John Griffin Bowie v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2007-CP-00898-COA
JOHN GRIFFIN BOWIE
APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
APPELLEE
3/5/2007
HON. STEPHEN B. SIMPSON
HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOHN GRIFFIN BOWIE (PRO SE)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DESHUN TERRELL MARTIN
CHARLES W. MARIS
CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISMISSED
AFFIRMED-03/04/2008
BEFORE KING, C.J., ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1.
This case is before the Court on appeal from the Harrison County Circuit Court’s dismissal
of John Bowie’s motion for post-conviction relief. We find no error and affirm the dismissal.
FACTS
¶2.
On April 4, 1988, Bowie waived his indictment and pleaded guilty in Harrison County
Circuit Court to a charge of burglary of a business. The trial court accepted his plea and sentenced
him to serve seven years in prison. Bowie filed his motion for post-conviction relief on December
12, 2005, which the trial court dismissed as being time-barred. He filed a subsequent motion for
post-conviction relief on January 10, 2007. The trial court dismissed that subsequent motion as a
successive writ as set forth under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-30-23(6) (Rev. 2000). It
is from the denial of that motion for post-conviction relief that Bowie now appeals. Bowie
completed his sentence, but he is currently incarcerated on a separate conviction.1
DISCUSSION
¶3.
“In reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for post-conviction relief the standard
of review is clear. The trial court’s denial will not be reversed absent a finding that the trial court’s
decision was clearly erroneous.” Smith v. State, 806 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Robinson v. State, 904 So. 2d 203, 204 (¶3)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
¶4.
Bowie’s first post-conviction relief motion was dismissed because it was filed in 2005, more
than seventeen years after he made his guilty plea in 1988. The post-conviction relief statute requires
any motion for relief to be filed within three years after a guilty plea has been entered. Miss. Code
Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2007). His second motion for post-conviction relief asserted that he could
overcome the statute of limitations because his claim fell within one of the enumerated exceptions
in the statute. The statute allows a prisoner to file subsequent motions for relief and motions after
expiration of the statute of limitations if he can show: (1) that there has been an intervening decision
of the United States Supreme Court or of the Mississippi Supreme Court that would have actually
adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence; (2)that he has new evidence that was
not discoverable at the time of trial; (3) that his sentence has expired; or (4) that his probation or
parole has been revoked unlawfully. Id. Bowie alleges in his current motion for post-conviction
1
There is currently a separate motion to dismiss this appeal filed by the State that will be
resolved separately.
2
relief that his sentence on the charge for which he seeks relief has expired and his plea was
involuntary.
¶5.
Indeed, Bowie’s sentence has expired. Bowie admits in his brief that he completed his
sentence for business burglary from 1988 and that he is currently incarcerated on another charge.
Bowie seeks relief related to his 1988 sentence, because he claims that sentence was used to enhance
the sentence he currently serves. The post-conviction relief statutes provide him with no relief,
however, as this Court has held that “unless he is being held under the sentence of which he
complains, the post-conviction relief statutes provide no remedy.” Elliot v. State, 858 So. 2d 154,
155 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Furthermore, the limited record presented to this Court shows that
part of Bowie’s plea agreement on the 1988 burglary charge included dropping the sentencing
enhancement as a habitual offender. Thus, even without the conviction he seeks to overturn, Bowie
could have been convicted as a habitual offender.
¶6.
In his petition, Bowie requested an evidentiary hearing so that he can show that his case falls
under an exception to the statute of limitations. This Court has recognized that a “post-conviction
relief petition which meets basic pleading requirement[s] is sufficient to mandate an evidentiary
hearing unless it appears beyond doubt that [the] petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of
[his] claim which would entitle him to relief.” Taylor v. State, 782 So. 2d 166, 168 (¶4) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2000) (quoting Robertson v. State, 669 So. 2d 11, 13 (Miss. 1996)). Because he completed his
sentence and is currently incarcerated for a separate conviction, Bowie lacks standing to seek postconviction relief. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion for post-conviction
relief as a successive writ and also on the basis that Bowie lacked standing.
¶7.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DISMISSING
THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS
APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO HARRISON COUNTY.
3
KING, C.J., LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES,
ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR.
4
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