Will D. Massey v. Joe S. Lewis
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CA-01870-COA
WILL D. MASSEY AND JACKIE M. MASSEY
APPELLANTS
v.
JOE S. LEWIS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
07/18/2007
HON. JERRY G. MASON
CHANCERY COURT OF LAUDERDALE
COUNTY
DON O. ROGERS
MARK A. SCARBOROUGH
CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
CONFIRMING TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY
IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE
REVERSED AND RENDERED-12/02/2008
BEFORE KING, C.J., BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This case arises from a property line dispute among Will D. (Will) and Jackie Massey
(collectively, Masseys) and their neighbor, Joe S. Lewis, in which the chancellor found that
a 1996 quitclaim deed vested title to the “hatched area” 1 of certain property in Lewis’s
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The “hatched area,” which is the focus of this dispute, is described in the record as
the area of property located between the old fence line and the actual dividing line separating
the Massey and Washington properties as described in their respective deeds. Though the
Masseys did not truly own this parcel of land, they had openly possessed and occupied it for
fifty years without objection from the Washingtons.
predecessor, and subsequently passed title to Lewis. The Masseys contended that they
acquired the hatched area by adverse possession and that it was never their intention nor
Lewis’s predecessor’s intention to relinquish title to that parcel. Aggrieved, the Masseys
appeal, asserting:
I.
The chancellor erred in holding that the 1996 quitclaim deed from the
Masseys to Lewis’s predecessor was without limitations or restrictions
and, therefore, passed title to the entire parcel of property as described
by the land description in the deed.
II.
The chancellor erred in not reforming the 1996 quitclaim deed
description to exclude the hatched area, because it was not Lewis’s
predecessor nor Masseys’ intention to convey the hatched area.
Finding that the original parties never intended to convey the hatched area, and that the
chancellor erred by failing to reform the 1996 quitclaim deed between the Masseys and
Lewis’s predecessor, we reverse the decision of the chancellor and render judgment
reforming the deed to exclude the hatched area and confirming title to the hatched area in
favor of the Masseys.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2.
The Masseys were neighbors of William and Mildred Washington for more than fifty
years. Each owned adjoining property in Lauderdale County. The Masseys’ property was
aligned along the eastern and southern border of the Washingtons’ property. The legal
descriptions that described their respective properties did not overlap but instead shared a
common dividing line. From the 1950s to the trial date, the dividing line was represented by
an old fence line that ran between the two properties. The old fence line was always
considered to be the property line, even though no survey had ever been conducted on either
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the Masseys’ or the Washingtons’ parcel of land.
¶3.
In 1992, the Washingtons’ property was sold at a tax sale. The highest bidder was Hot
Properties, Inc. After the Washingtons failed to redeem the property within the statutory
redemption period, the chancery clerk issued a tax deed to Hot Properties. The tax deed was
recorded in the land records office of the Chancery Clerk of Lauderdale County and
described the property as follows:
#9-B; N ½ S ½ SW NW 1/4 LESS 1 A IN NWC & LESS THAT PT S&W RD
SECTION 1 TOWNSHIP 7 RANGE 15
¶4.
Subsequently, the Masseys noticed a “for sale” sign on the Washingtons’ property and
agreed to purchase the property from Hot Properties for $10,000. A quitclaim deed was
executed by Hot Properties in favor of the Masseys on December 26, 1994, and recorded
with the chancery clerk. The quitclaim deed described the property conveyed to the Masseys
as follows:
#9-B; N ½ S ½ SW NW 1/4 LESS 1 A IN NWC & LESS THAT PT S&W RD
SECTION 1 TOWNSHIP 7 RANGE 15, LAUDERDALE COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI. PARCEL # 121010000000015,
together with all improvements situated thereon and all appurtenances
thereunto belonging, being the same interest acquired by Hot Properties, Inc.
....
Approximately three weeks after the deed was delivered to them, the Masseys filed a suit to
confirm title. The Washingtons objected and asked for the tax sale and tax deed to be held
void on the grounds that they did not receive proper notification. In 1996, the parties reached
a settlement in which the Masseys agreed to dismiss the suit and execute a quitclaim deed
in favor of the Washingtons in exchange for $7,600. The deed used the same legal
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description to describe the property as used in the quitclaim deed conveyed to the Masseys
by Hot Properties. The validity of the tax sale was not adjudicated by the court. After the
settlement, the Washingtons and the Masseys continued to occupy the same parcels of land
as they did prior to the tax sale. During this time, the Masseys constructed a barn and an
equipment shed that were located on their side of the old fence line but partially on the
hatched area.
¶5.
On August 13, 2002, the Washingtons conveyed their property to Lewis. Two years
later, Lewis employed a surveyor to survey the property. This was the first time that the
Washingtons’ property had ever been surveyed. Unbeknownst to the Washingtons and the
Masseys, Lewis discovered that the old fence was not located on the dividing line described
in the deed. Instead, the fence encroached onto Lewis’s property by 1.33 acres. Lewis and
Will attempted to reach a compromise by which Will would agree to move the fence.
However, the negotiations fell apart after the surveyor staked off the actual property line, and
Will realized that the stakes came a great deal further onto his property than he originally
anticipated. Will was specifically concerned about the location of three of his buildings that
were partially located in the hatched area, as well as access to a creek located on the north
side of the property.
¶6.
As a result of the failed negotiations, Lewis filed a complaint for declaratory judgment
and other relief in the Chancery Court of Lauderdale County naming the Masseys as
defendants. In response, the Masseys requested that the chancellor reform the 1996 quitclaim
deed description limiting the area of property conveyed to the Washingtons to the old fence
line. After hearing the evidence, the chancellor held that, though the Masseys had originally
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acquired title to the hatched area by adverse possession, they relinquished that title when they
reconveyed the property back to the Washingtons by way of the 1996 quitclaim deed. The
chancellor also held that the Masseys failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
execution and delivery of the deed resulted from mutual mistake between themselves and the
Washingtons. Finding that the deed was unambiguous, the chancellor held that the deed
vested title to the hatched area in the Washingtons as of that date; therefore, title passed to
Lewis when the Washingtons’ property was conveyed to him. Further, because only eight
years had passed between the reconveyance and Lewis’s complaint, the Masseys had failed
to reestablish their title by adverse possession under Mississippi’s ten-year adverse
possession statute. Therefore, the chancellor confirmed the title to Lewis’s property to
include the hatched area. The validity of the 1994 tax deed was not submitted before the
chancellor; therefore, he could not find that the deed was void.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7.
This Court adheres to a limited standard of review of the decisions of a chancellor.
Nichols v. Funderburk, 883 So. 2d 554, 556 (¶7) (Miss. 2004). We will reverse only when
the chancellor's determinations were manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or when the
chancellor applied an incorrect legal standard. Id. If substantial evidence supports the
chancellor's fact-findings, this Court must affirm. Id.
ANALYSIS
I.
¶8.
Whether the chancellor erred in holding that the Masseys’ legal
interest in the hatched area passed by virtue of the 1992 tax sale
and conveyance of the 1996 quitclaim deed.
It is undisputed that the Masseys acquired title to the hatched area by adverse
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possession prior to the 1992 tax sale.
The issue on appeal is whether the Masseys
relinquished their title to the hatched area by purchasing the Washingtons’ property after the
tax sale and subsequently reconveying the property back to the Washingtons in 1996. Lewis
argues that the tax sale interrupted the Masseys’ adverse possession claim, and their
subsequent conveyance by way of the 1996 quitclaim deed relinquished title to the hatched
area. The Masseys argue that the tax sale was void due to improper notice; therefore, no
legal interest in the hatched area was conveyed by virtue of the sale. Further, the Masseys
contend that it was never their intent to convey the hatched area. Therefore, their adverse
possession claim remained ripe, and the Washingtons had no interest in the hatched area to
convey to Lewis.
¶9.
The Masseys assertion that the tax sale was void is based solely on the Washingtons’
claim in the 1995 confirmation suit that they failed to receive proper notice of the sale.
However, because the Masseys and Washingtons subsequently settled the suit, the validity
of the tax sale was never adjudicated by the court. The chancellor noted this in his opinion,
stating that because the validity of the tax sale was not submitted to him, he could not find
that the tax sale was void. The Masseys have offered no other evidence sufficient to suggest
that the tax sale was void. Therefore, the chancellor was correct in his presumption that the
tax sale was valid.
¶10.
Having found that Hot Properties did possess a legal interest in the Washingtons’
property that they then could convey to the Masseys, we must determine whether the
Masseys relinquished their adverse possession claim to the hatched area. The Masseys
contend that it was never their intent to relinquish title to the hatched area through the 1996
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quitclaim deed. They argue that even if the tax sale was valid, it did not serve as an
interruption to the Masseys’ adverse possession claim to the property.
¶11.
The Masseys’ intent is largely irrelevant with regard to the effect that the tax sale had
on adverse possession. Mississippi Code Annotated section 27-45-23 (Rev. 2006) states that
when a property is sold for taxes and after the redemption period has expired, the chancery
clerk shall execute a deed of conveyance to the purchaser at the tax sale, and that
“conveyance shall vest in the purchaser a perfect title with the immediate right of possession
to the land sold for taxes.” Further, our supreme court has held that adverse possession
cannot operate to vest title while a municipality holds the tax title to the land in question.
Grayson v. Robinson, 240 Miss. 59, 63, 126 So. 2d 247, 249 (1961). The supreme court
expanded on this point in Cotten v. Cotten, 203 Miss. 316, 321, 35 So. 2d 61, 63 (1948),
stating that even if at the time of a tax sale a defendant had acquired perfect title to a disputed
strip of land by adverse possession, he could lose that title by permitting the land to be sold
for taxes as part of an adjoining tract of land not owned by him.
¶12.
As previously stated, it is undisputed that the Masseys had a matured and ripened
adverse possession claim to the hatched area prior to the 1992 tax sale, as they had openly
maintained ownership of the property for more than fifty years. However, regardless of the
extent and quality of the Masseys’ adverse possession, they relinquished their claim when
they allowed the hatched area to be sold at the tax sale as part of the Washingtons’ property.
Winstead v. Winstead, 204 Miss. 787, 789-90; 38 So. 2d 118, 119 (1948). This effectively
tolled the adverse possession period. Id. Further, the execution and delivery of the deed
from the chancery clerk to Hot Properties, and its subsequent recording, had the effect of
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removing record title from the Washingtons and vesting it in Hot Properties. Over the next
two years, record title was conveyed to the Masseys, who subsequently reconveyed title back
to the Washingtons. Therefore, the Masseys had to reestablish their adverse possession claim
of the hatched area at the point the property reverted back to the Washingtons. Given that
only eight years had passed between the reconveyance and Lewis’s filing of this action, the
Masseys’ title to the hatched area had not ripened by adverse possession.
¶13.
Under these circumstances, we find that the chancellor did not err in holding that legal
interest passed from the Masseys to Lewis by virtue of the 1992 tax sale and 1996 quitclaim
deed.
II.
Whether the chancellor erred in not reforming the 1996 quitclaim
deed description to exclude the hatched area.
¶14. The Masseys contend that the 1996 quitclaim deed should have been reformed to
reflect the intentions and expectations of the parties. Specifically, they allege that the deed
was conveyed as part of a settlement of their 1995 confirmation suit against the Washingtons,
and the deed must be read in conjunction and in light of that settlement. The Masseys claim
that the purpose of the settlement was to return to the Washingtons what they lost at the tax
sale. They contend that because the Washingtons did not believe that they owned the
hatched area before the tax sale, they did not expect to acquire it by the reconveyance after
the tax sale. Instead, their conveyance of the hatched area to the Washingtons was the result
of a mutual mistake as to the land description used in the deed.
¶15.
It is a well-settled principle that “[w]hen the language of the deed or contract is clear,
definite, explicit, harmonious in all its provisions and free from ambiguity throughout, the
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court looks solely to the language used in the instrument itself, and will give effect to each
and all its parts as written.” Estate of Deloach v. Deloach, 873 So. 2d 146, 150 (¶14) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2004). However, this is not to say that this principle is absolute in all cases. This
Court has stated that:
[w]hen, however, the language falls short of the qualities above mentioned and
resort must be had to extrinsic aid, the court will look to the subject matter
embraced therein, to the particular situation of the parties who made the
instrument, and to the general situation touching the subject matter, that is to
say, to all conditions surrounding the parties at the time of the execution of the
instrument, and to, what as may fairly assumed, they had in contemplation in
respect to all such said surrounding conditions, giving weight also to the future
developments therein about which were reasonably to be anticipated or
expected by them; and when the parties have for some time proceeded with or
under the deed or contract, a large measure, and sometimes, a controlling
measure, of regard will be given to the practical construction which the parties
themselves have given it, this is on the common sense proposition that actions
generally speak louder than words.
Id.
¶16.
Our supreme court has previously held that its purpose in construing deeds is to reflect
the intentions of the parties, stating that it is not always the description of the property that
the parties intend to write but rather the property the parties intended to include in the
description that controls. Webb v. Brown, 404 So. 2d 1029, 1031-32 (Miss. 1981). In Webb,
Peggy Wiggins and Durwood McGuffie had negotiated a purchase of property from Annie
Varnado, who was the original owner of the property. Id. at 1031. That conveyance had
included three different buildings, but unbeknownst to the parties, the deed included part of
a fourth building. Id. According to all testimony, Varnado specifically refused to convey
title to the fourth building. Id. McGuffie later purchased Wiggins’s interest and later sold
the identical property to one of the buildings’ tenants, Elizabeth Brown. Id. The deed to
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Brown used the same description as the prior conveyance from Varnado to Wiggins and
McGuffie, but it was not intended to include the fourth building. Id. Varnado’s heir,
McGuffie, and Wiggins sought reformation of the deed to exclude all of the fourth building.
Id. at 1030. However, the chancellor entered judgment in favor of the Brown. Id. On
appeal, the supreme court stated that the evidence unmistakably demonstrated that it was the
clear intention of Varnado not to convey the fourth building. Id. at 1032. The supreme court
also found that Brown, who had been a tenant of one of the buildings, was cognizant of the
fact that the fourth building was owned by Varnado and not McGuffie. Id. Even though the
deed description after the survey included part of the fourth building, it was not the
description they intended to write that controlled but the property the parties intended to
include in the description used. Id. Therefore, the supreme court concluded that the
evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt a mutual mistake on the part of the seller
and the purchaser. Id.
¶17.
The facts of this case are very similar to those in Webb. Although the Masseys
technically conveyed their interest in the hatched area by way of the 1996 quitclaim deed,
that conveyance was clearly based on a mutual mistake between the Masseys and the
Washingtons. The mistake was not in the deed description, having used the same legal
description that had always been used to describe the Washingtons’ property. Instead, the
mistake was in what the deed description included. It is clear from the record that both the
Masseys and the Washingtons believed that the deed description set the old fence line as the
dividing line between their properties.
For fifty years, both the Masseys and the
Washingtons recognized the old fence line as the property line. There is no evidence that the
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Masseys or the Washingtons ever disputed this belief. In fact, the record reflects just the
opposite. Both Will and Washington testified that prior to 2004, no survey had ever been
conducted on the property. Instead, they operated under the mistaken assumption that the
old fence was the proper boundary line.
¶18.
It is also clear from the record that based on their mistaken belief as to the property
line, the Masseys and the Washingtons believed the hatched area was part of the Masseys’
property; therefore, they never intended to include it in the deed description. In recognizing
that the old fence line was the property line, they recognized that everything to the east and
south of the old fence was Masseys’ property. This is reflected by the fact that during the
fifty-year period that the Masseys adversely possessed the property, the Masseys had
constructed and operated a barn, shop, and an equipment shed on the hatched area without
an objection from the Washingtons.
¶19.
This mutual mistake is also evident in several factual findings made by the chancellor
during the confirmation suit. First, the chancellor noted, “[the Masseys] in 1996 were not
aware that any real property south and east of the fence was not included within the real
property previously conveyed to them.” Second, “Mrs. Washington did not recall any
dispute between her family and the Massey family as to the location of the common
boundary lines . . . .” Third, the location of the property line was not even discussed during
the settlement negotiation. In fact, the Washingtons admitted that they were not aware that
any real property located south and east of the old fence was conveyed to them as a result of
the settlement. Finally, Will testified that it was never his intent to “give away anything
except what [he] got from Hot Properties. . . .” Will believed that he had always owned the
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hatched area and did not receive it as part of the conveyance from Hot Properties. Of even
greater significance is the fact that after the deed was conveyed, both the Masseys and the
Washingtons went back to occupying their respective properties as they had done before the
tax sale. In fact, the Masseys’ possession and ownership of the hatched area was not
challenged until Lewis’s survey was conducted eight years later.
¶20.
Accordingly, the evidence demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the Masseys’
conveyance of the hatched area to the Washingtons was based on a mutual mistake in the
deed description. Moreover, we are of the opinion that had the Masseys known that the deed
description included the hatched area, they would have never conveyed it to the
Washingtons. As the court held in Webb, “[i]t is not what description the parties intended
to write but what property the parties intended to have embraced in the description they
used.” Id. (quoting Brimm v. McGee, 119 Miss. 52, 57, 80 So. 379, 381 (1918)). Therefore,
the mistake in description in the deed should be reformed to coincide with the description of
the property intended to be conveyed. The chancellor erred by not reforming the deed to
reflect the Masseys’ and the Washingtons’ intentions.
¶21.
Finally, we turn to Lewis’s assertion that he was a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice, which he briefly mentions in his appellate brief. The evidence does not
support Lewis’s argument. Instead it supports a finding that Lewis, who was Washington’s
brother-in-law, was cognizant of the fact that he was not purchasing the area south and east
of the old fence. The Washington property had been in the family for many years, so we find
it reasonable to infer that Lewis knew the location of the old fence line and that it served as
the Washingtons’ property line. Lewis also did not conduct a survey of the property before
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it was conveyed to him. It was not until two years after the conveyance that Lewis conducted
a survey and found that the old fence was not located on the deed lines. Furthermore, based
on this evidence, the chancellor noted that: (1) “Lewis was surprised at the various distances
from the surveyed property line to the fence . . .”; and (2) “[t]hese litigants did not realize the
difference in the actual property line and the fence line until the plaintiff employed a
surveyor to survey the real property conveyed to him pursuant to the deed . . . .”
¶22.
The chancellor’s findings indicate that he believed that Lewis was under the
impression that the fence line was the actual property line and that the Masseys claimed the
hatched area. Such a finding would preclude Lewis from claiming the status of a bona fide
purchaser. Under the facts set out above, we cannot agree, based solely on Lewis’s blanket
assertion that he was a bona fide purchaser, that he had no notice of the Masseys’ claim to
the hatched area. Therefore, a reformation of the deed would be equitable as to all parties.
The chancellor’s finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record; therefore, we see
no merit to Lewis’s claim that he was a bona fide purchaser.
CONCLUSION
¶23.
Although the Masseys arguably relinquished their adverse possession claim to the
hatched area, the evidence clearly shows that they had no knowledge that the hatched area
was actually part of the Washingtons’ property. Further, the evidence shows that had they
known this, the Masseys would not have conveyed the hatched area to the Washingtons after
they acquired record title. Accordingly, we believe that no title vested in Lewis to the
hatched area; therefore, he had no interest in the title to such property.
¶24.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court. We render judgment
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reforming the 1996 quitclaim deed to exclude the hatched area from the deed description and
confirming title to the hatched area in favor of the Masseys.
¶25. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF LAUDERDALE
COUNTY IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE
ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS,
BARNES, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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