Quenton Hughes v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CP-00665-COA
QUENTON HUGHES A/K/A QUENTON BARCEL
HUGHES A/K/A QWENTON B. HUGHES
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
06/19/2006
HON. ROBERT G. EVANS
SIMPSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
QUENTON HUGHES (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DENIED
AFFIRMED: 08/05/2008
BEFORE KING, C.J., GRIFFIS AND CARLTON, JJ.
KING, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Quenton Hughes appeals the Simpson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion for post-
conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
Hughes was indicted on March 1, 2004, on two counts, second degree arson and attempted
strong arm robbery. He entered a plea of guilty as to second degree arson as a habitual offender, and
the State filed an entry of nolle prosequi to the charge of attempted robbery. The trial court accepted
his guilty plea and found him guilty of second degree arson and sentenced him as a habitual offender
pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2000). He was sentenced to the
maximum sentence for second degree arson of ten years in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections without eligibility for probation or parole.
¶3.
After sentencing, Hughes filed several motions in the trial court aimed at “discovery.” It
appears that he attempted to gather as much information as he possibly could about his case through
these motions. The motions included: (1) a motion for discovery filed on November 16, 2005, (2)
a motion for transcript and records filed on January 17, 2006, (3) a motion for discovery filed on
January 27, 2006, and (4) a motion to compel filed on April 25, 2006. All of these motions appear
on the circuit court’s docket. The circuit court’s order granting Hughes discovery from the district
attorney’s office was filed on May 2, 2006; the trial court’s two additional orders were both filed
on June 20, 2006. The first order denied Hughes’s “Motion to Correct Sentence,” while the second
order denied Hughes’s “Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief.” Conspicuously absent from
the record and the circuit court’s docket is any semblance of a motion to correct sentence or a
motion for post-conviction relief.
¶4.
Upon receipt of the circuit court’s June 20th orders, Hughes filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
¶5.
Hughes makes three different allegations of error on appeal: (1) he committed fourth degree
arson and not second degree arson; (2) he was wrongfully sentenced as a habitual offender under
section 99-19-83; and (3) his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶6.
However, prior to addressing the merits of Hughes’s claims, we must first take notice of the
fact that there is no record of exactly what Hughes raised before the trial court. As mentioned
before, a motion for post-conviction relief does not appear in the record. We cannot decide issues
based on the parties’ briefs alone; issues must be proven by the record. Genry v. State, 735 So. 2d
186, 200 (¶72) (Miss. 1999). Therefore, even if the trial court committed error in denying Hughes’s
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motion for post-conviction relief, this Court has no way of knowing what, if any, error occurred.
¶7.
We note that Hughes made several efforts to supplement the record with various information.
However, none of those efforts attempted to introduce the motion for post-conviction relief. The
majority of the efforts sought to introduce the plea colloquy into the record. It is the appellant’s duty
to provide this Court with the record to support the allegation that the trial court committed a
reversible error. Without any evidence of that motion, we cannot say that the trial court erred by
denying Hughes’s motion for post-conviction relief. Therefore, the matter is not properly before the
Court. Regardless, even if we took all of the facts provided by Hughes as true, the trial court should
not have granted the motion for post-conviction relief.
¶8.
As for Hughes’s first allegation of error, he claims that he should have only been found
guilty fourth degree arson and not second degree arson “because of his attention [sic] to burn the
build [sic], but never accomplish the job, because only personal property was damage [sic] by fire.”
He further admits that the vent panels of the building were also damaged. It appears that Hughes
misinterprets Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-17-5 (Rev. 2006) to require that the building
must be destroyed. However, section 97-17-5 reads: “Any person who willfully and maliciously sets
fire to or burns or causes to be burned . . . any building[.]” Clearly, the statute does not require
destruction of the building as alleged by Hughes. It merely requires that the building be burned.
Therefore, Hughes’s admission in his brief that he intended to burn the building and that the vent
panels and shoe rack were in fact burned provides enough evidence to show that Hughes was guilty
of second degree arson. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
¶9.
Likewise, his allegation that he was not eligible for an enhanced sentence under section 99-
19-83 is without merit. He alleges that while he was sentenced to at least two separate violent
crimes in Florida, he was sentenced to concurrent sentences; therefore, he did not serve separate
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sentences as required by section 99-19-83. However, the supreme court has held that when an
individual has been previously sentenced to two separate crimes which otherwise would satisfy the
elements of section 99-19-83, the mere fact that the sentences ran concurrently does not disqualify
them from the enhancement provision. Magee v. State, 542 So. 2d 228, 236 (Miss. 1989).
Therefore, Hughes’s Florida convictions for attempted robbery and robbery with a weapon would
have satisfied the elements for sentence enhancement under section 99-19-83.
¶10.
Finally, his allegation that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel is also
without merit. Hughes alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him that: (1) the
crime he committed was fourth degree arson and not second degree arson, and (2) he was not subject
to enhancement under section 99-19-83. As we have previously discussed, Hughes admits in his
briefs that he committed second degree arson, and his previous convictions in Florida properly
subjected him to sentence enhancement under section 99-19-83. Hughes has not provided this Court
with any other example that his counsel was deficient. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SIMPSON COUNTY DENYING
THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO SIMPSON COUNTY.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE,
ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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