PEOPLE OF MI V EDMUND MCGEHEE BARBEE
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 23, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 123491
EDMUND McGEHEE BARBEE, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
We
granted
leave
to
appeal
to
determine
if
a
defendant’s conduct that occurs before criminal charges are
filed can form the basis for an assessment of points under
offense
variable
19
(OV
19)
administration of justice.1
for
interference
with
the
Because we find that conduct
occurring before criminal charges are filed can form the
1
MCL 777.49 details the conduct that warrants points
under OV 19. Points assessed are used in conjunction with
other factors to produce a sentencing guidelines range
within which a defendant’s minimum sentence must fall
unless the sentencing court identifies substantial and
compelling reasons for deviating from the range.
basis for interference, or attempted interference, with the
administration
of
justice,
we
affirm
the
trial
court’s
scoring of ten points for OV 19.
I. FACTS
Defendant was stopped when a law enforcement officer
observed the car defendant was operating cross the fog line
twice.
The officer also observed that it was dark and the
car did not have its headlights on.
Defendant told the
officer his name was Christopher Noble Barbee.
Defendant’s
name is actually Edmund McGehee Barbee, Jr.
Defendant’s
fiancéé gave the officer defendant’s correct name.
A
Breathalyzer
test
determined
defendant’s
blood
alcohol content was 0.29 grams per 210 liters of breath.
Defendant pleaded guilty of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated, third offense, MCL 257.625, in exchange for
the dismissal of two charges related to driving while his
license was suspended, MCL 257.904.
Because defendant gave
the law enforcement officer a false name, the trial court
scored OV 19 at ten points and imposed a prison sentence of
twenty-nine to sixty months.
Defendant objected to the
assessment of ten points under OV 19, arguing that giving
the
law
enforcement
officer
his
brother’s
name
was
not
interference with the administration of justice because the
officer would have learned his true identity in due course.
2
Defendant’s motion for resentencing, which challenged the
scoring of OV 19, was denied.
The Court of Appeals denied
defendant’s application for leave to appeal for lack of
merit
in
the
grounds
presented.
This
defendant’s application for leave to appeal.
Court
granted
469 Mich 966
(2003).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation.
People v Krueger, 466 Mich 50, 53; 643 NW2d 223 (2002).
III. ANALYSIS
The
issue
interpretation.
in
this
case
is
one
of
statutory
The statute at issue, MCL 777.49, states,
in pertinent part, the following:
Offense variable 19 is a threat to the
security of a penal institution or court or
interference with the administration of justice
or the rendering of emergency services.
Score
offense variable 19 by determining which of the
following apply and by assigning the number of
points attributable to the one that has the
highest number of points:
(a) The offender by his or her conduct
threatened the security of a penal institution or
court ..................................25 points
(b) The offender used force or the threat of
force against another person or the property of
another person to interfere with, attempt to
interfere
with,
or
that
results
in
the
interference with the administration of justice
or
the
rendering
of
emergency
services
................................15 points
3
(c) The offender otherwise interfered with
or attempted to interfere with the administration
of justice .............................10 points
(d) The offender did not threaten the
security of a penal institution or court or
interfere with or attempt to interfere with the
administration of justice or the rendering of
emergency services by force or threat of force
................0 points[2]
Because
the
language
of
the
statute
is
plain
and
unambiguous, we enforce the statute as written and follow
its plain meaning, giving effect to the words used by the
Legislature.
See In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d
164 (1999).
While “interfered with or attempted to interfere with
the administration of justice” is a broad phrase that can
include acts that constitute “obstruction of justice,” it
is
not
limited
“obstruction
of
to
only
justice.”3
those
The
acts
that
Legislature
constitute
specifically
chose to use the phrase “interfered with or attempted to
interfere
with
the
administration
of
justice.”
If
the
2
The statute has been amended twice since the date of
defendant’s offense.
The amendments, however, do not
affect the issue or the outcome in this case.
3
In People v Thomas, 438 Mich 448, 458; 475 NW2d 288
(1991), this Court determined that the defendant’s conduct
—making a false statement in a police report—was a
“substantial impediment to the administration of justice,”
but was not an obstruction of justice.
4
Legislature had meant for OV 19 to apply only in cases
dealing
with
the
obstruction
easily used that phrase.
of
justice,
it
could
have
“Obstruction of justice” is a
well-known term of art.
In People v Thomas, 438 Mich 448,
457-458;
(1991),
475
NW2d
288
this
Court
stated
that
common-law obstruction of justice is comprised of various
offenses.
or
To the contrary, conduct that “interfered with
attempted
to
interfere
with
the
administration
of
justice” does not have to necessarily rise to the level of
a chargeable offense because it is merely being used as one
of various factors to determine a defendant’s sentencing
guidelines range.
The Court of Appeals in People v Deline, 254 Mich App
595, 597; 658 NW2d 164 (2002), ignored the significance of
the words used by the Legislature in MCL 777.49 and equated
“interfered
with
or
attempted
to
interfere
with
the
administration of justice” with “obstruction of justice.”4
Because
the
Legislature
chose
not
to
use
the
phrase
“obstruction of justice,” this Court cannot interpret the
4
Notably, in an opinion issued one week after Deline,
the Court of Appeals essentially reached the opposite
conclusion.
In People v Cook, 254 Mich App 635; 658 NW2d
184 (2003), the Court of Appeals held that it was proper
for the trial court to score ten points under OV 19 for
defendant’s conduct in attempting to flee from the police.
5
statute as if it had.
In reaching this decision, we are
merely applying basic rules of statutory interpretation and
giving effect to the words used by the Legislature.
See
Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993).
While the Deline panel held that OV 19 could only be
scored
when
process,
the
we
conduct
find
that
interfered
the
phrase
with
the
judicial
“interfered
with
or
attempted to interfere with the administration of justice”
encompasses
more
than
just
the
actual
judicial
process.
Law enforcement officers are an integral component in the
administration of justice, regardless of whether they are
operating directly pursuant to a court order.
In Hewitt v
White, 78 Mich 117, 119; 43 NW 1043 (1889), this Court
referred
to
the
sheriff’s
duties
as
relating
administration of civil and criminal justice.”
to
“the
Similarly,
in White v East Saginaw, 43 Mich 567, 570; 6 NW 86 (1880),
this Court referred to the sheriff’s duties as “'more or
less
directly
administration
of
justice,’” quoting People v Edwards, 9 Cal 286 (1858).
It
is
of
certainly
connected
interference
with
with
the
the
administration
justice to provide law enforcement officers with a false
name.
The
investigation
of
administration of justice.
crime
is
critical
to
the
Providing a false name to the
6
police constitutes interference with the administration of
justice, and OV 19 may be scored, when applicable, for this
conduct.
Therefore, to the extent that it is inconsistent
with this opinion, an order will be issued disapproving the
reasoning of Deline.
IV. CONCLUSION
Conduct that occurs before criminal charges are filed
can
form
the
basis
for
interference,
or
attempted
interference, with the administration of justice, and OV 19
may
be
scored
for
this
conduct
where
applicable.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s assessment of ten
points for OV 19 because defendant’s conduct constituted
interference with the administration of justice.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
7
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