Delphi Packard Electric Systems v. Earnil Brown
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-WC-00820-COA
DELPHI PACKARD ELECTRIC SYSTEMS,
EMPLOYER/SELF-INSURED
APPELLANT
v.
EARNIL BROWN
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
01/25/2007
HON. TOMIE T. GREEN
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ANDREW D. SWEAT
JENNIFER H. SCOTT
ROGER K. DOOLITTLE
CIVIL - WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CIRCUIT COURT AFFIRMED THE
COMMISSION’S FINDING OF
COMPENSABILITY AND AWARD OF
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS
AFFIRMED: 08/05/2008
EN BANC.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Delphi Packard Electric Systems appeals the decision of the Mississippi Workers’
Compensation Commission finding that Earnil Brown was entitled to permanent total disability
benefits as a result of physical and mental injuries sustained in a work-related accident on February
11, 1999. Delphi Packard argues that Brown failed to sufficiently show that: (1) his work injury
caused a disabling back injury or a mental injury, and (2) he failed to prove a loss of wage-earning
capacity. Finding that substantial evidence does exist to support the Commission’s decision, we
affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Hinds County and the decision of the Commission.
FACTS
¶2.
Brown petitioned the Commission for benefits based on injuries he sustained while employed
as a machine operator at his workplace, Delphi Packard, on February 11, 1999. Brown alleged that
he injured his neck, back, shoulders, and right hand when he fell on a wet floor while lifting
overhead. Later, Brown amended his petition to include a claim for work-related mental injuries.
¶3.
Delphi Packard admitted compensability. However, a dispute arose over the extent of the
resulting disability and the responsibility for certain medical care. Delphi Packard also denied that
Brown suffered any permanent disability or loss of wage-earning capacity as a result of the workrelated accident.
¶4.
After a hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Brown suffered a five
percent permanent partial medical impairment to his body as a whole as a result of the cervical
injury. The ALJ rejected the claim of permanent medical impairment as a result of the lumbar
injury. Brown was awarded temporary total disability benefits from September 1, 1999, through the
date of maximum medical improvement, May 2, 2000, as well as reasonable and necessary medical
services relating to the treatment of Brown’s cervical and lumbar injuries. However, Brown’s claim
for permanent benefits was denied due to his failure to prove a loss of wage-earning capacity by
making reasonable post-injury efforts to find gainful employment following his release back to
work. The ALJ denied Brown’s claim for mental injuries, finding that he failed to prove by a fair
preponderance of credible evidence that he suffered such an injury as a result of his employment
with Delphi Packard.
¶5.
Brown appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Commission. He asked the Commission to find
that he was entitled to compensation and benefits arising from his cervical, lumbar, and psychiatric
injuries. The Commission agreed with Brown and reversed the ALJ’s finding on permanent
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disability benefits. The Commission found that Brown was permanently and totally disabled.
Further, the Commission found that Brown sustained psychological or mental injuries flowing from
his physical injuries and ordered the employer to provide medical services and supplies related to
the treatment of such injuries.
¶6.
Delphi Packard appealed the Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court of Hinds County.
The circuit court found that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s decision and affirmed.
Delphi Packard’s appeal was deflected to this Court, where Delphi Packard argues that the
Commission erred in finding that Brown: (1) sustained a mental injury as a result of his February
11, 1999, work injury and (2) sufficiently proved a loss of wage-earning capacity necessary for an
award of permanent, total disability benefits.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7.
This Court’s scope of review in workers’ compensation cases is limited to a determination
of whether the decision of the Commission is supported by substantial evidence. Westmoreland v.
Landmark Furniture, Inc., 752 So. 2d 444, 447 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). The Commission sits
as the ultimate finder of fact; its findings are subject to normal, deferential standards upon review.
Natchez Equip. Co. v. Gibbs, 623 So. 2d 270, 273 (Miss. 1993). We will only reverse the
Commission’s rulings when its findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence, matters of
law are clearly erroneous, or the decision was arbitrary and capricious. Hale v. Ruleville Health
Care Ctr., 687 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Miss. 1997); Westmoreland, 752 So. 2d at 448 (¶8).
¶8.
“[A] finding is clearly erroneous when . . . the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made by the Commission in its findings
of fact and in its application of the Act.” J.R. Logging v. Halford, 765 So. 2d 580, 583 (¶13) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted).
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ANALYSIS
1.
¶9.
Whether substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determination that
Brown sustained a mental injury as a result of his February 11, 1999,
workplace injury.
The ALJ denied Brown’s claim for mental injuries, finding that Brown failed to prove that
he suffered mental or psychological injuries as a result of his employment with Delphi Packard. The
ALJ found that Brown’s psychological treatment was not reasonably and necessarily related to his
work injury. However, the Commission reversed this decision. The Commission found that
Brown’s mental injuries flowed from the existence of his physical injuries and awarded Brown
benefits based on this finding.
¶10.
When a claimant seeks compensation benefits for mental injuries, the claimant must prove
a causal connection between the employment and the injury by clear and convincing evidence.
Fought v. Stuart C. Irby Co., 523 So. 2d 314, 317 (Miss. 1988). “Furthermore, to be compensable,
a mental injury, unaccompanied by physical trauma, must have been caused by something more than
the ordinary incidents of employment.” Id.
¶11.
The Commission, as the fact-finder, considered this case with great care and provided a
well-reasoned opinion awarding benefits to Brown. That opinion reviewed all of the evidence,
including medical testimony, and provided a rational basis for resolving questions of credibility and
conflicting positions. As such, it is appropriate that this Court defer to the Commission’s findings.
¶12.
The Commission noted that Brown’s injury was initially treated by Dr. Irvin Cronin, who
is the physician Delphi Packard sent Brown to see. Brown continued to work, but he would on
occasion miss work due to this injury. While being treated by Dr. Cronin, Brown complained of
worsening pain in the area of the injury. In September 1999, Brown started treatment with Dr.
Kenneth Vogel, a neurosurgeon in New Orleans. Dr. Vogel’s records note consistent complaints
of pain by Brown in the area of the injury. Dr. Vogel first treated Brown in 1983 for a prior work-
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related injury. Dr. Vogel also treated Brown for subsequent work-related injuries; thus, he had a
fairly significant treatment history with Brown.
¶13.
Based upon his treatment of Brown, Dr. Vogel determined that “[t]he patient will have
incurred a five percent increase of medical impairment of the body as a whole with further
restrictions in that he has been advised to avoid those activities which require him to lift, push or
pull greater than 35 pounds or bend, repeatedly flex or hyper-extend the neck on a permanent basis
in the future relative to his cervical region.”
¶14.
Dr. Vogel referred Brown to Dr. Faeza Jones, a psychiatrist, for treatment of depression
secondary to chronic pain. Dr. Jones treated Brown for major depression secondary to chronic pain.
Dr. Jones noted evidence of depression with psychotic behavior, evidenced by crying episodes,
decreased appetite, sleeping disorders, and suicidal ideations – later to include homicidal ideations
as well. Dr. Jones, as a result, opined that Brown presented evidence of depression with psychotic
behavior related to work issues. According to Dr. Jones, Brown reached maximum medical
improvement, from a psychiatric basis, on December 5, 2002, but Brown required continuing
psychotherapy for major depressive disorder, secondary to chronic pain syndrome. Dr. Jones stated
that Brown’s depression, which was attributed to his chronic pain, rendered him permanently, totally
disabled.
¶15.
Brown was seen solely for an evaluation by Dr. Robert Smith, but was not treated. Dr.
Smith died prior to the hearing, and the Commission found that his medical records were too vague
to be of any assistance. The Commission noted that the only other medical evidence was that from
Drs. Robert McGuire and Mark Webb, each of whom saw Brown only once for an employer’s
evaluation and did not treat him.
¶16.
After an evaluation of all of the evidence, the Commission found Brown’s injury
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compensable, stating:
It is important to the Commission that this employee had worked for Delphi
Packard for so many years, had been injured so many times, had returned to work
after each of these injuries except the one in 1999 (and he actually may have tried to
return in 1999), was treated by his long-term physician who had performed cervical
surgeries, and was referred for treatment for depression, secondary to chronic pain
by this physician who had a long-standing relationship with the claimant.
Moreover, it is important to us that the claimant had no history or other
mental abnormality which required treatment prior to the 1999 injury and that the
medical records of Dr. Vogel reflect regular, consistent complaints of pain which
would be categorized as ‘chronic’ by medical definition. Thus contrary to the
Administrative Judge’s conclusion, it appears to us that the psychological or mental
injury flowed from the physical injuries, and we believe that this conclusion is
supported by the weight of evidence in this cause. Indeed, we give greater credence
in this case to the testimony of the claimant’s treating physicians rather than
succumb to the opinions of Doctors Smith, McGuire and Webb, however reliable
they may be. Their limited experience with and knowledge of the claimant, when
compared with the claimant’s relationship with Doctors Vogel and Jones, suggest
that it would be reasonable to accept the opinions of the latter as more reliable in this
case.
¶17.
The treating physicians’ medical records indicated no intervening injury that could be the
source of Brown’s pain. The Commission found that there was no credible suggestion of any source
of Brown’s chronic pain other than the work-related injury. Thus, the Commission found that the
mental injury “flowed from the physical injuries.”
¶18.
Because there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decision,
we affirm.
2.
¶19.
Whether the Commission erred in finding that Brown sustained a loss of
wage-earning capacity.
Delphi Packard argues that in the absence of evidence of reasonable efforts by an individual
to obtain other employment, the law precludes a finding of permanent, total disability. Delphi
Packard alleges that there was a lack of evidence to show that Brown made a reasonable job search;
therefore, the Commission’s decision awarding him permanent, total disability benefits was error.
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Brown responds that the Commission was correct in finding that the absence of completing a formal
job search did not preclude a finding of permanent disability.
¶20.
In the workers’ compensation context, “disability” is defined as the “incapacity because of
injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other
employment, which incapacity and the extent thereof must be supported by medical findings.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-3(i) (Rev. 2000). The supreme court set forth the following rule regarding
the burdens of proof required in a claim for disability:
The claimant has the burden of proof to make out a prima facie case for disability,
after which the burden of proof shifts to the employer to rebut or refute the
claimant’s evidence. After the burden shifts, evidence indicating that suitable
employment was available to claimant becomes relevant and admissible. In such a
posture, the employer may present evidence (if any) showing that the claimant’s
efforts to obtain other employment were a mere sham, or less than reasonable, or
without proper diligence.
Thompson v. Wells-Lamont Corp., 362 So. 2d 638, 641 (Miss. 1978). This rule has been interpreted
to require that a claimant “unequivocally prove a reasonable effort to find other employment.”
Sardis Luggage Co. v. Wilson, 374 So. 2d 826, 829 (Miss. 1979). “The injured claimant, in order
to demonstrate total disability must show that he has made a diligent effort, but without success, to
obtain other gainful employment. A finding that the claimant has not pursued alternate forms of
work with sufficient diligence is grounds to deny a claim of total disability.” McCray v. Key
Constrs., Inc., 803 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Walker Mfg. Co. v.
Cantrell, 577 So. 2d 1243, 1249 (Miss. 1991)).
¶21.
However, as with most rules, there are also exceptions. An exception to the requirement that
a claimant demonstrate reasonable efforts to find alternative employment is when his doctor declares
him totally disabled and lacking in the capacity to perform meaningful employment. As the
Commission noted, that is the circumstance in which Brown found himself. On December 5, 2002,
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Dr. Jones, without equivocation, stated, “Mr. Earnil Brown is being treated for Major Depressive
disorder, Secondary to Chronic Pain Syndrome. He remains on medication and is receiving
psychotherapy. He is totally disabled (100%) to perform any type of work. He will not be able to
return to work or other normal activity. He has reached his maximum recovery potential. Mr.
Brown has poor memory.” (emphasis added). Where a claimant’s doctor has declared him totally
disabled, this Court does not require that he act contrary to the advice of his doctor and seek
employment as a condition of receiving permanent, total disability. Stewart v. Singing River Hosp.
Sys., 928 So. 2d 176, 185 (¶46) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
¶22.
We find that Brown, by medical evidence, met his burden of proving a loss of wage-earning
capacity. Thus, the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not in
error.
¶23.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Hinds County and the decision of the Mississippi
Workers’ Compensation Commission are affirmed.
¶24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS AFFIRMED.
ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J.,
DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY ISHEE, ROBERTS AND
CARLTON, JJ. BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTING:
¶25.
Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority’s decision in this case. As to the first issue,
I am of the opinion that the medical evidence presented by Earnil Brown failed to show a causal
connection between his mental injury and his physical injury occurring on February 11, 1999; thus,
there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Brown is entitled to
benefits for his mental injury. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court and
the decision of the Commission on the issue of compensation for Brown’s mental injury and render
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judgment in favor of Delphi Packard Electric Systems.
¶26.
As the majority states, the ALJ found that Brown’s psychological treatment was not
reasonably and necessarily related to his work injury, but the Commission reversed, finding that
Brown’s mental injuries flowed from the existence of his physical injuries. In making this
determination, the Commission relied upon the opinion of Dr. V. Faeza Jones, Brown’s treating
psychiatrist. Dr. Jones diagnosed Brown with chronic pain syndrome and opined that this condition
led to depression and psychiatric disorders. The Commission found that Dr. Jones noted evidence
of Brown’s depression with psychotic behavior related to work issues.
¶27.
Based on Dr. Jones’s opinion, the Commission held that Brown’s compensable physical
injury resulted in his psychological disorder; thus, his mental injury was also compensable.
However, the law is clear that “a claimant asserting that a mental or nervous disease has resulted
from an industrial accident must show the causal connection between the accident and the
psychoneurosis by clear evidence.” Hemphill Drug Co. v. Mann, 274 So. 2d 117, 120 (Miss. 1973)
(quoting Miller Transporters, Ltd. v. Reeves, 195 So. 2d 95, 100 (Miss. 1967)) (emphasis added).
It is not enough to say, as the Commission did here, that because there was no history of mental
injury prior to the work injury, it therefore appears that the mental injury flowed from the work
injury. There was no clear evidence presented to the Commission connecting Brown’s mental
injuries to his work injury on February 11, 1999. As such, there is no substantial evidence to uphold
the Commission’s decision.
¶28.
When there is no evidence to support the Commission’s finding, we do not hesitate to
reverse. Foamex Prods. v. Simons, 822 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). The lack
of evidence showing a causal connection between Brown’s mental injury and his physical work
injury is shown by the following review of the evidence that was presented to the Commission.
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¶29.
Brown was referred to Dr. Jones in August 2000 for “psych treatment/pain management.”
Dr. Jones reported that Brown was anxious, paranoid, irritable, hearing voices, and having difficulty
sleeping. Dr. Jones consistently stated that these problems were secondary to the chronic pain rather
than a specific accident or injury. On an insurance form completed in 2001, Dr. Jones indicated that
Brown’s condition was not related to an accident; instead, it was due to chronic pain. Further, in
various “To Whom It May Concern” letters written in 2002, Dr. Jones again attributed the cause of
Brown’s psychological problems to chronic pain and in no way mentioned the accident on February
11, 1999. Upon review of the medical evidence, it is apparent that Dr. Jones attributed Brown’s
major depressive disorder to his chronic pain; however, Dr. Jones never connected Brown’s mental
disorder to his physical injury on February 11, 1999.
¶30.
The only other evidence before the Commission concerning Brown’s mental status was the
medical opinion of Dr. Mark Webb, a psychiatrist who evaluated Brown at the request of Delphi
Packard. Dr. Webb diagnosed Brown as suffering from major depression with psychotic features
and personality disorder with histrionic and paranoid features. He concluded that Brown’s
personality disorder had existed almost from childhood. Dr. Webb found that Brown’s personality
disorder worked to fuel his depressive state for which he is “sort of blaming [Delphi] Packard or
over-reacting.” Dr. Webb concluded that Brown’s psychiatric impairment was not related to his
work injury on February 11, 1999. Instead, he concluded that Brown’s chronic pain was “coming
from his paranoia and histrionic features” which had existed throughout most of Brown’s life.
¶31.
Because the medical evidence presented by Brown failed to show a causal connection
between his mental injury and his physical injury occurring on February 11, 1999, there is no
substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Brown is entitled to benefits for his
mental injury.
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¶32.
I must also respectfully dissent from the majority’s second issue regarding the Commission’s
finding that Brown suffered a loss of wage-earning capacity. The majority correctly cites the rule
that requires a claimant to make a diligent effort to find other gainful employment before receiving
total disability benefits. However, the majority finds that this case fits within an exception to this
longstanding rule because Dr. Jones, Brown’s psychiatrist, considered Brown 100% disabled and
unable to return to any type of work; thus, a job search was unnecessary.
¶33.
For this proposition, the majority cites our previous holding in Stewart v. Singing River
Hospital System, 928 So. 2d 176, 185 (¶46) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). However, the present case is
distinguishable from the facts of Stewart. In Stewart, the Court, stating the exception to the rule,
held that there was no requirement that the claimant seek out other employment when such a search
was contrary to a competent medical evaluation that the claimant was totally disabled and unable
to work. Id. However, the Court in Stewart specifically stated that the compensability of the
accident was never a matter of dispute in the case. Id. at (¶43). The sole contested issue was “the
existence and extent of any permanent disability and the loss of wage[-]earning capacity attributable
to the Claimant’s injury.” Id.
¶34.
Here, however, Delphi Packard not only disputed the diagnosis of disability by Dr. Jones but
also the mental injuries that were the basis of that diagnosis. Delphi Packard has at all times denied
the compensability of Brown’s mental injuries. Delphi Packard further contested the reasonableness
and medical necessity of the treatment Brown received from Dr. Jones and the causal connection
between her diagnosis and Brown’s work injury of February 11, 1999. Delphi Packard did not
accept the findings of Dr. Jones that Brown was unable to return to any type of work and retained
its own medical expert, Dr. Webb, who concluded that Brown’s mental injuries were not workrelated.
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¶35.
The compensability of Brown’s mental injury, which was the basis of Dr. Jones’s diagnosis
that Brown is totally disabled, has been a central point of contention throughout this case. Thus, the
facts here do not, as the majority suggests, neatly fall within the exception stated in Stewart. Just
as I find that Brown did not provide sufficient evidence to connect his mental injuries to his
compensable work injury, I also find that the diagnosis of his psychiatrist did not dissolve the
requirement that Brown conduct a job search.
¶36.
It is undisputed that Brown did not conduct any type of job search. Consequently, I find
that Brown did not meet his burden of proving a loss of wage-earning capacity. Further, the
Commission erred as a matter of law by holding that Brown was not required to conduct a diligent
job search in order to prove total disability. Therefore, there is no substantial evidence to support
the Commission’s award of permanent, total disability benefits. I would reverse the judgment of
the circuit court and the decision of the Commission on this issue and render judgment in favor of
Delphi Packard.
ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., JOIN THIS SEPARATE OPINION.
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