James Lloyd Presley, Sr. v. City of Senatobia, Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-01027-COA
JAMES LLOYD PRESLEY, SR., MARTHA
PRESLEY HOUSTON, AND MAE PRESLEY
VEAZEY
APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES
v.
CITY OF SENATOBIA, MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT
5/30/2007
HON. ANDREW C. BAKER
TATE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
RONALD W. LEWIS
MICHAEL KEVIN GRAVES
JAMIE MONSOUR HALL
CIVIL - MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES &
ANNEXATION
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
AFFIRMED - 12/09/2008
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS AND ISHEE, JJ.
MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
James Lloyd Presley, Sr., Mae Presley Veazey, and Martha Presley Houston (the
Presleys), appeal the Circuit Court of Tate County’s judgment dismissing their suit for lack
of jurisdiction. The City, in response, cross-appeals, adding numerous alternate grounds it
claims warrant dismissal of the Presleys’ suit, including that: (1) the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction; (2) the Presleys’ claim is barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the claim is
barred by collateral estoppel and/or res judicata; (4) the claim is based upon a valid exercise
of police power; (5) the claim is barred based on sovereign immunity; (6) any takings claim
was waived by the Presleys; and (7) there was not a taking of the Presleys’ property.
FACTS
¶2.
The Presleys each inherited one-third undivided simple fee interest in one hundred
acres of agricultural annexed property in Senatobia, Mississippi. The land was annexed by
the City in 1997 and was zoned as residential in 1998. Subsequently, valuable gravel
deposits were discovered on the property. The Presleys contracted a mineral lease for the
gravel deposits, contingent upon obtaining a rezoning of the land for light industrial use. The
Presleys filed an application for rezoning on August 30, 2001, with the City, which was later
denied on November 6, 2001. The denial was appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed
the City’s denial of rezoning on September 24, 2002. The Presleys did not take further
appeal.
¶3.
The Presleys later filed suit against the City on September 20, 2005, alleging inverse
condemnation of their land on the basis that the City’s denial of the rezoning request
constituted a regulatory taking. They also requested just compensation for the taking of their
mineral estate. The City filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. The circuit court granted the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because
of its 2002 judgment affirming the City’s denial of rezoning.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4.
“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court
2
conducts a de novo review and ‘examines all the evidentiary matters before us, including
admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and affidavits.’” Green v.
Allendale Planting Co., 954 So. 2d 1032, 1037 (¶8) (Miss. 2007) (quoting Price v. Purdue
Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479, 483 (¶10) (Miss. 2006)). Furthermore, the supreme court has
stated:
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion has been made. If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise, the
motion should be denied.
City of Jackson v. Sutton, 797 So. 2d 977, 979 (¶7) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Heigle v. Heigle,
771 So. 2d 341, 345 (¶8) (Miss. 2000)).
WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
¶5.
The Presleys frame the issue on appeal as whether they failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by not appealing the 2002 circuit court judgment affirming the City’s
denial of their rezoning request. The Presleys argue that by seeking compensation in a
subsequent action, they are following a procedure laid out in Dunston v. Mississippi
Department of Marine Resources, 892 So. 2d 837, 843 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), where
this Court stated that, under the facts of that case, the plaintiff was required to first establish
a taking by actually seeking a permit to build before filing suit for reverse condemnation.
¶6.
It is apparent from our reading of the record, however, that failure to exhaust
administrative remedies was not the basis for the circuit court’s decision. The circuit court’s
order instead stated:
3
[The Presleys’] claim of unconstitutional “taking” of their property in the
present lawsuit was waived or given up by not following through with their
administrative remedy, that being an appeal of the September 24, 2002, order
to the Mississippi Supreme court [sic] and, therefore, the Circuit Court of Tate
County does not have jurisdiction to hear [the Presleys’ claim of a] “taking”
separate from the original appeal of the rezoning appeal since it was
determined that the denial of [the Presleys’] request was not arbitrary,
capricious, discriminatory or beyond the Board’s legal authority. Therefore,
this Court has already determined by its prior order of September 24, 2002,
that the rezoning denial was not confiscatory.
The circuit court thus found that it was barred from relitigating its prior determination that
the zoning decision “was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or beyond the Board’s
legal authority.”
¶7.
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Presleys are precluded from relitigating
in a second action issues already decided in the prior action. Howard v. Howard, 968 So. 2d
961, 973 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). The circuit court’s prior judgment that denial of the
rezoning request was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable necessarily precludes
recovery in the instant inverse condemnation suit. See Burdine v. City of Greenville, 755 So.
2d 1154, 1158 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a denial of a rezoning request does
not amount to a confiscatory taking if it is “fairly debatable” and not arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable (citing Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So. 2d 902, 906 (Miss. 1987))).
Furthermore, the Presleys’ reliance on Dunston is misplaced, as that case did not involve
zoning and the plaintiffs had not sought any administrative remedy whatsoever. Dunston,
892 So. 2d at 843 (¶16).
¶8.
As the City’s issues on cross-appeal are simply alternative grounds for affirming the
circuit court’s judgment, we need not now address those issues substantively. We would,
4
however, note that cross-appeal is neither required nor expedient where its only purpose is
to urge alternative grounds for affirmance. See Dunn v. Dunn, 853 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (¶¶4-8)
(Miss. 2003).
¶9.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TATE COUNTY IS
AFFIRMED ON DIRECT AND CROSS-APPEAL. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
AND THE APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
5
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.