John Henry Ivy v. State of Mississippi
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2000-CP-01068-COA
JOHN HENRY IVY A/K/A JOHN ADAMS
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
APPELLANT
APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
06/19/2000
TRIAL JUDGE:
HON. THOMAS J. GARDNER III
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
PRO SE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: DEIRDRE MCCRORY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY:
JOHN R. YOUNG
NATURE OF THE CASE:
CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:
MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
DENIED
DISPOSITION:
AFFIRMED - 5/29/2001
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 6/15/2001; denied 8/14/2001
CERTIORARI FILED:
; denied 12/6/2001
MANDATE ISSUED:
9/4/2001
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, AND LEE, JJ.
BRIDGES, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. This case comes from the Circuit Court of Lee County, Honorable Thomas J. Gardner III presiding.
John Henry Ivy sought post-conviction relief from his guilty plea for the crime of robbery. Ivy's petition was
denied by the trial court. Ivy now appeals to this Court bringing three issues:
1. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT'S SUMMARY DENIAL AND DISMISSAL OF
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WAS ERROR?
2. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE WHO PRESIDED OVER THE POSTCONVICTION RELIEF MATTER BELOW, HON. THOMAS GARDNER, WAS NOT
NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL OR OBJECTIVE, AND SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED
HIMSELF?
3. WHETHER THE APPELLANT DID MAKE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF THE
DENIAL OF A STATE AND FEDERAL RIGHT?
Finding no error, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2. On March 11, 1987, John Henry Ivy was indicted in Pontotoc County for the armed robbery of Kay
Pratt. Ivy was found guilty of the crime and was sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the
Mississippi Department of Corrections. Almost a year later, Ivy was indicted in Lee County for the armed
robbery of Kay Pratt. A mistake was made in the indictment, as the victim was really Gene O'Callaghan,
and the indictment was amended on June 29, 1988. Trial was held in this case on June 30, 1988. During
this appearance Ivy pled guilty to the crime of armed robbery.
¶3. Ivy brought a motion for post-conviction relief to vacate his conviction and sentence on May 23, 2000.
Ivy filed this motion on the grounds the indictment filed against him did not properly name the person who
was actually robbed. The trial court held that even though the statute of limitations to file such an action is
three years, and the period of time which had expired was close to twelve years, it would rule on Ivy's
motion on the merits. The trial court did this because according to section 99-39-5 (2) of the Mississippi
Code, if an intervening decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court would have adversely affected the
outcome of the appellant's trial, the statute of limitations may be waived. One such exception is when the
appellant raises a challenge based on a violation of a fundamental right. Ivy claimed he fit into this exception
because his fundamental rights had been violated by the grand jury putting the wrong name on his
indictment. The trial court denied Ivy's petition for post-conviction relief.
DISCUSSION OF THE LAW
¶4. The three year statute of limitations for a post-conviction appeal has run in this case, therefore raising a
procedural bar. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2000). However, if an intervening decision of the
Mississippi Supreme Court would have adversely affected the outcome of the appellant's trial, the statute of
limitations may be waived. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that when it is necessary to protect
a fundamental right, a procedural bar may be excepted. Sneed v. State, 722 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (Miss.
1998). Ivy claims his fundamental rights were violated because the person named as the victim in Ivy's
indictment was the wrong person, therefore overcoming the procedural bar. We are not so convinced. Ivy's
indictment was amended in accordance with section 99-17-13 of the Mississippi Code, which allows
amendments to an indictment "[w]hen they are to form and not to substance." Burson v. State, 756 So. 2d
830 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). It has been held by this Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court that a
change of the name of the victim in an indictment goes to form not substance. Id.; Evans v. State, 499 So.
2d 781, 784 (Miss. 1986). For this reason, no fundamental right was violated in this case, and the three
year statute of limitations acts as a bar to Ivy's claim.
¶5. Additionally, we must point out Ivy pled guilty to the crime of armed robbery. "As a general rule a guilty
plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects contained in an indictment." Brown v. State, 772 So. 2d 411 (¶9)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2000). The name of the victim in the indictment is not the basis of the trial court's
jurisdiction in this case. The crime itself was the basis of the trial court's jurisdiction, and Ivy pled guilty to
the crime. Also, "[n]on-jurisdictional defects in an indictment may be cured by amendment" as was the
defect in this case. Id. at (¶8). Therefore, this Court can further affirm Ivy's conviction without addressing
Ivy's issues.
CONCLUSION
¶6. This Court finds Ivy's motion for post-conviction relief is barred by the statute of limitations, and Ivy's
guilty plea waives the defect in his indictment. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.
¶7. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING IVY'S MOTION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL
ARE ASSESSED TO LEE COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., PAYNE, THOMAS, LEE, IRVING,
MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR.
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