PEOPLE OF MI V NORMAN K SMALL
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No.
120617
NORMAN K. SMALL,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
PER CURIAM
This case involves a carjacking from a driver-victim who
may have illegally come into possession of the vehicle.
The
trial court foreclosed defendant from presenting evidence at
trial that might have shown the victim was not in lawful
possession of the vehicle on the ground that such evidence was
irrelevant.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of
carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and assault with intent to commit
murder, MCL 750.83, and was sentenced to concurrent prison
terms of seven to fifteen years for each conviction.
The
Court of Appeals affirmed.1
Defendant has filed an application for leave to appeal,
arguing, among other things, that his carjacking conviction is
invalid because the prosecution did not prove that the driver
of the vehicle was in lawful possession of the vehicle.
affirm
the
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
and
We
reject
defendant's claim that an element of the crime of carjacking
required the driver to be in lawful possession of the vehicle
in the context of this case.
I
Timothy Tyson testified that he knew defendant as a
relative of his neighbors in Mississippi.
Tyson said he
agreed to drive defendant to Michigan from Mississippi.
After
arriving in Michigan, Tyson and defendant made several stops.
At one point, Tyson pulled over so defendant could speak with
Willie McCall.
Defendant and McCall spoke to each other on
the sidewalk while Tyson waited in the vehicle.
Defendant and
McCall got into the vehicle, asking Tyson to take McCall to a
relative’s house.
While Tyson was driving, McCall grabbed him
from behind and defendant reached across from the passenger’s
seat and stabbed him in the chest.
1
Defendant said he was
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 26, 2001
(Docket No. 224913).
2
taking the vehicle, grabbed the wheel, and turned into an
alley.
Eventually defendant pushed Tyson out of the vehicle.
Tyson reported the incident to the police, and defendant and
McCall were arrested.2
When
ownership
defense
counsel
began
of
vehicle,
the
the
prosecution objection.
asking
trial
Tyson
court
about
the
sustained
a
In refusing to allow defendant to
present evidence regarding the propriety of Tyson’s possession
of the vehicle, the court said:
The first thing they teach you in criminal law
is that the title of a thief is good against the
whole world, except the true owner.
As long as he
had custody of that car, no one had a right to use
any force to get it from him.
II
Determining the scope of a criminal statute is a matter
of
statutory
interpretation,
subject
to
de
novo
review.
People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 561; 621 NW2d 702 (2001).
The
trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Mich 756, 761; 631 NW2d 281 (2001).
People v Layher, 464
However, where the
decision regarding the admissibility of evidence involves a
preliminary question of law, that question is reviewed de novo
2
McCall was also convicted of carjacking and assault with
intent to murder at a separate trial. His case is not before
us.
3
on appeal.
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607
(1999).
III
Defendant claims that he was denied his right to present
a defense and to confront witnesses because the trial court
precluded him from questioning the victim with regard to
whether he was in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.
It is generally understood that one need not rob the
actual owner of property in order to be lawfully charged and
convicted of armed robbery because it is sufficient if the
victim has an interest in the property superior to that of the
defendant.
People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 710-711; 645
NW2d 294 (2001).3
The case at bar presents the related question whether a
stolen vehicle may be the subject of a carjacking.
The carjacking statute, MCL 750.529a(1), provides:
A person who by force or violence, or by threat
3
The Rodgers Court explained:
[T]he essence of armed robbery is not that the
property belonged to the victim, but rather that it
belonged to someone other than the thief. To
constitute an armed robbery, the property must be
taken by force or violence, "'not necessarily from
the owner, but from any person in possession
thereof whose right of possession is superior to
that of the robber.’” [Id. at 711-712 (citations
omitted).]
4
of force or violence, or by putting in fear robs,
steals, or takes a motor vehicle as defined in [MCL
750.412] from another person, in the presence of
that person or the presence of a passenger or in the
presence of any other person in lawful possession of
the motor vehicle, is guilty of carjacking, a felony
punishable by imprisonment for life or for any term
of years. [Emphasis added.]
We begin by noting that the prosecutor's theory in this
case was based on a taking "from another person, in the
presence of that person."
Defendant contends that the “in the presence” part of the
statute means that the person from whom the car is stolen must
have had lawful possession of the vehicle.
In contrast, the
prosecution contends that the “lawful possession” portion of
the statute refers only to takings “in the presence of any
other person.”
We agree with the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and
the prosecution that “in lawful possession” only applies to
the words “in the presence
carjacking
statute.
We
of any other person” in the
note
that
this
construction
is
consistent with the common grammatical rule of construction
that a modifying clause will be construed to modify only the
last antecedent unless some language in the statute requires
a different interpretation.4
Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich
4
Unless set off by commas, a modifying word or phrase,
where no contrary intention appears, refers solely to the last
5
611,
616;
647
NW2d
508
(2002).
Under
this
rule
of
construction, the phrase "in lawful possession" only modifies
the phrase "in the presence of any other person."
It does not
modify the preceding phrases "in the presence of that person"
or "in the presence of a passenger."
Having concluded that a driver need not be in lawful
possession
of
a
vehicle
in
order
to
have
the
vehicle
carjacked, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
precluding defendant from eliciting testimony that the driver
may not have been in lawful possession of the vehicle because
whether the driver was in lawful possession of the vehicle
simply was not relevant to whether defendant is guilty of
carjacking.
Logical relevance is the foundation for admissibility of
evidence.
(1993).
People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 60; 508 NW2d 114
MRE 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan,
these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
As defined by MRE 401, "relevant evidence" is evidence that
has
antecedent. 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (6th
ed), § 47.33, p 369, 373.
6
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.
We also note that MCL 768.29 similarly provides:
It shall be the duty of the judge to control
all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the
introduction of evidence . . . to relevant and
material matters . . . .
Given our conclusion that the victim need not have been
in lawful possession of the vehicle, any evidence that the
driver was not in legal possession of the vehicle was not
related to any fact of consequence relating to the carjacking
charge.
Accordingly, such evidence was not relevant, and thus
inadmissible.
Therefore, the trial court properly precluded
defendant from presenting evidence that the driver may not
have been in lawful possession of the vehicle.
We
conclude
that
the
Legislature
did
not
intend
to
require legal possession as a prerequisite to all carjacking
convictions.
Because the prosecutor's theory in this case was
based on a taking "from another person, in the presence of
that person," MCL 750.529a(1), we reject defendant's claim
that the evidence was insufficient to support his carjacking
conviction.
IV
We thus affirm defendant’s carjacking conviction and
7
sentence.
In all other respects we deny leave to appeal.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN ,
JJ., concurred.
CAVANAGH , J., concurred in the result only.
8
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