PEOPLE OF MI V SHAWN LEON JENKINS
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice:
Opinion
Justices:
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED FEBRUARY 1, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 125141
SHAWN LEON JENKINS,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM.
This
case
requires
us
to
consider
when
defendant’s
consensual encounter with a police officer was transformed
into
an
investigatory
stop,
which
gives
rise
to
Fourth
Amendment protections and must be supported by reasonable
suspicion.
Defendant argues that the officer seized him
without reasonable suspicion to do so.
agreed,
granting
incriminating
dismissing
affirmed.
the
defendant’s
evidence
pending
later
motion
found
charges.
by
The
The trial court
to
suppress
the
officer
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
We conclude that
the
meaning
totality
of
reasonable
of
the
the
Fourth
Amendment
circumstances
suspicion
criminal behavior.
defendant was not “seized” within
that
until
gave
defendant
after
the
the
had
officer
a
been
engaged
in
Accordingly, the trial court erred when
it granted defendant’s motion.
We reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial
court
for
reinstatement
of
the
charges
brought
against
defendant and for further proceedings.
I.
BACKGROUND
During the evening of August 23, 2001, the Ann Arbor
Police Department received a complaint regarding a party in
progress in the common area of a housing complex on North
Maple Road.
Officers Geoffrey Spickard and Jeff Lind were
dispatched to the housing complex, which was known to the
police as a high crime and drug area.
Upon their arrival,
they found a gathering of fifteen to twenty people drinking
and talking loudly.
Defendant and another man were seated
on stairs leading to one of the housing units.
Officer
Spickard
approached
defendant,
and
engaged in a general conversation about the party.
the
two
At that
point, a woman emerged from the attached housing unit and,
using profane language, asked defendant who he was and why
he was seated on her porch.
Spickard
asked
defendant
After hearing this, Officer
if
2
he
lived
in
the
housing
complex.
Defendant
Spickard
asked
defendant
to
handed
said
see
over
that
he
defendant’s
his
state
did
not,
and
Officer
identification.
When
identification
card,
Officer Spickard pulled out his personal radio and started
to place a call to the Law Enforcement Information Network
(LEIN).
Defendant’s behavior immediately changed.1
He became
obviously nervous and made furtive gestures toward a large
pocket on the side of his pants.
despite
the
fact
identification
that
card
and
Officer
was
He began to walk away,
Spickard
speaking
to
still
him.2
held
his
Several
residents of the housing complex called out invitations for
defendant to enter their homes.
1
The dissent fails to note these changes in
defendant’s behavior. Post at 5-6. The dissent may view
these facts as irrelevant but, when the governing Fourth
Amendment principles are correctly applied, these changes
in defendant’s behavior support the officers’ ultimate
decision to seize the defendant.
2
This fact is also omitted from the dissent’s
analysis.
Thus, while the dissent concludes that no
reasonable person would walk away under the circumstances,
post at 8, this view was obviously not shared by the
defendant, who walked away “under those circumstances.”
That Justice CAVANAGH finds our reference to the record
“enigmatic[]”
and
“befuddl[ing],”
post
at
9
n
10,
demonstrates the dissent’s belief that we are entitled to
rewrite
the
events
underlying
this
appeal
with
an
unrealistic legal formalism.
It is only with a lawyer’s
armchair detachment that the dissent can hypothesize about
what a “reasonable person” would do while ignoring the
actions of the individual who actually observed the
officers’ conduct and whose liberty was actually at stake.
3
At that point, Officer Spickard and his partner walked
alongside
defendant,
encouraging
results of the LEIN inquiry.
him
to
wait
for
the
When defendant did not stop,
Officer Spickard placed a hand on defendant’s back and told
him that he was not free to leave.
The LEIN inquiry revealed an outstanding warrant for
defendant’s
defendant
arrest.
in
As
handcuffs,
Officer
a
Spickard
gun
fell
was
from
placing
defendant’s
waistband to the ground.
II.
Defendant
was
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
charged
with
carrying
a
concealed
weapon, MCL 750.227; possession of a firearm by a felon,
MCL
750.224f;
and
possession
of
a
firearm
during
the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b.
He
moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds
and sought dismissal of the charges.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which
both Officer Spickard and defendant testified.
court
considered
Officer
determined
that,
for
defendant
was
Spickard’s
"seized"
identification.
court
relied
believed
point.
that
In
on
purposes
when
reaching
Officer
defendant
of
this
not
testimony
the
Fourth
he
was
free
asked
for
the
trial
testimony
to
and
Amendment,
conclusion,
Spickard’s
was
The trial
leave
that
at
he
that
The trial court concluded that the officer did not
4
have
a
reasonable
investigative
suspicion
stop.
It
to
granted
support
defendant’s
such
an
motion
to
suppress evidence and dismissed the case.
A
divided
Court
of
Appeals
affirmed.3
panel
The
majority agreed with the trial court that Officer Spickard
seized
defendant
identification.4
when
he
asked
defendant
for
It concluded that the seizure was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion because defendant was
seated in a public area, was not engaged in the conduct for
which
the
answered
officers
the
were
officer’s
summoned,
questions.
and
As
”forthrightly”
a
result,
the
majority held that defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were
violated
and
that
the
trial
court
properly
granted
defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.
The dissenting judge, on the other hand,
determined
that the initial encounter, including Officer Spickard’s
request for defendant’s identification,
an investigatory stop.
did not constitute
The dissent further concluded that
subsequent events gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of
possible criminal activity and entitled Officer Spickard to
transform the encounter into an investigatory stop.
3
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued November 18,
2003 (Docket No. 240947).
4
The majority criticized the trial court’s reliance on
Officer Spickard’s subjective belief that defendant was not
free to leave once he had been asked to produce
identification, but concluded that there was objective
evidence as well to support this conclusion. We disagree.
5
The prosecutor seeks leave to appeal in this Court.
After
hearing
oral
prosecution’s
argument
application
from
for
both
leave
to
parties
appeal,
on
we
the
have
determined that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must
be reversed and that this matter must be remanded to the
trial
court
for
reinstatement
of
the
charges
against
defendant and further proceedings.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings in
a suppression hearing for clear error.
465
Mich
319,
“[a]pplication
325-326;
of
630
NW2d
constitutional
870
People v Custer,
(2001).
standards
by
But
the
the
trial
court is not entitled to the same deference as factual
findings.”
People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626, 631 n 7; 505
NW2d 266 (1993).
Application of the exclusionary rule to a
Fourth Amendment violation is a question of law that is
reviewed de novo.
Custer, supra at 326.
IV.
The
United
States
ANALYSIS
Constitution
and
the
Michigan
Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
US Const, Am
IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11.5
Under
certain
circumstances,
a
police
officer
may
approach and temporarily detain a person for the purpose of
5
Cf. Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 6 n 3; 664 NW2d
767 (2003).
6
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there
is no probable cause to support an arrest.
Terry v Ohio,
392 US 1, 22; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).
A brief
detention
if
officer
does
has
not
a
violate
the
reasonably
criminal activity is afoot.
Fourth
Amendment
articulable
suspicion
at
30-31.
that
Custer, supra at 327; People v
Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 192; 627 NW2d 297 (2001);
supra
the
Whether
an
officer
has
a
Terry,
reasonable
suspicion to make such an investigatory stop is determined
case by case, on the basis of an analysis of the totality
of the facts and circumstances.
determination
exists
regarding
“'must
be
based
Oliver, supra at 192.
whether
on
a
reasonable
commonsense
inferences about human behavior.'”
A
suspicion
judgments
and
Id. at 197 (citation
omitted).
Of
course,
not
every
encounter
between
a
police
officer and a citizen requires this level of constitutional
justification.
Fourth
Amendment
A
“seizure”
occurs
only
within
if,
the
in
meaning
view
of
of
the
all
the
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave.6
6
People v Mamon, 435 Mich 1, 11;
Justice CAVANAGH recognizes that this inquiry is an
objective one, but asserts that “an officer’s subjective
intent is relevant to the extent that it may have been
conveyed to the defendant by the words or actions of the
officers.”
Post at 8.
Justice CAVANAGH relies on a
proposition that secured only two votes in United States v
Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 554 n 6; 100 S Ct 1870; 64 L Ed 2d
7
457 NW2d 623 (1990).
and
seeks
When an officer approaches a person
voluntary
questioning,
there
cooperation
is
no
through
restraint
on
liberty, and the person is not seized.
noncoercive
that
person’s
Florida v Royer,
460 US 491, 497-498; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983)
(plurality opinion).
Here,
Officer
Spickard’s
defendant was consensual.
defendant
when
he
housing complex,
for
asked
initial
encounter
with
Officer Spickard did not seize
whether
defendant
lived
in
the
nor did he seize defendant when he asked
identification.
No
evidence
indicated
that
Officer
Spickard told defendant at this juncture to remain where he
was or that defendant was required to answer the officer's
questions.
Asking such questions to elicit voluntary information
from
private
investigations.
citizens
Hiibel
is
v
an
essential
Sixth
Judicial
part
Dist
of
police
Court
of
497 (1980). Also, he appears to misunderstand the meaning
of this passage.
Mendenhall simply recognizes that an
officer’s subjective intent may be relevant if it is
objectively manifested.
In other words, it restates the
principle that only objective conduct and circumstances are
relevant for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The dissent errs, therefore, by asserting that Officer
Spickard’s
subjective
beliefs
are
relevant
without
determining whether those subjective beliefs were, in fact,
objectively manifested.
Instead, the dissent “presume[s]”
that the officer’s beliefs were apparent to defendant.
Post at
10.
Assuming arguendo that we are entitled to
insert our presumptions into the record, Justice CAVANAGH’s
presumption is disproved by the fact that defendant himself
walked away from the officers during the LEIN check.
8
Nevada, 542 US __; 124 S Ct 2451; 159 L Ed 2d 292 (2004).
“In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a
person for identification without implicating the Fourth
Amendment.”
542 US ___; 124 S Ct 2458; 159 L Ed 2d 302;
see also Royer, supra at 501.
As the United States Supreme
Court has recognized, “[w]hile most citizens will respond
to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so
without being told they are free not to respond, hardly
eliminates
the
consensual
nature
of
the
response.”
Immigration & Naturalization Service v Delgado, 466 US 210,
216; 104 S Ct 1758; 80 L Ed 2d 247 (1984).
This summary of governing Fourth Amendment principles
demonstrates that the Court of Appeals majority erred when
it
analyzed
the
initial
conversation
between
Officer
Spickard and defendant, and Officer Spickard’s request for
identification,
as
if
the
protections
of
the
Fourth
Amendment were implicated.
The Fourth Amendment was not
implicated
Spickard
until
Officer
actually
hindered
defendant’s attempt to leave the scene, thereby “seizing”
him
within
the
meaning
of
the
Fourth
Amendment.
Specifically, this “seizure” occurred when Officer Spickard
followed
defendant
as
he
tried
to
walk
away,
orally
discouraged him from leaving, and, finally, put a hand on
his back and told him to wait for the results of the LEIN
inquiry.
This
point—when
Officer
9
Spickard
physically
hindered defendant’s departure and instructed him to stay
in
the
officer’s
presence—is
the
earliest
at
which
a
reasonable person might have concluded that he was not free
to leave.
By
this
point,
however,
Officer
Spickard
reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop.
the
officer
defendant’s
Second,
knew
a
female
unconsented-to
when
initiating
that
a
defendant
LEIN
resident
presence
saw
inquiry,
that
he
on
to
walk
away
from
her
Officer
immediately
nervously and reached toward his pocket.7
attempted
had
the
had
a
First,
challenged
front
porch.
Spickard
was
began
act
to
Third, defendant
officer,
apparently
so
intent on leaving that he was willing to lose possession of
his identification card.8
not live in the area,
Fourth, although defendant did
various people invited him into
their homes, offering him protection from further police
questioning.9
Considering
the
totality
of
these
7
This Court and the United States Supreme Court agree
that “'nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion.'”
Oliver, supra at 197,
quoting Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124; 120 S Ct 673;
145 L Ed 2d 570 (2000).
8
Presence in a high crime area coupled with unprovoked
flight can also give rise to a reasonable suspicion to
support an investigatory stop. Oliver, supra at 197.
9
An experienced officer could infer that these
bystanders had reason to know that defendant desired to
avoid further police scrutiny. This inference adds to the
quantum of evidence supporting the conclusion that Officer
Spickard had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant.
10
circumstances, Officer Spickard had a reasonable suspicion
sufficient to warrant transforming the consensual encounter
into an investigatory stop and briefly detaining defendant
until the LEIN inquiry could be completed.
V.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial
court’s conclusion that defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights
were violated and that the incriminating evidence produced
by
the
investigative
suppressed.
Appeals
and
reinstatement
We
reverse
remand
of
stop
the
this
in
the
case
charges
this
judgment
to
the
against
case
of
should
the
trial
Court
court
defendant
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
11
and
be
of
for
for
S T A T E
M I C H I G A N
O F
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 125141
SHAWN LEON JENKINS,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
Despite recognizing that a police officer must have a
reasonably articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot
before
incorrectly
detaining
identifies
the
a
person,
point
at
today’s
which
majority
defendant
was
seized to justify a detention based on suspicions formed
after the detention occurred.
without
Amendment
reasonable
expressly
Because defendant was seized
suspicion,
and
prohibits
because
using
the
Fourth
after-acquired
suspicions to justify a seizure, Florida v JL, 529 US 266,
271-272;
120
S
Ct
1375;
146
L
Ed
2d
254
(2000),
I
respectfully dissent.
The
Search
and
Seizure
Clause
of
both
the
United
States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution1 protects
1
US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
individuals
against
unreasonable
conducted by governmental actors.
searches
and
seizures
Whren v United States,
517 US 806, 809-810; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996);
People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 52; 378 NW2d 451 (1985).
Before detaining an individual, a police officer must have
a
particularized
criminal
and
activity
objective
by
the
Shabas, supra at 59.
basis
for
person
particular
suspecting
detained.
An “inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or ‘hunch’” is an insufficient basis for seizing
a person.
Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 27; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L
Ed 2d 889 (1968).
“a
Rather, the officer must have at least
particularized
suspicion,
based
on
an
objective
observation, that the person stopped has been, is, or is
about to be engaged in criminal wrongdoing.”
at 59.
Shabaz, supra
“As long as the person to whom questions are put
remains free to disregard the questions and walk away,”
there
has
been
no
Fourth
Amendment
violation.
United
States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 554; 100 S Ct 1870; 64 L
Ed
2d
497
(1980).
But
restrained, he is seized.
Generally,
“‘a
at
the
moment
that
person
is
Terry, supra at 16.
person
has
been
“seized”
within
the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would
have
believed
that
he
2
was
not
free
to
leave.’”
California v Hodari D, 499 US 621, 627-628; 111 S Ct 1547;
113 L Ed 2d 690 (1991), quoting Mendenhall, supra at 554.
Where a seizure by show of authority is alleged, rather
than a seizure by physical force, the test “is an objective
one:
not whether the citizen perceived that he was being
ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s
words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable
person.”
Hodari D, supra at 628.
Interestingly, the majority concludes that defendant
was
not
seized
until
the
officers
physically
defendant after he tried to walk away.
restrained
But the majority
ignores that a seizure can also occur by a police officer’s
show of authority.
The majority states, “When an officer
approaches a person and seeks voluntary cooperation through
noncoercive
questioning,
there
is
no
restraint
person’s liberty, and the person is not seized.”
on
that
Ante at
8-9, citing Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 497-498; 103 S Ct
1319; 75 L Ed 2d 229 (1983).
I agree that the initial
questioning and the officers’ request to see defendant’s
identification
encounter.
were
part
of
a
consensual
citizen-police
But the majority fails to address the next
3
critical event—the LEIN2 check—and instead jumps to events
that occurred while the LEIN check was in progress.
On the evening in question, Officer Geoffrey Spickard
and his partner responded to an Ann Arbor housing complex
after receiving a complaint about a large group of people
drinking and being loud in the complex’s courtyard.
the
officers
people
arrived,
engaged
in
they
those
observed
activities.
fifteen
to
When
twenty
Nonetheless,
they
bypassed those people and approached defendant and another
gentleman who were sitting quietly on some steps and who
were
not
drinking.
preliminary
examination
According
testimony,
to
Officer
he
Spickard’s
approached
these
particular two gentlemen because he did not recognize them.
At the suppression hearing, however, he testified that he
approached them because he believed defendant’s companion
resided at the apartment connected to the steps on which he
was
sitting,
and
the
officer
questions about the gathering.
wanted
to
ask
him
some
Officer Spickard testified
that while he was talking to the gentlemen, a woman opened
the adjacent door, asked defendant who he was and why he
was on her porch, and retreated inside.
2
Law Enforcement Information Network.
4
Thus,
according
to
Officer
Spickard,
he
initially
asked for defendant’s identification because he suspected
that defendant might not belong at the complex, and he
wanted
to
voluntarily
determine
informed
where
him
defendant
that
he
lived.
did
not
Defendant
live
in
the
complex, and he voluntarily gave him his facially valid
identification card.
At that point, any suspicions the
officers had about where defendant lived were resolved, and
there was no need to detain defendant.3
Of course, the
officers were free to continue the consensual encounter by
asking defendant additional questions, such as why he was
there, but, instead, they confiscated the identification
card and, without requesting permission, initiated a LEIN
check.4
3
The majority apparently does not contest that there
was no need to detain defendant because it does not find
that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain
defendant at the time of the LEIN check. See ante at 10.
And at the suppression hearing, Officer Spickard offered no
rationale whatsoever that would indicate that he or his
partner had a reasonable suspicion that any other sort of
criminal activity was afoot.
4
The majority claims that I “fail[] to note” changes
in defendant’s behavior that occurred after the officers
began the LEIN check, and that I thus erroneously fail to
properly assess the facts supporting reasonable suspicion.
Ante at 3 n 1.
Apparently, the majority misses my point
that at the time those subsequent behaviors occurred,
defendant had already been seized. Thus, not only do those
behaviors add nothing to the analysis whether the officers
5
The
LEIN
check
in
this
case
was
not
only
nonconsensual, but it was more than a momentary detention.5
A person “‘may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable,
objective
grounds
for
doing
so
.
Shabaz, supra at 57, quoting Royer, supra at 498.
.
.
.’”
When the
trespass theory is discounted, as it should be,6 even the
majority can find no facts that support a finding that the
had reasonable suspicion at the time of the seizure, but
considering subsequent behavior violates the United States
Supreme Court’s clear prohibition on using after-acquired
suspicions in a totality of the circumstances analysis.
See Florida v JL, supra at 271-272.
5
In fact, in this case, the wait for the LEIN check
results was unusually long because the police dispatcher
was busy.
6
MCL 750.552, in relevant part, defines trespass as
follows:
Any person who shall wilfully enter, upon
the lands or premises of another without lawful
authority, after having been forbidden so to do
by the owner or occupant, agent or servant of the
owner or occupant, or any person being upon the
land or premises of another, upon being notified
to depart therefrom by the owner or occupant, the
agent or servant of either, who without lawful
authority
neglects
or
refuses
to
depart
therefrom, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
. . . .
Of course, a LEIN check would not assist the officers
in determining whether the putative occupant had previously
asked defendant to leave, and the officers had not seen the
putative occupant ask defendant to leave.
Thus, any
alleged suspicion of trespass was unrelated to the LEIN
check and the subsequent detention.
6
officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when
the LEIN check was initiated.7
The situation that occurs when an officer asks for
identification and a person produces it involves a question
and
a
response,
an
exchange
that
can
be
fairly
characterized as a “consensual encounter” as that term is
used in Fourth Amendment context.
But here the officers’
next action did not involve a question to which defendant
had the opportunity to choose to respond.
ceased.
and
By confiscating defendant’s identification card
beginning
otherwise
skirting
The exchange had
an
investigation,
voluntary
that
issue
encounter
entirely,
the
into
the
officers
a
turned
detention.
majority
fails
the
By
to
correctly identify the point at which defendant was seized.
Using the objective test set forth in Hodari D, supra
at 628, the focus must be on whether, when the LEIN check
began,
“the
officer’s
words
7
and
actions
would
have
The officers would find out later that defendant was
there visiting his two daughters, who did live in the
complex.
While that fact has no direct bearing on this
analysis, Officer Spickard claimed that he continued
speaking with defendant because he suspected him of
trespassing. But the fact that the officers did not elicit
this information from defendant, which could have been
obtained by asking the simple question, “Why are you
here?”, but instead chose to run a LEIN check, which would
not answer the question, supports defendant’s theory that
the officers were acting on inchoate suspicions unrelated
to trespass.
7
conveyed” to a reasonable person that he was being seized.
“[T]he
threatening
presence
of
several
officers,
the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching
of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s
request
might
be
compelled”
are
some
suggest that a seizure has occurred.
circumstances
that
Mendenhall, supra at
554.
Here, two uniformed, armed police officers, who had
already resolved their initial concern about defendant’s
residence, nonetheless retained defendant’s identification
card and initiated a LEIN check with no particularized,
articulable basis for doing so.8
The officers’ actions
would have objectively conveyed to a reasonable person that
the person was not free to leave, and I cannot conceive of
a reasonable person who would feel free to walk away under
8
This particular situation differs from those in which
our courts have considered LEIN checks run in the course of
lawful vehicle stops. See, e.g., People v Davis, 250 Mich
App 357, 367-368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002), and People v Walker,
58 Mich App 519, 523-524; 228 NW2d 443 (1975).
In those
cases, the officers already had reasonable suspicion and
conducted LEIN checks in furtherance of their initial stop.
Here, the officers conducted the LEIN check without first
having reasonable suspicion to make the detention.
8
those circumstances.9 The critical distinction between this
and a consensual encounter is that defendant was no longer
being asked questions he could refuse to answer.
Moreover, an officer’s subjective intent is relevant
to
the
extent
defendant
by
that
the
it
may
words
have
or
Mendenhall, supra at 554 n 6.
been
actions
conveyed
of
the
to
the
officer.
In the following testimony,
Officer Spickard confirmed that defendant was not free to
leave once he initiated the LEIN check:
Q. [Defense counsel]: At the point that you
approached Mr. Jenkins and asked him for his
I.D., he was not free to leave at that point,
correct?
A. [Officer
correct.
Spickard]:
That
would
be
Q. And if he would have tried to run away,
you would have run after him, correct?
A. That would be correct.
Q. And if he would have tried to run away,
you would have stopped him?
9
The majority enigmatically states that while I
“conclude[] that no reasonable person would walk away under
the circumstances, this view was obviously not shared by
the
defendant,
who
walked
away
‘under
those
circumstances.’”
Ante at 3 n 2. Not only am I befuddled
at what this lends to the majority’s analysis, it seems to
assume that I state that defendant was a reasonable person.
I do not.
Moreover, the test to determine when a person
was seized does not consider the defendant’s subjective
feelings or actions; rather, it asks whether a reasonable
person in defendant’s position would feel free to leave.
Hodari D, supra at 627-628.
9
A. That would be correct.
Q. And, in fact, as you testified on direct,
you
encouraged
him
throughout
this
whole
encounter to stick around?
A. Correct.
Q. Because you wanted to
results were of the LEIN check?
see
what
the
A. Correct.
Q. And he was never free to leave throughout
that entire encounter?
A. I would characterize that as correct.
Q. And he was never able to get his I.D.
back from you, correct?
A. I believe we maintained possession of his
identification, yes.
* * *
Q. And if he had asked you for the I.D. back
at that point, you would have said no?
A. Pending the results of the LEIN check,
yes.
Officer
Spickard
was
an
experienced
officer
with
ten-year history with the Ann Arbor Police Department.
is
reasonable
to
presume
that
these
officers,
by
a
It
their
conduct and by withholding defendant’s identification card,
were effectively conveying to defendant that he was not
free to leave.10
10
The majority misreads my analysis by concluding that
I find the officers’ subjective beliefs, without more,
material.
But what I conclude is that the officers’ show
10
The officers could have easily avoided offending the
Fourth Amendment.
They could have extended the exchange by
asking defendant if he had any warrants, thereby giving
defendant an opportunity to answer “yes” or “no” or refuse
to answer altogether.
minded
if
they
They could have then asked him if he
checked.
Again,
answered or refused to answer.
and
legitimacy
of
this
defendant
could
have
But despite the simplicity
method,
and
the
well-settled
recognition that the police may approach people and ask
noncoercive
questions
justifications,
today’s
without
majority
needing
constitutional
contravenes
well-settled
constitutional law by installing a rule by which an officer
can approach a person, ask for identification, and run a
warrant check without reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot merely because that person is in a highcrime
area.
individual’s
activity,
Indeed,
presence
reasonable,
standing
it
in
alone,
particularized
committing a crime.”
cannot
an
is
be
area
not
suspicion
clearer
of
that
expected
“[a]n
criminal
enough
to
support
a
that
the
person
is
Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124;
of authority, actions, words, and conduct were objective
manifestations of their clearly held subjective belief that
defendant was not free to leave.
Such a conclusion is
perfectly within the confines of the rules governing the
consideration of subjective beliefs. See Mendenhall, supra
at 555 n 6.
11
120 S Ct 673; 145 L Ed 2d 570 (2000), citing Brown v Texas,
443 US 47; 99 S Ct 2637; 61 L Ed 2d 357 (1979).
Thus, like each court that has heard the matter until
now,
I
would
hold
that
defendant
without
reasonable
suspicion
officers
retained
defendant’s
or
was
illegally
probable
seized
cause.
identification
The
card
and
initiated a LEIN check without defendant’s permission and
after having already resolved their initial stated concern.
The officers did not identify, nor do the facts show, any
circumstances
reasonable,
that
suggested
articulable
that
suspicion
the
officers
based
on
had
a
objective
observations that defendant had been, was, or was about to
engage in criminal wrongdoing at that point.
at 59.
the
Shabaz, supra
Moreover, I believe that the officers’ conduct and
circumstances
surrounding
the
detention
would
have
persuaded any reasonable person to conclude that he was not
free to leave.
As such, I would affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
12
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