JASON TEEPLE V PIONEER STATE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JASON TEEPLE,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 291159
Chippewa Circuit Court
LC No. 07-009493-NF
PIONEER STATE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Stephens, P.J., and Cavanagh and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Pioneer State Mutual Insurance Company (Pioneer) appeals as of right the trial
court’s order granting the motion for summary disposition filed by defendant State Farm
Insurance Company (State Farm) and denying Pioneer’s cross-motion for summary disposition
in this action pertaining to the availability of no-fault benefits. We affirm. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff Jason Teeple suffered a shoulder injury while riding in a car driven by John
Bowen on September 19, 2006. At the time of the accident plaintiff did not have a driver’s
license, did not own a car, and did not have automobile insurance. Bowen was insured through
Pioneer. However, when Teeple attempted to obtain personal insurance protection (PIP) benefits
from Pioneer, Pioneer raised the question of whether Teeple was domiciled with his mother,
Julie Timmer, at the time of the accident, and thus would have no-fault PIP coverage through
Timmer’s policy with State Farm. Following cross-motions for summary dispositions by State
Farm and Pioneer, the trial court determined that plaintiff was not domiciled with Timmer as of
the date of the accident.
We review the trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). In deciding a
motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court considers the documentary evidence
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submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). If the evidence fails to establish a genuine
issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Because plaintiff did not have his own insurance policy, the priority provisions in MCL
500.3114 determine whether Pioneer or State Farm is responsible for paying plaintiff PIP
benefits. MCL 500.3114 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (5), a personal
protection insurance policy described in section 3101(1) applies to accidental
bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative
of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor
vehicle accident. . . .
***
(4) Except as provided in subsections (1) to (3), a person suffering
accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident while an occupant
of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers
in the following order of priority:
(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupied.
Thus, whether plaintiff was domiciled with Timmer is the central issue to resolve the priority
question.
“Domicile [is] that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere
special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either
permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.” Henry v Henry, 362 Mich 85, 101102; 106 NW2d 570 (1960), quoting Williams v North Carolina, 325 US 226, 236; 65 S Ct 1092;
89 L Ed 1577 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). See, also, Beecher v Common Council
of Detroit, 114 Mich 228, 230-231; 72 NW 206 (1897). A person’s “existing domicile continues
until he acquires another, and, vice versa, by acquiring a new domicile he relinquishes his former
one.” Beecher, supra at 230, quoting Cooley, Taxation (2d ed, p 369). In Fowler v Auto Club Ins
Ass’n, 254 Mich App 362; 656 NW2d 856 (2002), this Court provided the following discussion
concerning deciding questions of domicile:
Generally, the determination of domicile is a question of fact. However,
where, as here, the underlying facts are not in dispute, domicile is a question of
law for the court. Goldstein v Progressive Cas Ins Co, 218 Mich App 105, 111112; 553 NW2d 353 (1996); Williams v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 202
Mich App 491, 494-495; 509 NW2d 821 (1993). Several factors should be
considered in determining domicile, and these factors should be weighed or
balanced with each other because no one factor is determinative. Univ of
Michigan Regents v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 250 Mich App 719, 730; 650 NW2d
129 (2002).
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The relevant factors in deciding whether a person is domiciled in the same
household as the insured include: (1) the subjective or declared intent of the
claimant to remain indefinitely in the insured’s household, (2) the formality of the
relationship between the claimant and the members of the household, (3) whether
the place where the claimant lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage,
or upon the same premises as the insured, and (4) the existence of another place of
lodging for the person alleging domicile. Workman v DAIIE, 404 Mich 477, 496497; 274 NW2d 373 (1979).
When considering whether a child is domiciled with the child’s parents,
other relevant indicia include: (1) whether the child continues to use the parents’
home as the child’s mailing address, (2) whether the child maintains some
possessions with the parents, (3) whether the child uses the parents’ address on
the child’s driver’s license or other documents, (4) whether a room is maintained
for the child at the parents’ home, and (5) whether the child is dependent upon the
parents for support. Goldstein, supra at 112, citing Dairyland Ins Co v AutoOwners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675, 682; 333 NW2d 322 (1983). [Id. at 364-365.]
In addition, “the place of [instant] residence is prima facie the domicile, unless there be some
motive for that residence not inconsistent with a clearly-established intention to retain a
permanent residence in another place.” Beecher, supra at 231, quoting Jacobs, Law of Domicile,
§ 378.
In this case, plaintiff was 34 years old at the time of the accident. At that time, he was
living on a state campground in a recreational vehicle with his girlfriend, Georgina White. The
pair had been living there since July of 2006. Prior to July 2006, plaintiff was living with a
friend “on and off for a year” in another trailer “down on the beach.” He had come to the area to
attend Bay Mills Community College, and to work as a construction contractor for the college
and others. Prior to that time, plaintiff was in the Ann Arbor area “for a year and a half” where
he was employed as a carpenter. Prior to that, plaintiff lived with friends, before going to
Appleton, Wisconsin for eight months to work. When asked whether he also stayed at his
mother’s home1 during this time before he went to Ann Arbor, plaintiff replied that he stayed
with her one or two weekends a month, “whenever [he] got visitation with [his] child.”
Plaintiff did not have a driver’s license; however, his Tribal ID card contained his
mother’s address, and that address continued to be where plaintiff received his mail. He stated
that he continued to keep Timmer’s address as his mailing address because she knew how to
reach him, and it was an easy place to reach her if anything important came in or if he received a
message. Plaintiff also used Timmer’s address for Friend of the Court purposes. Plaintiff stated
that the last time he had stayed with Timmer full time was 15 years ago. He used his mother’s
address for most of that time, except for three years around 1998 when he was living with his
fiancée. He testified that he was still able to use his old bedroom at Timmer’s home during his
visits. He also stored some of his belongings, including tools and off-season clothing, at the
home. When he was not using the bedroom, it was used for storage. He did not pay rent to his
1
Timmer resides in Brimley, Michigan.
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mother, but had to perform chores around the house during his visits. He stayed with his mother
after the accident for a few days, because Georgina was working and it was a comfortable place
to stay. Plaintiff stated that his mother occasionally provided him with $20. He maintained that
he had had no intent to remain in his mother’s home or reside there for many years. The
deposition testimony of Georgina White and Julie Timmer were similar to plaintiff’s. Timmer
acknowledged that plaintiff stayed with her occasionally, when he was not staying with friends.
We find that the trial court did not err when it determined that plaintiff was no longer
domiciled with Timmer. The trial court’s finding that plaintiff was a “free spirit” who moved
around a majority of the time is an accurate one.2 The fact that he maintained his mother’s
address as his mailing address appears to be a recognition that even a free spirit needs a regular
place to collect mail. His monthly return to the home to visit with his daughter also appeared to
be driven by convenience or a desire to have his mother participate in the visits. Plaintiff does
not rely on Timmer for support and has claimed to have had no intention to remain domiciled
with her. In addition, while Pioneer claims that Timmer’s home is the only permanent address
plaintiff has ever had, it ignores plaintiff’s three-year residence with his ex-fiancée in their
house. Plaintiff obviously intended to remain indefinitely at that location. Nothing in the facts
presented showed a clear intent to return his domicile to Timmer’s home afterward, or to
maintain it as such once he moved on to his next residence. As stated in Dairyland Ins Co,
“[s]torage of some of his belongings at his mother’s home, use of such home as a mailing
address, and the knowledge that he could and would return to live with her if forced to do so by
adverse circumstances, are insufficient to constitute him a member of his mother’s household.”
Id. at 684. We thus find that the circumstances do not rebut the prima facie conclusion that
plaintiff intended to reside with White indefinitely, if not permanently, at the time of the
accident.
Affirmed.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Donald S. Owens
2
Apparently, plaintiff has either not yet abandoned, or has simply embraced, the “‘floating
intentions’ [that] are typical of the recently emancipated young adult.” Dairyland Ins Co, supra
at 683-684 (quotation omitted).
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