John Christopher Blakeney v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-KA-02271-COA
JOHN CHRISTOPHER BLAKENEY A/K/A
JOHN CHRISTOPHER PAUL BLAKENEY
A/K/A CHRIS BLAKENEY
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
10/05/2007
HON. BILLY JOE LANDRUM
JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
GEORGE T. HOLMES
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JOHN R. HENRY
ANTHONY J. BUCKLEY
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF MURDER AND
SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
AFFIRMED - 07/21/2009
BEFORE LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
LEE, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶1.
John Christopher Paul Blakeney was convicted of the murder of Willie Kitchens by
a jury in the Circuit Court of Jones County. Blakeney was sentenced to life in the custody
of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and if released before the full sentence is
served, he must complete the Eighteenth District Circuit Court’s Community Service
Program. Blakeney filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or,
in the alternative, a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. Blakeney was
indicted for the murder of Willie’s wife, Anita, but the jury was deadlocked and a mistrial
was declared on this charge.
¶2.
Blakeney now appeals his conviction and sentence, asserting the following issues: (1)
the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession; (2) the trial court erred
in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict; and (3) the verdict was contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding no merit to these issues, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
On July 10, 2006, at 4:55 a.m., Trooper Holt Ross of the Mississippi Highway Safety
Patrol responded to what was reported as a vehicle accident on Highway 84 East, west of
Waynesboro, Mississippi. Trooper Ross arrived at the scene at approximately 5:30 a.m. and
discovered a car that had been driven down a slight embankment, through a rusty fence, and
had come to rest against a tree. The bodies of Anita and Willie were found in the car. A fire
had been started in the backseat of the vehicle, and the windows were covered in smoke.
Trooper Ross noticed fireworks in the backseat of the car. The fireworks had been ignited,
but Trooper Ross could not find a lighter, matches, or anything else that could have ignited
the fireworks. The two occupants of the vehicle were in the driver’s seat and front passenger
seat. Both occupants were wearing seatbelts, and the airbags were not deployed. The car’s
engine was not running, the gearshift was in neutral, and the car did not show signs of serious
impact. A black glove was found in the car, and two containers of gasoline were found in
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the trunk. Trooper Ross called in the tag number of the vehicle, which showed that Willie
was the owner of the vehicle.
¶4.
Investigator Matt Ishee of the Jones County Sheriff’s Department arrived at the
Kitchens’s home at 6:30 a.m. the same morning. Anita and Willie lived in Jones County with
their granddaughter, Wanda Blakeney, whom they had adopted as their daughter, and
Wanda’s husband, John Christopher Paul Blakeney. Investigator Ishee discovered that the
Kitchens’s bed had been stripped and a garbage bag containing items of clothing was on the
floor in their bedroom. He also found what he described as confetti, which was actually
paper fired from a Taser cartridge. The paper bore the serial number of the cartridge.
¶5.
Wanda told law enforcement that her husband, Blakeney, had killed Willie and Anita.
Law enforcement located and arrested Blakeney in Louisiana on July 10, 2006. He was
detained for questioning in Louisiana until Officer Darrell Perkins, an investigator with the
Mississippi Bureau of Investigation, and Deputy James Grimes, an investigator with the
Jones County Sheriff’s Department, picked him up on July 12 and brought him back to Jones
County. Blakeney was interviewed on July 12 and July 13 and confessed that he and his
wife, Wanda, killed Willie and Anita. The interviews were recorded on audio and video
tape. The first interview lasted approximately three hours, and the second interview lasted
approximately two hours.
¶6.
Blakeney confessed that Wanda had incurred substantial debt from internet gambling
and that she owed Willie and Anita a great deal of money. Blakeney stated that Wanda had
gotten into a dispute with Willie and Anita over the money, and this led to Wanda’s idea to
murder them. He told the investigators that killing Willie and Anita was Wanda’s idea, but
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he had helped her carry out the murders. The couple planned the murders on July 4-6, 2006.
He admitted that Wanda told him to buy a Taser because Willie had a weak heart, and she
thought the shock would kill him. Blakeney shot the Taser at the victims in their bed while
they were sleeping. When the Taser did not kill either victim, Blakeney admitted that he
suffocated them with a trash bag that was in the room until they were dead. He admitted to
dressing the bodies to make it appear they were going to visit a relative, helping to carry the
bodies to the car, driving the car while sitting on Willie’s lap, and running the car off the
road. He communicated with Wanda, who was driving behind him with their two small
children in the car, by walkie talkie. After running the car off the road, he tried to light it on
fire with a lighter. He confessed that after the murders, Wanda drove him home, and he
drove back to Denham Springs, Louisiana, where he had reserved a hotel room. At some
point while Wanda was driving, Blakeney threw his clothes and the Taser out the window.
¶7.
A receipt for a Taser was found in Blakeney’s belongings. The receipt showed that
the Taser was purchased with cash in Denham Springs on July 7, 2006. Investigators went
to the store and confirmed with the clerk that Blakeney had purchased the Taser. Also, video
surveillance showed that it was Blakeney who had purchased the Taser. The investigators
purchased a Taser that was identical to the one purchased by Blakeney. At trial, the Taser
was fired to demonstrate that it ejected confetti which had the serial number of the cartridge
on it.
¶8.
Another receipt from a Walmart in Baton Rouge, Louisiana showed that later on July
7, Blakeney purchased men’s underwear, women’s beach shoes, men’s socks, men’s black
jeans, and a pair of gloves. The underwear was purchased with a debit card, and the
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remaining items were purchased with cash a minute later.
Investigators obtained a
surveillance tape that identified Blakeney as the purchaser of the items. The tape was
introduced into evidence at trial. Blakeney told officers that he bought the Taser to give to
Wanda for protection and that he purchased the black clothing for work.
¶9.
A third receipt was found which showed that Blakeney had paid for a room at a
Holiday Inn Express in Denham Springs from July 7-10, 2006. Blakeney’s brother, Anthony,
testified that he and Blakeney were in Ponchatoula, Louisiana all day on July 9, 2006, until
approximately 10:30 p.m. Denham Springs is approximately 285 miles from Jones County.
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING BLAKENEY’S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS HIS CONFESSION?
¶10.
Blakeney argues that the trial court erred in admitting his confession into evidence
because it was involuntary. Blakeney recanted his confession before trial and pleaded not
guilty. He argues that before being questioned about the murders, he was held for two days
on a suicide watch, and during those two days, he was cold and did not have his prescribed
anxiety medication, Paxil and Trazodone. Blakeney also argues that he invoked his right to
counsel, but the invocation for assistance of counsel was ignored by law enforcement.
Blakeney also argues that his confession was based on offers of leniency by law enforcement.
¶11.
“[T]his Court will reverse a trial court’s finding that a confession is admissible only
when an incorrect legal standard was applied, manifest error was committed, or the decision
is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Tyler v. State, 911 So. 2d 550, 55455 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Stokes v. State, 797 So. 2d 381, 383 (¶3) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2001)). “Great deference is afforded such findings because of the judge’s unique
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opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility.” Carley v. State, 739 So.
2d 1046, 1050 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). “Once the trial judge has determined at a
preliminary hearing, that a confession is admissible, the defendant/appellant has a heavy
burden in attempting to reverse that decision on appeal.” Id. at (¶18) (quoting Sills v. State,
634 So. 2d 124, 126 (Miss. 1994)).
¶12.
The law regarding the voluntariness of confessions was stated in Carley, 739 So. 2d
at 1050 (¶16), as follows:
The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and by Article 3, § 26 of the Mississippi
Constitution renders an involuntary confession inadmissible. Neal v. State,
451 So. 2d 743, 750 (Miss. 1984); Morgan v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 87 (Miss.
1996). When the voluntariness of a confession is put in issue, the burden falls
on the State to prove the voluntariness of the confession beyond a reasonable
doubt. Morgan, 681 So. 2d at 86; Haymer v. State, 613 So. 2d 837, 839 (Miss.
1993). The State meets that burden by offering the testimony of those
individuals having knowledge of the facts that the confession was given
without threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Cox v. State, 586 So. 2d 761, 763
(Miss. 1991).
1. Was Blakeney denied the right to an attorney?
¶13.
Blakeney was interrogated twice and informed each time by law enforcement of the
right to counsel and the right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). He was also read his Miranda rights when he was picked up in Louisiana. Blakeney
agreed to talk to law enforcement and signed a waiver of rights. The following exchange
took place between Blakeney and Officer Perkins at the beginning of Blakeney’s first
interview on July 12:
[Perkins]: This is a waiver. I am going to read it to you and you can read it as
well. I have read the statement of my rights and understand what my rights are
and am willing to answer questions and make a statement. I do not want a
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lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises,
threats have been make [sic] to me and no pressure or cohersion of any kind
has been made against me. Is that true?
[Blakeney]: So far.
[Perkins]: Ok. Do you wish to talk to me about what’s going on?
[Blakeney]: I need to talk to somebody[.] I don’t know if I need a lawyer or
not.
[Perkins]: I can’t advise you if you need a lawyer or not.
[Blakeney]: I don’t.
[Perkins]: We can talk about it or we can call and have a lawyer . . . but I
cannot tell you which way to go.
[Blakeney]: Do I have a right to stop talking?
[Perkins]: You sure do. If you get to a certain point and you say you don’t
want to talk to me any more [sic] and you want a lawyer then the interview at
that time is terminated. Do you wish to talk to me?
[Blakeney]: We’ll talk.
¶14.
At the suppression hearing, Blakeney testified that he requested an attorney before the
interview started, but he was told by Officer Perkins that he was not entitled to an attorney
until after he was indicted.
Blakeney also argues that the investigators repeatedly
discouraged him from requesting an attorney by making statements such as, “I’ll be here with
ya, . . . I ain’t gonna let nothing happen to ya,” and “if you need somebody to lean on I’ll be
there.” The State called Officer Perkins, Deputy Ishee, and Deputy Grimes to testify at the
suppression hearing. All three testified that Blakeney showed no sign of intoxication or
inability to understand his rights when he was in their custody. Officer Perkins testified that
he made no threats or promises to Blakeney. He also testified that he did not tell Blakeney
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that he could not have an attorney before he was indicted. Officer Perkins admitted to telling
Blakeney that he would not let anything happen to him, but he testified that he meant he
would not let Blakeney be physically harmed.
¶15.
After reviewing the testimony from the suppression hearing, we find that Blakeney’s
statements – “I need to talk to somebody.”; “I don’t know if I need a lawyer or not.”; and
“Do I have the right to stop talking?” – were at best ambiguous requests for an attorney. We
also find that the investigators did not overstep constitutional parameters in following up on
these statements with further questions regarding this statement. In Holland v. State, 587 So.
2d 848, 856 (Miss. 1991), the supreme court determined that the defendant’s question –
“Don’t you think I need a lawyer?” – was an ambiguous invocation of his right to counsel
and the police detective’s follow-up questions were within constitutional parameters. The
officers reminded the defendant of his right to counsel and that if he did not want to talk to
them he did not have to continue with the interview. Id. at 858. The defendant responded,
“Ok,” that “he would talk to them.” Id. The officers again advised the defendant of his
rights, which he again waived before confessing. Id. at 854.
¶16.
When Blakeney made the statement, “I don’t know if I need an attorney or not,”
Officer Perkins reminded him that he could ask for an attorney and the interview would be
terminated. Blakeney responded, “We’ll talk.” The investigators repeatedly told Blakeney
throughout both interviews that he could stop talking and call an attorney. The investigators
also told Blakeney several times that they could not advise him whether or not he needed an
attorney. As for Blakeney’s assertion that Officer Perkins told him he could not have an
attorney until after he was indicted, we find that even if taken as true, this was clarified at the
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beginning of the first interview when Blakeney signed the waiver of rights. Therefore, we
find that the trial court did not err in finding that Blakeney did not invoke his right to
counsel. This issue is without merit.
2. Was Blakeney’s confession coerced?
¶17.
Blakeney testified that he was told by sheriff’s deputies that they had him “red
handed” and that he would get the death penalty. Blakeney argues that the investigators used
deceptive practices and implied that he was totally dependent on them for any assistance.
Blakeney argues that they used his love for his wife against him by telling him that his wife
had confessed and blamed everything on him.
¶18.
Regarding a possible death-penalty sentence, Officer Perkins told Blakeney:
There’s two counts of charges of murder on Wanda and they’re gonna upgrade
them to Capital Murder. And there’s two charges of counts of murder on Chris
Blakeney and they are going to upgrade them to Capital Murder. Capital
Murder is bad. You can sit on death row for years. Or you can have two
consecutive life sentences. Or if the DA feels it [he] can reduce it or jack it up.
What ever [sic] [he] want[s] to do.
The investigators also told Blakeney that it was in his best interest to talk and that if they
could show the judge that Blakeney was willing to talk to them it would help him out. The
investigators also offered him smokeless tobacco when he asked for it, which Blakeney
argues was a ploy to make him confess.
¶19.
Officer Perkins, Deputy Grimes, and Deputy Ishee testified at the suppression hearing
that they did not threaten Blakeney or make any promise of leniency. When the investigators
asked Blakeney during his second interview whether he was coerced or manipulated into
confessing, Blakeney responded, “no, other than scaring the hell out of me, no.” Blakeney
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then compared his position to how his deck hands must feel when he, as boat captain, is in
front of them. At the suppression hearing, Blakeney testified that he stated he was coerced
and manipulated into confessing because he was intimidated by the officers and that he
would not have confessed otherwise. Blakeney also argues that he was refused medical care.
Blakeney asked, “Do they let doctors come visit people?” The investigator’s response was
that Blakeney would have to talk to an attorney about that, but that it might create a “difficult
situation” if Blakeney wanted to continue talking to law enforcement.
¶20.
Giving deference to the trial court’s ruling at the suppression hearing, we find that the
trial court did not err in denying Blakeney’s motion to suppress his confession. We find that
the proof established beyond a reasonable doubt that: Blakeney was given his Miranda
rights; he understood his rights; he freely signed a waiver of his rights; and he freely,
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights without any threats,
promises, or coercion by the investigators. Therefore, we find that this issue is without merit.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING BLAKENEY’S MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW
TRIAL?
¶21.
Blakeney argues that his conviction was based solely on his confession, which was
uncorroborated. Thus, he argues that his conviction should be reversed and rendered or, in
the alternative, a new trial should be granted.
¶22.
In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, “all of the evidence on
behalf of the [S]tate must be taken as true, together with any reasonable inferences, and, if
there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty, the motion for a directed verdict
must be overruled.” Gibson v. State, 503 So. 2d 230, 232 (Miss. 1987). Our standard of
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review concerning the granting of a new trial is well settled. “[W]e will only disturb a
verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to
stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844 (¶18)
(Miss. 2005) (citing Herring v. State, 691 So. 2d 948, 957 (Miss. 1997)). The appellate court
sits as a hypothetical “thirteenth juror.” Id. If, in this position, the Court disagrees with the
verdict of the jury, “the proper remedy is to grant a new trial.” Id.
¶23.
Murder is defined as “[t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law by
any means or in any manner . . . [w]hen done with deliberate design to effect the death of the
person killed, or of any human being . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19 (1)(a) (Rev. 2006).
¶24.
Blakeney argues that without his confession, the State had no evidence to show that
he committed either murder. He argued that he was not in Jones County at the time of the
murders. Blakeney’s brother, Anthony, testified that Blakeney was in Denham Springs,
Louisiana, which is approximately 285 miles from Jones County, Mississippi, on the night
before the murder. However, Anthony could not testify as to Blakeney’s whereabouts after
10:30 p.m. Telephone records indicated that his phone registered on a tower in Denham
Springs at 2:07 a.m. and 7:40 a.m. The call received at 2:07 a.m. lasted for approximately
one hour.
The State offered testimony that Blakeney’s cell phone had an automatic
answering feature that would allow the phone to answer itself when a call was made to it.
The call made on Blakeney’s cell phone at 7:40 a.m. was to his brother.
¶25.
It was undisputed that Blakeney purchased a Taser four days before the murders. An
identical Taser was fired at trial, and the jury was shown that the serial number on the type
of Taser that Blakeney purchased matched the serial number on the confetti shot out of the
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Taser fired in the Kitchens’s bedroom. Blakeney argued that he was not the one who shot
the Taser, but that he had given it to his wife for protection.
¶26.
Blakeney also presented evidence that DNA testing was done on hair follicles found
under the fingernails of the victims, and that the follicles did not belong to Blakeney. The
State, however, argued that the hair follicles could have belonged to Wanda or that they
could have been unrelated to the murder.
¶27.
We find that Blakeney’s arguments presented a factual dispute for the jury to resolve.
As we have consistently held, the jury is charged with the responsibility of resolving factual
disputes. Brown v. State, 934 So. 2d 1039, 1044 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). Furthermore,
we cannot find that the jury’s verdict was so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence as to amount to an unconscionable injustice. Also, taking the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Blakeney’s
motion for a directed verdict. Therefore, we find this issue to be without merit.
¶28. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF
CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL
COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JONES COUNTY.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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