Steven E. Williams v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CP-01081-COA
STEVEN E. WILLIAMS A/K/A STEVEN EDWARD WILLIAMS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT: 06/15/2000
TRIAL JUDGE:
HON. BARRY W. FORD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: ITAWAMBA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
PRO SE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEAN SMITH VAUGHAN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
JOHN R. YOUNG
NATURE OF THE CASE:
CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF DENIED
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED - 12/18/01
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
1/8/2002
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, AND CHANDLER, JJ.
McMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The appellant, Steven E. Williams, in this pro se appeal, seeks appellate review of an order of the
Circuit Court of Itawamba County denying his request for post-conviction relief from incarceration.
Williams had originally pled guilty to a charge of grand larceny and was sentenced to serve five years. The
sentence was suspended conditioned on his good behavior and completion of a substance abuse
rehabilitation program. His probation was revoked in September 1997 after he was arrested in Alcorn
County for driving while intoxicated.
¶2. Williams filed several post-detention pleadings seeking release from incarceration that included a
number of alternate theories for relief. The trial court consolidated these pleadings for consideration and,
treating them all as requests for post-conviction relief, denied relief by an order that was dated and entered
on February 8, 1999. Williams did not take an appeal from that order. Rather, on May 30, 2000, he filed
another motion for post-conviction relief, in which he claimed broadly that "the trial court was without
jurisdiction to impose sentence" in the grand larceny case. Alternatively, in an apparent attempt to get
around the three year statute of limitations, Williams claimed that he had newly-discovered evidence
concerning the propriety of his original sentence. That newly-discovered evidence was his assertion that he
had a previously-undisclosed felony conviction in Alabama dating back to 1991. The trial court denied
relief without hearing, finding that the motion was an impermissible successive filing raising the same issues
that had been presented in the previous filings.
¶3. It is from that order that Williams perfected the appeal that is now before this Court. We affirm the
decision of the trial court.
¶4. We have afforded Williams substantial latitude in reviewing the record and his brief in support of his
claim for relief regarding the attack on the court's jurisdiction to sentence him originally. We do so in view
of his status as a pro se litigant. Myers v. State, 583 So. 2d 174, 175 (Miss.1991). Even the most
expansive reading of his brief, however, leaves us convinced that his claims are founded on allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel at his original plea hearing. That matter was clearly before the trial court and
disposed of on the merits by the trial court's February 1999 order. Any additional attempt to raise that same
issue is specifically barred by the statutory provisions relating to successive filings. Miss. Code Ann. § 9939-27(9) (Rev. 2000); Hodgin v. State, 710 So. 2d 404, 405 (¶2) (Miss.1998).
¶5. As we have observed, Williams also claims that newly-discovered evidence now renders his original
plea void. Williams makes that claim by revealing that, at the time he was sentenced in 1997, he had a
previous felony conviction in Alabama arising in 1991, and that this fact deprived the trial court of authority
to enter a suspended sentence. See Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-33(1) (Rev. 2000). Whether a defendant
may maintain his silence regarding a felony conviction in another jurisdiction in order to obtain a suspended
sentence but then raise the issue at a later date when he deems it advantageous seems, at best, a dubious
proposition. We are, in all events, content to leave the merits of that assertion for adjudication in a case
where it would affect the outcome. We do not think such a claim, which necessarily had to be known to the
defendant himself when he pled guilty in 1997, is the type of newly-discovered evidence that would avoid a
successive-filings bar. In effect, we draw a distinction between newly-discovered evidence, which may not
be subjected to the procedural bar, and newly-disclosed evidence that was known to the movant from the
inception of the proceeding but, for reasons not apparent on the record, was not disclosed at the time of
sentencing. Williams had to be well aware that he had a prior felony conviction when he was being
sentenced and when his probation was being revoked in 1997, whether or not the prosecution and the
sentencing judge were aware of it. To the extent Williams was entitled to some form of relief for this
purported illegal sentence, his entitlement to assert that relief arose immediately upon his incarceration in
1997 and could have been raised in any of the multiple filings the trial court combined for consideration
under the post-conviction relief statutes and disposed of in February 1999. The bar against successive
filings applies, not only to issues actually determined in a previous post-conviction relief proceeding, but to
those issues that could have been raised. Smith v. State, 648 So. 2d 63, 66 (Miss. 1994).
¶6. There is the alternate argument, not made by Williams but which we acknowledge to exist, that the
illegal nature of his sentence adversely affected some right so fundamental to Williams as to require the trial
court (and this Court) to ignore any procedural bars and proceed to consider the claim on the merits. See,
e.g., Luckett v. State, 582 So. 2d 428, 430 (Miss.1991). In this case, Williams received a sentence that,
had the full facts been known to the court, he would not have been entitled to receive. Nevertheless, it
seems incontrovertible that the opportunity to have one's sentence suspended and thereby remain free from
incarceration is a substantial benefit rather than the kind of detriment that touches on an individual's
fundamental constitutional rights. The State has done nothing in the post-sentencing period to try to alter or
make more harsh Williams's treatment based on the post-sentencing revelation of an Alabama felony
conviction. Williams's subsequent incarceration was not attributable to the conviction, but was due solely to
Williams's failure to take full advantage of a benefit that, had all the facts been known, he would not have
been entitled to receive. This is not the same case as where the State, learning of a defendant's prior
conviction after formally making its sentencing recommendation, seeks to enforce the guilty plea while
nevertheless asserting that the defendant is no longer eligible for the recommended sentence. That scenario
raises different considerations. This Court recently held that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea offered
in reliance on the State's recommendation for a suspended sentence if the trial court becomes aware of the
defendant's ineligibility for such a sentence after plea acceptance but before formal entry of the judgment of
sentence and enters a judgment of sentence that includes immediate incarceration. Berry v. State, 99-CA01462-COA (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2001). It is a fundamental concept of our justice system that
one cannot complain of an alleged error in the law if that person has not been injured by the error. Catholic
Diocese of Natchez-Jackson v. Jaquith, 224 So. 2d 216, 221 (Miss.1969). Unless and until the State
attempted in some way to deprive Williams of the benefits of his sentence, he has not been adversely
affected by the fact that he received a more advantageous sentence than would have been permitted had the
full facts of his prior criminal record been known. To hold otherwise would permit a defendant to conceal
the fact of his criminal record in another jurisdiction in order to obtain a sentence that includes some form of
suspended sentence or probationary release and to hold that prior felony conviction as a reserve weapon to
be used only at such time as the defendant, for whatever reason, determines that he no longer desires to
operate under the original judgment of sentence. This Court, in a somewhat similar factual situation, has said
that an unduly lenient sentence is, in this context, more of a harmless error than one affecting some
fundamental right of the defendant. Chancellor v. State, 2000-CP-01245-COA (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App.
Sept. 25, 2001).
¶7. Though there is language in prior case law to the effect that a judgment of sentence that does not
comply with the statutory penalties for a particular crime is void (see, e.g., Lanier v. State, 635 So. 2d
813, 816 (Miss. 1994)), the Mississippi Supreme Court has made it clear that, in at least some
circumstances, the defendant may be permitted to enjoy the benefit of an improperly lenient sentence. That
situation arose when the Mississippi Supreme Court found that our Court had erred by noting an
impermissibly mild sentence on our own motion and remanding a criminal defendant's appeal to the trial
court for the imposition of a statutorily-permitted, and therefore harsher, judgment of sentence. Winston v.
State, 754 So. 2d 1154, 1157 (¶9) (Miss. 1999); Lester v. State, 744 So. 2d 757, 760 (¶9) (Miss.
1999).
¶8. We, therefore, find that Williams's efforts to raise the existence of his 1991 Alabama felony conviction
as a basis to vacate his guilty plea are barred under the provisions of the post-conviction relief statute
prohibiting successive filings.
¶9. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ITAWAMBA COUNTY DENYING
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED
TO ITAWAMBA COUNTY.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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