PEOPLE OF MI V JERRY CLAY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
C h i e f J u s ti c e
Maura D. Corrigan
J u s t ic e s
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED MAY 30, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 120024
JERRY CLAY,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
AFTER REMAND
YOUNG, J.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment on the ground that
defendant was not “lawfully imprisoned” as contemplated by MCL
750.197c.
We reverse.
I.
Defendant
was
Background
stopped
by
the
police
for
allegedly
trespassing, failing to obey a police officer, and assisting
in a traffic violation. After the stop, the police discovered
that defendant was carrying a concealed weapon without a
permit in violation of MCL 750.227.
As a result, defendant
was placed under arrest and taken to the county jail.
While at the county jail, defendant assaulted a law
enforcement officer. Consequently, defendant was charged with
assaulting a corrections officer, MCL 750.197c, and being an
habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12.
Defendant was
convicted of these offenses at trial and his convictions were
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.1
Defendant’s application
for leave to appeal was denied by this Court.2
In
separate
proceedings,
defendant
was
convicted
of
unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, and being
an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, for the
events that had led to his arrest and imprisonment in the
first place.
However, these convictions were reversed by the
Court of Appeals3 because there was insufficient probable
cause to initially stop defendant for trespassing, failing to
obey a police officer, or assisting in a traffic violation.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that evidence of the
concealed weapon subsequently discovered should have been
1
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 21, 1997
(Docket No. 183102).
2
456 Mich 888 (1997)(Docket No. 108578).
3
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 11, 1997
(Docket No. 183101).
2
suppressed
under
the
exclusionary
rule.
Plaintiff’s
application for leave to appeal was denied by this Court.4
Armed
with
the
reversal
of
his
concealed-weapon
conviction, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment
for his conviction of assaulting a corrections officer under
MCL 750.197c. Defendant argued that § 197c requires one to be
“lawfully imprisoned” and that the reversal of the concealed
weapon conviction because of the unconstitutional initial stop
and subsequent search meant that defendant had not been
“lawfully imprisoned” at the time he struck the officer in the
county jail.
bases.
The trial court denied the motion on alternate
First, the trial court held that the arrest was valid
for purposes of § 197c because an outstanding bench warrant
for defendant’s arrest existed at the time of his detention.5
Second, the trial court reasoned that a subsequent finding
that there was insufficient probable cause to arrest does not
render an arrest unlawful for purposes of § 197c.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds
from the trial court.6
The Court of Appeals majority held
that the text of § 197c does not necessarily require a
4
456 Mich 876 (1997) (Docket No. 109947).
5
Given our disposition of this case, we need not address
the prosecution’s appellate argument regarding the propriety
of the trial court’s bench warrant rationale.
6
239 Mich App 365, 369; 608 NW2d 76 (2000).
3
defendant to be “lawfully imprisoned.”
The dissenting judge,
on the other hand, read the statute such that the phrases
“lawfully imprisoned” in the statute collectively applied to
all the subclassifications listed in the statute.
After this Court granted defendant leave to appeal in
order to consider whether the Court of Appeals majority
properly
interpreted
prosecution
conceded
the
requirements
that
the
Court
correctly construed the statute.
under
all
circumstances
that
the
of
of
197c,7
§
Appeals
the
dissent
That is, § 197c requires
defendant
be
“lawfully
imprisoned” in order to be convicted of violating the statute.
We concurred with the prosecution’s concession that the Court
of Appeals dissent correctly stated the requirements of § 197c
and, in a summary disposition order, reversed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that Court to
decide whether the defendant’s imprisonment was, in fact,
lawful.8
On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for relief from judgment,
adopting the reasoning of the previous dissenting opinion that
defendant was not lawfully imprisoned.9
The Court wrote:
7
463 Mich 906 (2000).
8
463 Mich 970 (2001).
9
247 Mich App 322, 323-324; 636 NW2d 303 (2001).
4
The
prosecution
argues
that
defendant’s
incarceration was lawful because he had committed
the crime of carrying a concealed weapon and there
was an outstanding bench warrant for defendant’s
arrest when he was stopped. However, there is no
evidence that police were aware of either fact at
the time of the stop. The fact that the search of
defendant’s person led to evidence is irrelevant.
A search, in law, is good or bad at the time of
commencement, and its character does not change on
the basis of its success. People v LoCicero (After
Remand), 453 Mich 496, 501; 556 NW2d 498 (1996).
[247 Mich App 322, 324; 636 NW2d 303 (2001).]
We granted the prosecution leave to appeal.10
II.
Standard of Review
At issue is the proper interpretation of MCL 750.197c.
We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.
People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149, 156; 631 NW2d 694 (2001).
III.
At
the
time
of
the
Analysis
alleged
offense,11
MCL
750.197c
provided:
A person lawfully imprisoned in a jail, other
place of confinement established by law for any
term, or lawfully imprisoned for any purpose at any
other place, including but not limited to hospitals
and other health care facilities or awaiting
examination, trial, arraignment, sentence, or after
sentence awaiting or during transfer to or from a
prison, for a crime or offense, or charged with a
crime or offense who, without being discharged from
10
466 Mich 860 (2002).
11
1998 PA 510 inserted a subsection 2 to include public
and private youth correctional facilities in the definition of
“place of confinement” and independent contractors in the
definition of “employee.”
These later amendments do not
appear to alter our analysis of the legal issue before us.
5
the
place
of
confinement,
or
other
lawful
imprisonment by due process of law, through the use
of violence, threats of violence or dangerous
weapons, assaults an employee of the place of
confinement or other custodian knowing the person
to be an employee or custodian or breaks the place
of confinement and escapes, or breaks the place of
confinement although an escape is not actually
made, is guilty of a felony. [Emphasis added.]
The
issue
defendant’s
presented
conviction
is
of
whether
the
the
reversal
concealed-weapon
of
offense,
effectuated by an application of the exclusionary rule, means
that defendant was not “lawfully imprisoned” as contemplated
by MCL 750.197c.
To say that an action is “lawful” is to say that it is
authorized by law.
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 885.
In this case, defendant committed, in an officer’s presence,
the felony of carrying a concealed weapon without a permit.
Consequently,
defendant
was
detained
pursuant
to
MCL
764.15(1), which provides:
A peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest
a person in any of the following situations:
(a) A felony, misdemeanor, or
violation is committed in the peace
presence.
ordinance
officer’s
As a result, by the authority granted to him by MCL
764.15(1)(a), the police officer was authorized to imprison
defendant. Accordingly, defendant’s imprisonment was “lawful”
as contemplated by MCL 750.197c.
Defendant advances, nevertheless, that the subsequent
6
suppression of the evidence of the concealed weapon because of
the application of the exclusionary rule causes the police
officer’s conduct to be retroactively considered “unlawful.”
We disagree.
Simply put, for purposes of MCL 750.197c, a
subsequent determination concerning a defendant’s prosecution
cannot and does not serve to retroactively render “unlawful”
the actions of a law enforcement officer where those actions
are authorized by law.
Rather, for the purposes of MCL 750.197c, an imprisonment
cannot be unlawful where a law enforcement officer has been
given the authority under law to imprison the individual.
Because defendant was detained pursuant to the officer’s legal
authority under MCL 764.15(1)(a), he was “lawfully imprisoned”
under MCL 750.197c.12
12
To be certain, we note that in concluding in this case
(Docket No. 120024) that defendant was lawfully imprisoned as
contemplated by MCL 750.197c because of the authority vested
in the law enforcement officer by MCL 764.15(1), we are not
reconsidering whether in defendant’s other case (Docket No.
109947), concerning the underlying charge of unlawfully
carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, the law enforcement
officer had probable cause to stop or search defendant or
whether the seized evidence should have been suppressed. We
already denied leave to appeal in that case, 456 Mich 876
(1997), and regardless, as our analysis above indicates, those
issues are not relevant to the issue before us. Accordingly,
to the extent that the dissent suggests that an exclusionary
rule analysis is relevant to the issue presented, we disagree.
In addition, we find curious the dissent’s conclusion
that under MCL 764.15(1) and MCL 750.197c an arrest is lawful
but an imprisonment following such a lawful arrest is not.
Such an interpretation would lead to a mandatory “catch and
7
Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of
Appeals
and
reinstate
the
trial
court’s
denial
of
defendant’s motion for relief from judgment.
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Stephen J. Markman
CAVANAGH, J.
I concur in the result only.
Michael F. Cavanagh
release” system of law enforcement, whereby criminals may be
lawfully “arrested,” but not lawfully “imprisoned” until a
defendant has the opportunity to have any suppression motions
adjudicated. The statutes at issue simply do not permit such
an interpretation.
Further, we fail to find any logic in the dissent’s
position that statutorily permitting police officers to arrest
and hold an individual seen committing a crime under MCL
764.15(1), before a determination of the constitutionality of
such an arrest through subsequent judicial process, somehow
“sanctions, even encourages, illegal conduct by police
officers.”
Post at 1.
Under this “encouraged behavior
theory,” one must accept that police officers will seek to
arrest individuals with the hope that these arrested
individuals later assault a police officer while being held,
causing significant injury to the police officer, so that the
defendant will then be subjected to greater punishment for the
assault.
8
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 120024
v
JERRY CLAY,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion.
I believe that a defendant who has been illegally stopped
cannot be "lawfully imprisoned" within the meaning of MCL
750.197c.
The majority's conclusion to the contrary has no
basis in the law.
Moreover, it circumvents constitutional
protections and sanctions, even encourages, illegal conduct by
police officers.
The majority's reasoning is that police officers may
arrest a suspect if they observe him committing a felony,
although their observation was possible only because of their
own
illegal
activity.
Thus,
applied
to
this
case,
the
majority holds that a later determination that the officers'
initial stop of defendant's vehicle was illegal will not
render unlawful the imprisonment that followed the stop.
I think the decision is ill-advised.
implicates
the
exclusionary
rule
that
First, this case
the
United
States
Supreme Court fashioned to deter illegal police conduct. Mapp
v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Terry
v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).
The
protection of the rule is vitiated by a holding that the
imprisonment of a suspect can be "lawful," even if the initial
stop were constitutionally impermissible.
Under the majority's decision, the police could seize a
suspect with neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion,
literally for no legally sanctioned reason, hoping to find
evidence of a felony.
If they found such evidence and
imprisoned the suspect, the imprisonment would be "lawful."
Surely the same rationale that renders the fruit of the
poisonous tree inadmissible renders the imprisonment arising
from an unconstitutional seizure unlawful.
This is a case where defendant's stop was illegal,
lacking probable cause. As a result, the search that revealed
the concealed weapon was also illegal.
However, the majority
finds that the imprisonment that was based on the search was
legal.
It makes this finding because MCL 764.15(1) gives an
2
officer the right to arrest a person who commits a felony in
the officer's presence.
discards
from
In so ruling, the majority not only
consideration
the
fact
that
the
officer's
presence in this case was illegal, it equates lawful arrest
with lawful imprisonment.
MCL
764.15(1) makes the arrest lawful.
However, MCL
750.197c, the statute in question, refers not to "lawful
arrest," but to "lawful imprisonment."
The police have the
legal right to arrest an illegally stopped suspect, for
example, to prevent the furtherance of a felony. But there is
no legal basis for a finding that either the evidence seized
or
the
imprisonment
of
that
suspect
is
"lawful."
The
rationale underlying the exclusionary rule would dictate the
opposite result.
If the imprisonment were lawful, then could not the
police (1) illegally break into someone's home and search it,
(2) without a warrant or permission, (3) allege that the owner
possessed some kind of contraband, (4) imprison him, and (5)
if the owner, feeling wronged, escaped confinement, charge and
convict him of prison escape under MCL 750.197c because he was
"lawfully imprisoned" when he escaped?
The Legislature has used no language in MCL 750.197c from
which one can conclude that it intended such an outrageous
result.
Rather, it took pains to specify that, for the
3
statute to apply, the imprisonment must be lawful.
The
majority's only authority shows that it was lawful to arrest,
not that it was lawful to imprison.
The case before us on appeal is not one in which a
straightforward application of criminal law as written allows
defendant to escape the consequences of his criminal behavior.
The
prosecutor
could
have
charged
defendant
with,
and
presumably seen him convicted of and sentenced for, assault
and battery, MCL 750.81, and resisting or obstructing an
officer, MCL 750.479.
These offenses constitute a ninety-day
misdemeanor and a two-year felony, respectively.
It is
apparent that, here, the prosecutor seeks an extension of the
law for the purpose of charging defendant with a more serious
crime, a four-year felony under MCL 750.197c.
I believe that a holding that one may be "lawfully"
imprisoned under MCL 750.197c after an illegal stop lacks
legal authority. Morever, it constitutes a flagrant disregard
for the protections of our constitution.
If a constitutional
violation can be so easily sanitized after the fact, there
will be less incentive for police to observe constitutional
protections.
For those reasons, I would affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
Marilyn Kelly
4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
