Dennis Darnell Howard v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-KA-00671-COA
DENNIS DARNELL HOWARD
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
03/12/2007
HON. JOSEPH H. LOPER, JR.
ATTALA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOHN KEITH PERRY
ANTWAYN LAVELL PATRICK
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: BILLY L. GORE
DOUG EVANS
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF ARMED ROBBERY AND
SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND ORDERED TO PAY A
FINE OF $1,000.
AFFIRMED - 08/12/2008
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., IRVING AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Dennis Darnell Howard was convicted by a jury in the Attala County Circuit Court for the
crime of armed robbery. He was sentenced to serve a term of twenty-five years in the custody of
the Mississippi Department of Corrections and ordered to pay all court costs, assessments, and a fine
in the amount of $1,000. On appeal, Howard argues that (1) the verdict was against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence, and (2) the trial judge gave confusing supplemental jury
instructions. For the reasons explained below, we find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶2.
On the night of June 27, 2005, Craig Smith, who was employed as a manager at Burger King,
closed the store and went to Citizen’s Bank to deposit the business’s proceeds – approximately
$1,300. Smith’s co-worker, Cassandra Weatherby, followed in her vehicle. When they arrived at
the bank, Smith placed the money in the night depository; Weatherby remained in her vehicle. As
Smith returned to his vehicle, he noticed Howard emerge from a wooded area and proceed toward
him. According to Smith, Howard repeatedly beat him in the head with a small silver handgun and
demanded the money. The parties dispute whether Howard had a real handgun. The State contends
that Howard had a real handgun; Howard claims that he had a water gun. Smith told Howard that
the money was already in the depository, and Howard returned to the wooded area.
¶3.
Trial was held on March 12, 2007. Howard’s theory of the case was that, earlier on the day
of the robbery, he went to the drive-thru window at Burger King, where Smith “made a pass at him,”
which infuriated him. According to Howard, he saw Smith make the deposit, approached him, and
hit him with a water gun. In this regard, his attorney, Antwayn Patrick, told the jury during opening
statements that Howard hit Smith “[n]ot with a gun, with a water gun.”
¶4.
In its case-in-chief, the State called Smith, who testified in accordance with the above-
mentioned facts. The State then called Weatherby. She testified that she identified Howard, but she
was unable to hear the verbal exchange because she was situated some distance away. Weatherby
was asked no questions regarding a gun and made no mention of a gun. She stated only that she saw
Howard approach and hit Smith. As the State’s final witness, it called Dr. Brady Richardson, who
treated Smith in the emergency room shortly after the incident. Dr. Richardson testified that Smith
suffered a “raised tender area to the scalp on the left side of the crown of the head.” According to
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Dr. Richardson, Smith’s injuries were consistent with being struck in the head with a handgun. He
also testified that Smith’s injuries could have been caused with a fist, and it was possible that
Smith’s injuries were caused by a water gun.
¶5.
At the conclusion of Dr. Richardson’s testimony the State rested, and Howard made a motion
for a directed verdict of acquittal, which the trial court denied. Howard did not testify and called
no witnesses to testify on his behalf. Instead, he rested his case.
¶6.
The trial judge instructed the jury. Among the instructions given was instruction C-1, which
read in pertinent part as follows:
The evidence which you are to consider consists of the testimony and
statements of witnesses and the exhibits offered and received. You are also
permitted to draw such reasonable inferences from the evidence as seems justified
in light of your own experience.
Arguments, statements, and remarks of counsel are intended to help you
understand the evidence and apply the law, but are not evidence. If any argument,
statement, or remark has no basis in evidence, then you should disregard that
argument, statement, or remark.
¶7.
Approximately one hour into deliberation, the jury sent the following question to the trial
judge: “Both Mr. Howard’s lawyer, as well as the prosecution[,] stated that Mr. Howard was present
[and] had a gun of some type. Can this be used as evidence since Mr. Howard never stated this
himself?” The trial judge told the attorneys that he intended to submit the following written
response to the jury: “The Court instructed the jury that you’ve heard all of the evidence and that
you must base your verdict on the evidence as it has been presented.” The following exchange then
took place among the trial judge, Patrick, and the prosecutor, Adam Hopper:
BY MR. PATRICK: I think the answer would be no, Your Honor. It’s not in
evidence. Even what I said is not in evidence.
BY THE COURT:
Well, I know, and I’m saying - - I’m telling them that they’ve
heard all the evidence and must base their verdict on the
evidence that’s been presented.
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BY MR. HOPPER:
I think that’s proper, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT:
I mean, they’re being told they have to base it on the
evidence, and so - - and they were given an instruction
already.
BY MR. PATRICK: Can I say this, Your Honor? “Disregard anything that’s not
in evidence.”
BY THE COURT:
I already instructed them on that. In the Court instruction [C1], I told them that [attorney’s statements] are - - were not
evidence and are to help them understand the evidence and
apply the law but are not evidence. So they have already
been instructed on that . . . .
The trial court then submitted to the jury the following written response: “The Court instructs the
jury that you have heard all the evidence and that you must base your verdict on the evidence that
has been presented.”
¶8.
Approximately two hours later, the jury sent a second question to the trial judge regarding
the same issue: “We are having a discussion still over whether or not Mr. Howard’s lawyer’s
admission of his [sic] being there with a gun is evidence or is it that [sic] simply counsel’s remark?”
The jury also submitted a copy of instruction C-1 and underlined the portion of the instruction that
read, “Arguments, statements, and remarks of counsel are again to help you understand the evidence
and apply the law but are not evidence.” The following exchange then took place among the trial
judge, Patrick, and Hopper:
BY MR. PATRICK: I think they’re saying, Your Honor, that, basically, if it does
not come from the witness stand, it’s pretty much not
testimony - - I mean, not evidence. What either attorney says
is not evidence. I mean, that’s all I would ask, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT:
Well, it says that. I mean, I don’t know - - I really don’t
know what the confusion could possibly be over [instruction
C-1].
BY MR. PATRICK: I guess, obviously, Your Honor, they believe that what I say
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or what the [prosecution says] is evidence, and I think if we
just simply say what the attorneys say is not evidence, I think
that would clear - - that would clear it up to me, Your Honor.
BY MR. HOPPER:
That’s what he said in the instructions. There’s no way you
can make it any clearer. They’re not getting - - I mean, he’s
going to be writing the same thing that was in the Court’s
instruction. So if they didn’t get it the first time - -
BY MR. PATRICK: I think - - I guess they want it stated more plainly. I don’t
know how plain they can get it. Testimony from attorneys
are not [sic] evidence. It doesn’t get any simpler than that,
Your Honor.
¶9.
The trial judge then submitted a second written response to the jury: “The jury instruction
that you have made reference to is self-explanatory and your verdict should be based on the evidence
that was presented from the witness stand.” Fifteen minutes later, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty. Aggrieved, Howard now appeals to this Court.
DISCUSSION
1. Overwhelming Weight of the Evidence
¶10.
Howard argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial on the ground that the
verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The State points out that the record
does not reflect that Howard made a motion for a new trial and argues that Howard’s challenge to
the weight of the evidence is procedurally barred. We agree.
¶11.
A claim that the jury’s verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence must be
raised in a motion for new trial in order to be considered on appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 716
So. 2d 1076, 1078 (¶13) (Miss. 1998) (citing Colson v. Sims, 220 So. 2d 345, 346-47 n.1 (Miss.
1969)); Beckum v. State, 917 So. 2d 808, 813 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Because, Howard
presented no challenge to the weight of the evidence in the trial court, this issue is procedurally
barred.
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2. Confusing Supplemental Jury Instructions
¶12.
We review the trial court’s decision to issue supplemental jury instructions under the abuse
of discretion standard of review. Williams v. State, 928 So. 2d 867, 870 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)
(quoting Mickell v. State, 735 So. 2d 1031, 1033 (¶7) (Miss. 1999)). In reviewing a challenge to a
jury instruction, we read the instructions given as a whole. Milano v. State, 790 So. 2d 179, 184
(¶14) (Miss. 2001) (quoting Coleman v. State, 697 So. 2d 777, 782 (Miss. 1997)). “When so read,
if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will
be found.” Hawthorne v. State, 835 So. 2d 14, 20 (¶26) (Miss. 2003) (quoting Coleman, 697 So.
2d at 782). Stated differently, “if all the instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily
perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results.” Milano, 790 So. 2d at 184 (¶14).
¶13.
A trial judge is authorized to give supplemental jury instructions under Rule 3.10 of the
Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court, which provides in pertinent part:
If the jury, after they retire for deliberations, desires to be informed of any
point of law, the court shall instruct the jury to reduce its question to writing and the
court in its discretion, after affording the parties an opportunity to state their
objections or assent, may grant additional written instructions in response to the
jury's request.
¶14.
Howard argues that the trial judge’s supplemental jury instructions were confusing. He
claims that there is doubt as to whether the jury understood the supplemental instructions; and
therefore, the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.1 Howard relies on Girton v.
State, 446 So. 2d 570, 572 (Miss. 1984) and Carrol v. State, 391 So. 2d 1000, 1003-04 (Miss. 1980).
1
Although Howard did not raise this issue in a motion for new trial, precedent holds that “it
is not necessary to make a motion for a new trial grounded upon errors shown in the official
transcript of the record, including the pleadings, transcribed evidence, instructions, verdict and
judgment of the court.” Jackson v. State, 423 So. 2d 129, 131 (Miss. 1982) (quoting Colson, 220
So. 2d at 346 n.1). Accordingly, Howard’s challenge to the trial judge’s supplemental jury
instructions is not procedurally barred by virtue of his failure to raise it in a motion for new trial.
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After reviewing these cases, we find that neither requires reversal, as urged by Howard.
¶15.
The Carrol case was not reversed on the grounds that the supplemental jury instructions
given therein were confusing. Carrol, 391 So. 2d at 1003-04. There the defendant argued that the
trial judge’s comments to the jury induced the return of a guilty verdict; however, the court in Carrol
did not affirmatively rule on the issue. The Carrol court found that the trial judge’s immediate oral
response to a jury question concerning the definition of malice aforethought or premeditation
foreclosed the defense attorney’s opportunity to object to the instructions. Id. In reversing and
remanding, the court “concluded that substantial justice and traditional notions of fair play require
that the case be reversed and remanded for a new trial.” Id. at 1004. Because the court in Carrol
did not find the trial court’s error to be harmless, we infer that court found that the trial judge’s
comments influenced the jury to return a verdict of guilty. In any event, Howard does not argue that
the trial judge’s supplemental instructions given in the instant case influenced or induced the jury
to return a verdict of guilty. He contends simply that the instructions lacked the clarity to resolve
the jury’s question.
¶16.
Similarly, the issue of confusing jury instructions was not the basis of the Girton decision;
rather, that case turned on whether the trial judge’s response to a doubtful juror’s question induced
the jury to return a guilty verdict. See Girton, 446 So. 2d at 575. Moreover, contrary to Howard’s
assertion, the Girton case was affirmed. Id. Although, the Girton court did not find the instructions
at issue to be confusing, it did allude to the need for clarity in communications between the trial
judge and the jury, noting that “[o]ne of the most nettlesome problems faced by a circuit judge is an
inquiry from the jury when it has retired to reach its verdict.” Id. at 572. The court then
recommended that in dealing with questions from the jury, the trial judge should determine whether
further instruction is necessary to clarify or cover an omission and should make absolutely certain
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he understands precisely what is meant in any inquiry from the jury. Id. at 572-73.
¶17.
Applying Girton to the extent relevant, we find that the trial judge in the instant case
complied with the recommendations expressed therein. While the trial judge did not understand how
the jury could be confused by the instructions already given, the record makes clear that he
understood precisely what the jury was confused about and what the jury’s inquiry meant. Given
that the jury had explicit questions regarding the proper treatment of defense counsel’s statement,
the trial judge correctly determined that further instruction was necessary and properly undertook
the responsibility of providing the jury with further guidance. See Wright v. State, 512 So. 2d 679,
681 (Miss. 1987) (“Where, as here, the jury was apparently at a loss as to how it should proceed,
there is no rational reason why we should discourage our trial judges from providing supplementary
guidance.”).
¶18.
We are mindful that reversible error occurs where a trial judge gives “instructions likely to
mislead or confuse the jury as to the principles of law applicable to the facts in evidence.” Puckett
Mach. Co. v. Edwards, 641 So. 2d 29, 34 (Miss. 1994). However, we find that the jury instructions
given in the instant case were stated with sufficient clarity and did not possess a likelihood to
confuse or mislead the jury. Significantly, we note that the second supplemental instruction directed
to jury to the portion of the instruction they identified as troublesome (instruction C-1), plainly told
the jury that it was self-explanatory, and then further clarified that the “verdict should be based on
the evidence that was presented from the witness stand.” As stated above, where the instructions
taken as a whole “‘fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error
will be found.’” Hawthorne, 835 So. 2d at 20 (¶26) (citation omitted). The initial instructions and
the supplemental instructions given to the jury correctly stated the law.2 “[T]he law presumes the
2
We note that the portion of the second supplemental instruction, “your verdict should be
based on the evidence that was presented from the witness stand[,]” is arguably an incorrect or
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jury is competent and follows the instructions they are given.” Curry v. State, 939 So. 2d 785, 790
(¶17) (Miss. 2006) (citing Shoemaker v. State, 502 So. 2d 1193, 1195 (Miss. 1987)). We see no
reason to find that the jury, with the aid of the supplemental instructions provided by the trial judge,
did not follow all of the instructions given to them in the instant case.
¶19.
Accordingly, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion or create an injustice
in giving the supplemental instructions. This issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶20.
We find that Howard’s challenge to the weight of the evidence is procedurally barred, and
his challenge to the trial court’s supplemental jury instructions is without merit, as there is no basis
to conclude that they confused or mislead the jury, induced a doubtful juror to return a guilty verdict,
or otherwise prejudiced his case. Therefore, we affirm.
¶21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ATTALA COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF ARMED ROBBERY AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN
THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND FINE
OF $1,000 IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES,
ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR.
incomplete statement of the law, as it could be read to exclude the consideration of evidence such
as exhibits. However, we do not find this fatal to the instruction. Milano, 790 So. 2d at 184 (¶14)
(no error results where the instructions “fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable
rules of law. . . .”). Moreover, we find the verdict to be justified based solely on the testimonies of
Smith and Weatherby. Therefore, any error would certainly be harmless.
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