GARY HINKLE V WAYNE CO CLERK
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Chie f Justice
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED DECEMBER 10, 2002
GARY HINKLE, Executor of the Estate
of MARILYN J. HINKLE-CALCUTT,
Plaintiff,
v
No. 119566
WAYNE COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY OF WAYNE,
and WAYNE COUNTY COMMISSION,
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v
BILLY CALCUTT,
Third-Party Defendant,
and
RANDALL WOKAS,
Third-Party Defendant-
Appellant.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
This appeal arises from postjudgment proceedings in a
dispute over a partial refund owed by a hospital that was
overpaid for the care of plaintiff’s decedent, Marilyn J.
Hinkle-Calcutt.
We hold that MCR 2.614(A)(1), commonly described as the
automatic stay provision, does not apply to voluntary payments
in satisfaction of a judgment.
Therefore, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it holds
to the contrary.
I
While the plaintiff’s decedent was a patient at Harper-
Grace
Hospital,
two
insurance
payments for her care.
companies
made
duplicate
Harper-Grace was prepared to issue a
refund, but her surviving spouse, Billy J. Calcutt, and the
executor of her estate, Gary Hinkle, could not agree on which
of them should receive the money.1
Rather than choose between
Calcutt and Hinkle, the hospital deposited the disputed funds
with
the
Wayne
intervened.
In
County
1989,
Clerk.
the
Calcutt
trial
court
sued,
and
granted
Hinkle
summary
disposition against Hinkle and awarded the funds to Calcutt.2
Hinkle appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, he did
not attempt to obtain a stay of execution from the trial
1
The coverages were not coordinated, so the refund would
not be to the insurers.
2
The full procedural history of this decade-old dispute
is quite complex. For present purposes, we are describing
only those portions that are pertinent to today’s issue.
Neither do we address the merits of the underlying controversy
regarding whether the refund should go to Hinkle or Wokas.
2
court.
After entry of the order of summary disposition, the
county clerk asked Calcutt’s attorney, Randall Wokas, when he
would withdraw the funds.
Thereafter, Wokas removed the
funds, before the expiration of the twenty-one-day automatic
stay under MCR 2.614(A)(1).3
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment,
and ordered that the funds be divided between Hinkle and
Calcutt.
Hinkle, however, was unable to obtain the estate’s
share of the funds because the county clerk had previously
disbursed them to Wokas.
At that point, Hinkle filed the instant suit against the
Wayne
County
Clerk,
Wayne
County,
and
the
Wayne
County
Commission, alleging that the county had improperly disbursed
the
money.4
The
county
defendants
filed
a
third-party
complaint against Calcutt and Wokas, contending, in part, that
they acquired the funds in violation of MCR 2.614(A)(1).
Wokas moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),
arguing that the county defendants’ active fault precluded
their recovery.
The trial court, on reconsideration of an
earlier ruling, granted Wokas’ motion for summary disposition.
The county defendants appealed and Wokas cross-appealed.
3
Wokas’ removal of the funds spawned contempt
proceedings detailed in In re Contempt of Calcutt, 184 Mich
App 749; 458 NW2d 919 (1990).
4
Hinkle ultimately entered into a settlement agreement
with the county defendants.
3
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision that
granted summary disposition to Wokas.5
Wokas has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.
II
A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for
summary disposition is a question of law that we review de
novo. Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 159;
645 NW2d 643 (2002).
The interpretation of a court rule is
likewise a question of law and is reviewed de novo.
CAM
Construction v Lake Edgewood Condominium Ass’n, 465 Mich 549,
553; 640 NW2d 256 (2002).
III
This Court applies principles of statutory interpretation
to the interpretation of court rules.
When the language is
unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning plainly expressed,
and
judicial
construction
is
not
permitted.
Grievance
Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich 188, 193-194; 612 NW2d 116
(2000).
IV
The issue presented is whether the county defendants
violated MCR 2.614(A)(1) by voluntarily disbursing the funds
during the twenty-one-day automatic stay of execution provided
by the court rule.
The trial court agreed with Wokas that the
county did not wrongfully distribute the funds, but the Court
5
245 Mich App 405; 631 NW2d 27 (2001).
4
of Appeals held to the contrary.
That Court determined that
Wokas’ knowledge that a claim of appeal had been filed, and
that an informal request had been made to maintain the funds
in the clerk’s office, rendered Wokas responsible for the
unavailability of funds to satisfy the judgment after the
appellate decision in Hinkle’s favor.
The Court of Appeals
charged Wokas with notice of MCR 2.614(A)(1), the provision
for an automatic stay of execution pending appeal.
Thus, the
Court found that Wokas was responsible for the funds having
been mistakenly paid to Calcutt and Wokas.6
The Court of Appeals erred in finding a violation of the
automatic twenty-one-day stay provided by MCR 2.614(A)(1).
That
paragraph
precludes
execution
on
a
judgment,
not
voluntary payment by a party willing to satisfy a judgment.
Nothing in the plain language of the rule restrains a party
liable for a judgment and the party entitled to satisfaction
of
the
judgment
from
expediting
the
resolution
of
the
litigation by effecting payment without resorting to formal
methods of execution.
MCR 2.614(A)(1) states:
Except as provided in this rule, execution may
not issue on a judgment and proceedings may not be
taken for its enforcement until the expiration of
21 days after its entry.
If a motion for new
trial, a motion to alter or amend the judgment, a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or
a motion to amend or for additional findings of the
court is filed and served within 21 days after
entry of the judgment, execution may not issue on
6
The trial court had limited Wokas’ liability to
$23,500, the amount that he collected as attorney fees.
5
the judgment and proceedings may not be taken for
its enforcement until the expiration of 21 days
after the entry of the order on the motion, unless
otherwise ordered by the court on motion for good
cause. Nothing in this rule prohibits the court
from enjoining the transfer or disposition of
property during the 21-day period.
The language of the rule expressly limits execution on a
judgment, not voluntary payments.
Because this case involved
a voluntary payment, the rules governing execution were not
applicable.7
The Court of Appeals reliance on the proceedings in In re
Calcutt was misplaced.
expressly
stated
that
In that case, the Court of Appeals
the
purported
violation
of
MCR
2.614(A)(1) was not dispositive of the claim that Wokas and
Calcutt violated an order of the Court of Appeals.
755.
Id. at
The comments of the Court in Calcutt regarding the
effect of MCR 2.614(A)(1) were dicta. Neither MCR 2.614(A)(1)
nor MCL 600.6001 et seq. prohibited voluntary compliance with
the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor
of Calcutt.
Hinkle failed to obtain an order to preserve the
status quo and cannot now complain that the status quo was not
maintained.
7
Execution refers to the coercive process for the
collection of judgments. Regulations on coercive collection
are imposed because direct attachment of a debtor’s property
is disfavored. George v Sandor M Gelman, PC, 201 Mich App
474, 477; 506 NW2d 583 (1993).
Chapter 60 of the Revised
Judicature Act, MCL 600.6001 et seq., regulates the
involuntary payment of judgments.
6
V
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it reversed the order of summary disposition in favor of
Wokas.
The county clerk’s voluntary payment of the judgment
was not contrary to MCR 2.614(A)(1).
We therefore reinstate
the trial court order granting summary disposition for Wokas.
In light of our resolution of this issue, we find it
unnecessary to reach the remaining claims.
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
7
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
GARY HINKLE, executor of the estate
of MARILYN J. HINKLE-CALCUTT,
Plaintiff,
v
No. 119566
WAYNE COUNTY CLERK, COUNTY OF WAYNE,
and WAYNE COUNTY COMMISSION,
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
v
BILLY CALCUTT,
Third-Party Defendant,
and
RANDALL WOKAS,
Third-Party DefendantAppellant.
___________________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I
believe
that
this
case
is
disposition by per curiam opinion.
not
appropriate
for
Whether the Court of
Appeals correctly construed MCR 2.614 is a question of some
significance, not only to the parties, but to the bench and
the bar in general. Full briefing and oral argument would aid
the Court greatly in analyzing and resolving the complex
issues presented.
Therefore, I would not resolve this matter
by per curiam opinion, but would grant leave to appeal.
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
