William Patrick Daley v. Charlotte Carlton
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CA-00874-COA
WILLIAM PATRICK DALEY
APPELLANT
v.
CHARLOTTE CARLTON
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
03/03/2008
HON. CYNTHIA L. BREWER
MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
CHRISTOPHER A. TABB
JEFFREY BIRL RIMES
LISA M. USRY
CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
HUSBAND TO PAY BALLOON NOTE
MORTGAGE
AFFIRMED - 04/07/2009
BEFORE KING, C.J., ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This appeal concerns whether the Madison County Chancery Court erred in
construing Dr. William Patrick Daley and Charlotte Carlton’s property settlement agreement
that was incorporated into their irreconcilable differences divorce. The chancellor concluded
that the property settlement agreement was unambiguous in providing that Dr. Daley
intended to pay the entire mortgage obligation on the former marital home. Dr. Daley claims
the chancellor erred. However, after careful consideration, we find no error and affirm the
chancellor’s judgment.
FACTS
¶2.
Dr. Daley and Carlton were married for approximately eighteen years. They executed
a property settlement agreement into their irreconcilable differences divorce. Carlton’s
attorney drafted the agreement, and Dr. Daley signed it without legal representation. This
appeal focuses on paragraph V of that agreement, which states:
[Dr. Daley] agrees to pay alimony to [Carlton] in the amount of Eight Hundred
Ninety Eight ($898.55) Dollars and Fifty-Five Cents, until such time as the
mortgage on the property . . . is fully satisfied, said amount representing the
amount of the monthly mortgage payment. [Dr. Daley] and [Carlton] agree
that any additional and/or pre-paid alimony paid by [Dr. Daley] to [Carlton]
is to be applied fully and solely to the mortgage balance, it being the intent of
the parties that any funds paid over the regular monthly payment are for the
purpose of accelerating the payoff of the mortgage debt.
To be precise, the particular language at issue is the statement “until such time as the
mortgage is fully satisfied.” The mortgage on the marital home had a balloon payment of
$142,268.41 that became due in May 2008. Carlton took the position that Dr. Daley was
obligated to pay the balloon payment. Dr. Daley disagreed.
¶3.
Carlton filed a motion to interpret the property settlement agreement. The chancellor
conducted a hearing on Carlton’s motion. Carlton testified that she and Dr. Daley had two
assets: the marital residence and Dr. Daley’s medical degree. She further testified that Dr.
Daley did not work while he attended medical school; therefore, she worked outside the
home to support them. At the time of the divorce, Carlton’s net monthly income was
$180.58, and Dr. Daley’s was $7,765.05. According to Carlton, Dr. Daley requested that he
be allowed to pay the entirety of the mortgage in lieu of paying her alimony. Carlton also
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testified that Dr. Daley wanted to take advantage of the tax deduction for mortgage interest.
Finally, Carlton testified that Dr. Daley agreed to obtain a life insurance policy with a benefit
of $150,000, which was intended to cover the value of the marital residence.
¶4.
Conversely, Dr. Daley testified that he only intended to pay the mortgage on the
marital home until the mortgage matured and the balloon payment accrued. According to Dr.
Daley, he never intended to be held responsible for paying any portion of the balloon
payment. Dr. Daley testified that although he agreed to procure life insurance for the full
value of the former marital home, he did not believe he was obligated to pay anything once
the balloon payment became due.
¶5.
When the chancellor entered her opinion and final judgment, she interpreted the
property settlement agreement in Carlton’s favor. Specifically, the chancellor found as
follows:
This Court agrees with Dr. Daley that the language of [the agreement] is
ambiguous to the extent that it does not address how a balloon note that would
become due in four (4) years would be paid. However, the intent of the parties
is clear and unambiguous when examining [the agreement] in its entirety.
Paragraph V cited above provides that any additional payment is to be applied
“fully and solely to the mortgage balance, it being the intent of the parties that
any funds paid over the regular monthly payment are for the purpose of
accelerating the payoff of the mortgage debt.” Further, Paragraph VI reads:
The Husband and Wife agree that each waives any and all
claims in the other’s life insurance plans, if any. Excepting that
Husband agrees to provide a life insurance plan on his life
specifically for the purpose of paying off the balance of the
mortgage on the property . . . in the event of his death.
After reviewing the agreement in its entirety and the applicable case law, this
Court finds that the parties intended Ms. Carlton to receive the former marital
home free and clear of any mortgage debt.
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Aggrieved, Dr. Daley appeals.
ANALYSIS
¶6.
The standard of review applicable to a chancellor’s construction and enforcement of
a property settlement agreement is well settled. An appellate court “will not disturb the
findings of a Chancellor unless the Chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or
an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Bell v. Parker, 563 So. 2d 594, 596-97 (Miss.
1990). However, a property settlement agreement is a contractual obligation. East v. East,
493 So. 2d 927, 931-32 (Miss. 1986). Contract interpretation is a question of law and is
reviewed de novo. Warwick v. Gautier Util. Dist., 738 So. 2d 212, 215 (¶8) (Miss. 1999).
A court may not go beyond the text to determine the parties' true intent unless the contract
is unclear or ambiguous. Turner v. Terry, 799 So. 2d 25, 32 (¶17) (Miss. 2001). “The mere
fact that the parties disagree about the meaning of a contract does not make the contract
ambiguous as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Cherry v. Anthony, 501 So. 2d 416, 419 (Miss.
1987)).
¶7.
We first look to the agreement itself. Pursuant to paragraph V, Dr. Daley was
obligated to pay the mortgage until it was “fully satisfied.” Nothing in the record indicates
how the mortgage could be “fully satisfied” without paying the balloon payment. By way
of his appellate brief, Dr. Daley admits that he knew about the balloon payment when he
signed the property settlement agreement. However, the chancellor found that the property
settlement agreement is silent regarding which party bore the responsibility of paying the
balloon payment. Therefore, the chancellor found that paragraph V was ambiguous in that
regard. The chancellor’s conclusion is not inconsistent with the literal wording of paragraph
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V. Therefore, we find that the chancellor did not err in finding paragraph V to be ambiguous.
¶8.
Be that as it may, the chancellor did not find that the agreement was ambiguous as to
the parties’ intent regarding the balloon payment. Rather, the chancellor found that, viewing
the four corners of the property settlement agreement in its entirety, the agreement
unambiguously provided that Dr. Daley would pay the full amount of the mortgage.
Paragraph VI required that Dr. Daley obtain life insurance with a benefit amount that would
fully satisfy the mortgage. According to the chancellor, paragraph VI would be meaningless
unless Dr. Daley intended to obligate himself for the full value of the mortgage – including
the balloon payment. Thus, the chancellor found the agreement was not ambiguous, and it
was unnecessary to consider any parol evidence. We agree with the chancellor. It would be
nonsensical for Dr. Daley to voluntarily obligate himself to obtain life insurance for the full
amount due under the mortgage if he were not intending to obligate himself for this amount.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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