JACQUELYN V MAGEE V DAIMLERCHRYSLER
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice:
Opinion
Justices:
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED MARCH 8, 2005
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 126219
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM
In this case involving the Civil Rights Act, the Court
of
Appeals
harassment,
held
sex
that
and
age
plaintiff’s
claims
discrimination,
and
of
sexual
retaliation
were timely filed, because the lawsuit was brought within
three years of the date she resigned her employment with
defendant.1
We
conclude
that
plaintiff’s
claims
were
not
filed
within the limitations period because none of the alleged
discriminatory or retaliatory conduct occurred within the
1
Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 2, 2004
(Docket No. 243847).
three years that preceded the filing of the complaint.
We
therefore reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals
and
remand
reinstatement
of
the
the
matter
trial
to
the
court’s
trial
grant
court
of
for
summary
disposition to defendant.
I
Plaintiff
Jacquelyn
Magee
was
an
hourly
production
employee who began work for defendant DaimlerChrysler in
1976.
She went on medical leave for emotional distress on
September 12, 1998, and, without first returning to work,
resigned her job on February 2, 1999.
On February 1, 2002, Magee filed a lawsuit under the
Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq., claiming that she
had
been
during
unlawfully
most
of
her
discriminated
twenty-two
against
years
at
and
harassed
DaimlerChrysler.
Magee’s complaint lists separate counts for sex harassment
based on hostile work environment, sex harassment based on
quid pro quo harassment, retaliation, sex discrimination,
and age discrimination.2
2
Magee’s complaint also includes a separate count
alleging constructive discharge. The trial court dismissed
this count, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. Magee did not appeal, and the dismissal of
that claim is not before this Court.
2
In
her
complaint,
Magee
alleges
that
she
suffered
harassment from the 1980s until her last day of work on
September 12, 1998, and that her supervisors periodically
retaliated against her during this period as a result of
her resistance to the harassment.
Magee alleges that this
constant
to
harassment
caused
her
leave
her
job
at
DaimlerChrysler on September 12, 1998, and that she decided
to resign on February 2, 1999, because she anticipated that
the harassment would continue if she returned.
DaimlerChrysler
moved
for
summary
disposition,
asserting that Magee’s February 1, 2002, complaint failed
to allege any discriminatory acts after September 12, 1998,
and that the complaint was therefore not filed within the
three-year period of limitations applicable to Civil Rights
Act claims, MCL 600.5805(10).
The
motion
trial
without
court
initially
prejudice,
denied
allowing
DaimlerChrysler’s
Magee
to
amend
her
complaint to allege harassment or retaliation occurring up
to her February 2, 1999, resignation.
Magee’s
amended
complaint
continued
However, because
to
allege
only
harassment and retaliation through September 12, 1998, her
last day of work, the trial court granted DaimlerChrysler’s
motion and dismissed Magee’s complaint.
3
Magee appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Court
of Appeals, which relied on this Court’s recent decision in
Collins v Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628; 664 NW2d 713 (2003),
to reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the harassment,
retaliation,
and
discrimination
claims.
The
Court
of
Appeals concluded that these claims were timely, because
they were filed within three years of the date of Magee’s
resignation.
DaimlerChrysler then sought leave to appeal to this
Court.
After hearing oral argument from both parties on
the application, this Court has now determined that the
Court
of
Appeals
misapplied
Collins
and
erroneously
reinstated Magee’s Civil Rights Act claims.
II
In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of
action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations
is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.
Boyle v Gen Motors Corp, 468 Mich 226, 229-230; 661 NW2d
557 (2003).
Likewise, this Court reviews de novo rulings
on summary disposition motions.
Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich
661, 664; 685 NW2d 648 (2004).
III
In Collins, supra at 633, this Court held that a cause
of action for discriminatory termination does not accrue
4
until the date of termination.
The plaintiff employee,
Gwendolyn Collins, was suspended pending an investigation;
when the investigation was completed several weeks later,
her employment was terminated.
Within three years of her
termination, Collins filed a complaint alleging that her
termination
was
discrimination.
suit
was
not
the
result
of
race
and
gender
The Court of Appeals ruled that Collins’s
timely
under
the
three-year
period
of
limitations because her causes of action accrued on the
last day that she actually performed employment duties (as
opposed
to
disagreed
analysis
her
with
and
later
the
termination
Court
reversed,
of
date).
Appeals
holding
that
This
Court
last-day-worked
a
claim
for
discriminatory discharge cannot arise until a claimant has
actually been discharged. Id.
Relying on Collins, the Court of Appeals in this case
reasoned that Magee’s claim also accrued on her termination
date
as
opposed
to
her
last
day
of
work.
The
Court
acknowledged that Magee resigned, and was not terminated.
But it found significant that “her last day of work was
followed by a period in which she was on a medical leave of
absence” and that she was employed by DaimlerChrysler while
on leave.
Accordingly, it concluded that her causes of
action, if any, arose on February 2, 1999.
5
The Court of Appeals reliance on Collins to reinstate
Magee’s
claims
of
sexual
harassment,
sex
and
discrimination, and retaliation is misplaced.
age
Magee was
never terminated from her employment and does not allege
discriminatory termination.
claims
on
alleged
She bases her Civil Rights Act
discriminatory
before her leave of absence.
conduct
that
occurred
Indeed, when given a chance
to amend her complaint to plead claims falling within the
period of limitations, Magee was unable to do so.
Collins,
a discriminatory termination case, simply does not apply in
this situation.
To determine whether Magee’s claims were timely filed,
we look to MCL 600.5805(10), which establishes that the
applicable period of limitations is three years from the
date of injury.
Because Magee alleged no discriminatory
conduct occurring after September 12, 1998, the period of
limitations on Magee’s claims expired, at the latest, three
years
from
that
date,
or
by
September
12,
2001.
Accordingly, as the trial court held, Magee’s February 1,
2002, complaint was not timely filed.
The
Civil
dissent
Rights
argues
Act
within
that
the
the
defendant
three
years
violated
the
preceding
the
filing of plaintiff’s claim by failing to “prevent future
harassment . . . .”
Post at 3.
6
This interpretation of the
Civil
Rights
Act
amounts
to
a
continuing
violations
doctrine in which an employer is continuously liable from
the time it or its agent violates the act until the time
that
violation
is
remedied
by
the
employer.
Thus,
in
Justice CAVANAGH’s view, a plaintiff subjected to a hostile
work environment on December 31, 2005, may file a timely
complaint in December 2030 if the employer has failed to
remedy
years.
the
sexual
This
limitations
harassment
theory
renders
established
600.5805(10).
by
in
the
ensuing
nugatory
the
twenty-five
the
period
Legislature
in
of
MCL
It is therefore a theory we must reject.3
For these reasons, we reverse the relevant part of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to
the Macomb Circuit Court for reinstatement of the order
granting DaimlerChrysler’s motion for summary disposition.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
3
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys,
NW2d 686 (2001).
7
465 Mich 53, 60; 631
S T A T E
M I C H I G A N
O F
SUPREME COURT
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 126219
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result of the opinion per curiam that
reverses the Court of Appeals judgment in part and remands
the matter to the trial court for reinstatement of the
trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant.
Under the facts pleaded by plaintiff, the three-year period
of limitations1 began to run when plaintiff went on medical
leave
on
September
12,
1998,
for
emotional
distress.
Plaintiff’s claims were required to be filed within three
years of September 12, 1998.
Because they were not, the
trial court was correct to grant summary disposition to
defendant.
Therefore,
I
concur
in
the
result
opinion per curiam.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
1
MCL 600.5805(10).
of
the
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
JACQUELYN V. MAGEE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 126219
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I
disagree
with
the
majority’s
contention
that
defendant engaged in no discriminatory conduct during the
three
years
complaint.
that
preceded
the
filing
of
plaintiff’s
Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
Plaintiff began working for defendant in 1976.
the
years,
plaintiff
harassment.
making
Plaintiff
sexual
assigned
to
complained
a
advances
of
complained
toward
different
various
that
her.
supervisor,
her
incidents
of
foreman
was
plaintiff
was
her
When
Over
former
foreman
still worked in the same complex and continued to harass
her.
her
Because of the harassment, plaintiff was ordered by
psychiatrist
medical leave.
to
take
an
approximately
four-month
When plaintiff returned from her medical
leave, her former foreman was still working in the same
complex as plaintiff.
A subsequent foreman of plaintiff’s also made sexual
advances
toward
her,
plaintiff’s breast.
including
intentionally
touching
For an entire year, plaintiff also
complained to defendant about a sign in the men’s restroom
that referred to plaintiff in a derogatory and sexually
suggestive manner.
she
continued
to
Because of the stress of the harassment
suffer,
plaintiff
was
ordered
to
take
another medical leave of absence.
While she was employed by defendant, plaintiff’s union
steward
also
plaintiff’s
made
“ass”
sexually
and
manner.
Plaintiff’s
comments
about
her
cardboard sticks.
suggestive
touched
her
coworkers
body
and
in
made
began
comments
an
about
inappropriate
sexually
hitting
suggestive
her
with
When plaintiff asked her union steward
to intercede, he just laughed and said, “Yea, hit that
ass.”
Plaintiff repeatedly complained to defendant, yet
nothing was done.
When plaintiff requested a transfer, her
union steward told her that she could transfer if she had
sex with him.
Once plaintiff was transferred, the union
steward told her that she “owed” him and he wanted her to
have
sex
with
him.
He
later
stopped
plaintiff
from
training for another position because she was not having
2
sex with him.
Plaintiff again complained to a foreman, but
he said there was nothing he could do.
stress
plaintiff
harassment,
was
plaintiff
suffering
was
then
as
Because of the
a
ordered
result
to
of
take
a
the
third
medical leave.
Because defendant took no steps to stop the harassment
while plaintiff was on her third medical leave, she was
forced
to
decide
environment.
to
take
not
to
return
to
the
harassing
Defendant’s discriminatory conduct in failing
steps
to
prevent
future
harassment
throughout plaintiff’s medical leave.
continued
Requiring plaintiff
to return to the harassing setting to work in the unchanged
environment would be unreasonable and possibly dangerous to
plaintiff’s health, considering that her doctor had ordered
three
medical
harassment.
leaves
because
of
the
stress
of
the
As plaintiff explained, in order to have even
been considered for a possible transfer to another plant
after
having
been
out
on
her
third
harassment-related
medical leave, she would have had to return to the plant
she left and hope for a transfer, despite that her multiple
complaints had garnered no response before or during her
medical leave.
leave
the
Thus, for plaintiff to be able to try and
harassing
environment,
she
would
have
had
to
return to work with the same men who harassed her and whose
3
conduct necessitated that plaintiff take medical leaves in
the first place, without any assurance that defendant would
protect her.
This
case
presents
because
plaintiff’s
directly
related
to
a
unique
set
doctor-ordered
the
of
circumstances
medical
harassment.
leave
Plaintiff’s
was
final
medical leave was actually her third leave related to the
stress
of
the
harassment
she
suffered.
Defendant
maintained a hostile work environment despite plaintiff’s
repeated
complaints.
Defendant’s
failure
to
stop
the
harassment after these complaints is, under the facts of
this case, discriminatory conduct.
Because this conduct
occurred during the three years that preceded the filing of
plaintiff’s lawsuit, I find that her complaint was timely
filed.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
4
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