¶10)
(Miss. 2007)). Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, a court
shall grant summary judgment where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion
has been made, and the moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue
of material fact(s) exists. Harmon, 961 So. 2d at 697 (¶10). The trial court’s decision to grant
summary judgment will be reversed if there exists any triable issues of material fact. Todd,
993 So. 2d at 829 (¶9) (citing Harmon, 961 So. 2d at 697 (¶10)).
¶6.
Central to the resolution of the issue before us is the fact that, as noted in
Higginbotham I, Heather’s accident occurred on the first temporary connector.
Higginbotham, 962 So. 2d at 50 (¶5). The primary contractor for construction of the first
temporary connector was Endevco. Id. at (¶3). Endevco hired Lehman-Roberts as the
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subcontractor to do the paving on this connector. Id. The work on the first connector was
completed on December 8, 1998, and officially accepted by the MDOT on September 20,
1999. Id.
¶7.
In Higginbotham I, this Court stated:
After the contractor has turned the work over and it has been accepted by a
public board or a commission as satisfactory, the contractor incurs no further
liability to third parties, by reason of the condition of the work, and that the
responsibility, if any, for maintaining or using it in its defective condition, is
shifted to the public board or commission. This rule, however, is subject to
some qualifications, among them the cases where the work is a nuisance per se,
or where it is turned over by the contractor in a manner so negligently defective
as to be imminently dangerous to third persons.
Higginbotham, 962 So. 2d at 52 (¶12) (citing McKay v. Boyd Constr. Co., 571 So. 2d 916, 925
(Miss. 1990)).
¶8.
Here, Lehman-Roberts relies on Higginbotham I and argues that although it was the
subcontractor for the first temporary connector, it cannot be held liable for the accident
occurring on that connector because this Court has already held that Endevco, the contractor,
was not liable. In her brief, Higginbotham attempts to rebut this argument, asserting that
Higginbotham I “only addressed the completed and accepted North project and that [LehmanRoberts was] the general contractor for the South Project,1 which had not been completed at
the time of the accident.” (Footnote added). Higginbotham further argues that LehmanRoberts’s liability stems from Lehman-Roberts’s “failure to construct the intersection
according to MDOT specifications and [its] failure to warn of a hazardous condition of which
they [had] constructive notice.”
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The South Project included the construction of the second temporary connector.
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¶9.
For the reasons that we now explain, we are not persuaded by Higginbotham’s
argument that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of LehmanRoberts. In opposition to Lehman-Roberts’s motion for summary judgment, Higginbotham
offered the affidavit of Tina Read, a fact witness, and excerpts from the deposition of Jackie
Ray Tucker, another fact witness. She also offered the affidavit of Derek Barrentine, a
licensed highway construction engineer, along with excerpts from Barrentine’s deposition,
and excerpts from the deposition of Ulmer Bullock III, an engineer with the MDOT. We
briefly discuss the factual allegations set forth in each of these documents.
¶10.
In Read’s affidavit, she stated in pertinent part:
1.
I am familiar with the section of Highway 61 where the accident
occurred, as I made a round trip from Clarksdale, Mississippi to
Memphis, Tennessee utilizing that road at least once a week from 1990
to 2003;
2.
At the time of the accident, and the place of the accident[,] traffic on
Highway 61 north of the accident was four lane, and traffic on Highway
61 south of the accident was two lane;
3.
Traffic traveling [sic] from Memphis to Clarksdale at the accident scene
crossed over from the southbound four[-]lane road onto the northbound
two[-]lane road;
4.
I observed water on this section of the road on numerous occasions after
it rained. In fact, every time it rained, water would stand on that road,
or on that connecting road;
5.
On the day of the accident, I was approximately three car lengths behind
Heather’s vehicle[,] and I saw her vehicle approach the crossover. As
her vehicle entered the crossover, I saw water splashing[,] and it was
apparent that she hit a puddle of water in the crossover;
6.
After she hit the water, her vehicle immediately began to hydroplane[,]
and she began to fishtail and lost control of her vehicle. I slowed down
and continued to watch her vehicle as it traveled south. After hitting the
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water in the road[,] she was never able to regain control of her vehicle[,]
and her vehicle ultimately flipped over[,] and she was thrown out of the
vehicle.
¶11.
In his deposition, Tucker stated that he was a passenger in Heather’s vehicle when the
accident occurred and that at the time of the accident, they were on their way to
Higginbotham’s house for dinner. He stated that it had been raining heavily for an hour or
two prior to their leaving and that they had traveled approximately a mile before they arrived
at the place where the temporary connector connected the four southbound lanes to the two
northbound lanes. He stated that there was a dip in the middle of the connector that was
holding water. We quote directly from Tucker’s deposition as follows:
Q.
A.
It was in the middle.
Q.
In the middle?
A.
Yeah.
Q.
Okay. So it wasn’t near the end where the connector spits you out on
the two-lane [road]?
A.
¶12.
What I’m actually trying to figure out is where in that temporary
connector the water that y’all are saying the car hit was. Was it when
you first entered the connector or in the middle of the connector?
No, it was kind of in the middle.
Barrentine stated in his affidavit that “[i]t was foreseeable by Lehman-Roberts that a
southbound vehicle would encounter the standing water in the ‘S-connector,’ hydroplane, and
ultimately lose control of the vehicle [sic].” Additionally, Barrentine issued a written expert
opinion wherein he contended that “Lehman-Roberts was negligent, in that [it] failed to
recognize [s]tate and [f]ederal guidelines for drainage and traffic control at the accident site,
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and [it] failed to complete construction in a timely manner. Failure to do so created an ongoing hydroplane and edge drop-off hazard.” Barrentine further stated:
During construction of the new lanes in the south project, the southbound
connector from the north project remained in use. According to MDOT daily
reports around the time of the accident, a new co-located connector was also
under construction. This would allow the newly constructed southbound lanes
of the south project to be used for 2-way traffic during resurfacing of the
original highway lanes on the same job. As both connectors would intersect in
the median (creating an “X” at the center), additional fill material needed within
the median raised the adjacent ground to within inches of the original
[southbound] connector’s pavement elevation.
According to construction drawings and post-accident photographs by others,
storm runoff between the normal crowns of the northbound and southbound
lanes converged within the median and flowed [s]outh toward the intersecting
connectors. The higher elevation of the southbound connector’s asphalt surface
served to dam up approaching storm water along its north edge. Without proper
drainage, rain would simply pond up at that location. (Reference MDOT
lan/Profile Sheet at Station 1560, and ERC drawing “Drainage at Southbound
Connector,” and ERC drawing “Section A-A at Southbound Connector,” and
construction[-]site photos).
¶13.
In his deposition, the following exchange occurred between Barrentine and counsel for
one of the defendants:
Q.
All right. What facts do you have to substantiate that Lehman-Roberts
knew water stood on the connector?
A.
I’m wanting to refer to one of the employee’s depositions. Right now
I’m going to have to stop and go look for it again. Primarily[,] I’m
looking at the fact that in the normal standard of care for construction
companies who [sic] build roads on a continuous basis[,] they have to
remain aware of potential problems like this and accommodate for them
at that time. Understand [,] road hazards are created sometimes that are
unavoidable but the important thing is to navigate traffic around it until
they can subsequently fix the problem.
Q.
What I want to know is, notice is an issue in this case, what I want to
know is what facts do you have to substantiate that Lehman-Roberts was
on notice of there being a water problem on the connector?
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A.
Can we stop and look?
Q.
Sure.
A.
Okay. I’ll need to look over some things if [sic] I can find it if it’s there.
****
Q.
Mr. Barrentine, you looked through your file to refresh your memory.
What facts do you have to substantiate that Lehman-Roberts had notice
of the water on the connector?
A.
First of all, I apologize for the delay. I’m not always aware of what
questions you’re going to ask until I get here --
Q.
Of course.
A.
-- so sometimes I have to go look. I was looking, what I was
remembering was Darrey Williams’[s] deposition where he made
reference to where he had seen the water numerous times. Of course he
worked for MDOT so and what I was looking for was his reference to
whether he had told Lehman-Roberts about the problem. He said he
had not.
Q.
Okay.
A.
He did mention that they frequently run through the job site, the
employees of Lehman-Roberts, would certainly have an opportunity of
seeing it for themselves[,] but I don’t have anything on record that says
they did.
(Emphasis added).
¶14.
The final item offered by Higginbotham in opposition to Lehman-Roberts’s motion for
summary judgment was a limited portion of Bullock’s deposition. Higginbotham points
specifically to Bullock’s testimony wherein he admitted that “[i]f [water] was ponding it
would indicate that we had a problem somewhere.” We should point out here that Bullock
was quick to say that he was not aware of any ponding.
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¶15.
Higginbotham’s argument, as we understand it, is that although the south connector
(where the accident occurred) had been completed and accepted by the MDOT, that fact has
no bearing on Lehman-Roberts’s liability because Lehman-Roberts was the general contractor
for the remaining portion of the project (the South Project) and that, as the general contractor,
Lehman-Roberts was responsible for the safe passage of vehicles that were traveling through
the construction zone. According to Higginbotham, the construction zone included the
portion of the roadway containing the south connector because it provided the connecting link
or access to the south project portion of the highway.
¶16.
As stated, Higginbotham argues that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding
Lehman-Roberts’s negligence, notwithstanding the fact that the accident occurred on that
portion of the highway that was constructed by Endevco. Implicit in Higginbotham’s
argument is that the southbound connector could not have been properly constructed because
water would stand, stand, pond, or puddle in its middle section. However, she realizes that
Higginbotham I foreclosed any chance of a recovery against Lehman-Roberts under this
theory. Therefore, she takes her argument one step further, alleging that Lehman-Roberts is
liable because it did nothing to prevent, or warn motorists of, the ponding even though it knew
that the normal crowns of the northbound and southbound lanes allowed storm drainage to
converge within the median and flow south toward the intersecting connectors. According
to Higginbotham, the higher elevation of the southbound connector’s asphalt surface served
to dam up approaching storm water along its north edge. Without proper drainage, rain would
simply pond up at that location. Higginbotham relies on Barrentine’s opinion that “[t]here
was an opportunity for or there was water standing there in the gore that clearly could
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inundate a portion of the southbound connector and that doesn’t accommodate traffic as
specified here [in regulatory guideline 104.04].” (Emphasis added).
¶17.
While there is a dispute as to whether water ponded in the dip of the southbound
connector where the accident occurred, there is no evidence that this ponding, if indeed it
occurred, was caused by anything that Lehman-Roberts did or failed to do during its
construction of the South Project and of the northbound connector. As stated, Higginbotham
tries mightily to attach liability to Lehman-Roberts with her argument that Lehman-Roberts
sat idly by and allowed water to accumulate in the gore of where the two connectors crossed.
Assuming that this is the case, and we do not make that assumption, there still is not one
scintilla of evidence that, at the time of the accident, water was flowing from the gore onto
the southbound connector. Quite to the contrary, the controverted evidence is that there was
a dip in the middle of the southbound connector and that this dip allowed water to pond or
puddle when it rained.
CONCLUSION
¶18.
Higginbotham I makes it clear that Lehman-Roberts’s liability may not be premised
on faulty construction of the southbound connector.
We have found nothing in
Higginbotham’s response to Lehman-Roberts’s motion for summary judgment that raises a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lehman-Roberts’s dereliction of duty in the
construction of the South Project was the proximate cause or a proximate contributing cause
of Heather’s vehicle hydroplaning, which cost Heather her life. Therefore, we affirm the
decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment for Lehman-Roberts.
¶19.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TUNICA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS
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AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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