Jamie C. Bolden v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-KA-00108-COA
JAMIE C. BOLDEN
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
08/17/2007
HON. ANDREW K. HOWORTH
BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
GEORGE T. HOLMES
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER
BENJAMIN F. CREEKMORE
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND
SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH
TEN YEARS SUSPENDED, TWENTY
YEARS TO SERVE, FIVE YEARS OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, AND
REGISTRATION AS A SEX OFFENDER
AFFIRMED: 04/07/2009
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Jamie C. Bolden was convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to thirty years in the
custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with ten years suspended and twenty
years to serve, five years of post-release supervision, and registration as a sexual offender.
He now appeals his conviction alleging the following errors: (1) he was irreparably
prejudiced by improper opinion testimony; (2) violation of the witness-sequestration rule
requires reversal; (3) the trial court erred in refusing the jury instruction regarding
impeachment; and (4) the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. We find each
of these issues to be without merit; therefore, we affirm the trial court’s conviction and
sentence.
FACTS
¶2.
On September 25, 2004, Demetria Moore took her eight-year-old son, E.M., to a
birthday party at Patricia Bolden’s home. A.B., a nine-year-old male, and D.B., an elevenyear-old male, were also attending.1 Patricia is Bolden’s grandmother. That night E.M.
spent the night with A.B. at Patricia’s house after the party. Eighteen-year-old Bolden lived
with his mother, Penny Bolden, at the house next door to where the birthday party was held.
Bolden is a cousin of both A.B. and D.B., and although he is not related to E.M., all lived on
Little Egypt Road in Benton County when the incident is alleged to have taken place.
¶3.
The next day, Sunday, Demetria returned home from church and saw E.M. walking
in front of their driveway with Bolden and Bolden’s two sisters. Demetria picked up E.M.
and drove down their driveway to their home. After she and E.M. got out of the car, but
before they could get inside their house, E.M. disclosed to his mother that Bolden had taken
him, A.B., and D.B. into a wooded area off Little Egypt Road near a pipeline that runs
1
Initials of the minor victims are used to protect the their identities.
2
through the area. E.M. told his mother that Bolden had sex with E.M. and D.B. He then
forced A.B. and E.M. to have sex with each other.
¶4.
Upon hearing this, Demetria got back into her car and went to Frank Bolden’s house.
A.B. and D.B. were sitting on the front porch of the home. She asked the boys what had
happened that day, and they related the same account to Demetria. Demetria then traveled
to Penny’s home. There, she told Penny that Bolden had “messed with” E.M. Demetria
testified that Bolden’s mother had stated that “[t]his boy going to make me have a heart
attack” upon hearing the news. Next, Demetria and E.M.’s father, Russell Hunt, took E.M.
to the Tippah County Hospital where a rape kit was performed. Seminal fluids were found
on E.M.’s buttocks.
¶5.
At trial, the jury was shown a videotaped interview of E.M. conducted by the Family
Crisis Center in Oxford approximately one week after the sexual assault. In the video, E.M.
relates the same story he told his mother on the night of the incident, detailing how Bolden
forced the boys to have sex with him as well as each other. The nurse who aided in the
administration of the rape kit, Kelty Childs, also testified. She assisted Dr. Roger Marlin in
following the protocol of the rape kit which involved a Woods lamp, a blue florescent light
that makes sperm or seminal fluid glow when the overhead lights are turned off. She testified
that she swabbed the area near E.M.’s rectum that had glowed under the florescent light and
placed the swab in the rape kit package for evidence. A serologist from the Mississippi
Crime Laboratory testified that the swabbed substance from the rape kit was seminal fluid.
She also testified that the Woods lamp does not give false positives and only glows in
3
relation to sperm or seminal fluid.
¶6.
David Murphy with the Benton County Sheriff’s Department testified that the sheriff’s
office had requested a DNA analysis after the serology report confirmed the presence of
seminal fluid on the rape kit swabs taken from E.M. There was an insufficient sample for
the Mississippi Crime Laboratory to determine the presence of DNA, but Scale Biolab, a
private laboratory, was able to determine that the substance contained the DNA of E.M. and
a second person. The sample was insufficient to determine the identity of the second person.
¶7.
D.B. was called as a witness for the defense. On the stand, he testified that Bolden
did not do anything to him, A.B., or E.M., but that Bolden had previously caught A.B. and
E.M. in the woods and threatened to tell on them.2 D.B. testified that he and his mother, Lisa
Bolden, had met with District Attorney Ben Creekmore on the day of trial, and Lisa was
upset because D.B. was going to testify against Bolden knowing he might go to jail. Lisa and
Bolden’s mother are sisters and are very close. D.B. did not remember telling Creekmore
that the story he had related to the Family Crisis Center in Oxford was true, or that he was
angry at Bolden when he made up the accusations against him. The day of the trial was the
first time that D.B. claimed the accusations he made against Bolden were false.
¶8.
Pammie Davidson was called as a rebuttal witness for the State. She is the victims’
advocate coordinator for the Benton County District Attorney’s Office. Her duties include
preparing victims for trial. When it became apparent that D.B. was going to recant his
2
Bolden later alleged that he caught A.B. and E.M. having sex in the woods, leading
them to falsely accuse him of sexual assault.
4
statement, the State asked her to leave the courtroom so it could call her as a rebuttal witness.
Prior to this time, it was not anticipated that she would be called as a witness, and she was
not subjected to the sequestration rule. Because of her presence in the courtroom, Bolden
objected to her testimony. The prosecutor advised the trial court that she left the courtroom
almost immediately after D.B. took the stand. The trial court held that she could testify, but
it would entertain any contemporaneous objections if testimony contradicted the State’s
position that she was an unexpected witness.
Bolden did not make any such
contemporaneous objections while Davidson was on the stand.
¶9.
Davidson testified that she had been present during the conversation before trial
between D.B. and his mother, Lisa. Davidson said that Lisa had become very upset when
D.B. affirmed his prior statements. Lisa screamed and pointed her finger in the face of D.B.,
causing him to become tearful and withdrawn. Lisa told D.B. that he was making her chest
hurt, she was sick to her stomach, Bolden was going to jail, and D.B. was going to help put
him there. Lisa also told D.B. that Bolden’s trial was tearing the family apart. After the
exchange, Creekmore attempted to question D.B. again, but D.B. remained very upset and
shook his head “no” to all the questions he was asked, including whether his testimony would
be the same. The State did not call D.B. as a witness during its case-in-chief.
¶10.
Bolden testified in his own defense. On the stand, he claimed that he woke up Sunday
around 12:40 p.m. and went to Holly Springs with his girlfriend, Halley Crosby. He did not
return home again until 11:00 or 11:20 p.m. Sunday night. Bolden was cross-examined by
the State regarding his notice of alibi which stated that Bolden, Edmond Morgan, and Travis
5
Hodges had driven from Ashland to New Albany to Holly Springs and back to Ashland on
that Sunday and had not returned until after dark on the same day. Prior to trial, both Morgan
and Hodges had denied being with Bolden. The State also questioned Bolden about his
statement to the nurse who performed the rape kit – that he had never left the backyard that
Sunday. He denied making that statement and asserted that he had been confused as to the
exact date he, Morgan, and Hodges visited Holly Springs.
¶11.
After hearing all the evidence presented, the jury convicted Bolden of sexual battery.
The trial court sentenced Bolden to thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department
of Corrections with ten years suspended, twenty years to serve, five years of post-release
supervision, and registration as a sex offender. He appeals this conviction and the resulting
sentence, alleging four errors.
DISCUSSION
I.
¶12.
WHETHER IMPROPER OPINION TESTIMONY CAUSED
IRREPARABLE PREJUDICE.
The admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Seal v. Miller, 605 So. 2d 240, 243 (Miss. 1992) (citing Hooten v. State, 492 So. 2d 948,
950-51 (Miss. 1986)). Unless this Court can say that the trial court’s ruling was so arbitrary
or clearly erroneous that it constituted an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision is
insulated from reversal. Id.
¶13.
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 701 states that a lay witness is limited to opinions which
are “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to the clear
6
understanding of the testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Rule 702
states that an expert witness may give opinion testimony if “(1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”
¶14.
Bolden contends that Nurse Childs gave improper opinion testimony as to the dried
secretions obtained during the administration of E.M.’s rape kit. Prior to Childs taking the
stand, Bolden made an objection to her giving any type of opinion testimony about whether
the substance she swabbed was seminal fluid, because she had not received any specialized
training in that area. The State assured the trial court that it was only planning to ask Childs
if she had used a blue light and if she detected a foreign substance that should not have been
on the child’s buttocks. Given the State’s limitation, Bolden agreed to withdraw his
objection.
¶15.
During Childs’s direct examination by the State, she testified to the following:
We use what is called a Woods lamp. It’s a blue florescent light. You turn the
lights low or off in the room and you use the blue fluorescent light and sperm
or seminal fluid will usually floress [sic] and glow just a little so that you can
see them easier.
Bolden did not contemporaneously object to this statement by Childs. Instead, he waited
until after the State had finished its direct examination to complain to the trial court that
Childs had said that the Woods blue-light test is used to identify seminal fluid or sperm. The
trial court responded that it did not feel that Childs rendered any opinions beyond those she
7
was qualified to render, and it noted that defense counsel had failed to make a
contemporaneous objection to the statement. The trial court advised defense counsel to
question Childs on any specialized training in the area of seminal identification if counsel felt
that it was needed.
¶16.
On appeal, Bolden contends that the admission of this statement was in error because
Childs gave improper lay opinion about the substances gathered from E.M. This contention
is barred, however, because there was no contemporaneous objection during trial. “It is
axiomatic that a litigant is required to make a timely objection,” and “if no contemporaneous
objection is made, the error, if any, is waived.” Smith v. State, 797 So. 2d 854, 856 (¶7)
(Miss. 2001). Bolden was aware of the direction the State would take with Childs’s direct
examination, and he had no objection to the State questioning Childs about whether she used
a blue light, detected a foreign substance, collected a sample of that substance, and sent it to
the crime lab. This was essentially what the State asked Childs. Childs volunteered the
information about what the Woods light is used for, but defense counsel did not object to the
statement when it was made. It was not until after the entire direct examination had been
completed that Bolden’s counsel challenged her statement. Even then, the objection was
couched as an inquiry to the trial court of what extent defense counsel could cross-examine
Childs about her qualifications without opening the door to an in-depth redirect by the State.
It was not an outright objection to her statements, or even a request for a limiting instruction
to the jury; it was an inquiry as to how far defense counsel could question her as to her
qualifications without opening the door to further questioning by the State as to the dried
8
secretions. Thus, the objection was not properly preserved by Bolden at trial.
¶17.
However, even if there had been a contemporaneous objection by Bolden to Childs’s
statements, it would not have been reversible error for the trial court to allow the testimony.
The State questioned Childs regarding hospital protocol in administering a rape kit, which
was within her personal knowledge as she had worked at the hospital as a nurse for six years.
As a nurse, she personally assisted Dr. Marlin in performing the rape kit. See Moody v. State,
841 So. 2d 1067, 1093-94 (¶¶80-82) (Miss. 2003) (nurse who personally observed the taking
of vaginal swabs during an autopsy had personal knowledge regarding the procedure used
by the doctor in doing the autopsy).
¶18.
Also, the trial court correctly noted that Childs did not give any opinions beyond what
she was qualified to render. This Court dealt with a similar issue in Marbra v. State, 904 So.
2d 1169 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). In that case, Marbra challenged the admissibility of
testimony by a firearms specialist and a sergeant who took part in the investigation. This
Court held that even though the firearms specialist, who was employed by the Mississippi
Crime Laboratory, was not qualified by the trial court as an expert, his testimony was
properly admitted because the witness did not give an opinion, much less an expert opinion,
at any point during his testimony. Id. at 1174-75 (¶16). He only testified as to the results of
an accidental-firing experiment he performed to test the defendant’s claim that the shooting
had been accidental. Id. All of this information was found in his report, which had been
given to the defense. Id. The specialist did not give an expert opinion or any opinion during
his testimony.
9
¶19.
Also in the Marbra case, the testimony of a sergeant who took part in the investigation
was challenged. The sergeant testified that if a person held a gun in the manner which the
defendant claimed, gunpowder residue would be present on that person’s hand after the gun
was discharged. Id. at 1177 (¶30). This Court found the evidence was properly admitted
under Rule 701 because it was based on his experience and perception as a law enforcement
officer, and it helped the jury to determine the material issue of whether the gun had fired
accidently. Id. at (¶33).
¶20.
Similarly, Childs did not testify as to whether, in her opinion, the dried secretions
found on E.M.’s buttocks were seminal fluid. She testified as to the purpose of using a
Woods lamp. This knowledge was gained through her experiences and observations over six
years as a nurse. It helped the jury understand the process by which the evidence was
gathered and analyzed. She did not state that the dried secretions were seminal fluid; she
only stated that a foreign substance was found by a process that is used to detect seminal
fluid. This was not an opinion, and it was gained through her personal observation and
experiences. The trial court, therefore, did not err in allowing the testimony.
¶21.
Finally, assuming that a contemporaneous objection had been made to Childs’s
statements and her testimony did constitute reversible error, the information relayed to the
jury through her testimony was harmless. This Court will not reverse unless there has been
both an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defendant. White v. State, 847 So. 2d 886,
892 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). There was no prejudice to the defendant in this case
because a serologist from the Mississippi Crime Laboratory, who was qualified as an expert
10
by the trial court, testified that the substance swabbed was, in fact, seminal fluid. Thus, even
if Childs had only said that they used a blue light to highlight secretions on the skin, the fact
that the matter was seminal fluid would have been properly disclosed to the jury by the
serologist. Thus, this issue is without merit.
II.
¶22.
WHETHER A VIOLATION OF THE SEQUESTRATION
RULE REQUIRES REVERSAL.
Bolden contends that the testimony of Davidson, the victim’s advocate, was improper
because she was allowed to sit in on the majority of the trial in violation of the sequestration
rule. Davidson was called to rebut the testimony of D.B., who testified for the defense and
stated that Bolden did not sexually assault him or the other boys. Davidson relayed to the
jury that she had witnessed an argument between D.B. and his mother, in which D.B.’s
mother told him that he was putting his cousin Bolden in prison and tearing their family
apart. After this exchange, D.B. became sullen and withdrawn and indicated that he was
going to change his testimony. When D.B. took the stand for the defense, he recanted his
prior statements implicating Bolden and stated that the other boys had made up the
accusations after Bolden caught them in the woods.
¶23.
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 615 requires that the trial court, at the request of either
party or upon its own motion, exclude all witnesses so that they cannot hear the testimony
of other witnesses unless that witness is also: (1) a party, if that party is a natural person, (2)
an officer or employee, designated by the attorney as the representative of a party, if the party
is not a natural person, or (3) a person whose presence has been shown to be essential to the
11
presentation of a party’s case.
¶24.
“The purpose of the rule is to prevent a witness from adapting his/her testimony to
previous testimony.” Kiker v. State, 919 So. 2d 190, 194 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
Douglas v. State, 525 So. 2d 1312, 1316 (Miss. 1988)). The rule applies equally to rebuttal
witnesses and case-in-chief witnesses. Finley v. State, 725 So. 2d 226, 233 (¶21) (Miss.
1998). This Court is limited to an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing an alleged
sequestration violation. Whittington v. State, 748 So. 2d 716, 719 (¶19) (Miss. 1999). A
defendant must show on appeal that the trial court not only abused its discretion, but also that
the error caused prejudice to his defense. Finley, 725 So. 2d at 233 (¶22). This Court will
not simply reverse a trial court for failing to either declare a mistrial or exclude testimony
after a sequestration violation. Id.
¶25.
Once a witness has violated the sequestration rule, the appropriate remedy is within
the trial court’s sound discretion. Id. at (¶23). Such remedies can include:
prospectively excluding the witness where prejudice will otherwise ensue;
striking the witness's testimony where connivance gave rise to the testimony;
striking the witness's testimony where the testimony gave rise to prejudice; or,
most appropriately, allowing the other party to subject the witness to a
“full-bore cross-examination” on the facts of the rule violation. The court may
also instruct the jury that it may consider the rule violation when the jury
evaluates the violating witness's credibility.
Baine v. State, 606 So. 2d 1076, 1083 (Miss. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
¶26.
In the instant case, the trial court allowed Davidson to testify because she was an
unanticipated witness who left the courtroom as soon as it became apparent to the State that
she would be called as a rebuttal witness. The trial court noted that it would entertain any
12
contemporaneous objections to testimony that indicated Davidson had known she was going
to be a witness or had adapted her testimony as a result of not being subjected to the
sequestration rule. There were no objections by the defense during Davidson’s direct
examination concerning any sequestration violations.
¶27.
These facts are very similar to those of Kiker, where this Court held there was no
undue prejudice to a defendant when a deputy was called as a rebuttal witness by State after
sitting in on most of the State’s case-in-chief. 919 So. 2d at 195 (¶11). The deputy left the
courtroom as soon as it became apparent that he would be needed as a rebuttal witness, and
he was not in the courtroom during the testimony of the witness he was being called to rebut.
Id. This Court reasoned that those precautions prevented prejudice to the defendant and
upheld the trial court’s decision to allow the deputy to testify. See id.
¶28.
Likewise, Davidson was not present during the majority of D.B.’s testimony. Her
testimony was not based upon anything which could have been tailored by hearing other
parts of the State’s case-in-chief. Her statements were limited to the interaction between
D.B. and his mother. She did not testify as to anything that could have been adapted from
hearing other witnesses. Also, the only objection made by the defense during Davidson’s
direct examination was that a portion of a question involved hearsay, and the State withdrew
that portion of the question.
The defense also had the opportunity to cross-examine
Davidson, which it employed to question her regarding her interaction with D.B. and his
mother. Therefore, we find that allowing Davidson to testify was not an abuse of discretion
by the trial court, and this issue is without merit.
13
III.
¶29.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
THE JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING IMPEACHMENT.
Bolden contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the proposed jury
instruction regarding impeachment evidence. The supreme court has long held that:
The refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a
genuine issue of material fact is proper, only if the trial court -- and this Court
on appeal -- can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party requesting the instruction, and considering all reasonable favorable
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the requesting
party, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could find the facts in accordance
with the theory of the requested instruction.
Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So. 2d 807, 809 (Miss. 1986). On review, jury instructions should be
taken as a whole with all jury instructions being read together and not taking a single
instruction out of context. Ellis v. State, 790 So. 2d 813, 815 (¶5) (Miss. 2001) (quoting
Higgins v. State, 725 So. 2d 220, 223 (¶16) (Miss. 1998)). “A defendant is entitled to have
jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is
limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is fairly
covered elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.” Id.
¶30.
Bolden relies on the cases of Ferrill v. State, 643 So. 2d 501, 505 (Miss. 1994), and
McGee v. State, 608 So. 2d 1129, 1134 (Miss. 1992), to support his contention that the
refusal of the impeachment jury instruction was reversible error.
¶31.
Bolden’s proposed instruction reads:
The Court instructs the jury that the testimony of a witness or witnesses may
be discredited or impeached by showing that on a prior occasion they have
made a statement which is now inconsistent with or contradictory to their
testimony in this case. In order to have this effect, the inconsistent or
14
contradictory prior statement must involve matter which is material to the
issues in this case.
The prior statement of the witness or witnesses can be considered by you only
for the purpose of determining the weight or believability that you give to the
testimony of the witness or witnesses that made them. You may not consider
the prior statement as proving the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
This proposed instruction is almost identical to those instructions not given in Ferrill and
McGee that were held to be necessary, warranting reversal and a new trial. However, Bolden
relies on an incomplete statement of holdings in these cases. The supreme court has held that
“the trial court's general instruction that the jury determine the weight and credibility of a
witness's testimony, coupled with cross-examination of the witness concerning the
inconsistent statement and closing arguments drawing attention to the inconsistencies is
sufficient to remove error from the refusal to give an impeachment instruction.” Harris v.
State, 861 So. 2d 1003, 1020 (¶48) (Miss. 2003) (citing Swann v. State, 806 So. 2d 1111,
1117 (¶¶23-24) (Miss. 2002)).
¶32.
All three of the above requirements were satisfied in this case. First, jury instruction
C-1, which was given to the jury, was the trial court’s general instruction that the jury
determine the weight and credibility of a witness’s testimony:
You are the sole judges of the facts in this case. Your exclusive province is to
determine what weight and credibility will be assigned the testimony and
supporting evidence of each witness. You are required and expected to use
your good common sense and sound judgment in considering and weighing the
testimony of each witness who has testified.
This section of the trial court’s general instructions to the jury sufficiently covers the areas
of weight and credibility of witnesses in this case.
15
¶33.
Second, each witness impeached with prior inconsistent statements was thoroughly
cross-examined by the State and rehabilitated by the defense about these prior inconsistent
statements.3 Specifically, the State cross-examined D.B. in depth about why his story about
the alleged sexual abuse had changed the day of trial. The defense attempted to explain this
by showing that D.B. was angry at Bolden at the time he made the accusations. Finally, the
State was given ample opportunity to cross-examine Bolden concerning the change of his
alibi three times during the trial process. Bolden was allowed to explain why these
discrepancies existed. Therefore, each was given an opportunity to explain or explore
thoroughly the prior inconsistencies during trial.
¶34.
Third, the closing arguments of both parties referred to the prior inconsistent
statements and attempted to explain those inconsistencies in a way that supported that party’s
proposed explanation of the events on that day. Because other jury instructions discussed
the matters of weight and credibility of the evidence, all impeached witnesses were
questioned about the inconsistencies, and both closing arguments addressed the
inconsistencies, we cannot say that the refusal of the proposed jury instruction was reversible
error when taken in context with all other jury instructions. Thus, this issue is without merit.
IV.
WHETHER THE VERDICT WAS CONTRARY TO THE
OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
3
This section of the analysis will be slightly different because in the Harris and
Swann cases, the impeached witness was called by the State, but here it was Bolden who
called the impeached witnesses and attempted to explain away their prior inconsistent
statements. Therefore, it is necessary to make sure each party was given an opportunity to
explore the prior inconsistencies.
16
¶35.
Bolden’s final contention is that the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight
of the evidence. The appropriate standard of review for an objection to the weight of the
evidence is whether the verdict “is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence
that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Bush v. State, 895 So.
2d 836, 844 (¶18) (Miss. 2005) (citing Herring v. State, 691 So. 2d 948, 957 (Miss. 1997)).
The supreme court has consistently held that an appellate court “sits as a thirteenth juror.
The motion, however, is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised
with caution, and the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases
in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Id. (quoting Amiker v.
Drugs For Less, Inc., 796 So. 2d 942, 947 (¶18) (Miss. 2000)). All “evidence should be
weighed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. (citing Herring, 691 So. 2d at 957).
¶36.
Sitting as a thirteenth juror, this Court cannot find that the jury’s verdict amounted to
an unconscionable injustice, nor can we find that this is an exceptional case where the
evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. The State presented ample evidence to
support a guilty verdict. Examples of this evidence include the testimony of the victim, the
victim’s mother, the nurse who examined the victim on the night of the attack, a serologist
who determined that the dried secretion found on the buttocks of the victim was seminal
fluid, and members of the police department that participated in the investigations. The
victim maintained a largely consistent story from his first reports to his testimony on the
stand. All of the State’s witnesses presented testimony that implicated Bolden. Even though
there was some conflicting evidence presented by the defense and the defendant presented
17
an alibi, the evidence presented by the State was of such a level that we find that the guilty
verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. This issue is without
merit.
¶37. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BENTON COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF THIRTY YEARS IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH
TEN YEARS SUSPENDED, TWENTY YEARS TO SERVE, FIVE YEARS OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, AND REGISTRATION AS A SEX OFFENDER IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO BENTON
COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS,
CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR.
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