In Re the Marriage of: LeRoy Keith Storbeck, petitioner Respondent, vs. Denise Christine Storbeck, Appellant.

 STATE OF MINNESOTA
 IN COURT OF APPEALS
 CX-99-634
C3-99-653

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jose Angel Rosas,
Appellant.

 Filed July 13, 1999
 Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. K0-97-860

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota St., St. Paul, MN 55101; and

Wayne H. Swanson, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney, 223 E. Seventh St., Ste. 101, Crookston, MN 56716 (for respondent)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan K. Maki, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Ave. S.E., Ste. 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414-3230 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Harten, Judge.

 U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

 KLAPHAKE, Judge

Appellant Jose Angel Rosas pleaded guilty to one count of importing controlled substances across state borders. The district court sentenced him to 86 months in prison and ordered him to pay $1,158 for the costs of extradition. The court also denied his motion for jail credit for time spent in federal custody.

Rosas filed two separate appeals, which have been consolidated by this court. In one appeal, he argues that he is entitled to jail credit for the time he served in federal custody because he claims that his federal and Minnesota convictions both resulted from a single behavioral incident. In the other appeal, Rosas argues that the district court improperly ordered him to pay the costs of extradition because the need for extradition resulted from the fact he was serving a sentence in prison in another state, not because he fled the state to avoid prosecution. Because Minn. Stat. § 631.48 (1998) authorizes a district court to order a defendant to pay the costs of extradition as part of a sentence and because the time Rosas spent in federal prison was related to crimes committed in another state, we affirm.

 D E C I S I O N

 I.

A defendant may be ordered to pay the costs of prosecution, including the cost of extradition from another state to the state of Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 631.48 (1998). The purpose of this statute is "not the punishment of the offender but the reimbursement of the state." State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1999) (citation omitted).

Rosas challenges the district court's decision requiring him to reimburse Polk County for the costs of extradition. He argues that a distinction should be made between cases where extradition is necessary because a defendant voluntarily fled the state to avoid prosecution and cases where extradition is necessary because a defendant is in custody in another state. Rosas further claims that it is "blatantly unfair to charge him with this cost because, although he was placed in prison in Texas at his request, he was not allowed the opportunity to return to the State of Minnesota voluntarily."

Nothing in the record suggests that the district court's decision was unfair or otherwise an abuse of the court's discretion. To the contrary, imposition of the costs of extradition appears entirely reasonable, particularly given that (1) Rosas apparently chose to serve his federal sentence in Texas to be near his family; (2) Rosas could have requested disposition of the Polk County charges before he was transported to Texas; (3) Minnesota authorities were not required to give Rosas the option to return voluntarily to Minnesota from Texas to avoid the costs of extradition; and (4) the district court could have imposed a statutory minimum fine, but chose to waive that amount and merely require Rosas to reimburse Polk County for the costs of extradition. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Rosas to pay $1,158 for the costs of extradition.

 II.

When a criminal sentence is imposed, the district court is required to "assure that the record accurately reflects all time spent in custody in connection with the offense or behavioral incident for which sentence is imposed." Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B). Jail credit is allowed for time spent in another state only when incarceration in the foreign jurisdiction was "solely in connection" with a Minnesota offense. State v. Akbar, 419 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. App. 1988) (citation omitted). If a portion of the time a defendant spent in the other state was in connection with the out-of-state charge, he is not entitled to jail credit for that time. State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984); State v. Bentley, 329 N.W.2d 39, 40 (Minn. 1983) (defendant not entitled to credit for time spent in prison in North Dakota before he was paroled to Minnesota authorities).

Rosas argues that he is entitled to credit for time he spent in federal prison because his federal and state convictions both stemmed from one set of circumstances: the transportation of cocaine for sale from Texas to Minnesota. However, the time Rosas spent in federal custody related to much more than the mere transportation or importation of controlled substances across state lines; Rosas was in federal custody for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to grant Rosas credit for time spent in federal custody.

Rosas further argues that "fairness and equity" dictate that he be granted credit for time served in federal custody because he had no control over which jurisdiction prosecuted him first and because he will serve more time in prison than a similarly situated defendant who is prosecuted only in state court. Rosas urges that credit be granted "to avoid the appearance of prosecutorial manipulation," even though he agrees that the prosecutor did not act in bad faith but was exercising his discretion by deciding to prosecute this matter in state court after the federal court had already prosecuted him. "Absent an abuse of discretion amounting to a denial of equal protection, a prosecutor has broad discretion as to whom to prosecute and for what offense." State v. F.C.R., 276 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Minn. 1979). That discretion was not abused in this case.

The district court's decisions are affirmed.

Affirmed.