IN RE LEITA DEPOTTEY MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of LEITA DEPOTTEY, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 290308
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 04-119044-NA
SARAH DEPOTTEY,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Shapiro, P.J., and Jansen and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(F)(1)(b), (G)(3), and (J); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 344-345; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); In re Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 42; 549
NW2d 353 (1996). Among the conditions that led to the initial adjudication were respondent’s
mental health problems and her drug and alcohol use. The evidence showed that respondent
received services through Community Mental Health (“CMH”), which referred her to Consumer
Services. Respondent will require life-long psychiatric care, occasionally has problems adjusting
her medications, and is not always prompt in seeking a medical review. She blamed her
medications for her failure to attend various meetings and two court hearings. She also used her
medication problems as an excuse to self-medicate with illegal drugs and alcohol. She requires
assistance to parent a child and would likely have trouble comprehending simple documents.
She would need at least six months to a year of additional therapy before she could step down to
case management services and potentially be a full-time parent.
Although respondent never tested positive for drugs or alcohol on the drug screens she
completed during the pendency of this case, she admittedly relapsed after completing the drug
court program, despite having spent nine months in an inpatient treatment facility.1 She failed to
1
Prior to her stay at the inpatient treatment facility in 2005-2006, she attended an inpatient
(continued…)
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complete any of the three substance abuse treatment programs she was referred to—Odyssey
House, Sacred Heart, and Catholic Charities. She spent only three days at the Odyssey House
and admitted using drugs after leaving. She attended months of counseling at Sacred Heart, but
admitted using drugs again from November 2007 until January 2008, while she was receiving
substance abuse counseling from her case manager at Consumer Services. She was not honest
with her counselor about her many missed drug screens and the reasons she left the Sacred Heart
program. She forged a sign-in sheet for NA/AA meetings from May 28 to July 1, 2007, and
failed to provide any proof of attendance after August 2008. She never appeared for the Catholic
Charities program.
Respondent enlisted her therapist’s help, and that of the grandmother, in blaming the
DHS for her failures. It is evident that respondent complies with services only when she wants
to. She also made comments to the caseworker suggesting that she was using or had used an
adulterant to ensure negative drug screens. Respondent never admitted having a drug problem,
instead claiming that she was only an alcoholic, but turned to drugs when she had problems with
her medications or was feeling depressed. Respondent’s therapist admitted that respondent
would need another six months to a year before she would be ready to step down to case
management services. By then, the child will have been in foster care for almost three years. In
light of this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the conditions that led to
the initial adjudication had not been rectified and that there was no reasonable likelihood that
they would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age, thereby justifying
termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i).
With regard to § 19b(3)(g), the evidence showed that at least twice respondent left the
child in the care of others for lengthy periods of time and relied on others to provide her with a
place to live. She even left the child with a friend for an extended period of time, knowing the
child was sick, but failed to provide a medical card, power of attorney, or any other means for
the friend to procure medical care for the child. She was reluctant to try to live on her own or to
make an attempt to work. As discussed previously, she failed to fully address her mental health
and substance abuse issues and would need at least six months to a year of additional therapy
before she could step down to case management services and be a full-time parent. The trial
court did not clearly err in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent
failed to provide proper care and that there was no reasonable expectation that she would be able
to provide proper care within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. Thus, the trial court
did not err in finding that termination was also warranted under § 19b(3)(g).
Likewise, with respect to § 19b(3)(j), given the evidence that respondent twice left the
child in the care of others for lengthy periods without making legal arrangements, that she never
obtained her own place to live and did not plan to do so, her permanent mental health issues for
which she did not consistently take her medication, and her failure to fully address her substance
abuse problem, it is reasonably likely that the child would be harmed if returned to respondent’s
care. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was also warranted under
§ 19b(3)(j).
(…continued)
alcoholism program for five weeks when she was only 18 or 19 years old and attended NA/AA
meetings in 2003 or 2004 before the minor child was born.
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Lastly, with respect to the child’s best interests, despite the mutual love and affection
between respondent and the child, the evidence showed that respondent failed to fully deal with
her mental health and substance abuse problems. Also, the child was quiet and withdrawn while
in respondent’s care, but open and bubbly while in her foster home. The child had behavior
problems while in respondent’s care in 2006. Her behavior improved after she was taken into
care, but deteriorated again when the respondent’s mother began calling and visiting. The child
had spent the majority of her life in foster care placement since her birth in May 2004 and was in
need of stability and permanence, which respondent was not able to provide. Respondent
showed no interest in becoming independent, but instead planned to live with her parents even
though her father was occasionally abusive and her mother harbored conspiracy theories, blamed
the DHS for respondent’s problems, and felt justified in following and intimidating the foster
mother. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357;
612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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