Marcus Cockrell v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CP-00523-COA
MARCUS COCKRELL
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
03/03/2000
TRIAL JUDGE:
HON. JOHN M. MONTGOMERY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
PRO SE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: W. GLENN WATTS
NATURE OF THE CASE:
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
PCR DENIED
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED - 1/16/2001
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
2/6/2001
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., LEE, AND PAYNE, JJ.
McMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Marcus Cockrell pled guilty to the crime of drive-by shooting in 1997. Within three years of the entry of
that plea, he filed a motion for post-conviction relief with the trial court in which he alleged that he did not
have effective representation of counsel during the guilty plea proceedings in that (a) his attorney did not
inform him of the mandatory nature of the sentence he was to receive under a plea agreement, (b) his
attorney coerced him into pleading guilty even though he protested his innocence throughout the proceeding,
and (c) his attorney should have sought to have the case handled under the jurisdiction of the youth court
since Cockrell was only sixteen years old at the time of the crime. Besides attacking the competency of his
counsel, Cockrell additionally alleges that the trial court should not have accepted his plea of guilty when it
was apparent during the course of the plea acceptance hearing that Cockrell steadfastly maintained his
innocence. The circuit court denied relief without hearing and Cockrell has appealed that decision to this
Court raising the same issues.
¶2. We find these issues to be without merit and affirm the judgment denying relief.
I.
The Mandatory Sentence Issue
¶3. Cockrell pled guilty to a crime carrying a maximum sentence of thirty years. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3109 (Rev. 2000). The State recommended a twenty year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. The trial
court accepted the recommendation and sentenced Cockrell accordingly.
¶4. Although it is not entirely clear from his pro se brief, Cockrell now seems to contend that his records
with the Mississippi Department of Corrections indicate that his sentence was without benefit of parole. He
claims that this was not a part of the agreement he had reached with the prosecution. Though he initially
characterizes this as a failing on the part of his attorney, the thrust of his argument appears to be directed at
the MDOC for its refusal to change its records to indicate that he was not, in fact, sentenced to twenty
years without the possibility of parole.
¶5. In all events, Cockrell presents no evidence to support a claim of a discrepancy in the records relating
to his sentence. The sentencing order entered September 2, 1997, recites that "the defendant was
sentenced by the Court to serve a term of (20) twenty years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections .
. . ." It makes no reference to ineligibility for parole. The movant has the burden of showing, by affidavit or
otherwise, that there is a factual basis to support his claim for relief. Tate v. State, 767 So. 2d 1045 (¶7)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2000). No MDOC documents indicating any misunderstanding in the nature of Cockrell's
sentence appear in this record. The only conclusion we can draw from the nature of Cockrell's argument is
that, perhaps, he may not have fully appreciated the impact of the Legislature's decision in 1995 to pass
Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-138(5) (Supp. 2000), which requires that Cockrell serve at least eighty-five
percent of his sentence before he may become eligible for parole.
¶6. If that is the source of Cockrell's dissatisfaction, it was beyond the authority of the trial court to provide
him any relief, whether at the time of sentencing or upon the filing of his post-conviction relief motion. See,
e.g., McGowan v. State, 742 So. 2d 1183 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Brown v. State, 731 So. 2d
595 (¶7) (Miss. 1999). We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing Cockrell any relief on this
claim.
II.
Coerced Plea
¶7. During the course of the plea acceptance hearing, the trial court inquired of Cockrell whether or not he
had committed the acts that formed the basis of the drive-by shooting charge, which involved a claim of
firing a gun from one vehicle into another occupied vehicle. At first Cockrell said he did not and that he was
pleading guilty solely because that was part of the plea agreement reached with the prosecution. After a
brief recess to permit Cockrell to confer further with his attorney, Cockrell admitted that he had actually
fired the gun; however, he continued to insist that the discharge had been accidental when he attempted to
wrestle the weapon from another person in the vehicle who was, in fact, intent on purposely firing the gun.
At that point, the State represented to the court that it had three eye witnesses who would contradict
Cockrell's version of the events and had one witness prepared to testify that Cockrell, immediately prior to
firing, had verbally expressed his intention to kill one of the occupants of the other vehicle.
¶8. The trial court, after an extensive inquiry into Cockrell's understanding of the various constitutional rights
he was waiving, accepted Cockrell's guilty plea as being intelligently and voluntarily made. On these facts,
we do not find that to be error. Cockrell's protestation that the shooting was accidental does not, of itself,
render his plea involuntary. An unqualified admission of guilt is not necessarily a requirement for an
enforceable plea under the constitution. Reynolds v. State, 521 So. 2d 914, 917 (Miss. 1988). What is
required, rather than a full and complete confession, is "an independent evidentiary suggestion of guilt." Id.
We find that the record "suggests" Cockrell's guilt with sufficient force to withstand this challenge.
¶9. Cockrell filed no affidavit as to any specific acts of coercion by his attorney that occurred during the
recess. The merely conclusory claim of coercion, without any accompanying specific allegations, is not
sufficient to entitle Cockrell to a hearing on his motion. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-9(e) (Rev. 2000).
III.
Youth Court Jurisdiction
¶10. Cockrell claims that, because he was only sixteen years old at the time, his attorney should have sought
to have his case transferred to the jurisdiction of the Lowndes County Youth Court. In support of that
argument, Cockrell cites Section 7185-15 of the Mississippi Code of 1942, which gave the youth court
discretion to certify a child thirteen years old or older to be tried as an adult in certain cases. The short
answer to Cockrell's argument is that this provision, initially carried forward into the 1972 Code as Section
43-21-31, was repealed by the Mississippi Legislature effective July 1, 1979. The applicable statute
concerning youth court jurisdiction for this offense at the time it was committed was Section 43-21-159(7),
which provided that "[n]o offense involving the use or possession of a firearm by a child who has reached
his fifteenth birthday, and which if committed by an adult would be a felony, shall be transferred to the youth
court." Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-159(7) (Supp. 2000).
IV.
The Court's Decision to Accept Cockrell's Plea
¶11. Cockrell's brief blends two themes into his argument that his guilty plea should not have been accepted
in the face of his continued assertion of his innocence. We have already discussed this claim in the context
of Cockrell's claim that his attorney somehow coerced him into pleading guilty. Additionally, Cockrell faults
the trial court itself for not halting the plea proceeding and conducting a trial on the merits when he refused
to concede his guilt. Our discussion in Part II of this opinion sufficiently addresses this issue. The trial court
satisfied itself as to the extent of Cockrell's understanding of the consequences of a guilty plea and explored
the available evidence to satisfy itself that there was a sufficient quantum of evidence implicating Cockrell in
the crime to accept his plea despite his claim of a lack of criminal intent.
¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOWNDES COUNTY OF DENIAL OF
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THE APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO LOWNDES COUNTY.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, IRVING, LEE, MYERS, PAYNE, AND
THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR. CHANDLER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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