Richard Tucker v. Mississippi Department of Employment Security
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2008-CC-00329-COA
RICHARD TUCKER
APPELLANT
v.
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND CLEAN
SOURCE, INC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEES
01/18/2008
HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN III
MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JARROD W. TAYLOR
LEANNE BRADY
CIVIL – STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES
AFFIRMED AGENCY DECISION NOT TO
AWARD UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
AFFIRMED: 02/17/2009
BEFORE LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ.
GRIFFIS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Richard Tucker (“Richard”) appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Madison
County which affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits by the Mississippi Department
of Employment Security (“MDES”) Board of Review. On appeal, Richard argues that: (1)
MDES went beyond the scope of its power and violated his constitutional rights by
considering the testimony of the defendant, Betty Tucker (“Betty”); and (2) the Board of
Review’s finding that he voluntarily left work without good cause was not supported by
substantial evidence, was made in the presence of fraud, and was arbitrary and capricious.
We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Richard worked at Clean Source, Inc., for two years. His mother, Betty, owns the
company. Prior to working at Clean Source, Richard worked for Betty for ten years at
another janitorial service. Richard testified that in March 2007, Betty changed the locks to
Clean Source and told him that he did not work there anymore. Betty claims that she
changed the locks because Richard came to her house and gave her two weeks’ notice of his
intent to quit. Betty said she had to change the locks because Richard had stolen things from
Clean Source when he previously quit. Richard admits he went to Betty’s house and had an
“emotional discussion” with her about her decision to take one of his accounts, Virginia
College, away from him. He claims that he did not give two weeks’ notice but did ask if
Betty wanted him to give two weeks’ notice.
¶3.
Thomas Tucker, Betty’s husband and Richard’s father, testified that he was present
during the conversation between Richard and Betty. Thomas testified that Richard gave
Betty two weeks’ notice of his intention to quit. Silas Stapleton, a Clean Source employee,
testified that Richard called him and said he had given his two weeks’ notice. Additionally,
Sheryl Jones, Richard’s ex-wife, testified that Richard told her he had quit his job over the
Virginia College account. Stephanie Tucker, Richard’s current wife, was not present during
the conversation, but she testified that Betty had fired Richard.
¶4.
The crux of Richard’s claim is that Betty’s testimony is not credible because she lied
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to the administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Shortly before the hearing and off the record, the
ALJ and Betty discussed some papers that Richard wanted the judge to consider. Richard
mailed this packet of information to Betty by certified mail. On the record, the ALJ stated:
“I telephoned Ms. Betty Tucker and asked her if she had received the documents. She
advised me that she had not.” The ALJ faxed the documents to Betty prior to the hearing and
allowed them into the record.
¶5.
Later the same day, Richard received the return receipt, with “Betty Tucker” on the
signature line, postmarked a day earlier. Presumably, Clean Source had received the packet
prior to the hearing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6.
The findings of the Board of Review as to the facts is binding on the appellate court,
if supported by substantial evidence and absent fraud. Richardson v. Miss. Employment Sec.
Comm'n, 593 So. 2d 31, 34 (Miss. 1991). “Where there is the required substantial evidence,
[the appellate court] has no authority to reverse the circuit court's affirmance of the decision
of the Board of Review.” Id.
ANALYSIS
1.
¶7.
Did MDES go beyond the scope of its power and violate Richard’s
constitutional rights by considering the testimony of the defendant,
Betty?
Richard alleges that MDES violated his right to a fair and impartial hearing by
considering Betty’s testimony after it was informed that she gave “false information at the
hearing.” He claims this shows that the agency demonstrated an uneven view favorable to
Betty. We do not agree.
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¶8.
In making this determination, this Court can rely only on the record. While the ALJ
paraphrased his conversation with Betty on the record, the questioning was not under oath
or on the record. The ALJ stated: “I telephoned Ms. Betty Tucker and asked her if she had
received the documents. She advised me that she had not.” This Court has no way of
knowing the exact phrasing of the questions or how it could have affected Betty’s answer
concerning the receipt of documents. While there is a postmark on the return receipt, there
is no date of receipt. Based on what is in the record, we cannot find that Betty knowingly
made false statements to the ALJ.
¶9.
Even if Betty was not truthful when the judge asked her about the documents, it does
not mean that the Board of Review could not consider her testimony. “Only if a witness is
impeached to the extent that his [or her] testimony is rendered highly improbable or
incredible is that witness's testimony deprived of any probative value.” Boles v. State, 744
So. 2d 349, 351 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
¶10.
Betty’s testimony was corroborated by three other witnesses. Thomas testified that
he heard Richard give two weeks’ notice, and Stapleton and Jones both testified that Richard
told them he had resigned. The Board of Review had the opportunity to consider Richard’s
allegation that Betty had lied and to determine the probative value of her testimony. This
issue is without merit.
2.
¶11.
Was the Board of Review’s finding that Richard voluntarily left work
without good cause supported by substantial evidence, made in the
presence of fraud, or arbitrary and capricious?
Richard contends that the circuit court erred when it affirmed the Board of Review’s
finding that he voluntarily left work without good cause, because the finding was: (1) not
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supported by substantial evidence, (2) made in the presence of fraud, and (3) arbitrary and
capricious. Richard argues that he did not voluntarily quit; rather, he was discharged.
¶12.
The supreme court “has held on numerous occasions that the question of whether an
employee voluntarily quits or was discharged is a question of fact for the [agency] to
determine.” Huckabee v. Miss. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 735 So. 2d 390, 394 (¶14) (Miss.
1999). Accordingly, this Court is bound by the Board of Review's finding of fact that
Richard voluntarily quit his employment without good cause as long as such finding is
supported by substantial evidence, absent fraud, and the correct legal standard has been
applied.
¶13.
“Substantial evidence has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as reasonable minds
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’ or to put it simply, more than a ‘mere
scintilla’ of evidence.” Hooks v. George County, 748 So. 2d 678, 680 (¶10) (Miss. 1999)
(quoting Johnson v. Ferguson, 435 So. 2d 1191, 1195 (Miss. 1983)). Here, there were four
witnesses who testified that Richard voluntarily quit his job with Clean Source. Betty
testified that Richard gave her his two weeks’ notice. Thomas testified that he was present
and heard Richard give Betty his two weeks’ notice. Jones and Stapleton testified that
Richard told them he had resigned. Richard even testified that he had asked if Betty wanted
him to give her two weeks’ notice. We can only presume that he would give his two weeks’
notice if he were voluntarily resigning.
¶14.
The Board of Review’s finding that Richard voluntarily left work without good cause
was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious. We find that
this issue lacks merit.
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¶15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THE APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS
AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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