PEOPLE OF MI V KENYATTA LAJUAN DANIELS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283162
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-011262-FC
KENYATTA LAJUAN DANIELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, felon
in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and the misdemeanor of entering without owner’s
consent, MCL 750.115(1). Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Myeisha Mobley had taken a gun away from Elijah Whitehead, and he came to her home
to retrieve it. He was intercepted by Mobley’s stepmother, Grace Williams, who was talking to
him on the porch when defendant began approaching. Both Mobley and Williams testified that
defendant was holding a gun, but that they did not see Whitehead holding a gun. Williams said
defendant forced his way into her vestibule, pointed the gun at her head, demanded the other gun
and his “stuff”, and threatened to shoot her, everybody in the house, and her dogs. Williams said
that when defendant took a step back onto the porch, she slammed the door. She then heard
gunshots. There was a hole in the door and a bullet hole in a wall adjoining a bedroom. A bullet
was found in the bedroom and a casing was found in the living room.
Defendant, in essence, testified that Whitehead had entered the home and argued with
Mobley. He claimed Whitehead fired the shot. Gun residue was found on defendant, but he
claimed he was near Whitehead when the shot was fired.
Defendant avers that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. However, he made no
objections to the challenged comments. Thus, review is precluded unless an objection could not
have cured any error or a failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.
Review is for outcome-determinative, plain error, i.e., the conviction of an actually innocent
-1-
defendant1 or error that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceeding. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 234-235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
Reversal is not required if a curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect;
most inappropriate prosecutorial statements can be cured. Id. at 235.
In closing, the prosecutor referred to the evidence that Whitehead fired the shot as the
“throwing the kitchen sink” theory. The prosecutor also stated that defense counsel was
attempting to “confuse” the real issue, defendant’s guilt or innocence, by raising arguments
between Mobley and Whitehead and showing that Williams did not like Whitehead. Defendant
asserts that these arguments denigrated defense counsel and shifted the focus from the evidence,
diminishing the presumption of innocence.
In Unger, supra at 236, this Court stated
Prosecutors are typically afforded great latitude regarding their arguments and
conduct at trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
They are generally free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from
the evidence as it relates to their theory of the case. Id. However, “[a] prosecutor
may not suggest that defense counsel is intentionally attempting to mislead the
jury.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 592; 629 NW2d 411 (2001); see also
People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 569, 580; 419 NW2d 609 (1988).
The prosecutor may not question defense counsel’s veracity. When the
prosecutor argues that the defense counsel himself is intentionally trying to
mislead the jury, he is in effect stating that defense counsel does not believe his
own client. This argument undermines the defendant’s presumption of innocence.
Such an argument impermissibly shifts the focus from the evidence itself to the
defense counsel’s personality. [People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 101-102; 351
NW2d 255 (1984) (internal citations omitted).]
This case involved a credibility contest. In referring to the “kitchen sink”, the prosecutor
was arguing that defendant’s version of events was not credible. The prosecutor was not
denigrating defense counsel, but was characterizing the defense as untrustworthy. This was
consistent with vigorous advocacy; it did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.
We find no misconduct regarding comments that defense counsel was attempting to
confuse the real issue, defendant’s guilt or innocence, by bringing up arguments between Mobley
and Whitehead and evidence that Williams did not like Whitehead. The prosecutor was arguing
that defense counsel was trying to shift the focus away from the determination of defendant’s
guilt by focusing on issues pertaining to Whitehead and other individuals. It was within the wide
latitude afforded the prosecutor to ask the jury to focus on the main determination at hand.
1
We note that defendant was acquitted of assault with intent to murder, first-degree home
invasion, and felony firearm. However, if there were prosecutorial misconduct, his convictions
on the less serious offenses theoretically could have been averted.
-2-
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly painted Williams as noble. In
recapping what happened, the prosecutor stated that although Williams feared for her life, her
motherly instinct” led her to protect her children by telling them to get upstairs. This was a fairly
innocuous comment and nothing of consequence was interjected into the proceedings. Any
concern posed by this comment could have been cured by an instruction.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor vouched for Williams’s credibility when he said,
“Grace Williams knows what she saw. She saw wood chips fly into that door, that’s the bullet
going through. She sees that.” Defendant also points to the prosecutor’s comments suggesting
that Williams would have embellished her testimony if she were inclined to lie. The prosecutor
also asked the jury to consider whether Williams had a reason to lie, and stated she “had nothing
to lose but all to gain by telling you the truth.” Finally, the prosecutor asserted that Williams’s
testimony was consistent and stated, “not only do you believe Grace Williams because of the fact
that she testified as to the truth but the evidence.” The prosecutor then recapped the residue
evidence and noted that her testimony was corroborated by the match of the bullets with the gun.
A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness by suggesting that he has
some special knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully. Bahoda, supra at 276.
“[H]owever, the prosecutor may argue from the facts that a witness should be believed.” People
v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 630; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). The prosecution has wide latitude
in arguing the facts and reasonable inferences, and need not confine argument to the blandest
possible terms. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 112; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Here, the
prosecutor did not profess to have any special knowledge regarding the truthfulness of Williams’
testimony. Rather, he was asking the jury to judge her credibility based on consistency, the
absence of a motive to lie, and corroborating evidence. This argument was within the bounds of
proper argument.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.