PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice:
Opinion
Justices:
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED MAY 11, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 127115
JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM
This case concerns the constitutionality of a traffic
stop.
After stopping defendant's vehicle for speeding, a
state trooper asked defendant routine questions about his
travel
vehicle.
plans
and
obtained
his
consent
to
search
the
Cocaine and marijuana were discovered during the
search.
determined,
Defendant
that
his
argues,
consent
and
was
the
Court
invalid
of
Appeals
because
his
detention exceeded the proper scope of a traffic stop, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals
held that the trial court should have suppressed the fruits
of the search.1
We conclude that the detention was reasonable and did
not exceed the proper scope of a traffic stop.
Because
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated as a
result of the detention, his consent was valid.
We reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case
to
the
trial
court
for
reinstatement
of
defendant’s
convictions and sentences.
I.
BACKGROUND
On February 14, 2003, Michigan State Police Trooper
Jason Varoni observed defendant’s vehicle traveling eightyeight miles an hour on I-75 in Cheboygan County, where the
posted speed limit was seventy miles an hour.
defendant’s vehicle.
driver's license.
been
stopped
and
He stopped
Upon request, defendant produced his
Trooper Varoni told defendant why he had
asked
defendant
where
he
was
going.
Defendant answered that he was going to Cheboygan to visit
friends and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn.
Because Cheboygan does not have a Holiday Inn, Trooper
Varoni was suspicious of this response and asked defendant
to step from the vehicle to answer additional questions.
1
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued August 5, 2004
(Docket No. 249853).
2
Defendant did so and, in response to further questioning,
explained
that
he
was
coming
from
Detroit
intended to stay in Cheboygan for two days.
and
that
he
No luggage was
visible in the vehicle’s passenger compartment; when asked
about this, defendant said that he brought no luggage on
the trip.
Trooper Varoni asked defendant if he had “been
in trouble before,” and defendant disclosed that he had
previously been arrested for a marijuana-related offense.
Trooper Varoni then questioned the vehicle’s other two
occupants
about
their
own
travel
plans,
but
inconsistent responses only increased his suspicions.2
their
This
questioning was completed about five to eight minutes after
the traffic stop occurred.
Trooper Varoni then informed
defendant that he had received conflicting stories from the
occupants of the vehicle.
He asked for defendant’s consent
to search the vehicle, and defendant agreed.
Trooper Varoni contacted the Tuscarora Township canine
unit, and asked that a drug-detection dog be sent to the
scene.
The canine unit arrived within three minutes and
the dog signaled the presence of narcotics in the backseat
2
The front-seat passenger claimed that he did not know
where they were going or how long they would be gone; he
confirmed that he had no luggage. The backseat passenger,
defendant’s wife, told Trooper Varoni that they were going
shopping in Cheboygan and then Detroit. She said that they
had made no arrangements for accommodations.
3
of the vehicle.
Trooper Varoni did not find any narcotics
in that area, and he asked defendant for consent to search
the vehicle’s trunk.
Defendant initially agreed, but then
withdrew his consent.
A warrant was obtained, and the
police discovered substances that appeared to be marijuana
and cocaine.3
Trooper Varoni wrote defendant a citation for
speeding and two drug-related felonies, and arrested him.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to
deliver fifty grams or more but less than 225 grams of a
substance containing cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and
possession
with
intent
333.7401(2)(d)(iii).
to
deliver
marijuana,
MCL
He moved to suppress evidence of the
controlled substances seized from his vehicle, asserting
that the search4 and seizure were predicated on an illegal
detention.
The
trial
court
denied
the
motion.
It
concluded that the statements made by the occupants of the
vehicle raised reasonable suspicions in Trooper Varoni’s
mind.
It further concluded that the delay caused by the
3
This was confirmed through later testing.
4
Defendant disputes the validity of the initial search
of the car; he does not separately challenge the validity
of the later search of the trunk, which was conducted after
Trooper Varoni obtained a search warrant and which led to
the discovery of the controlled substances.
4
additional
questioning
was
not
unreasonable
under
the
circumstances presented.
Defendant was convicted as charged following a bench
trial, and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of
seven to twenty years (for the cocaine conviction) and two
to four years (for the marijuana conviction).
Defendant
appealed,
challenging
the
trial
court’s
denial of his motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals
reversed.
Concluding that the initial traffic stop had
been lawful, the Court then determined that the trooper
“unlawfully
exceeded
the
initial
stop
when
he
asked
defendant to step out of the vehicle” to answer questions
about his travel plans while the officer possessed only a
“generalized hunch” that criminal activity was afoot.
The
trooper’s questions had no relevance to the traffic stop,
the
Court
held,
and
he
had
no
reasonable
suspicion
criminal activity to warrant asking the questions.
Court
concluded
“hunch,”
which
that
is
investigatory stop.
Trooper
insufficient
Varoni
was
grounds
acting
for
of
The
on
pursuing
a
an
For these reasons, it reversed the
trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress.
The
prosecutor
applied
to
appeal.
5
this
Court
for
leave
to
II.
This
Court
STANDARD OF REVIEW
reviews
a
trial
court’s
suppression hearing for clear error.
findings
at
a
People v Jenkins, 472
Mich 26, 31; 691 NW2d 759 (2005); People v Custer, 465 Mich
319, 325-326; 630 NW2d 870 (2001).
But the application of
constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to
essentially
uncontested
facts
is
entitled
to
less
deference; for this reason, we review de novo the trial
court’s
ultimate
ruling
on
the
motion
to
suppress.
Jenkins, supra; People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 191-192; 627
NW2d 297 (2001).
III.
ANALYSIS
We review here the Court of Appeals determination that
the traffic stop escalated into an illegal detention in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, rendering defendant’s
eventual consent to search a nullity.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their
persons,
houses,
papers
and
effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.[5]
5
US Const, Am IV.
6
In assessing the protections created by this amendment, the
United
States
Supreme
Court
has
“long
held
that
the
'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.'”
Ohio v Robinette, 519 US 33, 39; 117 S Ct 417; 136 L Ed 2d
347 (1996) (citation omitted).
by
examining
Because
of
the
totality
“'endless
circumstances'”
Reasonableness is measured
of
the
variations
implicating
circumstances.
Id.
in
and
the
the
Fourth
facts
Amendment,
reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that does not
lend
itself
to
resolution
bright-line rules.
through
the
application
of
Id., quoting Florida v Royer, 460 US
491, 506; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983).
In analyzing the propriety of the detention here, we
apply the standard set forth in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88
S
Ct
1868;
20
L
Ed
2d
889
(1968).6
Under
Terry,
the
reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on “whether
the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and
whether
it
was
reasonably
related
6
in
scope
to
the
Knowles v Iowa, 525 US 113, 117; 119 S Ct 484; 142 L
Ed 2d 492 (1998) (despite existence of probable cause, a
common traffic stop is more analogous to limited detention
authorized by Terry than to an arrest) (quoting Berkemer v
McCarty, 468 US 420, 439-440; 104 S Ct 3138; 82 L Ed 2d 317
[1984]).
7
circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.”7
Terry, supra at 20.
In this case, there is no dispute that the initial
traffic stop was occasioned by defendant’s speeding, and
was therefore based on probable cause and was reasonable.
Robinette,
question
supra
is
at
whether
38.
Under
the
Terry,
subsequent
the
remaining
detention
was
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances" of this
case.
Terry, supra at 20.
We conclude that it was.
As a threshold matter, the Court of Appeals erred when
it agreed with defendant that the purpose of this traffic
stop was fully effectuated when defendant handed Trooper
Varoni his driver's license and other requested paperwork.
This
view
of
the
essential
nature
of
the
traffic
stop
imposes an unreasonable restriction on an officer’s ability
to investigate a violation of the law.
A traffic stop is reasonable as long as the driver is
detained only for the purpose of allowing an officer to ask
reasonable questions concerning the violation of law and
7
The reviewing court considers the objective facts
relating to the traffic stop; the officer’s subjective
state of mind is not relevant to the determination whether
the detention was proper. Oliver, supra at 199.
8
its context for a reasonable period.8
The determination
whether a traffic stop is reasonable must necessarily take
into
account
the
officer is faced.
evolving
circumstances
with
which
the
As we observed in People v Burrell, 417
Mich 439, 453; 339 NW2d 403 (1983), when a traffic stop
reveals a new set of circumstances, an officer is justified
in
extending
the
detention
long
enough
to
resolve
the
suspicion raised.9
It is no violation of the Fourth Amendment for an
officer
to
ask
reasonable
questions
in
order
to
obtain
additional information about the underlying offense and the
circumstances leading to its commission.
addition
to
asking
for
the
necessary
For example, in
identification
and
paperwork, an officer may also ask questions relating to
8
There is considerable discretion allowed an officer
charged with enforcing the traffic laws as a member of the
executive branch of government.
This discretion can be
exercised effectively only if an officer is allowed to ask
reasonable questions concerning the context of a traffic
offense.
To deny an officer the ability to ask
reasonable questions, reasonably circumscribed in scope and
duration, is to deny the officer the ability to reasonably
exercise the officer's discretion.
9
Put another way, when considering whether a detention
is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances of the
case, a reviewing court must consider whether “the
officer’s subsequent actions were fairly responsive to the
emerging tableau—the circumstances originally warranting
the stop, informed by what occurred, and what the officer
learned, as the stop progressed.” United States v Chhien,
266 F3d 1, 6 (CA 1, 2001).
9
the
reason
for
the
stop,
including
questions
driver’s destination and travel plans.
about
the
United States v
Williams, 271 F3d 1262, 1267 (CA 10, 2001).10
Specifically,
an officer may ask about the “purpose and itinerary of a
driver’s
trip
during
the
traffic
stop”
in
order
to
determine whether a “violation has taken place, and if so,
whether a citation or warning should be issued or an arrest
made.”
2004).
United States v Brigham, 382 F3d 500, 508 (CA 5,
Such
inquiries
are
“within
the
investigation attendant to the traffic stop.”
scope
of
Id.
Implicit in the authority to ask these questions is
the authority to ask follow-up questions when the initial
answers
given
are
suspicious.11
Likewise,
there
is
no
constitutional prohibition against asking similar questions
of any passengers in the vehicle.12
10
See also United States v Givan, 320 F3d 452, 459 (CA
3, 2003); United States v Linkous, 285 F3d 716, 719 (CA 8,
2002); United States v Hill, 195 F3d 258, 268 (CA 6, 1999);
United States v Johnson, 58 F3d 356, 357 (CA 8, 1995).
11
United States v Johnson, 58 F3d 356, 357-358 (CA 8,
1995).
12
Linkous, supra at 719 (an officer may question the
occupants of a vehicle to verify information provided by
the driver).
10
Simply put, the Fourth Amendment does not impose a
“one size fits all” rule of police investigation,13 much
less one that restricts the officer to informing the driver
of the nature of the infraction, and subsequently obtaining
the information necessary to fill out a citation.
Fourth
Amendment
reasonable—that
light
of
all
requires
is,
the
that
facts
only
it
that
The
detention
be
reasonably
be
the
restricted
in
available
to
the
officer.
See
Robinette, supra at 39.
That
standard
was
satisfied
here.
Trooper
Varoni
introduced himself to defendant, explained the purpose of
the
stop,
and
obtained
the
necessary
identification
and
paperwork in order to complete the citation for the civil
infraction of speeding.
In response to a routine question
about his travel plans, defendant provided Trooper Varoni
with an explanation that was implausible.14
before
Trooper
Varoni
could
resolve
Therefore, even
the
matter
of
13
See Robinette, supra at 39 (“In applying this test
we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness
inquiry.”).
14
The Court of Appeals stated that there were
“plausible” innocent explanations for the statements made
by the vehicle occupants.
But the fact that such
explanations can be imagined does not mean that Trooper
Varoni acted unreasonably in seeking to resolve the
inconsistencies. See Oliver, supra at 204.
11
defendant’s violation of the traffic laws, he was presented
with
additional
suspicious
circumstances
that
warranted
further investigation.
Trooper Varoni acted on these new suspicions by asking
defendant additional questions about his travel plans and
whether
he
had
been
in
trouble
before,
and
by
briefly
speaking with the vehicle's occupants. None of the answers
provided
by
defendant
Varoni’s suspicions.
or
his
companions
allayed
Trooper
Moreover, the entire encounter took
only five to eight minutes, at which time Trooper Varoni
requested and obtained defendant’s consent to search the
vehicle.
After reviewing the facts and evaluating the totality
of the circumstances, we conclude that the traffic stop
here was reasonable in both scope and duration.
It
detained
follows
when
that
he
was
defendant
asked
to
was
not
consent
being
to
unlawfully
the
search.
Consent must be freely and voluntarily given in order to be
valid.
People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294; 597
NW2d 1 (1999); Royer, supra at 497.
An investigatory stop,
as occurred in this case, is not so inherently coercive
that it renders involuntary consent given during the stop.
Royer, supra at 501, 502; People v Acoff, 220 Mich App 396,
12
400; 559 NW2d 103 (1996).
There is no suggestion that
defendant was coerced into giving his consent.15
It is unnecessary to consider whether Trooper Varoni
had an independent, reasonable, and articulable suspicion
that defendant was involved with narcotics, or even whether
the Fourth Amendment might impose such a requirement under
different circumstances.16
were
The detention and search here
reasonable because: (1) the initial traffic stop was
lawful, (2) Trooper Varoni’s questions about defendant’s
travel plans, and his limited follow-up, were reasonable
and did not exceed the proper scope and duration of the
initial
traffic
stop,
and
(3)
after
Trooper
Varoni
concluded his questioning, defendant voluntarily consented
to the search of the vehicle.
amounting
to
a
constitutional
All in all, rather than
violation,
we
find
that
15
Defendant’s own actions show that he understood that
he could refuse the request. He later declined to consent
to a search of the trunk.
16
One aspect of an officer’s ability to conduct a drug
search without independent, articulable, and reasonable
suspicion was addressed in Illinois v Caballes, 543 US ___;
125 S Ct 834; 160 L Ed 2d 842 (2005).
Employing the
reasonableness standard of Robinette, the United States
Supreme Court held that, as long as the traffic stop is not
prolonged, an officer may use a drug-detection dog to sniff
a vehicle during the stop, even if the defendant does not
consent and the officer lacks reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle are involved
with narcotics.
13
Trooper Varoni's work in this case amounted to excellent
police work.
The trial court properly denied defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence of the controlled substances
found during the search of his vehicle.
IV.
Because
constitute
a
the
CONCLUSION
detention
violation
of
was
reasonable
defendant’s
and
Fourth
did
not
Amendment
rights, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of
defendant’s convictions and sentences.
MCR 7.302(G)(1).
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
14
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 127115
JOHN LAVELL WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
erred by denying defendant's motions to suppress and to
strike the evidence provided by Trooper Jason Varoni.
trooper's
questions
of
defendant
were
not
The
reasonably
related to the purpose of the traffic stop. Furthermore,
defendant's statement to the trooper that he was staying at
a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan could not evoke a reasonable
suspicion
that
he
was
engaged
in
criminal
activity.
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Terry v Ohio
Traffic stops are subject to the test established by
the
United States Supreme Court in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1,
20; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). According to
Terry, an officer's investigation of a traffic stop must be
"reasonably
related
in
scope
to
the
circumstances
which
justified the interference in the first place."
Id.
defendant
without
may
reasonable,
not
be
objective
detained
grounds
even
for
momentarily
doing
so.
A
Florida
v
Royer, 460 US 491, 498; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229
(1983).
The
scope
of
the
detention
must
be
carefully
tailored to the justification for the stop. Id. at 500.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, I would
find that the officer's questioning in this case exceeded
the permissible legal scope of inquiry regarding a speeding
offense.
It
was
not
reasonably
violation of the speed limit.
related
to
defendant’s
Furthermore, I believe that
the answers to the officer’s questions did not give rise to
an articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
Scope of the Stop
Trooper
Varoni
detained
excess of the speed limit.
defendant
for
driving
in
An additional reason for the
stop was that his vehicle had a cracked windshield.
There
was
other
no
reasonable
articulable
suspicion
of
any
Supreme
Court
offense.
Neither
Michigan
the
Supreme
United
Court
States
has
ever
ruled
that
nor
the
questioning
beyond the scope of a traffic stop is allowed. The Court of
Appeals decision in this case accurately reflects Michigan
2
law.
However,
with
this
decision,
the
Court
changes
Michigan law to enlarge the permissible scope of an inquiry
by a police officer during a routine traffic stop.
Permissible Questioning
The
headed
in
questions
such
a
"Why
the
hurry?"
rush?"
from
a
and
police
"Where
are
officer
you
may
reasonably related to a traffic stop for speeding.
be
They
seek an admission of speeding.
But questions about a driver's destination, purpose,
length of stay, and with whom he will be staying are meant
to inquire into issues beyond a speeding offense.
Not only
have they nothing to do with a speeding offense, they are
not helpful to a police officer's decision to release the
driver or to issue a citation or warning.1 Ante at 10.
On direct examination, Trooper Varoni testified that
he asked defendant where he was going and that defendant
offered that "he was going into Cheboygan to visit friends
and that he was staying at the Holiday Inn."
However, it
is apparent from the cross-examination of Trooper Varoni
that defendant did not volunteer this information to the
1
The majority cites several federal circuit court of
appeals cases for the proposition that questions about
travel plans are reasonably related to the scope of a
traffic stop. We are not bound by these decisions, and, as
noted above, I find their logic defective.
3
trooper in response to a general question.
Instead, as
Trooper Varoni admitted:
A. Uh, it's—it's my practice to ask more
than
just
for
those
three
pieces
of
uh,
documentation
[referring
to
license,
registration, and insurance paperwork].
* * *
Q. All right. And then you proceeded to
further this investigation by questioning Mr.
Williams as to um, issues of where he was going
and what he was going to do when he was there, is
that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And these questions weren't relevant to
how fast he was going, were they?
A. I-I ask everybody I stop where they're
going to and where they are coming from.
* * *
Q. My question was; the question about where
he's going and how long he is staying is not
relevant to how fast he's going and the purpose
for your stop; is it?
A. That's correct.
Without
questions
question,
that
the
exceeded
the
regarding a speeding offense.
regarding
the
location
spend the night.
trooper
scope
asked
of
defendant
legal
inquiry
The trooper evoked an answer
where
defendant
was
planning
to
He also asked defendant if defendant had
any prior narcotics convictions. Trooper Varoni testified:
Um, I asked him if he had been in trouble
before and uh, he told me that he had. I asked if
4
it had any—you know, related narcotics [sic], if
he'd ever been arrested for anything to do with
drugs and he told me that he had. I asked him for
what and he said marijuana.
This question likewise was unrelated to the purpose of the
traffic stop. Once defendant stated that he was staying at
a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan in response to a question about
where
he
would
investigation
questions,
spend
the
night,
changed.
having
the
Trooper
nothing
to
do
purpose
Varoni's
with
the
of
the
subsequent
scope
of
the
traffic stop, changed the fundamental nature of the stop.
What
began
as
encompassing
a
routine
criminal
traffic
stop
investigation.
became
an
Trooper
allVaroni
admitted it:
Q. Your purpose of the initial stop had
seized [sic]; you weren't investigating speeding
violation [sic] anymore were you?
A. No, no I wasn't.
Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity
Even
if
Trooper
Varoni's
questions
had
been
appropriate for a traffic stop, a second pertinent concern
for
the
Court
is
whether
defendant's
answer
provided
a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring.
Trooper Varoni essentially admitted that he continued
questioning the occupants of the vehicle on the basis of a
hunch that something "wasn't quite right."
5
Q. [Mr. Kwiatkowsi]: Is it possible that he
was in error as to where the Holiday Inn was?
A. [Trooper Varoni]: That's possible, yes.
Q. And the fact that someone misstates where
they're staying um, you're saying that made you
suspicious of him, is that right?
A. Uh, you—you can call it what you want, I
don't know about suspicious but, yeah, it made me
think twice about the statements he made.
Q. All right, so you weren't suspicious?
A. Yeah, I-I questioned his statements.
Q. Well, now when you're talking about
suspicion you understand suspicious of something,
right? Of some activity that's unlawful, right?
A. Yes, that could be.
Q. Well, what was it about that response
that you were suspicious of that was unlawful?
A. I wasn't suspicious
thing that was unlawful.
of
any
particular
Q. So it was unparticularized suspicion is
that what you're saying?
A. Um, I guess that could be.
Q. Okay. Because you couldn't put your
finger on what it was you were suspicious of,
right?
A. I was suspicious that something wasn't
quite right.
Q. But you didn't know what it was, right?
A. That's right.
The trooper’s intuition that "something wasn't quite
right" and his observation that no luggage was visible in
6
the passenger compartment were the things that made him
suspicious.
The trooper admitted that it is not uncommon
for people to carry luggage out of sight in the trunk.
Therefore, the only valid reason for the trooper to be
suspicious was defendant's statement that he was staying at
a Holiday Inn in Cheboygan.
The fact that defendant answered with the name of a
hotel
hardly
chain
that
created
did
a
activity was afoot.2
not
have
reasonable
a
facility
suspicion
in
Cheboygan
that
criminal
The next question of defendant, once
he had stepped out of the vehicle, was whether he had any
prior conviction for drugs.
the traffic stop.
It was likewise unrelated to
This question is a further indicator
that the trooper was acting on a mere hunch.
Where there is no articulable basis to suspect that a
crime is being committed, the officer's questions amount to
2
It is noteworthy that the explanations Mr. Williams
and his two passengers gave are not as inconsistent as the
prosecution would have the Court believe. Mr. Williams
indicated that they were going to Cheboygan to visit
friends and would be there "about two days." They would be
staying at a Holiday Inn. His companion, Mr. King,
indicated that he was not sure how long they were going to
be gone. This is not inconsistent with defendant's
statement.
Mrs. Williams indicated that they were planning to do
some shopping in Cheboygan. She was not sure where they
were staying; they did not have reservations. This is also
not inconsistent with Mr. Williams's explanation.
7
nothing more than a fishing expedition.
The questioning
and the subsequent search in this case went beyond the
scope
of
the
traffic
stop
and
were
unsupported
by
any
reasonable articulable suspicion.
I agree with the Court of Appeals that, given the
totality of the circumstances, the trooper had insufficient
grounds for pursuing an investigatory stop and conducted
his
investigation
based
merely
on
a
hunch.
People
v
Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). I would
affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Marilyn Kelly
8
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