Monte Stuart Morris v. Lou Ann James Morris
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-00816-COA
MONTE STUART MORRIS
APPELLANT
v.
LOU ANN JAMES MORRIS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
04/12/2007
HON. JOHNNY LEE WILLIAMS
LAMAR COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
HERMAN M. HOLLENSED
ERIK M. LOWREY
DAVID ALAN PUMFORD
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
MOTION TO REDUCE OR TERMINATE
ALIMONY DENIED
AFFIRMED – 04/07/2009
BEFORE KING, C.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
IRVING, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Monte Stuart Morris and Lou Ann James Morris agreed to an irreconcilable
differences divorce and submitted a written agreement to the Lamar County Chancery Court
wherein they agreed to property division, child support, and alimony. The agreement was
ratified and approved by the chancery court and incorporated in the final judgment of
divorce. Four years later, Monte filed a motion to modify the final judgment, arguing, among
other things, that his alimony payments should be substantially reduced or terminated. The
chancellor denied Monte’s request. Feeling aggrieved, Monte appeals and asserts that the
chancellor erred in refusing to reduce or terminate his alimony payments.
¶2.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶3.
Monte and Lou Ann were divorced on November 6, 2001; two children, Kevin Stuart
and Anna Claire, were born to the marriage. Kevin was sixteen years old, and Anna Claire
was twelve years old at the time the divorce was entered. The final judgment of divorce
provided among other things: (1) that the parties would share joint legal custody of the
children and that Monte would make child support payments of $500 per child, per month,
(2) that Monte would be responsible for maintaining Lou Ann’s medical insurance, (3) that
Monte would convey his interest in the marital home to Lou Ann and pay the mortgage,
taxes, and insurance, and (4) that Monte would pay Lou Ann $1,500 per month in permanent
alimony.1
¶4.
On July 27, 2006, Monte filed a motion to modify the final judgment of divorce,
alleging that he had experienced a substantial reduction in his income and net worth. Monte
also alleged that Lou Ann had received a substantial increase in her income and net worth.
Further, Monte argued that Lou Ann had a greater ability to earn income than she did at the
time of divorce. Monte petitioned the court to modify the final judgment to reflect: (1) that
his obligation to pay child support for Kevin and Anna Claire shall cease when they reach
the age of twenty-one, (2) that his obligation to pay taxes and insurance on the marital home
1
As a term of their agreement, Monte also agreed to give Lou Ann a lump-sum
payment of $100,000, rather than transfer taxable assets to her.
2
be terminated immediately, and (3) that his alimony payments be substantially reduced or
terminated.
¶5.
Lou Ann filed an answer and counterclaim wherein she acknowledged that Monte was
no longer obligated to pay child support for Kevin, as he had reached twenty-one years of
age. Lou Ann also requested that Monte’s child support payments for Anna Claire be
adjusted to reflect fourteen percent of his adjusted gross income.
¶6.
A hearing was held on February 13, 2007. Monte testified that his financial condition
had declined to the point that he could no longer afford to pay Lou Ann $1,500 per month
in alimony. Following the hearing, the chancellor determined that Monte was no longer
required to pay child support for Kevin. The chancellor also determined that Monte’s annual
income exceeded $50,000 and increased his child support payments for Anna Claire’s benefit
from $500 per month to $583.73 per month.2 The chancellor further determined that Monte’s
obligation to pay taxes and insurance on the marital home would cease five years after the
retirement of the mortgage. However, the chancellor refused to reduce or terminate Monte’s
obligation to pay alimony. It is from this decision that Monte appeals.
¶7.
Additional facts, as necessary, will be related during our analysis and discussion of
the issue.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
¶8.
“When reviewing a chancellor’s decision, [an appellate court] will accept the
chancellor’s findings of fact as long as the evidence in the record reasonably supports those
2
The chancellor also ordered that the payments of $583.73 be made retroactive to
November 2006.
3
findings.” Norton v. Norton, 742 So. 2d 126, 128-29 (¶8) (Miss. 1999) (citing In re Estate
of Taylor v. Thompson, 609 So. 2d 390, 393 (Miss. 1992)). An appellate court will only
disturb a chancellor’s findings in instances where the findings are clearly erroneous or an
erroneous legal standard was applied. Id. at 129 (¶8) (citing Hill v. Se. Floor Covering Co.,
596 So. 2d 874, 877 (Miss. 1992)).
¶9.
In Steiner v. Steiner, 788 So. 2d 771, 776 (¶15) (Miss. 2001), the Mississippi Supreme
Court stated that “[s]upport agreements for divorces granted on the ground of irreconcilable
differences are subject to modification.”
Additionally, the court noted that “[t]he
modification can occur only if there has been a material change in the circumstances of one
or more of the parties.” Id. (citing Varner v. Varner, 666 So. 2d 493, 497 (Miss. 1995)).
Further, in Tingle v. Tingle, 573 So. 2d 1389, 1391 (Miss. 1990) (citing Clark v. Myrick, 523
So. 2d 79, 82 (Miss. 1988)), our supreme court stated that the material change must concern
circumstances that arise after the original divorce decree was entered. The Tingle court also
stated that the change could not have been anticipated at the time of the divorce. Id. (citing
Morris v. Morris, 541 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Miss. 1989)).
¶10.
Monte argues that the chancellor erred in failing to grant his motion for a cessation
or substantial reduction of his alimony payments. The alimony provision of the property
settlement agreement reads as follows:
ALIMONY. Husband shall pay to Wife the amount of $1,500.00 per month
as permanent alimony, with $750.00 being due and payable on the first (1st)
day of each month and the remaining $750.00 being due and payable on the
fifteenth (15th) day of each month. This requirement of permanent alimony
shall cease upon the death or remarriage of Wife.
¶11.
Monte makes two arguments in support of his contention that the chancellor erred in
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failing to reduce or terminate his alimony payments: (1) that Lou Ann’s receipt of disability
benefits constitutes a material change in circumstances, and (2) that since the divorce was
granted, Lou Ann has received an increase in income while he has experienced a reduction
in income, one that he did not anticipate at the time that the agreement was reached. The
crux of Monte’s argument, as it relates to Lou Ann’s increase in income, is based on her
receipt of disability benefits following their divorce. In 2001, Lou Ann twice applied for
disability benefits; however, her first two requests were denied, and she was not approved
until 2003.3 She then received back benefits from the date of her initial filing. Lou Ann
testified that, in addition to her disability benefits, she receives income for consulting work
that she does several days a week for Deaconess Home Health and Hospice.
¶12.
In his brief, Monte asserts that “[w]hen the parties were divorced, Lou Ann did not
have disability income to satisfy her standard of living.” It is puzzling to this Court how
Monte can argue on appeal that Lou Ann’s receipt of disability benefits constitutes a material
change in circumstances when this was clearly not an unanticipated event.
¶13.
First, the plain language of their agreement reflects that it was anticipated that Lou
Ann would receive disability benefits at some point in the future. The following excerpt is
taken from the medical insurance provision of the property settlement agreement:
Further, Husband shall continue to maintain and pay for Wife’s medical
insurance costs, presently being $209.00 per month. If, in the future, Wife
does, in fact, receive disability for which insurance would be applicable, then
3
Lou Ann testified that her health problems are the result of a bout with Cushing’s
Disease. Lou Ann stated that she began having problems from the disease that required three
surgeries, approximately three years prior to her divorce. Following the third surgery, she
developed meningitis and lapsed into a coma. Lou Ann testified that she still suffers from
problems which resulted from the meningitis and the coma.
5
the parties agree that any reduction in cost to her, as it relates to medical
insurance premiums, would be payable by Husband at the reduced amount,
and Wife will supply said insurance information to Husband, whether for
direct payment or for reimbursement to her. Also Wife agrees that if the
Disability Insurance allows for coverage of the children at a savings from the
insurance which is now being supplied by Husband, she will allow the children
to be added to the policy for which Husband will continue to be responsible for
the premiums and any unpaid amount of deductible or coverage.
(Emphasis added).
¶14.
Second, Monte testified at the modification hearing that, although Lou Ann was not
working at the time of their divorce, he was aware that she had taken steps to receive
disability benefits:
Q.
Monte, when you and Lou Ann divorced, was she working to your
knowledge?
A.
No, not to my knowledge.
Q.
Was it your understanding that she had no income at that time?
A.
That is my understanding.
Q.
Was she seeking to get on disability at that time to your knowledge?
A.
To my knowledge that was the plan that she was proceeding with.
(Emphasis added).
¶15.
Despite Monte’s acknowledgment at the hearing that he was aware when he and Lou
Ann entered into the agreement that Lou Ann “was seeking to get on disability,” he now
argues that her receipt of those very benefits constitutes a material change in circumstances.
We conclude that the chancellor did not err in finding that Monte failed to prove that Lou
Ann’s receipt of disability benefits constitutes a material change in circumstances.
¶16.
We now turn to Monte’s argument as it relates to his reduction in net worth and
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income. Monte’s major source of income is derived from his position as vice president of
a family-owned collection agency.4 Monte testified that each year he receives a salary, as
well as forty-five percent of any profits that the company makes. According to Monte, he
has experienced a reduction in income due to competition and a downturn in market
conditions. We note at the outset that the record does not contain Monte’s 8.05 statement5
that was considered by the chancellor during the divorce proceedings in November 2001.
However, his 2001 federal tax return, which was admitted into evidence during the
modification hearing, shows that his income for that year was $158,749. Also, Monte
testified at the modification hearing that his net worth at the time of the divorce in 2001was
approximately $650,000. Monte’s assessment of his net worth at the time of the divorce is
not contradicted by anything in the record.
¶17.
In support of his motion for modification, Monte filed a joint 8.05 statement with his
new wife, Christina.
This statement reflects that their net worth at the time of the
modification hearing was $552,986.36.
¶18.
The record reflects that Monte’s annual salary from 2001 to 2005 was $55,000. In
addition to his salary, he received the following amounts in profits from the family-owned
business: approximately $80,000 in 2001, $92,000 in 2002, $62,000 in 2003, $48,000 in
2004, and $15,000 in 2005. Monte testified that his salary in 2006 was $75,000 and that he
expected to receive $15,000 in year-end profits, although he had not received the $15,000
4
Monte and his sister each own forty-five percent of the company, and his father owns
ten percent.
5
Rule 8.05 of the Uniform Chancery Court Rules requires parties in domestic cases
to file a financial disclosure statement.
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at the time of the hearing in February 2007. The joint 8.05 statement shows that Monte’s
monthly income in February 2007 was $7,583, comprised of $6,250 in salary from the family
business and $1,333 in dividends and interest.
¶19.
In his bench opinion denying the modification, the chancellor stated the following:
Certainly we’ve had evidence and proof about Monte’s income being reduced.
He started at somewhere around 140 or $150,000 when the divorce first
occurred. Through some changes, alleged changes, in the industry of his
business, the income has dropped somewhere approximately 40 or $50,000.
The Court is unable to determine for a fact whether or not that drop in income
has affected Monte’s life-style and left him at a disadvantage in a way that
would really weigh in his favor to cause the Court to determine that the Court
ought to provide some relief because Monte is in a position where he’s unable
to meet his obligation.
If the court looks at the assets that Monte has, Monte still has anywhere from
four to $500,000 in assets. Monte has the ability as the owner of his business
to make adjustments in how he receives income. He even increased his
monthly income in a way that produced approximately a $20,000 increase in
the year 2006. He’s also going to get profits from his business that is [sic] yet
to be determined.
¶20.
In Holcombe v. Holcombe, 813 So. 2d 700, 706 (¶32) (Miss. 2002), a chancellor
refused to reduce a husband’s alimony payments even though the 73-year-old husband had
clearly experienced a significant reduction in income and a deterioration in health since the
divorce. The parties in Holcombe were granted a divorce in 1991 after forty years of
marriage. Id. at 701 (¶1). The husband, who had worked for forty-nine years as a traveling
salesman, was ordered to pay the wife periodic alimony. Id. at 702 (¶¶1-2). In 2000, the
husband petitioned the chancery court for a reduction in his alimony payments on two bases:
his income had been substantially reduced and his health was deteriorating. Id. at 701 (¶1).
The husband testified that his loss of income was a result of his losing a long-time client from
8
which he generated the majority of his business income. Id. at 704 (¶14).
¶21.
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision and
noted that “[f]rom 1991 to 1998 [the husband’s] annual gross business income had an
estimated average of $138,576.00.” Id. at 701 (¶1). The court also noted that the husband
had experienced a significant reduction in gross business income, as his earnings went from
$146,187 in 1998 to $61,116 in 1999.6 Id. at 702 (¶5). The court further noted the
chancellor’s findings:
After taking the above into consideration and finding the sole grounds offered
by [the husband] for the alimony modification to be his decrease in income and
deteriorating health, the chancellor refused to modify the divorce decree. He
found there was no material change in [the husband’s] circumstances
warranting modification. In support of this position, the chancellor noted that
[the husband’s] spending habits and lifestyle had not changed as a result of
losing the Frisco Manufacturing furniture line; he was still able to travel and
had not missed work since the loss of the Frisco line; he had new sources of
income from his mandatory retirement and social security payments . . . .
Id. at 703 (¶9).
¶22.
As stated, our supreme court affirmed the chancellor, even though it recognized that
the husband had experienced a significant reduction in income. Id. at 706 (¶32). The court
noted the chancellor’s finding that the husband’s “lifestyle and spending habits indicate the
loss in business had no effect upon his purchasing decisions.” Id. The spending habits that
the court was referring to was the husband’s purchase of “a 2000 automobile with a large
monthly payment despite his loss of income.” Id. at 705 (¶25). The supreme court
summarized its holding as follows:
6
The court did not state the husband’s gross business income at the time of the
divorce.
9
After reviewing these facts, we conclude that the chancellor did not err in
refusing to modify the divorce degree in [the husband’s] favor. Surely [the
husband’s] business suffered from the loss of the [long-time client] and his
health continues to deteriorate with his increasing age. However, his lifestyle
and spending habits indicate the loss in business had no effect upon his
purchasing decisions. He admirably continues to work and had not missed any
work up to the chancellor’s hearing. Furthermore, he is a salesman of such
quality that soon after losing the [long-time client], he was able to pick up two
more [clients] . . . .
Id. at 706 (¶32).
¶23.
Here, the chancellor found that Monte’s net worth and income had been substantially
reduced but concluded that he could not determine whether this reduction had affected
Monte’s lifestyle. On this point, we note that there is nothing in the record that indicates the
quality of Monte’s lifestyle at the time of the divorce, but it does shed some light on the
lifestyle that Monte has enjoyed since his divorce from Lou Ann. Monte testified: (1) that
he has a country club membership, (2) that in 2005, he purchased a used 2003 Cadillac, (3)
that he purchased a vehicle for his wife, (4) that he has two “Sea-Doos,” (5) that he has
several checking and savings accounts with a total of $26,200 contained therein, as well as
several investment accounts which total over $400,000.
¶24.
Based on our supreme court’s holding in Holcombe, we conclude that the chancellor’s
decision to deny Monte a reduction or termination of his alimony payments is supported by
substantial evidence. This issue lacks merit.
¶25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAMAR COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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