Anthony Knight v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CP-00667-COA
ANTHONY KNIGHT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
DATE OF TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT: 03/23/2000
TRIAL JUDGE:
HON. LAMAR PICKARD
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COPIAH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
PRO SE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: SCOTT STUART
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
ALEXANDER C. MARTIN
NATURE OF THE CASE:
CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF DENIED
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED - 09/18/2001
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
10/9/2001
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., THOMAS, AND CHANDLER, JJ.
McMILLIN, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Anthony Knight is seeking to have his plea of guilty to a charge of sale of cocaine set aside in a postconviction relief proceeding. Knight claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to insist that Knight be
permitted to view a videotape alleged to show Knight selling cocaine to an undercover agent. Knight also
claims that he was coerced into pleading guilty by threats from an angry police officer. The trial court denied
relief on the petition without a hearing and Knight has appealed that decision to this Court. We find Knight's
claims to be without merit and affirm the decision of the trial court.
¶2. Both of Knight's issues arise out of pre-trial dealings relating to the videotape. Knight alleges that a time
was scheduled for him and his attorney to view the videotape but that his attorney did not appear at the
appointed time. Knight, who was in custody, had been transported to the scene of the proposed viewing by
a law enforcement officer. Knight asserts that, when his attorney did not show up, the officer became angry
and threatened to see that Knight received the maximum sentence if he did not go ahead and plead guilty.
¶3. Interestingly, Knight does not make a claim that he was not on the videotape. Rather, his contention
appears to be that he was entitled to view the tape to make his own independent evaluation as to how
incriminating the tape might be. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Knight
must show (a) that his attorney's performance fell below the standard of competence reasonably to be
expected, and (b) that, but for this substandard performance, there was a reasonable probability of a more
favorable outcome for the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
¶4. It is clear from the record that there were eyewitnesses to various aspects of the drug transaction who
would, presumably, be prepared to implicate Knight in the sale. With that kind of evidence before the jury,
the fact that the videotape may not have permitted a clear identification of Knight would not suggest that a
different outcome of the case was likely if its contents were thoroughly explored. Only if the tape would
provide positive information indicating that the seller was someone other than Knight to the extent that it
would be useful in impeaching the State's eyewitnesses would the videotape seem to become pivotal
evidence for the defense. Without an allegation or evidence tending to show that the videotape would have
exonerated Knight in this manner, we are unconvinced that defense counsel's failure to insist that his client
be permitted to view the tape caused counsel's performance to fall below acceptable constitutional
standards of competence. In that light, it is important to keep in mind that there is no allegation that defense
counsel himself did not examine the videotape and evaluate its evidentiary value in advance of advising
Knight regarding the entry of a guilty plea. There is a legitimate distinction to be drawn between an
attorney's duty to investigate and evaluate the evidence against his client and the right of the defendant
himself to insist that he participate in all aspects of the process. Even if defense counsel's performance were
considered substandard for sake of argument, Knight's claim would still fail the second prong of the
Strickland test because there is nothing before this Court to even faintly support the proposition that, had
Knight been permitted to view the videotape, a more favorable outcome of the case from his standpoint
would have been reasonably likely.
¶5. As to Knight's claim that his guilty plea was induced by an officer's threat of harsh punishment based on
his attorney's failure to appear for the scheduled videotape viewing, we observe that at his plea acceptance
hearing, Knight affirmatively represented to the court that he had not been promised a reward or threatened
in order to compel him to plead guilty. Rather, Knight asserted on the record that he was pleading guilty
solely because he had, in fact, committed the acts charged. When the trial court can determine that a factual
assertion by the movant in a post-conviction relief proceeding is belied by unimpeachable evidence in the
transcript of the case that led to conviction, no hearing is required and the trial court may summarily dismiss
the motion. Harris v. State, 578 So. 2d 617, 620 (Miss. 1991).
¶6. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COPIAH COUNTY DENYING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO
COPIAH COUNTY.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING, MYERS, AND
CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. BRANTLEY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
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