LOUIS GHAFFARI V TURNER CONSTRUCTION CO
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice:
Justices:
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JULY 12, 2005
LOUIS GHAFFARI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 124786
TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant, Cross-Plaintiff,
Third Party Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
HOYT, BRUM & LINK, and GUIDELINE
MECHANICAL, INC.,
Defendants,
Cross-Defendants-Appellees,
and
R.W. MEAD & SONS, INC., and CONTI
ELECTRIC, INC.,
Third-Party Defendants,
and
ACOUSTICAL CEILING AND PARTITION
COMPANY,
Defendant,
and
THE EDISON INSTITUTE a/k/a HENRY FORD
MUSEUM & GREENFIELD VILLAGE,
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff.
_______________________________________/
LOUIS GHAFFARI,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
v
No. 124787
TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant, Cross-Plaintiff,
Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
HOYT, BRUM & LINK,
Defendant,
Cross-Defendant-Appellee,
and
GUIDELINE MECHANICAL, INC.,
Defendant, Cross-Defendant,
and
ACOUSTICAL CEILING & PARTITION
COMPANY,
Defendant,
and
THE EDISON INSTITUTE a/k/a HENRY FORD
MUSEUM & GREENFIELD VILLAGE,
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff,
and
CONTI ELECTRIC, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.
_______________________________________/
2
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MARKMAN, J.
The
question
presented
is
whether
the
“open
and
obvious” doctrine has any application in a claim brought
under the “common work area” doctrine.
We conclude that it
does not.
I.
FACTS
AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of a slip and fall incident that
occurred during construction of an IMAX theater at Henry
Ford Museum in Dearborn.
The premises were owned by the
Edison Institute, better known as the Henry Ford Museum and
Greenfield Village (Edison).
contract
with
defendant
Edison signed a construction
Turner
Construction
Company
(Turner), whereby Turner agreed to act as the construction
manager for the project.
then
negotiated
Pursuant to this contract, Turner
trade
contractor
agreements
with
subcontractors on behalf of Edison, and administered them
as the construction manager.
Plaintiff,
an
employee
of
electrical
subcontractor
Conti Electric, Inc., was injured on the construction site
when he tripped on pipes left on the floor of a storage
area
that
he
alleged
had
served
as
a
passageway.
Plaintiff further alleged that the pipes were owned by one
of
two
other
Mechanical,
subcontractors:
Inc.
either
(Guideline),
3
defendant
the
Guideline
pipefitting
subcontractor, or defendant Hoyt, Brum & Link (Hoyt), the
plumbing subcontractor.
Plaintiff testified that he had rounded a corner and
walked through an archway that, until recently, had been
covered with plywood.
the
pipes
as
he
Plaintiff claimed that he slipped on
entered
the
storage
gangboxes that stood in the walkway.
area
from
behind
He testified that
other pipes closer to eye level distracted his vision as he
rounded the gangboxes.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary
disposition on the ground that the hazard was open and
obvious, citing this Court’s then-recent decision in Lugo v
Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512; 629 NW2d 384 (2001).
The
trial
court
also
granted
summary
disposition
to
Guideline on the additional ground that no evidence was
presented to indicate that the pipes in question belonged
to
Guideline.
The
Court
of
Appeals
affirmed
in
an
unpublished per curiam opinion, which was later published
at defendants’ request.
Ghaffari v Turner Constr Co, 259
Mich App 608; 676 NW2d 259 (2003).
We granted leave to appeal and directed the parties to
address
whether
the
open
and
obvious
doctrine
has
any
application in a claim under the common work area doctrine
described in Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45,
54; 684 NW2d 320 (2004), and, if so, how the open and
4
obvious doctrine could be reconciled with Hardy v Monsanto
Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc, 414 Mich 29; 323 NW2d 270 (1992),
in which this Court concluded that the goal of safety in
the
workplace
principles
of
would
be
enhanced
comparative
by
the
application
negligence.
See
Ghaffari
of
v
Turner Constr Co, 471 Mich 915 (2004).
II.
STANDARD
REVIEW
OF
This case requires that we consider whether the open
and
obvious
setting.
doctrine
The
is
applicable
applicability
of
a
in
the
legal
construction
doctrine
is
a
question of law that we review de novo.
People v Thousand,
465 Mich 149, 156; 631 NW2d 694 (2001).
We also review de
novo
a
circuit
court’s
grant
of
summary
disposition.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
III. ANALYSIS
The
question
presented
is
whether
a
general
contractor,1 when confronted with potential liability for a
job
site
injury
suffered
by
the
employee
of
a
subcontractor, may avoid liability on the basis that the
condition giving rise to the injury was open and obvious.
1
Although, under the terms of its contract with the
premises owner, Turner was in fact a “construction
manager,” and not a “general contractor,” the distinction
is one without a difference for purposes of our analysis in
this case. Because our common work area jurisprudence has
heretofore referred to “general contractors,” we will
continue to use that term.
5
In order to answer this question, we must first examine two
relevant
common-law
doctrines:
the
common
work
area
doctrine and the open and obvious doctrine.
A.
The Common Work Area Doctrine
At common law, property owners and general contractors
generally could not be held liable for the negligence of
independent subcontractors and their employees.
However,
in Funk v Gen Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91, 104; 220 NW2d 641
(1974), this Court departed from this traditional framework
and
set
forth
an
exception
to
the
general
rule
of
nonliability in cases involving construction projects:
We regard it to be part of the business of a
general contractor to assure that reasonable
steps within its supervisory and coordinating
authority are taken to guard against readily
observable, avoidable dangers in common
work
areas which create a high degree of risk to a
significant number of workmen. [Emphasis added.]
We also articulated several practical considerations
that supported this exception:
Placing
ultimate
responsibility
on
the
general contractor for job safety in common work
areas
will,
from
a
practical,
economic
standpoint, render it more likely that the
various subcontractors being supervised by the
general contractor will implement or that the
general contractor will himself implement the
necessary precautions and provide the necessary
safety equipment in those areas.
[A]s a practical matter in many cases only
the general contractor is in a position to
coordinate work or provide expensive safety
features that protect employees of many or all of
the subcontractors. . . .
[I]t must be
6
recognized
that
even
if
subcontractors
and
supervisory
employees
are
aware
of
safety
violations they often are unable to rectify the
situation themselves and are in too poor an
economic position to compel their superiors to do
so.
[Id. (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).]
In Ormsby, supra at 54, we listed the elements of what
had
become
known
since
Funk
as
the
common
work
area
doctrine:
That is, for a general contractor to be held
liable under the “common work area doctrine,” a
plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant,
either the property owner or general contractor,
failed to take reasonable steps within its
supervisory and coordinating authority (2) to
guard against readily observable and avoidable
dangers (3) that created a high degree of risk to
a significant number of workmen (4) in a common
work area. [Emphasis added.]
We made clear in Ormsby that only when this test is
satisfied may a general contractor be held liable for the
alleged
negligence
of
the
employees
of
independent
subcontractors with respect to job site safety.
56.
Id. at 55-
The failure to satisfy any one of these elements is
fatal to a Funk claim.
B.
In
general,
Id. at 59.
The Open and Obvious Doctrine
a
premises
possessor
must
exercise
reasonable care to protect invitees from an unreasonable
risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land.
Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich 606, 609; 537 NW2d 185
(1995).
However, this duty does not generally require the
7
removal of open and obvious dangers.
In Lugo, supra at
516-517, we rearticulated the open and obvious doctrine:
[W]here the dangers are known to the invitee
or are so obvious that the invitee might
reasonably be expected to discover them, an
invitor owes no duty to protect or warn the
invitee unless he should anticipate the harm
despite knowledge of it on behalf of the invitee.
* * *
In sum, the general rule is that a premises
possessor is not required to protect an invitee
from open and obvious dangers, but, if special
aspects of a condition make even an open and
obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises
possessor has a duty to undertake reasonable
precautions to protect invitees from that risk.
[Internal citations omitted; emphasis added.]
We
also
stated
that
the
open
and
obvious
doctrine
should not be viewed as “some type of ‘exception’ to the
duty generally owed invitees,” but rather viewed “as an
integral part of the definition of that duty.”
C.
Id. at 516.
Compatibility of the Two Doctrines
Defendants urge us to find that the two doctrines—the
common
work
area
doctrine
and
the
open
and
obvious
doctrine—are compatible and can be applied harmoniously.
However, as noted above, for a general contractor to be
held
liable
under
the
common
work
area
doctrine,
a
plaintiff must show that the general contractor has failed
“to guard against readily observable and avoidable dangers
. . . .”
Ormsby, supra at 54.
Yet, one could replace the
phrase “readily observable and avoidable” as used in Ormsby
8
with the phrase “open and obvious” without significantly
changing
the
meaning
of
this
passage.
Thus,
irreconcilable conflict immediately arises:
an
one doctrine
(common work area) imposes an affirmative duty to protect
against hazards that are open and obvious, while the other
(open
and
obvious)
asserts
that
hazards are open and obvious.2
no
duty
exists
if
the
Because of this logical
conflict, we have no difficulty in concluding that the open
and obvious doctrine and the common work area doctrine are
incompatible.
The
Court
Michigan
courts
doctrine
into
of
Appeals
have
a
not
recognized
expanded
the
general-contractor
Ghaffari, supra at 614.
in
this
open
case
and
liability
that
obvious
context.
However, the Court then proceeded
to conclude that “there is nothing in the history of the
open and obvious danger doctrine . . . to suggest that the
doctrine should not apply in other contexts.”
Id.
With
this conclusion, we respectfully disagree.
In addition to the logical conflict noted above, we
recognize
that
there
are
several
critical
distinctions
between the two doctrines that demonstrate that they serve
different objectives.
First, our jurisprudence makes clear
2
At least, absent “special aspects.”
517-518.
9
Lugo, supra at
that the two doctrines are applicable in entirely different
contexts.
The open and obvious doctrine is specifically
applicable to a premises possessor.
517.
Lugo, supra at 516-
The common work area doctrine, meanwhile, is not
applicable
to
the
premises
possessor,
but
rather
to
a
general contractor whose responsibility it is to coordinate
the
activities
of
an
array
of
subcontractors.
See,
generally, Funk and Ormsby.
In Perkoviq v Delcor Homes—Lake Shore Pointe, Ltd, 466
Mich 11; 643 NW2d 212 (2002), this Court recognized the
distinction inherent in these two contexts.
In Perkoviq,
the plaintiff worker was injured when he fell from the roof
while painting a partially constructed house. He brought
suit
against
the
defendant,
the
owner
and
general
contractor of the subdivision development, on both premises
liability and contractor liability theories.
the
Court
of
Appeals
conclusion
that
In reversing
genuine
issues
of
material fact existed regarding the plaintiff’s premises
liability claim, we observed:
The Court of Appeals seems to have confused
general contractor liability with the liability
of a possessor of premises. In explaining its
conclusion that defendant could be liable on a
premises
liability
theory,
the
Court
used
analysis that was irrelevant to that theory and
would be applicable only to a claim against a
general contractor. . . .
The fact that defendant may have additional
duties in its role as general contractor,
10
however, does not alter the nature of the duties
owed by virtue of its ownership of the premises.
[Id. at 19.]
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals analysis, Perkoviq
makes
clear
that
different
duties
are
owed
under
each
doctrine, and that the legal analyses employed in the two
contexts are distinct.
Moreover,
Ormsby
itself
implicitly
recognized
fundamental difference between these two contexts.
premises
owner
who
generally
not
liable
negligently causes,3
hires
for
an
independent
injuries
we noted in
that
Ormsby
While a
contractor
the
the
is
contractor
that a premises
owner may still be liable for injuries to workers under
limited circumstances.
Where the premises owner retains
sufficient control over the construction project, the owner
“steps into the shoes of the general contractor and is held
to the same degree of care as the general contractor.”
Ormsby, supra at 49.
In such a case, the owner would face
liability under the “retained control doctrine,” which we
described as standing for the proposition
that when the Funk “common work area doctrine”
would
apply,
and
the
property
owner
has
sufficiently
“retained
control”
over
the
construction project, that owner steps into the
shoes of the general contractor and is held to
the
same
degree
of
care
as
the
general
3
See, e.g., DeShambo v Anderson, 471 Mich 27, 31; 684
NW2d 332 (2004).
11
contractor.
Thus,
the
“retained
control
doctrine,” in this context, means that if a
property owner assumes the role of a general
contractor, such owner assumes the unique duties
and obligations of a general contractor.
[Id.
(emphasis added).]
Ormsby
made clear that the owner’s liability in such a
situation would stem not from the owner’s status as the
premises possessor, but from his or her status as the de
facto general contractor.
Ormsby
recognized
the
In making such a distinction,
distinction
between
the
duties
a
premises possessor owes by virtue of his or her status as a
possessor,
and
the
duties
owed
by
virtue
of
retaining
control as a contractor over a common work area.
Because
these duties—articulated in the open and obvious doctrine
and
the
common
work
area
doctrine,
respectively—are
distinct, so too must be the doctrines that articulate such
duties.4
A second distinction between the two doctrines that
our
cases
make
apparent
concerns
4
the
issue
of
worker
We note that the retained control doctrine is not
implicated in the instant case, because none of the
remaining defendants is the premises owner.
We refer to
that doctrine only to point out its recognition that the
nature of the liability faced by one who possess premises,
and by one who controls premises during their construction,
are distinct.
12
safety.5
We note that the application of the open and
obvious doctrine in the construction setting would conflict
with
the
reasoning
underlying
this
Court’s
holding
in
Hardy, because it would largely nullify the doctrine of
comparative
negligence
effectively
restore
liability
abolished
in
the
the
construction
complete
when
Hardy
bar
to
setting,
and
a
contractor’s
eliminated
contributory
negligence in that setting.
In Hardy, supra at 39, this Court addressed “whether
the Funk policy of promoting safety in the workplace would
be
undermined
principles
of
or
enhanced
comparative
by
the
application
negligence.”
In
of
the
adopting
comparative negligence, we observed:
In Funk, this Court found the total bar of
contributory negligence to be inconsistent with
the public policy of promoting safety in the
workplace. The Court refused to allow a general
contractor and a landowner to “avoid” liability
“by pointing to the concurrent negligence of the
injured worker in using the [unsafe] equipment.”
Before Funk, the contractor could entirely avoid
5
While the foundational consideration underlying the
common work area doctrine is one of job site safety, safety
concerns of course are not limited to the construction
setting. While our opinion today distinguishes the common
work area doctrine from the open and obvious doctrine, we
emphasize our view that the latter doctrine also promotes
safety concerns, albeit in a different manner.
As is
apparent from our discussion later in this opinion of the
hazards typically found in a construction site, what
constitutes “ordinary care” in a premises liability setting
may differ substantially from what constitutes “ordinary
care” in the construction setting.
13
liability by convincing the finder of fact that
the plaintiff was even 1% negligent.
Apparently
it was feared that some contractors might succumb
to the temptation of employing skilled defense
counsel instead of adequate safety devices. . . .
“To allow defendants in this case to invoke
the protection of the contributory negligence
doctrine would be tantamount to subverting the
very safety concerns that the . . . Funk court[]
extolled as of paramount importance. Such a
position might allow a manufacturer to escape its
duty of due care . . . .”
* * *
In
stark
contrast,
the
defense
of
comparative negligence never allows a contractor
to entirely “avoid” liability and thus “escape”
the duty of due care.
Under Placek [v Sterling
Hts, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979)], the
defendant must pay the full percentage of damages
caused by his negligence.
[Id. at 39-40
(citations omitted).]
The adoption of the open and obvious doctrine in the
general contractor setting would tend to thwart the goals
of workplace safety advanced by our decisions in Funk and
Hardy.
Court
If we were to adopt the rule set forth below by the
of
Appeals,
we
would
contributory negligence regime.
effectively
return
to
a
In such a case, no matter
how negligent the general contractor was in creating or
failing to ameliorate the hazard, the employee would be
barred
from
recovery
because
the
hazard
was
open
and
obvious.
Hardy recognized that such bars to recovery “provide a
strong financial incentive for contractors to breach the
14
duty to undertake reasonable safety precautions.”
41.
Indeed,
result—the
such
more
a
rule
egregious
might
lead
(i.e.,
to
a
obvious)
Id. at
paradoxical
the
safety
violation, the less incentive the contractor would have to
ameliorate
the
obviousness
of
hazard,
the
because
hazard
of
would
liability for the resulting injury.
the
bar
knowledge
the
that
contractor's
Instead, Hardy adopted
a comparative negligence rule on the grounds that such a
rule retains a strong incentive for general contractors to
maintain workplace safety.6
Accordingly, we believe that
Hardy supports the conclusion that the open and obvious
doctrine should remain distinct from the common work area
doctrine.
As a third distinction between the two doctrines, we
offer a final observation grounded in the nature of the
different
harms
confronted
doctrine is applicable.
in
the
realms
in
which
each
In particular, there exist unique
and distinct attributes of the construction setting that
would make the rules applicable in the typical premises
liability setting inappropriate.
6
In addition, such a rule also ensures that the worker
also bears responsibility for his or her own conduct.
A
comparative negligence regime “enhances the goal of safety
in the workplace under these conditions . . . .”
Hardy,
supra at 41.
15
Construction sites typically involve the comings and
goings of multiple subcontractors and their materials, a
physical
venue
alteration,
evolving
that
with
by
is
any
the
constantly
number
of
moment.
being
open
The
subjected
hazards
to
are
existing
at
hazards
that
construction sites are numerous and may typically come from
any one of three dimensions, including from above.
hazards may often be in motion.
These
Loud and sudden noises may
surround and distract the construction worker, with many of
these
noises
carried
emanating
out
by
from
fellow
the
workers
dangerous
activities
who
be
may
near.
Nonetheless, at the same time that he or she is confronted
with such an environment, the construction worker must move
at a business-like pace in order to carry out his or her
job—one that may require considerable physical exertion,
and
require
attention
to
detail
and
compliance
with
demanding professional standards—in a timely manner.
This
is in contrast to the typical premises liability case in
which
the
open
and
obvious
hazard
is
found
on
or
near
ground level, and in which distractions, although they may
sometimes
exist,
are
of
a
considerably
less
urgent
and
persistent character than those faced by the construction
worker.
While
responsibility
the
of
construction
carrying
out
worker
his
or
still
her
bears
work
the
in
a
reasonable and prudent manner, the worker will typically
16
encounter more dangers of a more diverse character, and
more distractions coming from more directions, than will
persons
shopping
in
retail
establishments
or
walking
in
parking lots or visiting the residences of others, and will
generally be less able to avoid a given hazard than the
typical invitee or licensee, even if the hazard may be seen
after the fact as open and obvious.
It is the general contractor who has the coordinating
power and supervisory authority to ensure that this unusual
array of physical risks does not devolve into chaos, and it
is the general contractor upon whom ultimate responsibility
for the safe completion of a project rests.
As the overall
coordinator
contractor
of
this
activity,
the
general
is
best situated to ensure workplace safety at the least cost.
Because of this position, the duty to keep common work
areas safe reasonably falls on the general contractor.
As our analysis today attempts to make clear, the two
doctrines at issue are independent of and distinct from one
another.
The
open
and
obvious
doctrine
serves
as
an
“integral part of the definition” of the duty a premises
possessor
owes
invitees,
Lugo,
supra
at
516,
while
the
common work area doctrine “is an exception to the general
rule of nonliability for the negligent acts of independent
subcontractors
and
their
employees,”
under
which
“an
injured employee of an independent subcontractor [may] sue
17
the general contractor . . . .”
two
doctrines
plaintiffs
involve
and
Ormsby, supra at 49.
completely
defendants,
and
distinct
therefore,
The
sets
noted
as
of
in
Perkoviq, different sets of duties.
Thus,
this
contrary
Court’s
to
cases
the
have
Court
not
of
Appeals
suggested
conclusion,
that
the
two
doctrines are compatible, but rather have made clear that
the rationale and practical considerations underlying the
open and obvious doctrine are separate and distinct from
those that underlie the common work area doctrine.
Because
we reaffirm that the two doctrines are, in fact, distinct,
we
hold
that
applicability
the
to
a
open
claim
and
obvious
under
the
doctrine
common
has
no
work
area
doctrine, and therefore the trial court erred in granting
summary disposition in favor of defendants on the basis
that the pipes at issue were an open and obvious hazard.
D.
Subcontractor Liability
The question remains regarding the liability of the
defendant subcontractors, Hoyt and Guideline.
argues
that
summary
disposition
should
not
Plaintiff
have
been
granted because a question of fact existed with regard to
“whether defendants negligently performed their contractual
obligations
Plaintiff
to
and
clean
up
defendant
and
Hoyt
18
remove
safety
disagree
hazards.”
regarding
the
relevance of our decision in Fultz v Union-Commerce Assoc,
470 Mich 460; 683 NW2d 587 (2004).
Moreover, with respect to defendant Guideline, besides
granting summary disposition because the condition was open
and obvious, the trial court granted summary disposition on
the additional ground that no evidence was presented to
indicate that the pipes in question belonged to Guideline.
Plaintiff argues to this Court, as he did to the Court of
Appeals, that summary disposition was inappropriate with
regard to Guideline, because a genuine issue of material
fact was presented concerning whether it owned the pipes
that caused plaintiff’s fall.
conclusion
that
plaintiff’s
the
claim,
open
the
However, in light of its
and
Court
obvious
of
doctrine
Appeals
never
barred
addressed
this alternate ground for summary disposition.
Because our decision in Fultz was released nine months
after
the
Court
of
Appeals
decision
in
this
case,
and
because the Court did not address the matter of Guideline’s
ownership of the pipes, remand to the Court of Appeals is
necessary for resolution of these issues.
Court
shall
first
consider
whether
a
On remand, the
genuine
issue
of
material fact exists regarding Guideline’s ownership of the
pipes.
If it concludes that no such issue exists, then it
shall affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition
for Guideline on that ground.
19
Should the Court conclude
that an issue of fact does exist, then the Court shall
consider if Guideline, along with Hoyt, owed plaintiff any
duty under Fultz.
If the Court concludes that Hoyt, Guideline, or both
owed plaintiff a duty under Fultz, the Court shall then
remand to the trial court for further proceedings against
the relevant subcontractor(s) and Turner.
However, should
the Court conclude that the subcontractor(s) owed plaintiff
no
contractual
duty,
then
it
shall
dismiss
Hoyt
and
Guideline from the suit and remand for further proceedings
against Turner only.7
IV.
CONCLUSION
The open and obvious doctrine has no applicability to
a claim brought under the common work area doctrine.
The
two doctrines are conceptually distinct, and our case law
7
While we decline to review plaintiff’s contract-based
claim of liability in advance of the Court of Appeals, we
note in passing that the subcontractors face no liability
under the other theories addressed in this opinion.
No
liability could attach under a premises liability theory,
because
the
subcontractors
were
not
the
premises
possessors.
See Lugo, supra at 516-517.
Nor can the
subcontractors face liability under the common work area
doctrine, because they did not have control of the work
area.
We recognized in Ormsby, supra at 56-57, that the
common work area doctrine is only applicable to a general
contractor or to a property owner who retains sufficient
control of the work so as to act in a superintending
capacity (under the “retained control” doctrine).
Here,
the subcontractors acted as neither.
Thus, neither of
these doctrines serves as a basis for imposing liability on
Hoyt or Guideline.
20
has treated them as such.
Accordingly, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.
However, because the Court of Appeals declined, on the
basis of its findings regarding the applicability of the
open and obvious doctrine, to review the alternate ground
for
summary
disposition
given
with
respect
to
defendant
Guideline, and because our decision in Fultz was released
after the Court of Appeals decision in the instant case, we
remand to that Court to determine the outstanding questions
concerning the liability of the subcontractors.
has
resolved
these
questions,
the
Court
of
Once it
Appeals
is
instructed to further remand to the trial court for further
proceedings
consistent
with
this
opinion
with
Turner and, if applicable, Hoyt and Guideline.
Stephen J. Markman
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
21
regard
to
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