Raymond L. Pannell v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2006-KA-01882-COA
RAYMOND L. PANNELL
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
10/6/2006
HON. THOMAS J. GARDNER III
PRENTISS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
PHILLIP BROADHEAD
JOHN CARL HELMERT
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: W. GLENN WATTS
JOHN RICHARD YOUNG
CRIMINAL - FELONY
CONVICTED OF ARSON AND SENTENCED
TO TWENTY YEARS, WITH TEN YEARS
SUSPENDED, IN THE CUSTODY OF THE
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
REVERSED AND REMANDED - 9/9/2008
BEFORE MYERS, P.J., IRVING AND ISHEE, JJ.
ISHEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
Raymond Louis Pannell was convicted of arson and sentenced to twenty years, with ten years
suspended, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Aggrieved by
his sentence and conviction, Pannell now appeals, contending that the circuit court erred in failing
to suppress his confession to law enforcement officers after he invoked his right to counsel. This
Court finds that Pannell's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel were violated by a
police-initiated interrogation, which resulted in Pannell's confession and occurred after Pannell
asserted his right to have counsel present during questioning. For this reason, the confession, which
was made without the benefit of counsel, should have been suppressed. Therefore, the judgment of
the circuit court is reversed, and this case is remanded to the court for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
FACTS
¶2.
Raymond and Teresa Pannell were married for twenty-three years. While married, the
Pannells lived in a home that they personally built located in Baldwyn, Mississippi. The Pannells
divorced on November 24, 2004. As part of the divorce settlement, Teresa was granted the
exclusive use, possession, and control of the house until their minor children reached the age of
twenty-one. The property was vacant for a period of time after the divorce. During this time, Teresa
had the locks changed on both the doors and the gate to the fence surrounding the property.
¶3.
On December 4, 2004, police responded to a call that a fire had broken out on the property.
When they arrived, they found that the Pannells’ house had burned down. After investigating the
scene and speaking to witnesses, police identified Pannell as a suspect. Later that evening, Pannell
was placed under arrest for trespass and arson. He was given an initial appearance two days later
at the Prentiss County Justice Court where he was represented by his attorney, and a $50,000 bond
was set.
¶4.
Subsequently, during his incarceration, a meeting was arranged between Pannell and the jail
administrator, Officer Brian Taylor. Officer Taylor also happened to be the investigating officer of
the alleged arson. Although it is disputed as to whom actually initiated the meeting and its purpose,
it is undisputed that the meeting took place in the jail’s law library and was witnessed by fellow
officer, Jeremy Pace. At some point during the meeting, the conversation turned to the subject of
the fire. Before answering any questions about the fire, Pannell notified Officer Taylor that he did
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not want to talk without his attorney present. Officer Taylor testified that he honored that wish by
not explicitly questioning Pannell about the fire. However, subsequent to Pannell’s request for his
attorney, Officer Taylor notified Pannell that he had compiled strong evidence against him and
proceeded to show Pannell the contents of the evidence file. This file included photographs of the
crime scene and an incriminating statement taken from Pannell’s brother, Herman Pannell. After
viewing the evidence against him, Pannell decided to confess to the crime. Prior to taking the
confession, the officers read Pannell his Miranda rights. Pannell then signed a Miranda waiver.
Pannell’s confession was written down by Officer Taylor and was signed by Pannell.
¶5.
Shortly after Pannell gave his confession, his case was presented to the Prentiss County
grand jury. The grand jury heard testimony regarding the charge of arson. However, based upon
the testimony of Officer Taylor at the suppression hearing, it appears that Pannell’s confession was
not presented to the grand jury. Finding that there was insufficient evidence to indict Pannell, the
grand jury failed to return a true bill against him.1 Though the grand jury retired on April 1, 2005,
Pannell was not released from jail until May 1, 2005, having remained in jail for an additional month
after the grand jury failed to indict him.
¶6.
After Pannell’s release, the State presented its case to the grand jury a second time on August
22, 2005. This time it appears the State did present Pannell’s confession before the grand jury.
Having the benefit of Pannell’s confession, the State was able to obtain an indictment. As a result,
Pannell was re-arrested and charged with arson.
¶7.
Prior to trial, Pannell filed a motion to suppress his confession contending that it was given
involuntarily and in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. A suppression hearing was
1
The exact date of the presentation of Pannell’s case to the first grand jury is not completely
certain. However, in the State’s motion in limine filed on October 2, 2006, the State admits that the
no true bill was issued between March 28 and April 1, 2005; the dates the grand jury was in session
following Pannell’s confession.
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held on September 26, 2006. After hearing the testimony of both Officer Taylor and Officer Pace,
the circuit court found that there was sufficient evidence for concluding that Pannell “initiated”
contact with Officer Taylor. Further, the circuit court opined that the presentation of evidence by
Officer Taylor to Pannell did not constitute police interrogation. As a result, the circuit court found
that Pannell’s statements were “freely, knowingly, and voluntarily given” and were made after the
execution of a valid Miranda waiver and affidavit that had been signed and witnessed. The circuit
court denied Pannell’s motion to suppress the confession, and the State was permitted to use it as
evidence at trial. Pannell was convicted of arson on October 6, 2006. Pannell filed a motion for
acquittal notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which subsequently was
denied. Pannell now appeals the circuit court’s ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8.
In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress a confession, "we apply the familiar
general rule that since the trial court sits as the fact-finder when determining the issue of whether
an accused's confession has been intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily given, we will only
reverse the trial court's determination of this issue when such determination is manifestly wrong."
Glasper v. State, 914 So. 2d 708, 716 (¶21) (Miss. 2005) (citing Manix v. State, 895 So. 2d 167, 180
(¶39) (Miss. 2005)). In order for us to reverse a trial court's determination on the admissibility of
a confession into evidence, the trial court must have committed manifest error, applied an incorrect
legal standard, or rendered a decision contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. at
716-17 (¶21) (citing Thorson v. State, 895 So. 2d 85, 115 (¶73) (Miss. 2004)). Further, "there is no
doubt that a confession is admissible only after the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused's confession was not the product of promises, threats or inducements." Id. at 717.
ANALYSIS
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I.
¶9.
Whether the circuit court erred in denying Pannell’s motion to suppress his
confession as the statement was obtained after he invoked his right to counsel.
Pannell contends that his confession on March 12, 2005, was taken at a time after he had
asserted his right to have counsel present during questioning. Pannell further contends that
regardless of whom initiated the meeting between Pannell and Officer Taylor, the presentation of
evidence by Officer Taylor to Pannell constituted a police-initiated interrogation. Pannell argues
that because the interrogation occurred after his request to see his attorney, his right to counsel was
violated, and therefore, any subsequent waiver of his rights should have been held invalid. Thus,
Pannell contends his confession should have been suppressed at trial. In analyzing this issue, we
must consider: (1) whether Pannell asserted his right to counsel, (2) whether showing Pannell the
evidence file constituted a police-initiated interrogation, and if so, (3) whether Pannell effectively
waived his right to counsel.
A.
¶10.
Pannell’s Right to Counsel
An accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel accrues once the accused is in custody.
Brink v. State, 888 So. 2d 437, 447-48 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Balfour v. State, 598 So.
2d 731, 743 (Miss. 1992)). "Specifically, the right attaches at the point in time when the initial
appearance ought to have been held." Id. at 448 (¶28) (citing McGilberry v. State, 741 So. 2d 894,
904 (¶17) (Miss. 1999)). Once the accused asserts the right to an attorney, the right attaches and
"any statements obtained from the accused during subsequent police-initiated custodial questioning
regarding the charge at issue (even if the accused purports to waive his rights) are inadmissible."
Balfour, 598 So. 2d at 742 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 179 (1991)). "An accused
. . . having expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v.
5
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
¶11.
Clearly, Pannell’s right to counsel accrued prior to his confession to police. The record
indicates that when Pannell was given an initial appearance, he appeared before the court with his
attorney present. Further, it is undisputed that Pannell asserted his right to counsel prior to being
questioned by police. The circuit court held that Pannell “initiated” contact with the police, citing
to disputed evidence that Pannell had asked to meet with Officer Taylor; therefore, the court
determined that Pannell’s confession was voluntary. However, both Officer Taylor and Officer Pace
testified at the suppression hearing that Pannell requested to speak to his attorney before he
answered any questions about the fire. Therefore, even if Pannell initiated the meeting, he
effectively cut off questioning by asking for his attorney. The United States Supreme Court, as well
as our own supreme court, has made it clear that if the accused states that he wants an attorney, all
interrogation must cease until his attorney is present. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150
(1990); Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85; Sanders v. State, 835 So. 2d 45, 50 (¶16) (Miss. 2003).
Therefore, the question of admissibility turns on whether Pannell, after asserting his right to counsel,
reinitiated contact with the officers or whether his confession came in response to further
interrogation by Officer Taylor.
B.
¶12.
Court’s Definition of “Interrogation”
The issue before us is a difficult one and has not been completely resolved in this state. It
poses the question as to what police procedures should be considered “interrogation”; specifically,
whether showing the accused the evidence compiled against him after he has requested to see his
attorney constitutes custodial interrogation in violation of his constitutional rights. The circuit court
was of the opinion that showing Pannell the evidence file after he asserted his right to counsel did
not constitute “interrogation.” The circuit court judge based his decision on the fact that Officer
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Taylor did not explicitly question Pannell about the contents of the file or facts of the case.
However, the term “interrogation” has not been limited to encompass only express questioning by
the police. In fact, the Mississippi Supreme Court has applied a broad interpretation to the term
“interrogation” to include not only questioning, but rather “questioning and its functional
equivalent." Culp v. State, 933 So. 2d 264, 273 (¶19) (Miss. 2005) (citing Pierre v. State, 607 So.
2d 43, 52 (Miss. 1992)). In the landmark decision of Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980),
the United States Supreme Court defined "functional equivalent" to mean “words or actions . . . that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. In broadening its definition of “interrogation,” the Supreme Court in Innis
noted that its concern in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) was that “the ‘interrogation
environment’ created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would ‘subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner’ and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 299.
¶13.
What police measures and procedures actually fall under this “functional equivalent”
category have been difficult to ascertain. In Innis, the Supreme Court included in its survey of
interrogation practices the use of psychological ploys such as those that “posit the guilt of the
subject” or “cast blame on the victim or on society.” Id. However, the Court has stopped short of
creating an exhaustive list of police techniques that are held to be interrogation practices. Likewise,
the law in this state provides little guidance as to what procedures should be considered
interrogation. This Court has stated that interrogation “must reflect a measure of compulsion above
and beyond that inherent in the custody itself.” Bryant v. State, 853 So. 2d 814, 819 (¶13) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2003) (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 300). The test does not examine the subjective intent of
the police, but rather, whether the officer “should ‘have known his actions were reasonably likely
7
to elicit an incriminating response.’” Id. (quoting Snow v. State, 800 So. 2d 472, 497 (¶91) (Miss.
2001)).
¶14.
We now turn to whether confronting Pannell with the evidence that Officer Taylor had
compiled against him violated the prohibition expressed in Innis against the use of "any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Because the inquiry is contextual, we review the known facts. Pannell
invoked his right to cut off questioning, thereby triggering the prohibition in Innis against further
interrogation. In response, Officer Taylor failed to cease communication with Pannell completely.
Instead, he notified Pannell that he had compiled strong evidence against him. He then proceeded
to lay out the contents of the evidence file before Pannell. In doing so, Officer Taylor showed
Pannell pictures of the burned house, as well as an incriminating statement taken from Pannell’s
brother. Only after Pannell reviewed the evidence did he decide to give a written statement
confessing to the arson. The crucial inquiry is whether Officer Taylor should have known that his
actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Pannell. We find, given the
facts of this case, Officer Taylor should have known that his actions were likely to elicit a
confession.
¶15.
Though the facts suggest that this is a case of first impression in this state, the Mississippi
Supreme Court has once before been presented with the question of whether presenting evidence
before an accused satisfies the definition of “interrogation.” See Balfour v. State, 580 So. 2d 1203
(Miss. 1991). In Balfour, the defendant and her accomplice were arrested and charged with capital
murder and several armed robberies. Id. at 1204. The defendant requested counsel on at least two
occasions, both upon her arrest and at her initial appearance. Id. at 1208. At some point after the
defendant’s initial appearance, she was approached in her cell by two officers who requested to
8
speak to her. Id. The officers told the defendant that her accomplice had made a statement
implicating her in their criminal activity. Id. Upon hearing this, the defendant acquiesced and
submitted a written confession to the police. Id. Our supreme court held that given that the
defendant had already asserted her right to counsel and that the officers’ tactics were carried out in
an effort to elicit an incriminating response, the trial court’s admission of the defendant’s confession
violated her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 1209.
¶16.
Although not identical, the police practices at issue are indistinguishable from the type of
police practices criticized in Balfour. Similar to Balfour, the officers confronted Pannell with
testimonial evidence implicating him in the crime after he asserted his right to counsel. Although
the statement at issue was not given by an accomplice, as it was in Balfour, it carries equal weight.
Both statements represent witness testimony that implied guilt directly on the accused. The
statement with which Pannell was confronted was provided to police by his brother, Herman. The
relevant portion of Herman’s statement alleges that on the day of the alleged arson, Pannell told
Herman that he was going to burn the house and kill his ex-wife. The statement also alleges that
Herman saw Pannell running from the house shortly before it caught on fire. Because the Balfour
court determined that the incriminating testimonial evidence was presented in an effort to elicit an
incriminating response from the accused, we are persuaded to hold the same is true in this case.
¶17.
Similarly, we are of the opinion that the ploy of confronting an accused with the
incriminating evidence against him, without being prompted by the accused’s request or inquiry into
the evidence, is indistinguishable from the types of police practices criticized in Innis. As
previously stated, Innis admonishes “positing the guilt of the subject.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 299. It is
easy to see from Pannell’s perspective, under the circumstances of this case, that being advised of
incriminating evidence was the functional equivalent of police positing guilt. It is undisputed that
prior to giving his confession to Officer Taylor, Pannell said very little, if anything at all, after
9
asking to see his attorney. We can see no other rational reason why Officer Taylor would have
presented the evidence to Pannell other than to posit Pannell’s guilt. Pannell did not ask Officer
Taylor about the charges against him. He did not inquire into the evidence compiled by the police,
nor did he ask to explicitly see the contents of the evidence file. It is obvious to this Court that
Officer Taylor showed Pannell the evidence file in an attempt to have him reconsider his request for
counsel; a tactic that proved successful as Pannell was not prompted to speak until he reviewed the
evidence placed before him.
¶18.
Further, the actions of the police in this case reflect a measure of compulsion above and
beyond that inherent in the custody itself. Of primary significance is the manner in which the police
detained Pannell, holding him long enough to obtain a confession and releasing him only after his
written confession was secured. These actions, taken together, reflect a police effort, whether out
of intent or neglect, to deprive Pannell of his constitutional rights.
¶19.
First, it is obvious that the police ignored Pannell’s right to an attorney at two different points
during the meeting. Officer Taylor knew or should have known that Pannell was represented by
counsel because Pannell’s attorney appeared with him at his initial appearance. Therefore,
regardless of whom initiated the meeting between the two, Officer Taylor should have contacted
Pannell’s attorney before any meeting took place. Even if the meeting was called for a simple jail
administrative purpose, one which would not require assistance from Pannell’s attorney, that
purpose clearly shifted when the subject of the fire was broached. From that point, the nature of the
meeting clearly became investigatory, and the failure to notify Pannell’s attorney of the meeting was
a violation of Pannell’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Second, once Pannell unequivocally
asked to see his attorney, the interrogation should have ceased until his attorney was present.
Therefore, Officer Taylor should have ended the conversation there; instead, he chose to continue
the interrogation by placing the evidence file before Pannell violating his Sixth Amendment right
10
to counsel. Finally, Pannell remained in jail for at least a month after the first grand jury failed to
return a true bill against him with no promise of release.2
¶20.
Under these circumstances, we believe that Officer Taylor should have known that his
actions were likely to elicit an incriminating response. It is clear that his actions aided in creating
a coercive interrogation environment that subjugated Pannell to the will of his examiners, thereby
undermining his right against compulsory self-incrimination.
Therefore, we conclude that
confronting a suspect with the incriminating evidence compiled against him after he has invoked his
right to counsel, and without any initiation on the part of the suspect, is precisely the kind of
psychological ploy that definition of interrogation in Innis was designed to prohibit.
¶21.
In so holding, we are mindful that courts have not spoken uniformly in this area of the law.
Some appellate courts have allowed police to show an accused the evidence against him and then
ask if he would reconsider his decision to remain silent. See Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969 (7th Cir.
2006) (holding that an officer's statement regarding the evidence and the possible consequences of
the charges did not rise to the level of interrogation); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.
1992) (finding that statements by law enforcement officials to a suspect regarding the nature of the
evidence against the suspect did not constitute interrogation as a matter of law); United States v.
Thierman, 678 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982) (determining that police officers’ discussion of the
investigation in accused’s presence after he invoked his right to counsel did not constitute
interrogation). But see United States v. Poole, 794 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that showing
a suspected bank robber surveillance photos is interrogation). After reviewing these cases, these
courts seem to support their decisions under one of two rationales: (1) that apprising a suspect of the
2
Officer Taylor testified during the suppression hearing that he presented evidence before
the grand jury on two separate occasions. When asked why he had to present the evidence a second
time, Officer Taylor admitted that the grand jury returned a “no true bill” the first time that it met.
The State also admitted in both its motion in limine filed on October 2, 2006, as well as its
supplemental brief, that the no true bill was issued by the first grand jury.
11
charges and evidence against him or her is inherent in arrest and custody, and (2) a suspect should
be informed of the evidence against him or her so he or she can make an informed decision on how
to proceed.
¶22.
This Court has several concerns with applying these rationales to this case. First, in
reasoning that apprising a suspect of the evidence is inherent in arrest and custody, the courts have
considered mainly cases where a confession is made during arrest or normal booking procedures.
This case is distinguishable in that Pannell’s statement did not come while being placed under arrest.
In fact, Pannell had been in the custody of the Prentiss County Sheriff’s Department for three
months at the time his meeting with Officer Taylor took place. Further, the purpose of the meeting
was not a matter inherent in the custodial relationship. Whether or not the meeting was originally
called for a jail administrative matter, that purpose clearly shifted once the subject turned to the
matter of the fire. Once Officer Taylor inquired about the fire, the purpose of the conversation
clearly became investigatory and constitutional protection was necessary.
¶23.
Second, this Court fails to see how apprising a suspect of the evidence after he asserts his
right to counsel is necessary to help him make an informed decision about the case. It is unlikely
that an accused is capable of weighing the evidence against him in order to make an informed
decision without the assistance of counsel. By requesting to see his attorney, Pannell obviously did
not believe that he could protect his interests without his attorney’s advice. Therefore, to apprise
him of the evidence after he made his request only increased the danger that Pannell would feel
compelled to reconsider his right to counsel.
¶24.
This Court is persuaded by the decisions of those appellate courts that have noted that the
practice of permitting interrogators to apprise a suspect of the evidence against him has been brought
into doubt by Innis. See United States v. Pena, 897 F.2d 1075, 1082 n.16 (11th Cir. 1990)
(disapproved on other grounds); Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 1984) (overruled on
12
jurisdictional grounds). Specifically, we agree with the bright line approach taken by the Eleventh
Circuit in which the court stated, “[t]he law in this area is clear: once an accused requests counsel,
the officer cannot ask questions, discuss the case, or present the accused with possible sentences and
the benefits of cooperation.” United States v. Gomez, 927 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing
Innis, 100 U.S. at 299); United States v. Johnson, 812 F.2d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1986)). Rather
than attempting to list matters that police could or could not discuss with an accused in custody after
he has asserted his right to counsel, the court reasoned that “[i]t best serves all interests, especially
law enforcement, to remain close to the ‘bright line’: interrogation must cease when the accused in
custody requests the presence of a lawyer before further interrogation.” Johnson, 812 F.2d at 1331.
We agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s view that "an accused's request for an attorney is per se an
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease." United States v.
Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719
(1979)). It is this Court’s position that when in doubt, adhering to the “bright line” rule is necessary
to ensure that an accused’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are fully protected.
¶25.
We are further persuaded by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96
(6th Cir. 1972) as it provides facts very similar to this case. In Combs, the defendant surrendered
to police after being sought out for murder. Id. at 97. After being informed of his constitutional
rights, the defendant notified police that he would make a statement but only after first speaking to
his attorney. Id. In response, police showed the defendant the ballistics report on the rifle and bullet
used in the crime. Id. at 98. This prompted the defendant to confess to the murder. Id. The Sixth
Circuit held that under the circumstances, the defendant’s confession was taken involuntarily in
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 98-99. In doing so, the court noted that the purpose
of a question is to get an answer, and “[a]nything else that has the same purpose falls in the same
category and is susceptible of the same abuses Miranda seeks to prevent.” Id. at 99. The court
13
opined that the only possible object of showing the defendant the ballistics report was to elicit a
confession from him. Id.
¶26.
Applying the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Combs to the facts of this case, it is unlikely
that Officer Taylor showed Pannell the evidence file for any reason other than for the purpose of
eliciting a confession. Being the lead investigator on the case, Officer Taylor had obvious incentive
to elicit information from Pannell about the fire. Further, Pannell never inquired about the charges
or evidence against him during the meeting, nor did he request to see the evidence after he asserted
his right to counsel. Since Pannell refused to answer questions about the fire, it is only rational to
believe that Officer Taylor showed him the evidence file in order to prompt a response from him.
Therefore, Officer Taylor’s actions, having the same purpose of explicit questioning, constituted
interrogation made after Pannell asserted his right to counsel.
¶27.
Accordingly, we conclude that Pannell’s confession was made involuntarily and in violation
of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
C.
¶28.
Pannell’s Waiver of Rights
The State contends that even if Pannell did assert his right to counsel, that right was validly
waived when he signed the Miranda waiver and voluntarily agreed to make a statement. Pannell
argues that his signed waiver of rights was not effective because he did not initiate the interrogation.
Pannell contends that regardless of whom initiated the initial meeting, once he asserted his right to
counsel, the continued interrogation by Officer Taylor violated his constitutional rights. Therefore,
a valid waiver could not be achieved.
¶29.
In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held that “an accused . . . having expressed
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. In
14
other words, once an accused has invoked his right to counsel, any statements given by the
defendant in response to further police questioning are admissible only where (1) the defendant
initiated further discussions with the police and (2) knowingly and intelligently waived the rights
he had invoked. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984). Further, “when an accused has invoked
his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot
be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation
even if he has been advised of his rights.” Edwards 451 U.S. at 484.
¶30.
There is no evidence that Pannell initiated further discussions with Officer Taylor after
asserting his right to counsel. Our supreme court has held that in order for a defendant to initiate
a “conversation” as the word is used in Edwards, his statements must express a desire to open up
a generalized discussion about the investigation. Haynes v. State, 934 So. 2d 983, 988-89 (¶¶19-23)
(Miss. 2006). It is clear to this Court that Pannell did not express a desire to open up a generalized
discussion about the investigation after asserting his right to counsel. In fact, there is no evidence
to show that he evinced a desire to open up any type of discussion. Pannell was prompted to speak
only after Officer Taylor showed him the contents of the evidence file. Because we have already
held that the actions of Officer Taylor constituted police-initiated custodial interrogation, a valid
waiver cannot be established simply by showing that Pannell responded to the interrogation.
Accordingly, Pannell’s supposed waiver of his constitutional rights during questioning was invalid.
¶31.
Therefore, because Pannell’s confession was taken involuntarily in violation of his Fifth and
Sixth Amendments rights and those rights were not validly waived, the trial court erred by failing
to suppress Pannell’s confession.
II.
¶32.
Whether the circuit court’s failure to suppress the confession was harmless
error.
We must now determine whether the admission of the confession constituted harmless error,
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thus, allowing the verdict to stand. "The admission of confessions obtained in violation of Edwards
and its progeny constitutes trial error, and is therefore amenable to harmless error analysis." Haynes,
934 So. 2d at 991 (¶31) (quoting Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 181 (5th Cir. 1997) (questioned
on other grounds)). “In order for a violation of a constitutional right to be held harmless, this Court
must determine that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). “Similarly, our supreme court has held ‘errors involving a
violation of an accused's constitutional rights may be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
where the weight of the evidence against the accused is overwhelming.’” Id. (quoting Clark v. State,
891 So. 2d 136, 142 (¶29) (Miss. 2004)). Our supreme court has also held that the admission of a
confession in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights is not harmless error where the
confession in question was the only confession available. Balfour, 580 So. 2d at 1210.
¶33.
Here, we cannot say that the trial court’s error in admitting Pannell’s confession was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Without Pannell’s confession, the State presented only
circumstantial evidence establishing that Pannell actually set fire to Teresa’s house. Although the
State submitted testimony that placed Pannell at the scene of the crime on the day in question, it
presented little concrete evidence actually showing Pannell was responsible for setting the fire.
Pannell was also able to provide an alibi by presenting three separate witnesses who testified to his
whereabouts on the day in question. Further, his confession was the only confession to the crime
obtained by the police. As a result, the State relied heavily on the confession to prove Pannell’s
guilt.
¶34.
The prosecutor obviously knew the important role that the confession played in proving his
case, as it appeared to be the focal point of his closing argument. Specifically, he used the
confession to corroborate the testimonies of several of his witnesses and refute Pannell’s testimony.
First, he focused on the fire marshal’s assertion that the fire was caused by an open flame device,
16
stating:
It was an open flame device used to put the house on fire. I think [the fire marshal]
used the analogy of putting the flag on fire and it burning and then causing the rest
of the house to go up in flames. Like lighting the curtains in the patio room, which
is exactly what the defendant said he did in his confession, in his statement that he
gave to the authorities that he signed off on. That’s exactly what he said happened,
and it matches up with what the fire marshal said caused the fire.
Second, the prosecutor used the confession to corroborate Herman’s testimony that he saw Pannell
bring a gun with him to the house on the day of the fire. He stated, “[Pannell] even says in his
statement that he had a gun with him, and that’s exactly what Herman Pannell told you. He came
trotting up the driveway with a gun in his hand. So here is the defendant corroborating everything
Herman says . . . .” Third, the prosecutor concludes his initial closing argument by using Pannell’s
confession as evidence of his guilt stating, “And we know from his confession that what he did is
he went to that house, he went and busted out a window, and he took his lighter and he lit the
curtains and he burned the house down.” Within the same paragraph, the prosecutor essentially
misled the jury by implying that Pannell’s confession corroborated Teresa’s allegation that Pannell
threatened to burn the house down the night before the fire. During this argument, the prosecutor
argued:
So here is the defendant corroborating everything Herman says and corroborating
everything his wife has said. He made the threat that he was going to burn it down.
We know doggone well he was mad about the fact that his wife had possession of the
house. He was there that day, just like he said and Herman Pannell said. And in his
own confession he tells you that he burned the house down.
In fact, Pannell did not corroborate Teresa’s entire testimony. At trial, Pannell admitted to speaking
to Teresa the night before the fire, but denied making any such threat. Finally, and most notably,
the prosecutor expended his entire final closing argument to refute Pannell’s testimony that he only
gave his confession because the officers promised him that, in doing so, he would be released from
jail. Implying that Pannell had lied on the stand, the prosecutor argued to the jury that “if you go
17
back there and decide to return a not guilty verdict in this case, you have disregarded the testimony
of the law enforcement officers who took the statement . . . where they said that [Pannell] freely and
voluntarily gave the statement . . . .” Viewing the closing argument as a whole, it appears the
prosecutor used Pannell’s confession as his trump card when attempting to clear up the gray areas
in his case.
¶35.
It is also important to note that Pannell’s case was brought before two grand juries. As
previously stated, the first grand jury met between March 28 and April 1, 2005. After reviewing the
evidence before it, the grand jury failed to return a true bill against Pannell, finding insufficient
evidence to indict him on the charge of arson. Of great significance is that though the grand jury
appeared to meet after Pannell’s involuntary confession was taken by Officer Taylor, it appears
likely, based on the record, that the State did not present his confession before the grand jury. It
was only after the State failed to secure an indictment the first time, that the State went back before
the grand jury, this time with Pannell’s involuntary confession. Having the benefit of Pannell’s
involuntary confession, the second grand jury determined that there was enough evidence against
Pannell to warrant an indictment.
¶36.
Given these facts: that Pannell’s confession was the only confession available, that it
appeared essential to the State’s ability to prove Pannell’s guilt, and that it appeared to be the
weighing factor in the grand jury’s decision to indict Pannell, the circuit court’s admission of the
confession was not harmless error.
CONCLUSION
¶37.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the circuit court erred by failing to suppress Pannell’s
confession, which was elicited as a result of police-initiated interrogation after he asserted his right
to counsel. Further, the error was not harmless because without the confession, it appears that the
State was unable to secure an indictment against Pannell and was only able to present circumstantial
18
evidence of Pannell’s guilt at trial. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
¶38. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PRENTISS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REVERSED
AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO PRENTISS COUNTY.
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND
ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART
WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY IRVING, J.
CARLTON, J., CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART:
¶39.
I agree with the majority’s finding that the trial court erred by admitting Raymond L.
Pannell’s confession, as the police’s conduct in showing Pannell the evidence against him, after he
raised his right to counsel, constituted the functional equivalent of police-initiated interrogation.
However, I find that this error was harmless in light of the remaining evidence against Pannell,
which was overwhelming in my opinion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶40.
As the majority notes, “errors involving a violation of an accused’s constitutional rights may
be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the weight of the evidence against the
accused is overwhelming.” Haynes v. State, 934 So. 2d 983, 991 (¶31) (Miss. 2006) (quoting Clark
v. State, 891 So. 2d 136, 142 (¶29) (Miss. 2004)). I am mindful that error in admitting a tainted
confession is rarely harmless in the absence of other admissible confessions. See Balfour v. State,
580 So. 2d 1203, 1209-10 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted).3 However, contrary to the majority’s
3
The majority cites Balfour, 580 So. 2d at 1210, for the proposition that “the admission of
a confession in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights is not harmless error where the
confession in question was the only confession available.” In my opinion, this is an imprecise and
overly broad statement of the law. In Balfour the court observed that where “the [erroneous]
admission of a tainted full confession [has been] held harmless, almost without exception, the court
has been presented with other full confessions which passed constitutional muster.” Balfour, 580
So. 2d at 1209 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Since Balfour, the Mississippi Supreme Court
has held the admission of a tainted confession harmless in the absence of an additional admissible
confession where the remaining evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. See Haynes,
934 So. 2d at 991-92 (¶¶31-36).
19
determination, I find that, aside from his confession, the evidence against Pannell was
overwhelming, and the trial court’s error in admitting the confession was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
¶41.
I find most significant, the eyewitness testimony of Pannell’s own brother, Herman, who
testified that he encountered Pannell at a relative’s trailer near4 Teresa’s house on the morning of
the fire. Pannell was angry because Teresa had locked the gate to the house, and Pannell told
Herman:
I’m going to kill her and burn the house down. She ain’t taking my place. This is
family. She’s not taking my place. I’ll burn it down before she does. I’m going to
give you my phone number. You call me if any of the Roberts family comes over.
You let me know.
¶42.
Herman left the trailer and returned approximately an hour-and-a-half later to find Pannell
running toward him from the direction of Teresa’s house. He saw Pannell toss either a rifle or a
shotgun in his car and drive off. Minutes later, Herman noticed “big ole black smoke just a rolling”
from Teresa’s house.
¶43.
Additionally, Teresa testified that she saw Pannell at a restaurant the day before the fire. On
this occasion, Pannell told her that he would burn the house down before he let her move back into
it; Pannell admitted that he saw Teresa the day before the fire, and he was angry with her.
¶44.
In my opinion, the evidence against Pannell was quite damning. He repeatedly stated his
intent to burn down Teresa’s house, and he was seen fleeing from the direction of the nearby house
only moments before the fire was discovered. Also, his motive was abundantly clear. Therefore,
I find that the error in admitting Pannell’s confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For
these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of conviction entered in the circuit court.
IRVING, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.
4
From the record, it appears that this trailer was situated less than a quarter mile from
Teresa’s house.
20
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