PEOPLE OF MI V FREDERICK G ATTEBURY JR
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 24, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No.
115225
FREDERICK G. ATTEBURY, JR.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CORRIGAN, C.J.
We granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to
appeal
to
consider
the
propriety
of
the
trial
court’s
application of the “public safety” exception to Miranda v
Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
Because we conclude that the circumstances of this case fall
within the rule of New York v Quarles, 467 US 649; 104 S Ct
2626; 81 L Ed 2d 550 (1984), we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial
court.
I. FACTUAL
AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 19, 1996, defendant approached his estranged
wife in a shopping center parking lot in Marysville and
threatened to shoot her.
After explaining that he had a gun,
defendant ordered his wife into the driver’s seat of her car.
He then displayed a handgun he had tucked into his pants and
forced his way into the back seat of her car before his wife
could drive away. Fearing for her life, defendant’s wife fled
on foot to a nearby video store and promptly called the
police.
When the police arrived minutes later, defendant had
left the area.
Defendant’s
wife
filed
a
complaint
and
the
police
obtained a warrant for defendant’s arrest on a charge of
assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277.
Two
days after the incident in the parking lot, three police
officers went to defendant’s apartment to execute the warrant
for his arrest.
In addition to information in the arrest
warrant regarding the nature of the alleged offense, the
officers knew that defendant had recently been treated for
mental problems at a local hospital.
Officer Larry West
testified as follows at defendant’s suppression hearing:
2
We knew that prior to this incident taking
place on or about the 18th, which would have been
the night before the alleged assault, there was a
broadcast put on the police radio with Mr.
Attebury’s
name
attached
to
it,
that
the
psychiatrist had alerted the police he was
homicidal at that point or had homicidal thoughts.
Using a key provided by the landlord, the officers
entered defendant’s apartment without knocking.
Once inside
the apartment, they discovered that defendant was taking a
shower.
Officer
West
described
the
officers’
initial
interaction with defendant:
Q. Tell the Judge briefly what transpired in
or around the bathroom area of the shower.
A. After we entered the home, it was to our
left. I knocked on the door, advised him who we
were, why we were there. He was given permission
to continue his shower.
After he finished he went to get dressed. We
showed him the warrant.
While he was getting
dressed, because he was going in and out of a
dresser and what not, we asked him whether there
were weapons in the home.
He said that there
wasn’t.
Q. Did he tell you—what are the things that
he told you with regard to questions you asked him
about the weapon?
Tell the Judge what the
questions were and what his answers were?
A. Whether there were weapons in the home, he
said not at this time. And we asked him because
there was a weapon indicated in the warrant if he
had that weapon there or where it was at.
He
indicated to me at that time he had taken it to his
brother’s house.
Q. And did you later locate a weapon at the
brother’s house?
3
A.
Yes, we did.
Q. Were it not for his statement to you as to
the location of that weapon, do you think you would
have tracked it down, it being at the brother’s
house by other means?
A.
That would have been doubtful.
Q. Okay. Did you know before asking the
question about the weapon whether he had the weapon
in the home or what he had done with the weapon?
A. No. We had no idea where the weapon was
at that time.
Q. What was your concerns [sic] with regard
to that weapon? What concerns?
A. The fact of not knowing Mr. Attebury. Not
knowing him. There were three police officers in
his room.
We are certain that he allegedly
threatened to kill one person and he would have
access to a weapon. We didn’t know where one was,
if he had thrown it in the ditch or river, if he
had it stashed somewhere in his home, if he had a
person who was hiding when he heard us come in, any
of those scenarios that have come up.
It is undisputed that the police did not advise defendant of
his Miranda rights before asking about the gun.
When the
officers later informed defendant of his rights, defendant
again explained that he had given the gun to his brother.
Faced with the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon,
MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277, defendant moved to suppress his
initial statement to the police and the gun on the ground that
his
federal
constitutional
rights
had
been
violated.
Defendant argued that his statement regarding the whereabouts
4
of the gun was unlawfully obtained in violation of the Miranda
rule, and that the gun itself was the “fruit of the poisonous
tree,” see Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 488; 83 S Ct
407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).
After an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied defendant’s motion on the ground that the
facts fell within the public safety exception set forth in
Quarles.
At trial, Officer West testified specifically about
defendant’s statement in the apartment regarding the location
of the gun described in the arrest warrant.
A jury convicted
defendant as charged and the trial court sentenced him to a
two-year term of probation.
The
Court
of
Appeals,
over
a
dissent,
reversed
defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.1
The
majority concluded that the facts of this case were “markedly
and significantly different” from the situation in Quarles,
because the police were “not confronted with an immediate
threat
to
circumstances
the
public.”
under
which
Given
the
the
police
“unthreatening”
first
encountered
defendant and the fact that the police had no “indication that
the gun was located in a place where it was endangering the
public,” the majority reasoned that “the police were not
confronted with a situation where they had to make a split
1
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 13, 1999,
reh den June 21, 1999 (Docket No. 197053).
5
second
decision
between
giving
Miranda
warnings
and
neutralizing a volatile danger to public safety.” Rather,“the
questioning of defendant was clearly investigatory and did not
relate in any way to an objectively reasonable concern for
public safety.”
Accordingly, the majority concluded that the
“type of exigent circumstances that justify application of the
narrowly tailored public safety exception to the Miranda rule
were not present in the case at hand.”
The majority ruled
that the defendant’s statement should have been suppressed
because it was obtained in violation of the Miranda rule, and
that the gun should have been suppressed “given that its
discovery was the illegal fruit of the Miranda violation.”
In the dissenting judge’s view, the circumstances of the
case,
including
the
nature
of
the
alleged
offense
and
defendant’s homicidal tendencies, gave the arresting officer
“an objectively reasonable justification to question defendant
regarding
the
whereabouts
of
the
gun
defendant regarding his Miranda rights.”
before
instructing
In particular, he
opined that “while one might question the wisdom of the
officer’s decision to grant defendant the liberty to dress
himself
officer’s
without
restraint,
question,
e.g.,
the
the
exigency
safety
of
justifying
the
the
arresting
officers, was nonetheless present when the officer questioned
defendant regarding the location of the gun that was used to
6
commit the crime named in the warrant.” The dissent concluded
that “under the circumstances of this case, the questions
posed to defendant by the arresting officer were reasonably
prompted by a concern for the safety of the officers, and
therefore, the questions come within the exception to the
Miranda rule recognized in Quarles.”
The dissenting judge
would have affirmed.
II. STANDARD
OF
REVIEW
We review a trial court's factual findings in a ruling on
a motion to suppress for clear error.
To the extent that a
trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress involves an
interpretation
of
the
law
or
the
application
of
a
constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de
novo.
See People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629-630; 614 NW2d 152
(2000); People v Stevens (After Remand), 460 Mich 626, 631;
597 NW2d 53 (1999).
III. THE MIRANDA RULE
AND THE
QUARLES PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
In its landmark Miranda decision, the United States
Supreme Court announced the general rule that the prosecution
in a criminal case may not use a statement “stemming from
custodial
interrogation
of
the
defendant
unless
it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 444.
As a basis for the rule, the Miranda Court explained that in
7
order
to
effectively
combat
the
“inherently
compelling
pressures” of custodial interrogation, an accused must be
“adequately and effectively apprised” of rights associated
with the interrogation.
Miranda,
the
described
the
United
Id. at 467.
States
required
Supreme
advice
In the years since
Court
of
rights
has
repeatedly
as
being
a
“prophylactic” measure designed to protect the exercise of an
accused’s Fifth Amendment rights.
See Dickerson v United
States, 530 US 428, ___, n 2; 120 S Ct 2326, 2333, n 2; 147 L
Ed 2d 405 (2000) (citing cases).
Although some of these
decisions, including Quarles, might have been read to suggest
that Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required,2 the
Court
has
recently
confirmed
that
“announced a constitutional rule.”
the
Miranda
decision
Dickerson, 120 S Ct 2336.
In so doing, however, it also explained that the Miranda rule
was not “immutable.”
120 S Ct 2335.
Most notably, for
purposes of this case, Dickerson described the Quarles public
safety exception as merely being a “modification” of the
Miranda rule.
Id.
Accordingly, Quarles remains “good law”
after Dickerson.
2
For instance, in Quarles, supra at 654, the Court
quoted Michigan v Tucker, 417 US 433, 444; 94 S Ct 2357; 41 L
Ed 2d 182 (1974), for the proposition that the “prophylactic”
Miranda warnings are “not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution, but [are] instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.”
8
In Quarles, a woman approached a police officer alleging
that she had just been raped by an armed man.
She described
her assailant and told the officer that the man had gone into
a nearby grocery store.
Entering the store, the officer saw
the suspect, who turned and ran toward the rear of the store.
The suspect was briefly out of the officer’s sight.
When the
officer apprehended the suspect a moment later, the officer
frisked the man and discovered that he was wearing an empty
shoulder holster. The officer then handcuffed him and—without
giving Miranda warnings—inquired about the location of the
gun.
The suspect nodded toward some cartons and said that it
was “over there.”
Subsequently, the gun was found and the
suspect was charged with criminal possession of a weapon.
The issue before the Quarles Court was whether the
officer
“was
justified
in
respondent
the
privilege
against
Miranda.”
Quarles, supra at 655.
question
in
procedural
failing
the
considerations
of
safeguards
compulsory
affirmative,
public
to
make
available
associated
with
self-incrimination
the
since
The Court answered this
concluding
safety”
to
that
justified
“overriding
the
officer’s
failure to provide Miranda warnings before asking “questions
devoted to locating the abandoned weapon.”
Id. at 651.
It
then explained that the Miranda rule does not apply “in all
its
rigor”
to
situations
involving
9
police
questions
“reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.” Id.
at 656.
In defining, more precisely, the parameters of the public
safety exception, the Court first rejected the notion that the
availability of the public safety exception should depend on
the subjective motivation of the officers involved:
In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one
confronting these officers, where spontaneity
rather than adherence to a police manual is
necessarily the order of the day, the application
of the exception which we recognize today should
not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a
suppression hearing concerning the subjective
motivation of the arresting officer. [Id. at 656.]
The Court also suggested that application of the public safety
exception was limited to situations involving an “immediate”
public safety concern.
Id. at 657, 658, n 8.
It described
the exigency faced by the arresting officers in Quarles as
follows:
So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in
the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts
unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to
the public safety: an accomplice might make use of
it, a customer or employee might later come upon
it. [Id. at 657.]
Although the Quarles Court repeatedly referred to “public
safety,”
its
use
of
the
phrase
“public
safety”
clearly
encompassed the safety of the officers as well as the general
public.
See id. at 658-659, n 8.
Finally, the Court drew a
specific distinction between questions objectively necessary
10
to secure the public safety and those with an investigatory
purpose,
explaining
that
only
the
former
application of the public safety exception.
can
trigger
Distinguishing
Quarles from its earlier decision in Orozco v Texas, 394 US
324; 89 S Ct 1095; 22 L Ed 2d 311 (1969), the Court explained:
In Orozco four hours after a murder had been
committed at a restaurant, four police officers
entered the defendant's boardinghouse and awakened
the defendant, who was sleeping in his bedroom.
Without giving him Miranda warnings, they began
vigorously to interrogate him about whether he had
been present at the scene of the shooting and
whether he owned a gun. The defendant eventually
admitted that he had been present at the scene and
directed the officers to a washing machine in the
backroom of the boardinghouse where he had hidden
the gun. We held that all the statements should
have been suppressed. In Orozco, however, the
questions about the gun were clearly investigatory;
they did not in any way relate to an objectively
reasonable need to protect the police or the public
from any immediate danger associated with the
weapon. In short there was no exigency requiring
immediate action by the officers beyond the normal
need expeditiously to solve a serious crime. [Id.
at 659, n 8 (emphasis added).]
The preceding excerpt nicely captures the relevant elements of
the Quarles public safety exception: for it to apply, the
police
inquiry
must
have
been
an
objectively
reasonable
question necessary to protect the police or the public from an
immediate danger.
IV. APPLICATION
OF THE
PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
This case presents the first occasion we have had to
apply the Quarles public safety exception to Miranda.
11
As an
initial matter, the parties agree that defendant was in
custody at the time of Officer West’s questions.
At the
suppression hearing, West testified that defendant was “in
custody” and had no right to leave.
Moreover, defendant does
not contend that his statements to the police were anything
less
than
completely
voluntary.
Defendant
voluntarily
answered the officer’s questions, knowing that the police were
in his apartment to execute a warrant for his arrest in
connection
with
the
threats
he
made
against
his
wife.
Accordingly, there was no due process violation, see Spano v
New York, 360 US 315; 79 S Ct 1202; 3 L Ed 2d 1265 (1959), and
no violation of the express language of the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination clause, see generally Oregon v Elstad, 470
US 298, 304-309; 105 S Ct 1285; 84 L Ed 2d 222 (1985); see
also
Daoud,
Amendment
supra
itself
at
637
protects
(recognizing
only
that
against
“the
compelled
Fifth
self
incrimination”).
With
respect
to
application
of
the
public
safety
exception itself, we agree with the analysis of the Court of
Appeals dissent.
limiting
The Court of Appeals majority erred by
application
of
the
public
safety
exception
to
questions necessary to protect the public other than the
police themselves.
See Quarles, supra at 658-659, n 8.
It
also erred in concluding that the situation did not pose an
12
immediate danger.
Viewed in an objective fashion as Quarles
requires, once the officers allowed defendant to dress, and
defendant began to rummage through his dresser drawers, any
reasonable person in the officers’ position would have been
concerned
for his own immediate safety.
Not only did the
officers know that the arrest warrant stemmed from an incident
in which defendant threatened his wife with a gun, but they
also knew that defendant had previously expressed homicidal
and suicidal thoughts.3
While the officers might have, in
hindsight, mitigated the exigency by physically restraining
defendant before he was allowed to dress, their failure to do
so does not alter our analysis.
exigency existed.
The fact remains that an
The logic underlying Quarles is based on
the existence, rather than the cause of, a “public safety”
exigency.
Finally, contrary to defendant’s argument, the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Orozco, supra, does not
command a different result.
There, as noted above in the
3
Compare United States v DeSantis, 870 F2d 536 (CA 9,
1989) (concluding that the exception applied where the police
questioned the defendant regarding the presence of weapons in
a bedroom of an otherwise unoccupied apartment in response to
the defendant’s request to change into clothes located in that
bedroom), with United States v Mobley, 40 F3d 688 (CA 4, 1994)
(concluding that the exception did not apply where the police
encountered the naked defendant alone in his apartment, had
performed a security sweep, and inquired regarding the
presence of weapons as they were leading the defendant away).
13
excerpt from Quarles, supra at 659, n 8, the sleeping suspect
was awakened only after being surrounded by four police
officers. He was then questioned vigorously while he remained
in bed. Under the circumstances, the officers’ questions “did
not in any way relate to an objectively reasonable need to
protect the police or the public from any immediate danger
associated with the weapon.”
Id.
Here, however, defendant
easily could have hidden the weapon in one of the dresser
drawers to which he had immediate access. Thus, as in Quarles
rather
than
Orozco,
the
officers’
initial
attempts
to
ascertain the location of the gun were directly related to an
objectively reasonable need to secure protection from the
possibility of immediate danger associated with the gun.
Moreover, the pre-Miranda questioning in the present case
related solely to neutralizing this danger. The officers only
asked about the whereabouts of the gun and not other broader
questions relating to investigation of the crime.
This case
is thus unlike Orozco, where the pre-Miranda questioning
included general investigation, such as whether the suspect
was at the scene of the crime, which was unrelated to any
immediate danger to the officers or the public.
Here, once
the officers were satisfied that defendant posed no immediate
threat of danger to them, they informed defendant of the
Miranda rights and began their general investigation. For all
14
of these reasons, the pre-Miranda questioning at issue in this
case falls squarely within the public safety exception to
Miranda.
In sum, we hold that the officers were justified in
forgoing immediate adherence to the Miranda rule, given the
exigencies of the situation in defendant’s apartment at the
time of his arrest.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err
in refusing to suppress defendant’s statement or the gun. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment
of the circuit court is reinstated.
WEAVER , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN , JJ.,
concurred
with
CORRIGAN , C.J.
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., concurred in the result only.
15
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