IN RE HON WILLIAM RUNCO
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JANUARY 17, 2001
In re HONORABLE WILLIAM J. RUNCO,
No. 116565
________________________________
PER CURIAM
The Judicial Tenure Commission has asked this Court to
enter a public censure of 19th (Dearborn) District Judge
William
J.
Runco.
We
accept
the
recommendation
of
the
commission, and we enter this opinion, which will stand as our
censure.
I
Our review of this matter is de novo.
Mich 350, 358; 582 NW2d 817 (1998).
In re Ferrara, 458
Having examined the
record and considered the arguments of the parties, we adopt
the following facts, as found by the commission:1
Gerald and Ilene Trifan were the owners of a
bowling alley in Melvindale, Michigan, which they
had acquired for $60,000 in 1984. Respondent Runco
1
As its findings of fact, the commission adopted the
facts found by the master.
Thus, the quoted material was
authored by the master.
did the legal work for the Trifans in the purchase
of the property. The building became damaged and
condemned by the City of Melvindale in 1986. The
Trifans could not afford to remove it, therefore,
the City removed it and filed a lien against the
property for the cost of the removal.
As of
November 1986, the liens against the property were
approximately $36,000.
The Trifans were interested in purchasing a
bowling alley in Allen Park, Michigan, since their
building had been destroyed, and were negotiating
for its purchase in 1986.
Mr.
Trifan engaged
Respondent Runco regarding this purchase.
The
Trifans had limited resources as a result of the
closing of the Melvindale bowling alley, their sole
source of income at that time, and needed money
from the sale of that property in order to purchase
the Allen Park bowling alley.
The Trifans had listed the Melvindale property
for sale with a multiple listing service for
$49,000. Little Caesar’s restaurant chain made a
written offer of $49,500, $500 more than the
listing agreement price. Mr. Trifan brought this
offer to Respondent Runco and asked him to review
the terms of the purchase.
Respondent Runco advised Mr. Trifan of
contingencies in the Little Caesar’s offer.
He
suggested that there were so many contingencies
that the purchaser would be able to back out
without completing the sale.
He then told Mr.
Trifan that he had a friend, Raymond Trudeau, who
had developed various properties in the area, and
that he might be interested in the Melvindale
property. Respondent Runco was aware that Trudeau
had developed a Meineke Muffler Shop on similar
property that he owned in Lincoln Park. Respondent
Runco obtained Mr. Trifan’s permission to discuss
the property with Trudeau.
The property now
consisted of seven vacant lots. Respondent Runco
did not suggest or recommend that the Trifans
either make a counteroffer to Little Caesar’s or
negotiate to remove some of the unacceptable
contingencies. Instead, he brought the property to
Mr. Trudeau’s attention.
In the first conversations with Trudeau,
Respondent Runco indicated that he would like to be
part of the developments Trudeau was working on.
He indicated his interest in becoming a partner in
the
development
of
the
Trifan’s
Melvindale
2
property. During the course of these conversations
and before the purchase of the Trifan’s property,
it was agreed between Trudeau and Respondent Runco
that they would work together on the Trifan
property, with Trudeau doing all of the developing
and investing all of the money and Respondent Runco
doing all of the legal work in the development and
sale of the property.
Trudeau agreed that they
would share the profits equally. Respondent Runco
admitted there was an agreement, but claimed it was
entered into after the sale of the Trifan’s
property on March 31, 1987. Even the disclosure of
Respondent’s interest in the sale after March 31,
1987, however, would give the appearance of
impropriety.
. . . Mr. Trudeau testified more credibly in
this regard. Unlike Respondent Runco, Mr. Trudeau
had no apparent motive to provide false testimony.
Memoranda was [sic] presented which indicated
payments to Respondent Runco as a “finders fee.”
The Trifans received no information about this
informal partnership before or after the sale.
Respondent Runco, on several occasions, indicated
to Trudeau that his financial interest in this
property should not be disclosed to anyone. As a
result, Trudeau did not disclose this to anyone
except his wife, who was a partner in their
development partnership known as VI Properties, and
Joe Guido, a business associate.
Trudeau and
Respondent Runco obtained the zoning variance to
permit the construction of an oil lube and muffler
business on the Melvindale property before the
purchase of the property.
Trudeau, on behalf of the Trudeau/Runco
partnership, made an offer of $46,000, which was
accepted by the Trifans and the deal was closed on
March 31, 1987, the same day that the Trifans
closed on the purchase of the Allen Park property.
The deal was closed in Respondent Runco’s office.
In
November
of
1987,
Trudeau
was
“flabbergasted” when he received an offer for
$133,000 for four of the seven lots as a site to
build a Jiffy Lube.
After negotiation, the
property was sold for that amount. The transaction
closed on January 19, 1988, and Trudeau and
Respondent Runco shared the profits equally.
Shortly thereafter, the remaining three lots were
sold for $20,000. The two partners, again, shared
the profits equally. Respondent Runco admitted on
the witness stand that he received a total on the
3
two sales of $41,000 and deposited those sums in
his brokerage account. At no time did Respondent
Runco or Trudeau ever advise the Trifans of the
secret partnership between them.
Respondent
Runco’s
attorneys
tried
to
introduce many irrelevant facts regarding Mrs.
Runco’s campaign for a State Senate seat. During
this campaign, certain Dearborn businessmen had
circulated derogatory statements about Mrs. Runco.
Trudeau was never found to have participated in nor
been responsible for any activity in this regard.
This
testimony,
therefore,
did
not
impeach
Trudeau’s credibility.
Near
offered
a
the
end
of
concluding
its
recommendation,
paragraph
that
well
the
commission
summarizes
misconduct involved in this case:
The Commission would further state that the
Master, who heard the testimony and observed the
witnesses, was in a better position to determine
the credibility of the witnesses and that he
rejected Respondent’s version of the facts.
However, even if Respondent’s version of the facts
were accepted as true, Respondent would still be
guilty of professional misconduct.
Respondent’s
actions, as an attorney, created a breach of his
fiduciary duty to his clients, the Trifans.
Further,
Respondent’s
actions
constituted
a
conflict of interest, or at least the appearance of
same relative to his clients, the Trifans. This is
not
a
situation
where
Respondent
acquired
information
about
his
clients’
property
independently, after the fact, and subsequently
acquired an interest in it pursuant to some
business arrangement with an unrelated third party.
Instead, Respondent acquired information from his
clients while he was representing them; he
introduced the purchaser to his clients and
essentially
brokered
the
deal.
Without
Respondent’s involvement, there is no likelihood
whatsoever that this transaction would have been
consummated. Almost immediately thereafter, under
Respondent’s version, he became involved in a
business relationship with his handpicked purchaser
and acquired an interest in the property, which
translated very quickly into a substantial profit.
Given Respondent’s role in the initial transaction,
and
the
proximity
in
time
between
his
representation of the Trifans and his business
4
the
arrangement involving the property, accepting his
version of the sequence of events, he should have
been put on notice that his actions constituted
self-dealing or the appearance of self-dealing and
monetary benefit at the expense of his clients.
The commission also found that Judge Runco committed
judicial misconduct by failing to file a timely answer to the
formal complaint:
Respondent failed to file an answer to the
Formal Complaint containing a full and fair
disclosure
of
all
facts
and
circumstances
pertaining to the alleged misconduct, as required
by MCR 9.209(A), and failed to comply with a
Commission Order requiring that he “file and serve
his answer to the Formal Complaint on or before the
close of business on January 8, 1999,” despite a
warning from the Master that he would be in default
if he failed to comply.[2]
Throughout the pendency of this matter, the parties have
disputed whether this matter should be dismissed on the basis
of laches, or some similar theory.3
On this record, we are
2
The formal complaint was filed on November 23, 1998.
In response, Judge Runco filed on December 7, 1998, a document
entitled “Answer to Complaint,” but which specifically stated
that “Respondent is not at this time filing an Answer to the
Formal Complaint as contemplated by MCR 9.209.”
Instead,
Judge Runco filed a complaint for mandamus under MCR 7.304(A),
seeking to have this Court exercise superintending control
over the Judicial Tenure Commission and dismiss the formal
complaint in part on the basis of laches. As the commission
noted in its opinion, Judge Runco also ignored a December 15,
1998, order directing him to file an answer.
Even assuming without deciding that the filing of the
complaint for mandamus tolled the fourteen-day period in which
Judge Runco’s answer was due under MCR 9.209(A), Judge Runco
still did not file an answer until July 26, 1999, more than
two months after this Court dismissed his complaint and lifted
the stay of proceedings that had been entered.
3
In
response
to
Judge
Runco’s
complaint
for
superintending control, we directed the parties in March 1999
to brief “the questions whether (a) a formal complaint may be
defended on a ground in the nature of a statute of
5
satisfied that, even if such a defense were available in this
case (a question we do not decide), there would be no basis
for its application here.
As the commission observed, the
heart of this dispute concerns the timing of the agreement
between Judge Runco and Mr. Trudeau.
Each testified at
length, and we accept the commission's determination that the
materials that had become unavailable over time did not
include any that were necessary for resolution of the central
issues.
The
commission
found
that
a
public
censure
was
an
appropriate sanction in this case:4
In considering what sanction to recommend to
the Supreme Court, the Commission notes that
Respondent committed the acts underlying Formal
Complaint No. 61 over 12 years ago, when he was a
fairly young, inexperienced attorney, and the book
has yet to be closed as Respondent's former client
has a pending civil action for money damages.
Furthermore, there is no record of any disciplinary
limitations, (b) whether such a defense, if accepted, should
be developed as a court rule, or as an application of laches
or due process, or in some other manner, (c) whether such a
defense, if accepted, should include a tolling or discovery
provision, and (d) how such a defense, if accepted, pertains
to the present case.” 590 NW2d 288 (1999). After hearing
oral argument, we entered an order that provided:
Counsel for the Judicial Tenure Commission
having
represented
at
oral
argument
that,
consistent with MCR 9.205(E), the commission must
consider all circumstances, including equitable
defenses, in deciding whether to take action, and
further that the master is authorized to recommend
dismissal at any time during the proceedings, the
complaint for superintending control is dismissed.
[459 Mich 1251 (1999).]
4
Three members of the commission dissented in part,
urging this Court to impose a thirty-day suspension without
pay.
6
action against Respondent as a judge, a position he
held for eight years prior to this proceeding.
We agree with the commission’s finding that Judge Runco
committed misconduct in violation of Const 1963, art 6, § 30,
and MCR 9.205(E) by engaging in self-dealing contrary to the
interests of his clients, and that Judge Runco’s failure to
file a timely answer to the formal complaint constitutes
additional grounds for discipline.
MCR 9.209(A).
agree that a public censure is warranted.
We further
Accordingly, for
these reasons, we publicly censure the Honorable William J.
Runco,
Judge
of
the
19th
District
Court.
This
written
judgment will stand as our censure.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN ,
JJ., concurred.
7
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
IN re HONORABLE WILLIAM J. RUNCO,
No. 116565
___________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the findings of fact and conclusions of law
in the per curiam opinion, but dissent from the sanction
imposed.
dissenting
I would impose the sanction recommended by the
opinion
of
the
Judicial
thirty-day suspension without pay.
Tenure
Commission,
a
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