AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE INSUR CO V FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Opinion
Chief Justice
Maura D. Corrigan
Justices
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED MAY 5, 2004
AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., and DVA AMBULANCE
INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 121968
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
also known as FARMERS INSURANCE
COMPANY, FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY, COATES MASONRY, INC.,
and CRIPPLE CREEK, INC.,
Defendants,
and
DONALD JEFFREY YORK,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
Under the Michigan no-fault automobile insurance act,
MCL 500.3101 et seq., intentional conduct resulting in harm
strips an insured tortfeasor of the immunity from liability
otherwise given by the act.
Here, the insured’s conduct
was found to be wilful and wanton.
The Court of Appeals
held
that
such
conduct
was
not
the
equivalent
of
intentional misconduct and, so, the insured retained the
immunity from liability granted by the act.
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals,
We affirm the
but
for
different
reasons.
I
While attending a Christmas party in 1997, defendant
Donald York drank for six or seven hours.
York called his
wife to pick him up because he was concerned about his
ability to drive safely.
But he later changed his mind and
decided that he could drive himself home.
On the way home,
he failed to stop at a stop sign and collided with an
ambulance owned by DVA Ambulance Company.
DVA was insured
by plaintiff American Alternative Insurance Company, which
paid DVA $61,000 for damage to the ambulance.
American
then filed this action, seeking reimbursement from York.
York defended on the basis that, under the Michigan
no-fault insurance act, as a tortfeasor in an automobile
accident, he was immune from tort liability.
court disagreed with York.
The trial
It found his conduct wilful and
wanton, which it determined was equivalent to intentional
conduct.
Thus,
the
court
concluded
that
York
was
not
immune from suit under the no-fault act and he was liable
to American.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court, concluding, in essence, that
2
the actions of York were not sufficiently wilful and wanton
to be intentional.
II
This
case
language.
involves
the
interpretation
of
statutory
Matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed
under a de novo standard.
DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp,
461 Mich 394, 401; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).
Dispositive in
this case is the rule of statutory construction that if the
language
of
the
statute
is
clear
and
unambiguous,
no
interpretation is necessary and the court must follow the
clear
wording
of
the
statute.
Cruz
v
State
Farm
Mut
Automobile Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002);
City of Lansing v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641, 649; 97 NW2d
804 (1959).
III
As part of the automobile no-fault insurance system
enacted in 1972,1 our Legislature at MCL 500.3135 abolished
tort liability for harm caused while owning, maintaining,
or
using
a
motor
vehicle
in
Michigan.
The
primary
exception to this broad immunity was that a suit could be
maintained when there was a death, serious impairment of
body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.
exception,
1
relevant
here,
was
1972 PA 294.
3
when
the
Another
tortfeasor
had
intentionally caused harm.
The Legislature defined this
exception at MCL 500.3135(3), saying it encompassed:
(a) Intentionally caused harm to persons or
property.
Even though a person knows that harm
to persons or property is substantially certain
to be caused by his or her act or omission, the
person does not cause or suffer that harm
intentionally if he or she acts or refrains from
acting for the purpose of averting injury to any
person, including himself or herself, or for the
purpose of averting damage to tangible property.
[Emphasis added.]
This
subsection
contains
two
sentences.
The
first
sentence sets out the general class of injuries for which
the tortfeasor is liable, i.e., harm that is intentionally
caused.
this
The second sentence then presents an exception to
class:
when
the
tortfeasor
is
attempting
to
avert
injury, he is not liable for harm even if the harm was
substantially certain to result.
Harm resulting from an
attempt to avert injury is not “intentionally caused.”
In this case, the insured did not act in an attempt to
avert injury.
harm
defined
We must therefore determine if the class of
by
the
first
sentence
of
the
subsection,
“[i]ntentionally caused harm,” applies.
In
reviewing
the
trial
and
wanton
defendant’s
wilful
intentional
conduct,
the
court’s
Court
conduct
of
determination
was
Appeals
that
equivalent
to
attempted
to
qualify Citizens Ins Co of America v Lowery, 159 Mich App
611, 616-618; 407 NW2d 55 (1987), and thus engaged in a
4
discussion of the common-law distinctions between the tort
concepts of “wilful and wanton” and intentional.
The Court
stated:
With
some
qualification,
we
are
not
persuaded by defendant’s claim that Lowery was
wrongly decided. Where the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, the statute does not need
interpretation and must be enforced as written.
Roberts v Mecosta Co General Hosp, 466 Mich 57,
63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). Because § 3135 used the
phrase “intentionally caused harm,” and that
phrase is unambiguous, we must enforce it as
written.
Therefore, the phrase “wilful and
wanton” may be substituted for “intentional” only
to the extent that it has the same meaning as
“intentional.”
As the above quotations from
Lowery and Boumelhem [v Bic Corp, 211 Mich App
175, 185; 535 NW2d 574 (1995)] suggest, “wilful
and
wanton”
is
generally
equated
with
“intentional.”
Therefore, to the extent that
Lowery
equates
“wilful
and
wanton”
with
“intentional,” we agree with the decision in
Lowery. However, to the extent that “wilful and
wanton” is read to include conduct less than
intentional, such as recklessness, then the
decision in Lowery improperly interpreted the
statute and cannot stand.
Therefore, we agree
with Lowery to the extent that it employs a
meaning of “wilful and wanton” that is synonymous
with “intentional” and we limit its holding
accordingly. [252 Mich App 76, 79-80; 650 NW2d
729 (2002).]
The gist of this is, as we read it, that while much
intentional conduct is wilful and wanton, not all wilful
and wanton conduct is intentional.
Be that as it may, this
case lends itself to a simpler analysis.
The Legislature, in speaking so clearly in § 3135(3),
made unmistakable its intent to define where immunity was
5
lost.
As set out in the statute, the test is: was the harm
intentionally caused.2
“wilful
and
3135(3)(a),
wanton.”
the
courts
The statute makes no reference to
Accordingly,
are
to
review
in
analyzing
only
whether
§
the
defendant intended to cause the harm that resulted.
As to the instant case, while there is evidence that
York was intoxicated, there is none to support a finding
that he actually intended to collide with the ambulance and
cause
damage
to
it.
Thus,
under
the
language
of
the
statute, because York did not intend to cause damage to the
ambulance, he is immune from suit.
Therefore, the Court of
Appeals correctly determined that the trial court’s finding
was clearly erroneous.
MCR 2.613(C).
The trial court and the Court of Appeals applied the
wrong
legal
standards.
However,
because
the
Court
of
Appeals reached the correct result, we affirm the Court of
Appeals decision for the reasons stated herein.
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
2
This test is accurately stated in Hicks v Vaught, 162
Mich App 438, 440; 413 NW2d 28 (1987), which the Court of
Appeals, for whatever reason, did not discuss.
6
S T A T E
M I C H I G A N
O F
SUPREME COURT
AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., and DVA AMBULANCE
INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 121968
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
also known as FARMERS INSURANCE
COMPANY, FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY, COATES MASONRY, INC.,
and CRIPPLE CREEK, INC.,
Defendants,
and
DONALD JEFFREY YORK,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).
I concur.
Although I agree with the result reached by
the majority, I find its analysis inadequate because it
fails at all to address plaintiff’s principal argument—that
"intentionally caused harm" in the first sentence of MCL
500.3135(3)(a)
sentence,
and,
"intentionally
is
defined,
as
caused
a
by
implication
result,
harm,”
but
in
encompasses
also
harm
the
second
not
that
only
is
“substantially certain” to occur.1
1
At oral argument, both parties essentially contended
that § 3135(3)(a) should be understood in such a manner.
Kevin Sralla, plaintiff’s attorney, stated:
Or if you do something where you know that
you’re substantially certain to hit the other
truck and there’s no element of acting to avert
harm, then I think that also would be an
intentional act. And that’s precisely the reason
why I think the Legislature contemplated a
broader umbrella for intentional acts because it
used the words “substantially certain.”
It
didn’t say if you intend to do something, it said
“substantially certain.”
In his opening statement, William Schultz, defendant’s
attorney asserted:
The
Legislature
intended
by
that
particular language [in the second sentence] then
to provide that there was a status of misconduct
that did not get immunity.
That misconduct
includes and includes only intended actions where
the person knows that harm is substantially
certain to occur as the result of that person’s
conduct.
Later, Mr. Schultz stated:
I don’t believe that you can read in
harmony the second [sentence] of [§ 3135(3)(a)]
with an argument that in all cases there is no
immunity only if there is an intended action that
results in intended harm.
In other words, we
agree that in order to read [the first and second
sentences] in harmony, there has to be a
2
Section
which
an
3135(3)
insured
enumerates
tortfeasor
several
may
be
circumstances
held
liable
in
for
a
vehicular accident, despite the automobile no-fault act's
broad personal immunity from tort liability.
Section 3135,
in particular, provides:
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, tort liability arising from the ownership,
maintenance, or use within this state of a motor
vehicle . . . is abolished except as to:
(a) Intentionally caused harm to persons or
property.
Even though a person knows that harm
to persons or property is substantially certain
to be caused by his or her act or omission, the
person does not cause or suffer that harm
intentionally if he or she acts or refrains from
acting for the purpose of averting injury to any
person, including himself or herself, or for the
purpose of averting damage to tangible property.
While
the
second
sentence
in
subsection
(a)
conceivably can be read to imply that the “intentionally
caused
harm”
standard
of
the
first
sentence
is
to
be
defined with reference to a state of mind in which a person
is “substantially certain” that an outcome will result from
particular
conduct,
I
do
not
believe
better reading of this provision.
that
this
is
the
Rather, “intentionally
caused harm” should be given its ordinary meaning, one that
concession that there is some conduct less than
the true intentional tort for which the person
does not get the immunity provided by the nofault act.
Otherwise, it seems to us, that
second [sentence] of the statute is unnecessary.
3
requires purposefulness on the part of the driver, rather
than a mere awareness of probabilities.
That is, absent
some special definition of “intentionally” in the statute,
it
should
be
assumed
“intentionally.”
NW2d
250
define
ordinarily
words
Although
to
mean,
possess
“intentionally”
means
People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603
(1999).2
words
that
mean
the
Legislature
something
other
it
nonetheless
should
their
ordinary
meanings
is
than
be
free
to
what
they
assumed
that
unless
clearly
defined in a contrary manner.
While it might, not unreasonably, be argued that the
second
sentence
“intentionally”
“substantially
of
by
subsection
(a)
impliedly
certain,”
such
attempts
to
equating
an
redefine
it
implication,
with
in
my
judgment, is simply too obscure in this context to overcome
the presumption that words should be understood by their
ordinary
meanings.
Here,
in
the
case
of
a
term,
"intentionally," that has a longstanding and well-defined
meaning ranging across a variety of discrete areas of the
2
See In re Certified Question (Kenneth Henes v Biomass
Ind, Inc), 468 Mich 109, 114; 659 NW2d 597 (2003)(defining
“intentional,” for purposes of MCL 600.2961[5][b], in
accordance
with
the
Random
House
Webster’s
College
Dictionary [1991] [“done with intention or on purpose;
intended”]). See also Cruz v State farm Mut Automobile Ins
Co, 466 Mich 588, 595; 648 NW2d 591 (2002); Hicks v Vaught,
162 Mich App 438, 440; 413 NW2d 28 (1987).
4
law,3 § 3135(3) fails to communicate with sufficient clarity
that
the
term
here
inconsistent meaning.
is
to
be
given
an
alternative
and
Instead, the statute leaves such a
conclusion to be drawn only by negative inference from what
is clearly an awkward phraseology.4
Although I believe that the purpose of the prefatory
clause in the second sentence is merely to introduce an
3
See, e.g., Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co, 453
Mich 149, 171; 551 NW2d 132 (1996)(opinion by BOYLE,
J.)(concluding that an “intentional tort,” for purposes of
MCL 418.131[1], occurs, not where the “employer is only
substantially certain that injury will result from his
acts,” but only where the employer has “in mind a purpose
to bring about given consequences”); Auto-Owners Ins Co v
Churchman, 440 Mich 560, 573; 489 NW2d 431 (1992)(holding
that the insured’s actions satisfied an insurance policy’s
exclusionary clause, which exempted coverage for “bodily
injury or property damage expected or intended by an
insured person,” because the insured “purposely went to
[the victim’s] house and shot him four times at close
range”); People v Dykhouse, 418 Mich 488, 502; 345 NW2d 150
(1984)(stating that a “very high risk of death” intent is
insufficient to satisfy first-degree murder, which is a
specific intent crime requiring proof of defendant’s
intention to take a life); Book Furniture Co v Chance, 352
Mich 521, 526-527; 90 NW2d 651 (1958)(holding that
“[w]aiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right . . . . The usual manner of waiving a right is by
acts which indicate an intention to relinquish it, . . . or
by so neglecting and failing to act as to induce a belief
that it was the intention and purpose to waive.")
4
I surmise that the drafters of this provision sought
to restate the rule of the first sentence in the prefatory
clause to the second sentence, but sought also to avoid the
awkwardness of repeating the language of the first sentence
in so doing.
Unfortunately, their resummarization was
imprecise and has engendered confusion.
5
exception to the rule of the first sentence, rather than to
serve as a definitional clause for the first sentence, this
purpose is considerably less clear than it might have been.
Therefore,
I
interpretation
do
as
not
view
unreasonable,
plaintiff's
but
simply
reasonable than that adopted by the majority.
proposed
as
less
Choosing
among these interpretations requires this Court to select
among imperfect alternatives.
Although § 3135(3)(a) is certainly crafted more
awkwardly
majority’s
than
it
might
interpretation
have
of
been,
this
I
believe
provision
is
that
the
the
more
reasonable interpretation, and I therefore concur with the
majority.
Stephen J. Markman
6
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