Keith Ouzts v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CA-01120-COA
KEITH OUZTS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
05/30/2000
HON. GRAY EVANS
LEFLORE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
KATHRYN N. NESTER
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS
FRANK CARLTON
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DENIED
AFFIRMED - 10/09/01
11/7/2001; denied 2/19/2002
3/4/2002; denied 5/30/2002
6/20/2002
BEFORE KING, P.J., BRIDGES, AND IRVING, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶1. This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief to Keith Ouzts by the Circuit Court of Leflore
County.
¶2. On February 16, 1979, Ouzts, Donald Keeton and Robert Stanley Rowland set out to rob a poker
game at the Leflore County Country Club. They covered their faces with ski masks and entered the room
where some men were playing poker, brandishing shotguns and wearing gloves. Ouzts, Keeton and
Rowland had the men line up against the wall as they began to take the money from the poker table.
Keeton testified that, as he was leaning across the table to rake off the money, his shotgun accidentally
discharged and killed James Campbell, one of the poker players. After the shot, another poker player, Paul
Hughes, began to run from the room and he was shot as he was trying to get away. Ouzts and Keeton have
maintained all throughout the case that Rowland was the one who fired the shots at Hughes. Rowland, on
the other hand, initially stated that it was Ouzts who shot Hughes. However, Rowland changed his story
after his conviction and now says that he did shoot Hughes.
¶3. Ouzts, Keeton and Rowland were all charged with two counts of capital murder and two counts of
armed robbery in an indictment returned by the grand jury on March 8, 1979. All three defendants initially
retained the same attorney, Joe Buchanan, to represent them collectively in this matter. However, on April
2, 1979, Buchanan moved to withdraw from representing Rowland on the grounds that Rowland and Ouzts
had two conflicting stories about the facts of their case and he could therefore not represent them both to
the best of his ability. He chose to continue representing Ouzts because, as Buchanan testified, Ouzts's
recollection of the events surrounding the robbery and murders was consistent with Keeton's version and
Rowland's story was the only one that differed.
¶4. After Rowland had retained new attorneys to represent him, the three defendants appeared at their plea
hearing before Judge Wilkes, circuit court judge of Leflore County. Prior to the hearing, the State made an
offer to all three defendants wherein they would all plead guilty in exchange for two life sentences each on
the capital murder charges and two sentences of twenty-four years each on the armed robbery charges, to
run consecutively with the two life sentences. Under the conditions of this agreement, none of the three
defendants would be subjected to the death penalty, which would be the penalty requested by the State if
the defendants were to plead not guilty and go to trial. On August 2, 1979, Ouzts and Keeton, under
advisement by Buchanan, took the State's deal and pled guilty to all counts for which they had been
charged. Rowland did the same under the advisement of his new attorneys.
¶5. It was not until May 21, 1999, almost twenty years after the convictions of Ouzts, Keeton and
Rowland, and twelve years after the applicable statute of limitations under the Mississippi Uniform PostConviction Collateral Relief Act had run, that Ouzts met with a new attorney who reviewed the documents
in this matter and decided to file a motion for post-conviction relief. Ouzts is challenging his sentence on
several grounds, despite the State's argument that the three-year statute of limitations in which to seek postconviction relief ran long ago, thereby barring Ouzts's claim for relief. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2)
(1984).
¶6. Ouzts cites several issues for our review, including whether there was an actual conflict of interest in
Buchanan's representation of Ouzts and Keeton together; whether Buchanan was ineffective as counsel
because he failed to disclose a more lenient plea agreement offered by the State to the three defendants
than the one they accepted; whether there were illegal ex parte communications between the district
attorney and the judge hearing the matter; and finally, whether Ouzts's case falls under any of the exceptions
to the three-year statute of limitations found in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 1984).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶7. We will first speak to the issue of the statute of limitations since a discussion on the remaining issues
rests on whether the statute has effectively run against Ouzts. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 1984).
Ouzts pled guilty to the crimes of capital murder and armed robbery (two counts each) and final judgment
was entered on August 2, 1979. Although the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act
did not go into effect until 1984, it would still apply to Ouzts's case. Odom v. State, 483 So. 2d 343, 344
(Miss. 1986). "Individuals convicted prior to April 17, 1984, have three years from April 17, 1984, to file
their petition for post-conviction relief." Id. Therefore, Ouzts had until April 17, 1987 to file his petition. It
was not, however, filed until May 21, 1999, over twelve years later. Because this is an overwhelming
violation of the three-year statute of limitations, we look to any exceptions to this limitation period that
would have been available to Ouzts during the time in which he had to file his petition for relief (1984-1987)
. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 1984). The statute as it was written during that time reads as
follows:
A motion for relief under this chapter shall be made . . . in case of a guilty plea, within three years after
the entry of the judgment of conviction. Excepted from this three-year statute of limitations are those
cases in which the prisoner can demonstrate either that there has been an intervening decision of the
Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or the United States which would have actually
adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence or that he has evidence, not reasonably
discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had
such been introduced at trial it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence.
Likewise excepted are those cases in which the prisoner claims that his sentence has expired or his
probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked.
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 1984).
¶8. Clearly, there has been no intervening decision by either the Mississippi or United States Supreme
Court which would adversely affect the outcome of Ouzts's conviction. Similarly, Ouzts is not claiming that
his sentence has expired or his probation has been unlawfully revoked. Ouzts argues, however, that he does
have evidence which was not reasonably discovered at the time of his guilty plea that would have caused
him to receive a lesser sentence than his co-defendants. The statute requires, however, that this new
evidence would almost certainly require a different result in the conviction or sentence. Miss. Code Ann. §
99-39-5(2) (Rev. 1984). We do not find that this would be the case.
¶9. It has been almost twenty years since the plea hearing of these three defendants. The judge who heard
this case, as well as the prosecutor who prosecuted this case, are both deceased. They are the only
witnesses who could rebut many of the arguments cited by Ouzts. Without such key witnesses, we are only
able to hear one side of the story and would be required to speculate on the rest. This is exactly what the
legislature and the courts feared when it was decided that limitations periods for filing a lawsuit or for
seeking post-conviction relief were necessary. One of the primary purposes for limitations statutes such as
this one is to make sure that a right of action is pursued within a "reasonable" amount of time. Cole v.
State, 608 So. 2d 1313, 1317 (Miss. 1992). See also Mississippi Dept. of Public Safety v. Stringer,
748 So. 2d 662, 666 (Miss. 1999).
These statutes are founded upon the general experience of society that valid claims will be promptly
pursued and not allowed to remain neglected. They are designed to suppress assertion of false and
stale claims, when evidence has been lost, memories have faded, witnesses are unavailable, or facts
are incapable of production because of the lapse of time.
Cole, 608 So. 2d at 1317. The court in Cole goes on to hold that simply because a time-barred claim is an
honest and merited claim it does not become exempt from the limitation period. Id.
¶10. Ouzts has produced insufficient evidence which would convince this Court that any of his fundamental
rights were violated. Because the statute of limitations has been seriously abused in this case, and because
we find no conclusive evidence that his case falls under any of the exceptions to the statute, a discussion of
the remaining issues in this case is not necessary. Ouzts's claims of conflict of interest, ineffective assistance
of counsel, lesser culpability, etc., contain absolutely no merit. We agree with the lower court's acceptance
of Ouzts's guilty plea and find nothing in the record of this case that would effectively rebut the fact that all
of these claims are time-barred according to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 1984).
¶11. For the foregoing reasons, we find nothing that would allow us to circumvent the statute of limitations
in this case.
¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEFLORE COUNTY DENYING
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED TO APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS,
CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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