Wendy Michelle Cheatham v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-KA-00090-COA
WENDY MICHELLE CHEATHAM
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
01/14/2008
HON. MARCUS D. GORDON
LEAKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
EDMUND J. PHILLIPS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER
CRIMINAL – FELONY
CONVICTED OF POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE AND SENTENCED
TO TEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, WITH FOUR YEARS
SUSPENDED AND FOUR YEARS OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION
AFFIRMED – 06/30/2009
BEFORE LEE, GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This case presents for review the denial of a motion for new trial filed by Wendy
Michelle Cheatham. On January 11, 2008, the Circuit Court of Leake County denied the
motion, and Cheatham now appeals arguing that the verdict is against the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. We find that the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight
of the evidence and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
On October 29, 2007, Cheatham was indicted, along with Jason McKee and Malcolm
Allen, for possession of methamphetamine pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section
41-29-139(c)(1)(E) (Rev. 2005). The indictment stemmed from the execution of a search
warrant on McKee’s camper. The search warrant was executed on April 11, 2007. Once
officers gained entry to the camper, they found Cheatham, McKee, and Allen inside.
¶3.
Inside the small camper, officers discovered approximately 170 grams of
methamphetamine scattered throughout the camper. A portion of the methamphetamine was
found in plain view on the dining room table just inside the entrance to the camper. Another
portion of the methamphetamine was found in a bedroom not far from the table, while
another portion was found in the bathroom adjacent to the table. Consequently, Cheatham,
McKee, and Allen were taken into custody.
¶4.
The next day, April 12, 2007, Officer Clay McCombs, a narcotics investigator with
the Leake County Sheriff’s Office, interviewed Cheatham in the presence of Sarah Thames,
an employee of the facility in which Cheatham was being detained. Officer McCombs gave
Cheatham a Miranda 1 warning, and Cheatham signed a waiver of her rights. Cheatham then
confessed that the methamphetamine found inside the camper was hers. When asked where
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring defendants be informed of the
right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning, the right against
self-incrimination prior to questioning by police, and that defendants not only understand
these rights, but voluntarily waive those rights).
2
she
obtained
the
methamphetamine,
Cheatham
stated
she
manufactured
the
methamphetamine. Despite this voluntary confession, Cheatham later claimed it was not true
and attempted to prove such at trial.
¶5.
On October 31, 2007, Cheatham entered a plea of not guilty in the Circuit Court of
Leake County. At trial, in addition to her own testimony denying the truthfulness of her
confession, Cheatham offered the testimony of McKee who testified that the
methamphetamine recovered did not belong to Cheatham. On January 8, 2008, the jury
convicted Cheatham of possession of more than thirty grams of methamphetamine, and the
court sentenced her to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections,
with four years suspended and four years of post-release supervision. On January 11, 2008,
Cheatham filed a motion for a new trial challenging the weight of the evidence, which was
denied that same day. Cheatham timely appealed on January 11, 2008.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6.
“When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial[,] [we] will only disturb a
verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to
stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844 (¶18)
(Miss. 2005) (citing Herring v. State, 691 So. 2d 948, 957 (Miss. 1997)). The scope of this
Court’s review is limited: all the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
verdict, and this Court will reverse only when we are convinced that the circuit court abused
its discretion. Herring, 691 So. 2d at 957. “Any less stringent rule would denigrate the
constitutional power and responsibility of the jury in our criminal justice system.” Howery
3
v. State, 809 So. 2d at 761, 763 (¶7) (Miss. 2002) (quoting Hughes v. State, 724 So. 2d 893,
896 (¶14) (Miss. 1998)).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
¶7.
The circuit court jury convicted Cheatham of constructive possession. With regard
to constructive possession, supreme court precedent provides:
What constitutes a sufficient external relationship between the defendant and
the narcotic property to complete the concept of “possession” is a question
which is not susceptible of a specific rule. However, there must be sufficient
facts to warrant a finding that [the] defendant was aware of the presence and
character of the particular substance and was intentionally and consciously in
possession of it. It need not be actual physical possession. Constructive
possession may be shown by establishing that the drug involved was subject
to his dominion or control. Proximity is usually an essential element, but by
itself [it] is not adequate in the absence of other incriminating circumstances.
Curry v. State, 249 So. 2d 414, 416 (Miss. 1971). Further, as in this case, when the illegal
substances are found on premises not owned by the particular defendant, physical proximity,
by itself, is not enough to prove constructive possession. Hamm v. State, 735 So. 2d 1025,
1029 (¶13) (Miss. 1999).
In such a case, the State must show other incriminating
circumstances, in addition to proximity, in order to prove constructive possession. Fultz v.
State, 573 So. 2d 689, 690 (Miss. 1990).
¶8.
These rules were applied in Buie v. State, 761 So. 2d 892 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) to
facts involving constructive possession and a disputed confession. In Buie, the defendant
lived in a house with three other individuals, and while the defendant was not at home, police
executed a search warrant on the house. Id. at 892-93 (¶2). The search revealed drugs,
weapons, and large sums of cash in what police believed was Buie’s bedroom. Id. at 893
4
(¶2). After turning himself in to the police the next day, the defendant initially confessed that
the drugs were his, but later he denied making the confession. Id. at (¶3). Based on the
defendant’s proximity to where the drugs were found and his confession, he was found to be
in constructive possession of the contraband. Id. at (¶10).
¶9.
The defendant then unsuccessfully moved for a new trial. Id. On review, this Court,
taking as true the evidence supportive of the guilty verdict, upheld the trial court’s denial
finding the testimony as to the defendant’s confession provided competent evidence to
support the jury’s finding of constructive possession, despite the lack of fingerprint analysis
or other physical evidence of possession. Id. at 894 (¶¶10-11). Significantly, the Court
found that the confession was “an additional incriminating fact connecting [the defendant]
to the contraband.” Id. at (¶10). The dispute over the confession “conjures a credibility
issue” within the realm of the jury, and the issue was “obviously resolved” by the jury in
favor of the State. Id.
¶10.
Yet another case finding constructive possession despite a disputed confession is
Stewart v. State, 921 So. 2d 1287 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). The defendant in Stewart was
arrested for possession of cocaine when he was pulled over while driving a car belonging to
someone else. Id. at 1288 (¶2). The cocaine was found in plain view in the driver’s side
door pocket, and Stewart stated at the police station, with regard to the cocaine: “I guess it’s
mine.” Id. at 1288 (¶4). The trial court considered this to be a confession, and Stewart was
found to have constructively possessed the cocaine despite denying ever making the
admission. Id. at 1289 (¶¶4-5).
5
¶11.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the verdict arguing that it was against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. at (¶8). Upholding the verdict, this Court found
that the confession provided an incriminating circumstance in addition to mere proximity to
the cocaine. Id. at 1290 (¶11). Of substantial importance, we noted the dispute surrounding
Stewart’s confession was a question of fact to be resolved by the jury. Id. at (¶12).
¶12.
Returning to the case at bar, taking as true the evidence which supports the verdict
finding Cheatham guilty, there are both proximity and an additional incriminating
circumstance – Cheatham’s confession – as was the case in both Buie and Stewart. Under
our limited review, this Court must accept as true the testimony demonstrating Cheatham was
in close proximity to the methamphetamine. See Herring, 691 So.2d at 957. Specifically,
Cheatham knew that methamphetamine was present in the small camper the night the search
took place and that a portion of the methamphetamine was found in plain view on the dining
room table in close proximity to where Cheatham was standing when officers entered the
camper. Having established close proximity, we must also take as true the additional
incriminating circumstance: Cheatham’s voluntary confession to Officer McCombs that the
methamphetamine belonged to her. Such was enough for the jury to weigh the evidence in
favor of conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that the guilty verdict does not lead to an
unconscionable injustice and find that the circuit court correctly denied the motion for a new
trial.
¶13.
We find that Cheatham’s confession was voluntary. Consequently, it was entirely
within the prerogative of the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be assigned to
6
Cheatham’s voluntary confession. “[T]he weight and credibility of an accused’s confession
is for the jury to decide.” Lee v. State, 457 So. 2d 920, 922 (Miss. 1984) (citing Wilson v.
State, 451 So. 2d 724, 726 (Miss. 1984)). The jury heard testimony from Officer McCombs,
Thames, and even from Cheatham herself, and, in reaching a guilty verdict, the jury found
the confession credible.
¶14.
In an attempt to distance herself from her voluntary confession, Cheatham offers two
principal arguments, but neither argument requires the sort of relief Cheatham seeks. First,
Cheatham posits that her confession was uncorroborated, and thus her conviction cannot
stand. Cheatham cites Anderson v. State, 184 Miss. 892, 894, 186 So. 836, 836 (1939) in
support of her argument. That case involved an escaped prisoner whose handcuffs were
removed at some time between his escape and capture. Id. The defendant was charged with
aiding the escaped prisoner based on the defendant’s alleged confession that he removed the
escaped prisoner’s handcuffs. Id. Besides the absence of the handcuffs, there was no other
evidence corroborating the defendant’s alleged confession. Id.
¶15.
Based on the facts of the case at bar, Anderson is inapplicable. Cheatham’s
confession must be considered in light of the physical evidence and her own testimony. The
officers conducting the search found nearly 170 grams of methamphetamine in the small
camper in which Cheatham was present. The methamphetamine was found strewn about the
small camper: in the bedroom, in the bathroom, and in plain view on the dining room table.
Moreover, Cheatham testified she was aware of the presence of the methamphetamine on the
evening in question. Accordingly, the Court is not faced with such an uncorroborated
7
confession.
¶16.
Second, Cheatham places great emphasis on McKee’s testimony that the
methamphetamine belonged to him rather than Cheatham. Such emphasis, however, is
misplaced. “Factual disputes are properly resolved by the jury and do not mandate a new
trial.” McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999, 1009 (Miss. 1993) (citing Temple v. State, 498 So.
2d 379, 382 (Miss. 1986)). If anything, McKee’s testimony creates a factual dispute between
his testimony and Cheatham’s voluntary confession. Echoing Buie and Stewart, such a
dispute was within the jury’s purview to resolve, and the jury resolved this dispute by finding
Cheatham guilty. Consequently, the jury’s resolution of this factual dispute does not provide
a ground for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
¶17.
We find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cheatham’s
motion for a new trial.
Specifically, the guilty verdict was not “so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an
unconscionable injustice.” Bush, 895 So. 2d at 844 (¶18) (citations omitted). We, therefore,
affirm the circuit court’s denial of Cheatham’s motion for a new trial.
¶18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEAKE COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE AND SENTENCE OF
TEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, WITH FOUR YEARS SUSPENDED AND FOUR YEARS OF
POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
8
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.