PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL THOMAS JACKSON
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
O pinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 117594
MICHAEL T. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
In 1985 the defendant was found guilty following a bench
trial of first-degree murder, and his conviction was affirmed
on appeal.
In 1998, he filed a motion for relief from
judgment under MCR subchapter 6.500. Relief was denied by the
circuit court, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to
appeal.
Defendant has filed an application for leave to
appeal to this Court.
In addition to arguing the substantive
issues, he maintains that the limitations on relief provided
by MCR 6.508(D) should not apply to him because his conviction
predated the effective date of the rule.
He claims that it
would constitute a due process violation to apply the rule
retroactively to his case.
We conclude that the subchapter 6.500 procedures do apply
to convictions before the effective date of the rule and that
there is no constitutional impediment to doing so.
facts
of
this
case,
the
defendant
has
not
On the
established
entitlement to relief as required by MCR 6.508(D), and the
order of the circuit court denying relief is affirmed.
I
On December 13, 1983, a fourteen-year-old girl was beaten
to death in her Saginaw County home. Attention focused on the
defendant when it was learned that he had been there that day.
Defendant was then sixteen years old, and thus proceedings
began in the probate court.
After several days of waiver
hearings, the juvenile division of the probate court waived
jurisdiction on August 20, 1984, and the defendant was bound
over on a charge of first-degree (premeditated) murder.
Defendant
waived
a
jury
and
presented
an
insanity
defense, making no effort to dispute that he killed the
victim.
The circuit judge found him guilty as charged on
April 18, 1985, and imposed the mandatory life sentence on
May 31, 1985.
Defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied
in an opinion issued November 21, 1986.
Defendant appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed on
2
September 7, 1988.1
1989.2
In
his
We denied leave to appeal on April 25,
direct
appeal,
among
other
issues,
the
defendant raised claims regarding the waiver of jurisdiction
by
the
juvenile
division
of
the
probate
court
and
the
admissibility of his confession.
In July 1998, the defendant filed a motion for relief
from
judgment
in
the
Saginaw
Circuit
Court,
once
again
challenging the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and the
admissibility
of
his
confession.
He
also
argued
that
MCR 6.508(D) should not be applied retroactively to his case.
The circuit court’s consideration of the motion took
place in several stages.
First, on August 12, 1998, the
court3 issued an opinion and order dealing with the issues
regarding admissibility of the defendant’s statement.
The court noted that the voluntariness of the defendant’s
statement had been tested in both the juvenile court and the
circuit court with evidentiary hearings under People v Walker,
374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965), and resolved against the
defendant.
Further, on his initial appeal, the defendant
raised for the first time the question of police compliance
with former Juvenile Court Rule 3.3.
The Court of Appeals
held that no miscarriage of justice would result from failure
1
171 Mich App 191; 429 NW2d 849 (1988).
2
432 Mich 896 (1989).
3
The circuit judge who presided at trial had retired,
and the motion was assigned to his successor.
3
to review the objections, but went on to say that despite the
police failure to carry out their duties under JCR 3.3,
defendant’s statement was properly admitted under the totality
of the circumstances.
Finally, the circuit court addressed the defendant’s new
claim that the confession was inadmissible as the product of
an illegal arrest.
finding no error.
The court discussed the issue at length,
It said:
While it is true that only a short time
elapsed between defendant’s seizure and statement,
he was, during that period, twice advised of his
Nor does the Court find the
Miranda[4] rights.
police conduct in this case particularly flagrant
or of such character as to justify the remedy
sought.
It is undeniable the police lacked
probable
cause
to
arrest
defendant
at
his
residence. They did, however, clearly have a right
and need to question him about his presence at the
victim’s home and any knowledge he may have had of
the killing. In this regard, the entire purpose of
taking him into custody was not to place him under
arrest, but to hold him until he could properly be
questioned in the presence of his father. Although
there apparently was a failure to comply with all
appropriate procedures governing questioning of a
minor, the officers were at least aware that
different procedures and rules applied and did
their best to comply with them. There is nothing
in this case to suggest that their actions were
part of some illegal plan or scheme or product of
improper motivation.
As noted above, no attempt
was made to question defendant until his father was
present.
Mr. Jackson was contacted as soon as
possible, arriving at the post a short time after
his son. Both of them were given Miranda warnings
and the defendant made his statement. As noted by
the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that the father was not fully
able to exercise his free will and protect the
rights and interests of his son.
Under the
4
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d
694 (1966).
4
circumstances, the Court finds that any taint of
initial police misconduct was sufficiently purged
and the statement admissible under the Fourth
Amendment. It follows that any neglect of trial or
appellate counsel in failing to raise this issue
was of no consequence. For the same reasons, it
also follows that any consent obtained from the
defendant and his father to search the premises in
question was voluntary and otherwise proper, and
that any evidence seized as the result of that
consensual search was properly admitted at trial.
The court then turned to the other issue raised in the
motion regarding the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction.
The circuit court said that from the motion and supporting
brief it could not say that the issue raised was without merit
and
that
defendant
was
plainly
not
entitled
to
relief.
Accordingly, the court ordered the prosecutor to respond to
the motion.
Following the response, the court issued a second
opinion and order on May 28, 1999, rejecting the defendant’s
claim.
After
reviewing
the
testimony,
as
well
as
applicable legal principles, the court concluded:
Having reviewed the testimony presented, this
Court is not left with any firm and definite
conviction defendant was improperly waived to the
adult system.
Although there was sufficient
indication that Michael was amenable to treatment
and that the juvenile system could provide the type
of treatment required, the evidence and testimony
clearly supports the conclusion that there simply
was not enough time to sufficiently resolve the
underlying psychological problems that helped
trigger this tragic event before Michael reached
nineteen and juvenile jurisdiction ended, and that
he would likely remain a danger to the public if
released at that time. Nor does the Court find, as
suggested by defendant, that the Probate Judge
ignored key testimony or otherwise misinterpreted
the evidence. In this regard, the Court notes that
while Michael could have been placed in Yorkwood
5
the
and then transferred to the adult unit at Ypsilanti
State Hospital at age eighteen, there would be no
way to ensure continued treatment after age
nineteen except through a petition for involuntary
commitment and hospitalization.
Although Judge
Barber made no mention of Yorkwood in his opinion,
he apparently found, and this Court agrees, that
the scenario envisioned by defendant was neither
likely [n]or viable. In summary, the Court finds
the decision to waive jurisdiction to be supported
by substantial and credible evidence on the record.
It follows that any claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel must also fall.
Defendant
appeal.
filed
a
delayed
application
for
leave
to
The Court of Appeals denied the application, “for
failure to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to
relief under MCR 6.508.”5
II
Subchapter 6.500 of the Michigan Court Rules, containing
the procedure for motions for relief from judgment, was added
by order of March 30, 1989, and was effective October 1, 1989.
It was part of an overall revision of the rules governing
criminal procedure.
The amendments adopted at that time
included several related provisions applicable to criminal
appeals, including the addition of MCR 7.205(F)(2), limiting
a criminal defendant to a single appeal by right or leave from
a conviction, and the amendment of MCR 7.205(F)(3) to make the
eighteen-month limit6 on granting delayed application for
leave to appeal applicable to criminal cases.
5
Unpublished order, entered July 18, 2000 (Docket No.
225416).
6
Since shortened to twelve months.
6
The rules themselves, and the order adopting them, did
not say anything about the applicability of the rules to cases
that had already been commenced or cases involving crimes
committed before the effective date of the amendments.
The
general provision of the Michigan Court Rules regarding the
application of the rules to pending actions is MCR 1.102,
which provides:
These rules take effect on March 1, 1985.
They govern all proceedings in actions brought on
or after that date, and all further proceedings in
actions then pending. A court may permit a pending
action to proceed under the former rules if it
finds that the application of these rules to that
action would not be feasible or would work
injustice.
Those principles have been applied not only to the
initial adoption of the rules, but also to later adopted or
amended rules.
See Reitmeyer v Schultz Equipment & Parts Co,
237 Mich App 332, 337; 602 NW2d 596 (1999).
Subchapter 6.500
has been consistently applied in cases involving convictions
and appeals concluded before October 1, 1989, by both this
Court and the Court of Appeals.
See, e.g., People v Reed, 449
Mich 375; 535 NW2d 496 (1995); People v Carpentier, 446 Mich
19; 521 NW2d 195 (1994); People v Ross, 242 Mich App 241; 618
NW2d 774 (2000); People v Watroba, 193 Mich App 124; 483 NW2d
441 (1992).7
7
In addition, we have cited MCR 6.508 in numerous orders
denying leave to appeal from denial of motions for relief from
judgment. E.g., People v Davis, 440 Mich 866; 486 NW2d 722
(1992); People v Dunham-Bey, 441 Mich 855; 489 NW2d 766
(1992); People v Yousif, 444 Mich 878; 511 NW2d 683 (1993);
People v Selby, 452 Mich 874; 552 NW2d 176 (1996).
7
III
MCR
6.508(D)
provides
the
standards
for
determining
whether a defendant is entitled to relief:
(D) Entitlement to Relief. The defendant has
the burden of establishing entitlement to the
relief requested. The court may not grant relief
to the defendant if the motion
(1) seeks relief from a judgment of conviction
and sentence that still is subject to challenge on
appeal pursuant to subchapter 7.200 or subchapter
7.300;
(2) alleges grounds for relief which were
decided against the defendant in a prior appeal or
proceeding under this subchapter, unless the
defendant establishes that a retroactive change in
the law has undermined the prior decision;
(3) alleges grounds for relief, other than
jurisdictional defects, which could have been
raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence
or in a prior motion under this subchapter, unless
the defendant demonstrates
(a) good cause for failure to raise such
grounds on appeal or in the prior motion, and
(b)
actual
prejudice
from
the
alleged
irregularities that support the claim for relief.
As used in this subrule, "actual prejudice" means
that,
(i) in a conviction following a trial, but for
the alleged error, the defendant would have had a
reasonably likely chance of acquittal;
(ii) in a conviction entered on a plea of
guilty,
guilty
but
mentally
ill,
or
nolo
contendere, the defect in the proceedings was such
that it renders the plea an involuntary one to a
degree that it would be manifestly unjust to allow
the conviction to stand;
(iii) in any case, the irregularity was so
offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial
process that the conviction should not be allowed
to stand regardless of its effect on the outcome of
the case;
8
(iv) in the case of a challenge
sentence, the sentence is invalid.
to
the
The
court
may
waive
the
"good
cause"
requirement of subrule (D)(3)(a) if it concludes
that there is a significant possibility that the
defendant is innocent of the crime.
The requirements of showing good cause for failure to
raise the issue on direct appeal and prejudice from the
alleged error to entitle a defendant to relief are derived
from United State Supreme Court decisions involving federal
habeas corpus challenges to state convictions and collateral
review of federal ones.
See Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72; 97
S Ct 2497; 53 L Ed 2d 594 (1977); United States v Frady, 456
US 152; 102 S Ct 1584; 71 L Ed 2d 816 (1982); Davis v
United States, 411 US 233; 93 S Ct 1577; 36 L Ed 2d 216
(1973). The provision of subrule (D)(2) regarding issues that
were decided against the defendant in a prior appeal state
familiar principles drawn from the doctrines of res judicata
and law of the case.
Before the adoption of subchapter 6.500 and the related
appellate procedure provisions, our rules were silent on the
matter of delayed motions for new trial.
We had said that the
courts do not look with favor on such long delayed motions,
People v Barrows, 358 Mich 267, 272; 99 NW2d 347 (1959), but
there was no bar to repeated filings of such motions without
any limitation period.
Id., p 273; Reed, supra at 388.8
8
We reiterate the principle stated in Barrows that long
delayed
motions
seeking
relief
from
convictions
are
disfavored. See People v Ward, 459 Mich 602, 611-614; 594
NW2d 47 (1999).
9
IV
The defendant makes no claim that on their face the
provisions of subrule (D)(3) are unconstitutional.
Such a
claim would be futile in light of the United States Supreme
Court’s recognition of those standards. Rather, the defendant
argues that it constitutes a denial of due process to apply
MCR 6.508 to him, because his crime, conviction, and direct
appeal occurred before the effective date of the rule.
He
relies principally on Rogers v Howes, 144 F3d 990 (CA 6,
1998).
Rogers was a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 USC 2254.
The defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder in
1965.
In 1992, he filed a motion for relief from judgment,
which the trial court denied on the ground that the defendant
failed to raise the claims on direct appeal and did not
establish good cause for the failure to do so.
The defendant
filed a habeas corpus petition in United States District
Court,
which
held
that
because
the
issues
raised
were
procedurally defaulted under Michigan law, it could not review
the claims.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for
the
Circuit
Sixth
6.508(D)(3)
procedure
reversed,
was
not
concluding
“a
firmly
that
the
established
MCR
and
regularly followed rule of the Michigan courts at the time of
petitioner’s conviction . . . .”
Id. at 995.
Thus, it did
not constitute “an adequate and independent state ground”
barring review of petitioner’s habeas petition in federal
10
court.
Id.
Defendant’s reliance on Rogers is misplaced.
not
hold
that
the
defendant
is
denied
due
application of MCR 6.508(D)(3) to his motion.
Rogers did
process
by
Rather, Rogers
must be understood in the context of federal habeas corpus
review of state court convictions.
The federal courts will
not review a habeas corpus petition where the state prisoner
has not first presented his federal claims to the state courts
and exhausted all state court remedies available.
Rust v Zent, 17 F3d 155, 160 (CA 6, 1994).
See, e.g.,
Further, when a
habeas corpus petitioner is denied the opportunity to present
a federal claim in state court because of failure to comply
with state procedural rules, that decision may preclude habeas
corpus review where the state procedural rule constitutes an
“independent and adequate state procedural ground” for the
decision.
Wainwright, supra at 87.
Under federal law, a
procedural bar does not operate to preclude federal habeas
corpus review unless it is (1) independent of the federal
claim at issue, (2) serves as an adequate basis for barring
review,
and
(3)
was
“firmly
established
and
regularly
followed” at the time to which the rule is to be applied.
See
Ford v Georgia, 498 US 411, 424; 111 S Ct 850; 112 L Ed 2d 935
(1991). In Rogers, the Sixth Circuit concluded that MCR 6.508
was not such a firmly established and regularly followed rule
at the time of the petitioner’s conviction and appeal, and
11
thus the federal court was not barred from considering the
habeas corpus petition.
Thus, viewed in context, Rogers does not constitute
authority that Michigan courts may not apply MCR 6.508(D)
retroactively, but only that our decision to do so will not
restrict the federal courts in exercise of their authority
under 28 USC 2254.
V
That
leaves
the
question
whether
application
of
MCR subchapter 6.500 to the defendant’s conviction denies due
process.
The principles are similar to those regarding
retroactive application of statutes that are alleged to impair
vested rights.
In general, an act relating to remedies or
modes of procedure may be given retroactive effect.
said
in
In
re
Certified
Questions
(Karl
v
As we
Bryant
Air
Conditioning Co), 416 Mich 558, 572; 331 NW2d 456 (1982):
[R]etrospective application of a law is
improper where the law “takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or
attaches
a
new
disability
with
respect
to
transactions or considerations already past”.
Hughes [v Judges’ Retirement Bd, 407 Mich 75, 85;
282 NW2d 160 (1979)].
“Statutes related to remedies or modes of
procedure which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of a
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing
will, in the absence of language clearly showing a
contrary
intention,
be
held
to
operate
retrospectively and apply to all actions accrued,
pending or future, there being no vested right to
keep a statutory procedural law unchanged and free
12
from amendment.”
[Quoting Hansen-Snyder Co v
General Motors Corp, 371 Mich 480; 124 NW2d 286
(1963) (headnote no. 1).]
See also Romein v General Motors Corp, 436 Mich 515, 531;
462 NW2d 555 (1990), aff’d 503 US 181; 112 S Ct 1105; 117 L Ed
2d 328 (1992).
On the related question whether retroactive procedural
statutes violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post
facto laws, we have explained that not every enactment that
works
to
violation.
the
detriment
of
a
party
constitutes
such
a
See People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 592-593; 487
NW2d 698 (1992):
The
United
States
Supreme
Court
has
consistently held that the Ex Post Facto Clause, US
Const, art I, § 10, cl 1, was intended to secure
substantial personal rights against arbitrary and
oppressive
legislation,
and
not
to
limit
legislative control of remedies and procedure that
do not affect matters of substance. In Dobbert v
Florida, 432 US 282, 292-293; 97 S Ct 2290; 53
L Ed 2d 344 (1977), the Court stated:
“It is settled, by decisions of this Court so
well known that their citation may be dispensed
with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an
act previously committed, which was innocent when
done; which makes more burdensome the punishment
for a crime, after its commission, or which
deprives one charged with crime of any defense
available according to law at the time when the act
was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.
* * *
“Even though it may work to the disadvantage
of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post
facto. For example, in Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574 [4
S Ct 202; 28 L Ed 262] (1884), as of the date of
the alleged homicide a convicted felon could not
have been called as a witness. Subsequent to that
date, but prior to the trial of the case, this law
was changed; a convicted felon was called to the
13
stand and testified, implicating Hopt in the crime
charged against him.
Even though this change in
the law obviously had a detrimental impact upon the
defendant, the Court found that the law was not ex
post facto because it neither made criminal a
theretofore innocent act, nor aggravated a crime
previously
committed,
nor
provided
greater
punishment, nor changed the proof necessary to
convict. Id. at 589.”
An enactment will not escape a court’s
scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto Clause merely
because a legislature has given it a procedural
label.
However, legislation will not be found
violative of the clause simply because it works to
the disadvantage of the defendant.[9]
We can discern no theory upon which the defendant can be
said
to
have
thereof—for
a
vested
bringing
right
long
convictions
extant
MCR
6.500.
subchapter
in
delayed
before
In
1989,
the
procedures—or
challenges
the
the
to
criminal
adoption
defendant
lack
had
of
been
convicted, that judgment had been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and we denied leave to appeal.
At that point, the
judgment was final. The defendant had no due process or other
constitutional right to further review of his convictions.
See Pennsylvania v Finley, 481 US 551, 556-557; 107 S Ct 1990;
95 L Ed 2d 539 (1987); McKane v Durston, 153 US 684, 687-688;
14 S Ct 913; 38 L Ed 867 (1894).
There being no vested right
in such procedures, there is no due process impediment to
subjecting
the
defendant
to
the
new
subchapter
6.500
procedure.
9
For a similar analysis of the retroactive effect of the
new federal limits on habeas corpus relief, see Libby v
Magnusson, 177 F3d 43, 46-47 (CA 1, 1999).
14
The federal courts have faced similar questions regarding
the limitations on second or successive petitions recently
adopted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act.
PL 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996).
Those
restrictions have been applied even where the petitioner’s
first petition preceded the effective date of the statute.
See, e.g., Pratt v United States, 129 F3d 54, 58 (CA 1, 1997):
The filing dates of Pratt’s two section 2255
petitions straddle AEDPA’s effective date. On this
basis, Pratt maintains that the question whether
the statute applies to his second petition must be
answered in the negative because doing so would
place an impermissible retroactive burden on his
petition. We disagree.
We begin our analysis by remarking the
obvious: applying a statute to a pleading that was
filed after the statute’s effective date is not
really a “retroactive” application in the classic
sense.
Here, moreover, we know on the best of
authority that Congress intended that AEDPA apply
to all section 2255 petitions filed after its
effective date (April 24, 1996).
See Lindh v
Murphy, 521 US 320, 325-326; 117 S Ct 2059; 138 L
Ed 2d 481 (1997).
We know, too, that the Supreme Court recently
and uncritically applied AEDPA to a prisoner’s
second habeas petition even though the prisoner had
filed
his
first
petition
prior
to
AEDPA’s
enactment. See Felker [v Turpin, 518 US 651, 656
657; 116 S Ct 2333; 135 L Ed 2d 827 (1996)].
Several courts of appeals have followed suit. See,
e.g., In re Medina, 109 F3d 1556, 1561-62 (CA 11,
1997); Roldan v United States, 96 F3d 1013, 1014
(CA 7, 1996); Hatch v Oklahoma, 92 F3d 1012, 1014
(CA 10, 1996).
This approach is sound not only
from a legal perspective but also from the
standpoint of common sense.
After all, if
pre-AEDPA jurisprudence somehow attached to an
entire course of post-conviction proceedings by
virtue of a prisoner’s having filed a pre-enactment
petition at some point along the way, then the
Court’s opinion in Felker would be drained of all
meaning.
15
VI
Defendant
also
maintains
that,
concerning
his
claim
regarding improper waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile
division of the probate court, he is not required to show good
cause for failure to raise the matter on appeal or actual
prejudice.
MCR 6.508(D)(3) expressly excepts “jurisdictional
defects.”
He maintains that the circuit court never properly
obtained subject matter jurisdiction, entitling him to review
of the issue.
Regardless of whether this claim is a jurisdictional one
within the meaning of MCR 6.508(D)(3), the defendant is not
entitled
to
relief.
Pursuant
to
MCR
6.508(D),
"[t]he
defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to the
relief
requested."
The
circuit
judge’s
second
opinion
discussed the merits of the juvenile court waiver issue and
found it to be without merit.
Accordingly, the defendant
failed to establish his entitlement to relief.
Thus, the
defendant has not been deprived of review of that issue by the
operation of subrule (D)(3).10
VII
In addition to his arguments regarding the applicability
of MCR 6.508, the defendant argues that he had shown good
10
Nor does the Court of Appeals citation of the court
rule indicate otherwise.
The Court of Appeals cited
MCR 6.508(D), of which subrule (3) is only a part. The Court
of Appeals order cited the rule in the context of its
statement that the defendant had not met his burden, and did
not refer to this as a failure to establish good cause or
prejudice.
16
cause for failing to raise the issues in his appeal of right
because of prior counsel’s ineffectiveness in dismissing the
juvenile waiver appeal and in failing to raise the police
violation of JCR 3.3.
As noted earlier, the circuit judge
carefully reviewed and discussed the merits of these claims,
finding them without merit.
This, in effect, amounts to a
determination that defendant failed to establish the prejudice
aspect
of
the
MCR
6.508(D)(3)
standard.
That
made
it
unnecessary for the court to address the good cause question.
See Reed, supra at 400-401.
We find no error in the judge’s analysis of the prejudice
question and therefore affirm.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
17
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