PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID JEROME KATAJA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 17, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 282953
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-213611-FH
DAVID JEROME KATAJA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Whitbeck and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(A) (person under 13); attempted CSC II, MCL
750.520c(1)(A), MCL 750.92; and furnishing alcohol to a minor, MCL 436.1701(1). We affirm.
Defendant’s first alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Whether
defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel generally presents a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246
(2002). This Court reviews de novo issues of constitutional law, but the trial court’s findings of
fact, if any, are reviewed for clear error. Id. “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and
defendant bears a heavy burden to prove otherwise.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 396;
688 NW2d 308 (2004). To demonstrate a denial of effective assistance of counsel, defendant
must show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that the “deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).
Whether defense counsel’s performance was deficient is measured against an objective standard
of reasonableness. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). “To demonstrate
prejudice, the defendant must show the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Carbin, supra at 600.
First, defendant argues that defense counsel failed to “thoroughly investigate” the
victim’s previous contacts with the police officer in charge of the case. Defendant asserts that
trial counsel’s failure resulted in a deprivation of “potentially admissible useful information
regarding the complainant’s credibility and ongoing professional relationship” with the testifying
officer. Defendant contends that defense counsel should have moved to discover any potential
police records showing the previous contacts between the officer and the victim and that any
resulting documents could have been used for impeachment and to show bias.
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“A defendant is entitled to have his counsel prepare, investigate, and present all
substantial defenses.” People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). “A
substantial defense is one that “might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.” Id.
“[A] particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668, 691; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
We conclude that, in this case, defense counsel’s performance did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Toma, supra. Counsel’s failure to obtain or introduce the
victim’s police records did not amount to a failure to adequately investigate a “substantial
defense.” Defendant speculates that such records would have been useful to his defense.
However, he fails to demonstrate how any of the alleged documents would have made a
difference at trial when, at best, they could only have been used for impeachment. Kelly, supra.
In addition, defense counsel effectively attacked the victim’s credibility during his direct
examination of the police officer with whom the victim was acquainted without any documents
from the police department and, during his cross-examination of the victim, he questioned her
regarding inconsistencies in her testimony on direct-examination. Counsel’s decision as to what
evidence to present for impeachment purposes is a matter of trial strategy that we will not
second-guess with the benefit of hindsight. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601
NW2d 887 (1999). Furthermore, as discussed infra at 9-10, although defendant argues that one
of the documents would have shown that the victim previously made a false CSC allegation, this
assertion is belied by the fact that, after receiving documents post-trial that included the name
and address of the man against whom there was a possible CSC allegation, counsel did not
obtain an affidavit to show that the victim in this case was the complainant in the other incident
or that the allegation was false.
Second, defendant contends that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he
failed to object to evidence showing that defendant purchased alcohol for the victim on
numerous occasions in addition to the night of the offense, failed to object to evidence showing
that two minors were drinking at defendant’s house on one occasion, failed to object when the
victim testified that one of her friends indicated that defendant also touched her in an
inappropriate manner, and failed to object to evidence that defendant made threats to two of the
victim’s friends shortly after the offenses. Defendant argues that all of this evidence was
inadmissible under MRE 404(b).
MRE 404(b) provides in relevant part, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes . . . .” The evidentiary rule provides a
nonexclusive list of permissible grounds upon which other acts may be admitted. People v Starr,
457 Mich 490, 496; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). Other-acts evidence is admissible where the act
“being introduced [is] offered for the purpose of explaining the circumstances leading up to the
charged offense and [is] not offered to prove that defendant, by virtue of his commission of the
separate act had committed the offense for which he was on trial.” People v Bowers, 136 Mich
App 284, 294; 356 NW2d 618 (1984). “Stated differently: Evidence of other criminal acts is
admissible when so blended or connected with the crime of which defendant is accused that
proof of one incidentally involves the other or explains the circumstances of the crime.” People
v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996) (quotations and citation omitted).
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In this case, evidence was introduced that defendant purchased and provided alcohol to
the victim on numerous occasions. This evidence assisted the jury in understanding the
circumstances leading up to the offenses, specifically the relationship between defendant and the
victim. It was not offered to show defendant’s propensity to commit CSC, or that defendant, by
virtue of purchasing and providing alcohol on previous occasions, committed the charged
offenses. Bowers, supra. Similarly, with respect to evidence that defendant threatened certain
individuals shortly after the incident, this evidence explained the circumstances surrounding the
disclosure of the offenses; it was blended with the circumstances of the crime. Sholl, supra;
Bowers, supra. With respect to evidence that two of the victim’s minor friends were drinking
alcohol at defendant’s house, the evidence as presented did not relate to any act of defendant.
There was no testimony that defendant purchased or supplied the alcohol that the two were
drinking. On the record, we conclude that defense counsel’s conduct did not fall below an
objected standard of reasonableness where objection to the challenged evidence would have been
meritless. People v Goodin, 257 Mich App 425, 433; 668 NW2d 392 (2003).
Defendant also challenges his counsel’s failure to object to the victim’s testimony that a
friend revealed that defendant touched the friend in an inappropriate manner. This was otheracts evidence for which no notice was given to defendant, MRE 404(b), and defense counsel
could have objected and requested a curative instruction. However, his failure to do so did not
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Toma, supra. Defense counsel called the
friend as a defense witness and she denied telling the victim that defendant had inappropriately
touched her. Further, during closing argument defense counsel attacked the victim’s credibility,
informing the jury that the victim failed to mention the incident at any time before trial.
Counsel’s actions reflect a reasoned trial strategy that we will not second-guess with hindsight.
Rockey, supra.
Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the
testimony of prosecution witness Tricia Schuster, a forensic interviewer at the Care House
agency, who was not qualified as an expert. MRE 702 governs admissibility of expert testimony
and it provides:
If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (1) the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
In this case, Schuster offered testimony based on her knowledge, experience and training but was
never formally qualified as an expert witness pursuant to MRE 702. Assuming defense counsel
was ineffective in failing to object to the witness’s testimony absent qualification as an expert,
any error was harmless. The record indicates that Schuster was more than qualified to offer
expert testimony on forensic interviews and the methods used at Care House. See People v
Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 76; 732 NW2d 546 (2007) (unqualified expert testimony did not
constitute error requiring reversal where the record indicated that the witness was more than
qualified to offer expert opinion under MRE 702).
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We agree that the prosecution improperly asked whether the victim appeared truthful and
that defense counsel should have immediately objected. People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 352;
537 NW2d 857 (1995), amended 450 Mich 1212 (1995) (it is improper for an expert in a child
sexual abuse case to offer opinion testimony regarding the victim’s veracity for truthfulness).
We find this failure harmless, however. Schuster did not directly answer the question and stated
that she could not testify regarding whether the victim completed the interview to the best of her
ability. Furthermore, it was defense counsel who first brought up the issue of truthfulness by
asking whether “witnesses at Care House ever lie to Care House workers” and stating “[i]n fact,
there’s no reason for a child to lie to you.” Having contributed to any error, whether by plan or
negligence, the error is not reversible. People v Witherspoon (After Remand), 257 Mich App
329, 333; 670 NW2d 434 (2003).
Finally, defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object
when the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof during cross-examination when she
asked two defense witnesses if they approached police before trial to offer a statement. In
People v Gray, 466 Mich 44, 47; 642 NW2d 660 (2002), our Supreme Court adopted the
proposition that “no special foundation is necessary before the trier of fact may be apprised that
an alibi witness failed to come forward earlier with exculpatory information.” That ruling
logically and necessarily applies to the situation in this case involving non-alibi witnesses. The
two defense witnesses offered exculpatory evidence related to defendant’s touching of the
victim, but failed to come forward at any time before trial. This fact impacted their credibility
and was properly made known to the jury. Defense counsel did not render deficient performance
in failing to object to the questioning. Goodin, supra.
Having found no merit to any of defendant’s assertions, we conclude that defendant was
not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Additionally, defendant’s request for a remand for
an evidentiary hearing is not properly before this Court. MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a).
Defendant also contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his post-trial
motion for discovery, which requested the trial court order the Milford Police Department to turn
over unredacted documents showing contacts between the department and the victim in this case.
Alternatively, defendant requested that the trial court conduct in camera review of the documents
to determine if they contained any evidence that would be favorable to his defense. The trial
court asked defense counsel what prevented her from obtaining the information without a court
order, to which she replied she could probably make a request under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). There was some discussion off the record and then defense counsel requested the
matter be adjourned for 30 days while she attempted to make a FOIA request for the documents.
Pursuant to the request, the police department disclosed two sets of documents with
names of certain involved individuals redacted. The documents showed that unnamed
individuals set fire to a field and that an unnamed individual made a CSC complaint against a
neighbor for allegedly directing a vulgar comment at her. There were two other documents the
police department refused to disclose pursuant to a “parent-child” privilege under FOIA.
Defense counsel moved to have the trial court order the production of complete, unredacted
documents including the unproduced “privileged” documents. The trial court denied defendant’s
post-trial discovery motion and held that regardless whether the information was accessible,
defendant would not be entitled to a new trial because, at best, the documents would be relevant
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for impeachment purposes only. Defendant contends the trial court’s ruling denied him his Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense.
Issues involving a trial court’s ruling on a discovery matter in a criminal case are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Lemcool, 445 Mich 491, 497; 518 NW2d 437
(1994). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is outside the “principled range of
outcomes.” People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). This Court reviews
de novo the question whether a defendant was denied his constitutional right to present a
defense. People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 327; 654 NW2d 651 (2002).
A criminal defendant does not have a general right to discovery. People v Stanaway, 446
Mich 643, 680; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Discovery is generally left to the trial court’s discretion
and will be ordered when “the thing to be inspected is admissible in evidence and a failure of
justice may result from its suppression.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). The moving party
has the burden to show facts “indicating that such information is necessary to a preparation of its
defense and in the interests of a fair trial, and not simply a part of a fishing expedition . . . .” Id.
Exculpatory evidence, however, must always be disclosed by the prosecutor if such evidence is
in his possession. Id. at 666.
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s post-trial
motion for discovery. Defendant merely speculates that information contained in the police
records would be favorable to his defense, arguing that there may have been something in the
requested record that would have been useful for impeachment or would lead to further
discovery. This is insufficient, as defendant has provided “no basis for a good-faith belief that it
was probable that such information would be found.” Id. at 651. Accordingly, defendant’s
motion was a post-trial fishing expedition for impeachment evidence and an in camera inspection
was not required. Id. at 681-682.
Further, defendant failed to show that any of the documents he sought would be
admissible or that a failure of justice would result from suppression of the documents.
Defendant argued that the records might have shown that the victim committed an offense
involving theft or dishonesty. However, to be admissible under MRE 609, the documents would
have to show a conviction. Thus, defendant’s request was based on multiple unfounded
presumptions: first, that the documents would reflect that there was an incident involving theft
or dishonesty and second, that the presumed incidents resulted in convictions. This is too
speculative to show either admissibility or a failure of justice based on their suppression. Id.
Defendant alleges that the records might have shown that the victim made a false
allegation of sexual misconduct against another person. We agree with defendant that, were
there such evidence, it would not be subject to the rape-shield law. A defendant may crossexamine the victim about a prior false accusation of a similar nature and submit proof of the false
allegation if the victim denies making it. People v Mikula, 84 Mich App 108, 115; 269 NW2d
195 (1978). However, prior to introducing testimony regarding the prior accusation, a defendant
must first make an offer of proof, showing with concrete evidence, that the prior accusation was
false. People v Williams, 191 Mich App 269, 273; 477 NW2d 877 (1991). In Williams, this
Court held that such evidence was inadmissible because:
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In short, defense counsel had no idea whether the prior accusation was true or
false and no basis for believing that the prior accusation was false. Counsel
merely wished to engage in a fishing expedition in hopes of being able to uncover
some basis for arguing that the prior accusation was false. [Id. at 273-274.]
The circumstances here are even more tenuous, as there is no evidence that the victim made a
prior accusation. But, even assuming that she was the complainant, rather than a witness to the
disclosed incident, there is simply no evidence that the prior incident was false.
Although the names of minors were redacted from the documents received based on the
FOIA request, the name of the man against whom there was a possible CSC allegation, along
with his address, remained in the report. Thus, counsel had the ability to contact this individual
and inquire as to whether the victim had made the allegation, if the allegation was false and, if
so, obtain an affidavit so stating. Although the affidavit would not necessarily meet the
“concrete evidence” standard, it would certainly have supported defendant’s claim far more than
the mere assertion that such evidence might exist. Further, the fact that counsel did not obtain
such an affidavit suggests that either the victim was not the complainant, or the allegation was
not false. Having failed to provide any evidence that the prior incident was false, the prior
incident was inadmissible and, therefore, not discoverable. Stanaway, supra at 680. Because
there is no evidence that the request was anything other than a fishing expedition, and defendant
has not even shown that the requested documents were discoverable, the trial court properly
denied the motion.
Although we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion, we have concerns
about the trial court’s sua sponte discussion of the application of FOIA as a mechanism the
defense could employ to obtain the sought information without the trial court issuing an order.
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to caution trial courts that it is their responsibility to
determine whether parties are entitled to the discovery they request. Trial courts should not
attempt to avoid making a decision simply because there may be another avenue, such as a FOIA
request, through which the requested discovery might be obtained. The function of the trial court
is to be neutral and impartial. See People v Williams, 464 Mich 174, 179; 626 NW2d 899
(2001). If a party is entitled to the requested discovery under the court rules, the trial court
should order it. If the party is not entitled to the discovery under the court rules, the trial court
should not order it. It is up to the party’s attorney, not the trial court, to determine whether there
is some other way to obtain the information.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
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