John Kornegay v. State of Mississippi
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-KA-01654-COA
JOHN KORNEGAY
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
09/26/2000
HON. W. SWAN YERGER
HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JOE N. TATUM
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: W. GLENN WATTS
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
ED PETERS
NATURE OF THE CASE:
CRIMINAL - FELONY
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
CONVICTED FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM,
SENTENCED TO SERVE 3 YEARS.
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED - 2/26/2002
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 3/28/2002
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
6/4/2002
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS, AND MYERS, JJ.
McMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. John Kornegay was convicted by a Hinds County Circuit Court jury of the crime of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. Kornegay has appealed that conviction, urging that it be reversed on two
grounds. First, he alleges that he was improperly denied a continuance based on his belated receipt of
discoverable information from the prosecution. Secondly, he urges his entitlement to a new trial on the
ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Neither issue has merit and we, therefore,
affirm the conviction.
I.
Facts
¶2. The State's version of events, presented through its witnesses, was as follows: Kornegay was stopped
while driving his vehicle after he was observed to be driving in a somewhat erratic manner. The officer, in
the course of investigating regarding his suspicion that Kornegay may have been under the influence of
intoxicants, inquired as to whether Kornegay had a firearm in the vehicle. The officer testified that the
inquiry was solely for the purpose of insuring his safety during the course of the inquiry. Kornegay stated
that there was a gun concealed in the vehicle and, in fact, a pistol was subsequently recovered from the
vehicle in close proximity to the driver's seat. Because the officer continued to believe that Kornegay might
be intoxicated, Kornegay was transported by investigating officers to be asked to submit to an intoxilyzer
test. Subsequent investigation revealed that Kornegay had a prior felony conviction and, as a result, he was
indicted for firearm possession by a convicted felon.
¶3. Kornegay's defense, as presented by his own testimony and that of a cousin, was that the cousin had
been driving the vehicle earlier in the day and that the firearm belonged to the cousin. The cousin testified
that he had concealed the weapon and subsequently forgotten to retrieve it or to alert Kornegay to its
presence.
¶4. The issue of Kornegay's guilt in the face of this conflicting evidence was submitted to the jury. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty.
II.
Continuance
¶5. On the date of trial Kornegay's counsel had replaced an earlier attorney. The State had furnished
discovery to the first attorney but did not furnish duplicate discovery material to the new attorney. The
prosecutor's office had a standing policy that, when a defendant changed attorneys, the prosecution did not
customarily directly furnish the new attorney with discovery material, but, instead, required the attorney to
obtain that material from the former counsel.
¶6. There was, in this case, some confusion in the matter of discovery arising out of the fact that Kornegay
had two outstanding charges against him for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. The separate
charges were unrelated and arose on different dates. According to representations made by the prosecuting
attorney, all discoverable evidence as to both charges was provided to Kornegay's original attorney.
However, on the morning of trial, the replacement counsel said that all that he had received from the
attorney he replaced was information relating to the separate charge not set for trial. The attorney indicated
that he had not discovered the error until substantially late in the day because he had an understanding that
the case was going to be continued by agreement and was not informed until shortly before the trial date
that the State would not agree to continue the case.
¶7. Defense counsel represented to the court that this set of circumstances prevented him from adequately
preparing a defense. Though it is not entirely clear that the State was responsible for the fact that the
defense did not have the proper discoverable evidence, the trial court essentially treated the matter as a
discovery violation and stated that the court would proceed to seat a jury but would delay the beginning of
the trial until 1:00 p.m. that afternoon to give defense counsel time to review the recently-furnished
discovery material. Defense counsel announced ready to proceed with trial at 1:00 p.m.
¶8. The rules relating to discovery in criminal matters provide rather clear-cut procedures that include
directions for handling discovery violations. URCCC 9.04. The rules necessarily vest the trial court with
substantial discretion in dealing with such matters. Gray v. State, 799 So. 2d 53, 60 (¶ 26) (Miss. 2001).
The evident purpose of the rules is to permit a case to proceed to conclusion expeditiously, even in the face
of discovery problems, when there is a viable alternative to a substantial delay that preserves the
fundamental rights of the parties. Thus, in the face of a claim of late discovery, the court's first step is to
provide counsel a reasonable opportunity to review the information and, hopefully, to devise a trial strategy
to meet the previously-undisclosed evidence. It is incumbent upon a defense attorney believing, after an
examination of the evidence, that additional time beyond that allotted by the court is necessary to
adequately prepare to meet the evidence to so inform the court. URCCC 9.04 (I.).
¶9. In this case, defense counsel was given time to review the information and trial commencement was
delayed, albeit for only a short time, to accommodate that purpose. After being afforded that opportunity,
defense counsel did not actively seek further delay in the trial or otherwise seek to inform the court as to the
nature of the newly-disclosed evidence that would prejudice the defense were it not afforded more time to
prepare to meet it. Neither has Kornegay in his brief to this Court done anything to inform us of the nature
of the evidence furnished in discovery so that we could make an informed determination as to whether the
trial court erred in forcing Kornegay to trial without more time to prepare to deal with that evidence.
¶10. The facts of the case were straight-forward and the State's proof was uncomplicated and, on its face,
apparently free from any surprising twists. It consisted entirely of the testimony of the two officers who were
at the scene when Kornegay's vehicle was stopped.
¶11. In these circumstances, this Court is unconvinced that Kornegay was denied a fundamentally fair trial
strictly because his counsel did not receive the State's discovery material at some earlier point in the
prosecution of this case.
III.
Weight of the Evidence
¶12. Kornegay's motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence was denied by the trial court. The trial court is afforded the authority to grant such a motion when,
in the discretion of the court, to permit the verdict to stand would constitute a manifest injustice. Collier v.
State, 711 So. 2d 458, 461 (¶12) (Miss. 1998). Kornegay now asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in ruling as it did. In that situation, our obligation is to evaluate all the evidence in the light most
favorable to upholding the verdict, keeping in mind that the jury is charged to resolve essential questions of
fact when the evidence bearing on such issues is disputed. Maldonado v. State, 796 So. 2d 247, 253-4
(¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). Based upon such a review, we may intercede and order a new trial only if we
are satisfied that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the new trial motion. Id. at 253 (¶16).
¶13. In this case, there was ample evidence to support a verdict of guilty. It is the duty of the jury to assess
the credibility of the various witnesses and to decide the worth of the testimony of a particular witness.
Hester v. State, 753 So. 2d 463, 466 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). In order to acquit in this case, the jury
would have had to give substantial credence to the testimony of Kornegay's cousin. His testimony was
essentially that, in the short time he had possession of Kornegay's vehicle, he went home, retrieved an
admittedly-expensive firearm, concealed it in the vehicle as a precaution for his own "protection" against an
unspecified danger, and then promptly forgot that he had done so. We do not find this witness's testimony
so compelling as to hold that the jury acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting it completely - as it
clearly did by virtue of its verdict. That being the case, there is no basis to find the verdict against the weight
of the evidence.
¶14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY OF CONVICTION
OF POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON AND SENTENCE OF
THREE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THE APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, MYERS, CHANDLER
AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
