Jonathan Develle Jones v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-KA-00661-COA
JONATHAN DEVELLE JONES A/K/A 'POKIE'
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
DATE OF TRIAL COURT
JUDGMENT:
TRIAL JUDGE:
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
04/18/2000
HON. V. R. COTTEN
NEWTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
P. SHAWN HARRIS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DEWITT T. ALLRED III
KEN TURNER
CRIMINAL - FELONY
04/18/2000: SALE OF COCAINE WITHIN 1500 FEET OF
CHURCH: SENTENCED TO SERVE A TERM OF 30
YEARS IN THE MDOC AND PAY A FINE OF $15,000.
AFFIRMED - 07/31/2001
DISPOSITION:
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
CERTIORARI FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
8/21/2001
BEFORE KING, P.J., LEE, AND CHANDLER, JJ.
LEE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Jonathan Devell Jones a/k/a "Pokie" was found guilty of the sale of cocaine within 1,500 feet of a
church. Feeling aggrieved, Jones has filed a timely appeal and presents the following issues: (1) whether the
trial judge erred when he denied the motion for a directed verdict and peremptory instruction, and (2)
whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as it pertained to the identification
of Jones. Finding these issues without merit, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. Vanessa Saucier, an agent for the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics, was involved in an undercover
narcotic operation, and her assignment was to attempt to purchase illegal drugs in Newton, Mississippi. She
was placed with a confidential informant to pursue this task. Additionally, Agent Saucier was given one
hundred dollars to make any purchase of a controlled substance and the informant was equipped with a
body wire transmitter. Thereafter, Agent Saucier and the informant got into an automobile and proceeded
to Pine Street which is located in Newton. Agent Saucier was driving the automobile.
¶3. Agent Saucier testified that once she and the informant were on Pine Street she heard "Pokie" call out
and she stopped the vehicle. Agent Saucier identified the person she referred to as "Pokie" as the same
person as Jonathan Jones. She explained that Jones approached her window and poured crack cocaine in
her hand. She stated that she purchased $100 of crack cocaine from Jones. Agent Saucier noted that at the
time of the transaction it was around 3:30 p.m., it was clear daylight, there were no obstructions, and Jones
was next to the open car window. Additionally, Agent Saucier revealed that she had seen Jones prior to this
sale and was familiar with his face. Furthermore, Agent Saucier made an in-court identification of Jones.
Not only did Agent Saucier identify Jones as the individual that sold her the cocaine, but she also presented
testimony regarding the location of the sale.
¶4. Agent Saucier testified that she was positive the purchase occurred within 1,500 feet of the Triumph the
Church and Kingdom of God in Christ Church. She later explained that although she had not measured the
distance, Agent Wash had and told her it was within fifteen hundred feet. She also stated that she had
"driven off" the distance and knew it was within 1,500 feet. In addition to Agent Saucier's testimony, Chief
Curry, a member of the surveillance team, testified.
¶5. Chief Curry stated that he had known Jones a/k/a "Pokie" for years. Chief Curry asserted that he was
clearly familiar with Jones' voice and recognized his voice during the illegal drug transaction. There was also
testimony from Jamie Johnson, a forensic scientist with the Mississippi Crime Laboratory. Johnson
confirmed that the substance that was purchased from Jones was cocaine. Indeed, Johnson testified that it
was 0.48 grams of cocaine. Jones testified in his own behalf.
¶6. He denied that he had the nickname of "Pokie." Instead, Jones asserted that his nickname was "Smoke
Dog." He explained that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., when the transaction was supposed to be taking
place, he was at his aunt's house feeding his dogs. Jones' aunt, Deborah Jones, also testified and reiterated
this information. In rebuttal to this testimony, Chief Harvey Curry and Officer Melvin Evans testified.
¶7. Curry testified that he had always known Jones by the nickname of "Pokie," never the nickname of
"Smoke Dog." Additionally, he explained that he had even called Jones by the name of "Pokie" and Jones
acknowledged this name. Thereafter, Officer Evans testified that the purchase occurred around 3:30 p.m.
and that he was at the post-buy meeting. Officer Evans stated that after the post-buy meeting at
approximately 3:45 p.m. he went to Pine Street and he saw Jones. This testimony was presented to refute
the testimony concerning the contention that he was at his aunt's house feeding his dogs. Officer Evans
further explained that he had known Jones quite a while and that his nickname was "Pokie."
DISCUSSION
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED WHEN HE DENIED THE MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT AND PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTION.
AND
II. WHETHER THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE AS IT PERTAINED TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF JONES.
¶8. Jones argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict; therefore, he was entitled to a
directed verdict or a peremptory instruction of "not guilty." Additionally, it appears that Jones asserts that
the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as it pertains to his identification. Jones
contends that the evidence presented during his trial was not sufficient to establish that he was the individual
who sold the cocaine to Agent Saucier or establish that the transaction occurred within 1,500 feet of a
church. The State contends, to the contrary, that the evidence presented was sufficient to prove both Jones'
identification and the distance which the sale transpired from the church. We will first review Jones'
argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as it pertains to his identification as the individual selling
the controlled substance.
¶9. Objections to the denial of a directed verdict or a peremptory instruction challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence. McClain v. State, 625 So. 2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993). Our standard for reviewing challenges to
convictions based on sufficiency of the evidence is well established.
¶10. When considering a motion for a directed verdict, this Court must consider the evidence introduced in
the light most favorable to the State, accepting all evidence introduced by the State as true, together with all
reasonable inferences therefrom. McClain, 625 So. 2d at 778. If there is sufficient evidence to support a
guilty verdict, the motion for a directed verdict must be overruled. Smith v. State, 646 So. 2d 538, 542
(Miss. 1994).
To test the sufficiency of the evidence, we must, with respect to each element of the offense, consider
all of the evidence -- not just the evidence which supports the case for the prosecution -- in the light
most favorable to the verdict. The credible evidence which is consistent with guilt must be accepted as
true. The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be
drawn from the evidence. Matters regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence
are to be resolved by the jury. We may reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the
elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded
jurors could only find the accused not guilty.
Wetz v. State, 503 So. 2d 803, 808 (Miss. 1987) (citations omitted).
¶11. In the case at bar, the above statement of the facts discloses there was sufficient evidence to support
the trial judge's decision to deny a directed verdict or peremptory instruction regarding the identification of
Jones as the individual who committed the crime. The testimony of Agent Saucier and Chief Curry provided
enough evidence so that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could find Jones guilty of the sale of cocaine.
Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied Jones' motions for directed verdict
and request for peremptory instruction on this basis. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.
However, this is not the only issue presented on appeal, we must now review the aforementioned evidence
regarding the identification of Jones and apply the standard for a motion for a new trial to see if error was
committed by the trial judge.
¶12. In Benson v. State, 551 So. 2d 188, 193 (Miss. 1989), the Mississippi Supreme Court provided the
following explanation of when it would grant a new trial:
This Court will not order a new trial "unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an
unconscionable injustice." Groseclose v. State, 440 So. 2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1983). Factual disputes
are properly resolved by the jury and do not mandate a new trial. Temple v. State, 498 So. 2d 379,
382 (Miss. 1986).
A motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Burge v. State, 472 So. 2d 392,
397 (Miss. 1985). It must be kept in mind that any discrepancies were properly resolved by the jury as fact
finder because questions regarding weight and worth of witness testimony or witness credibility are for the
jury to settle. Eakes v. State, 665 So. 2d 852, 872 (Miss. 1995). The Court accepts as true all evidence
which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the trial court has abused its discretion
in failing to grant a new trial. Id.
¶13. While the above referenced statement of the facts shows that there was conflicting testimony, it was
for the jury to determine whose testimony was credible. It is apparent from the verdict of guilty, that the jury
chose to believe the testimony of Agent Saucier, Chief Curry, and others who testified for the State.
Accepting the evidence presented by these witnesses which supports the verdict as true, we are not
convinced that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a new trial to Jones. Accordingly, we
conclude this issue has no merit. Finally, we must address whether there was sufficient evidence presented
by the State to prove that the sale took place within 1,500 feet of a church.
¶14. The same standard of review applies as was earlier stated in this opinion for the review of the
sufficiency of the evidence regarding Jones' identification. The testimony established that a church was
present and the sale occurred within 1,500 feet of that church. Therefore, considering the testimony given in
the light most favorably to the State, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find Jones guilty of selling the
drugs within 1,500 feet of a church. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
¶15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NEWTON COUNTY OF
CONVICTION OF THE SALE OF COCAINE WITHIN 1,500 FEET OF A CHURCH AND
SENTENCE OF THIRTY YEARS IN THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND FINE OF $15,000 IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE TAXED TO NEWTON COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., PAYNE, BRIDGES, THOMAS,
IRVING, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR.
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