LINDA C GOULET V ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LINDA C. GOULET,
UNPUBLISHED
December 23, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
V
No. 281685
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000323-CZ
ANN ARBOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant,
and
TOWNSHIP OF PITTSFIELD,
Defendant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Markey and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this slip-and-fall case, plaintiff appeals, and defendant, Ann Arbor Public Schools,
cross-appeals, as of right from the circuit court’s orders granting summary disposition to
defendants. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
Plaintiff alleged that she was injured while attempting to step onto a sidewalk located
within defendant Pittsfield Township, running between Fresno Lane and Carpenter Elementary
School, the latter of which is part of defendant Ann Arbor Public Schools. Plaintiff filed suit to
recover for her injuries.
Both defendants moved for summary disposition. The court denied the motion in
connection with the township, but this Court peremptorily reversed that decision in light of
subsequently released caselaw. Plaintiff attempted to challenge the latter result in the present
appeal, but this Court, in deference to its earlier reversal, dismissed the township from this
appeal, and struck from plaintiff’s brief the issue relating to that defendant.
-1-
The trial court granted the school district’s motion, predicated in part on governmental
immunity, on the ground that the district did not have jurisdiction over the sidewalk in question.
Plaintiff’s challenge to that decision stands as her only remaining issue on appeal.1
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo
as a question of law. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). A
motion for summary disposition based on governmental immunity is decided by examining all
documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true,
and construing all evidence and pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Tarlea v Crabtree, 263 Mich App 80, 87; 687 NW2d 333 (2004); Travelers Ins Co v Guardian
Alarm Co of Michigan, 231 Mich App 473, 477; 586 NW2d 760 (1998).
Governmental agencies in this state are generally immune from tort liability for actions
taken in furtherance of governmental functions. MCL 691.1407(1). However, the immunity
statute includes an exception for public highways, according to which “each governmental
agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so
that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” MCL 691.1402(1). Not in dispute is
that the Ann Arbor Public Schools is a governmental entity. At issue is whether it had
jurisdiction over the walkway in question for purposes of the highway exception.
Plaintiff points to the school district’s answers to interrogatories, where, in response to
the request that it name the entity having jurisdiction or control over the sidewalk in question, as
well as maintenance responsibilities, the district specified itself. However, the question is not
whether the school district actually took part in the construction or maintenance of the sidewalk,
but rather whether the district has statutorily recognized jurisdiction over it for purposes of the
highway exception.
This Court squarely addressed that issue in the case upon which the court below relied,
Richardson v Warren Consolidated School Dist, 197 Mich App 697; 496 NW2d 380 (1992).
Plaintiff points out that in that case, this Court stated, “Our research has disclosed no case
holding that a school district has jurisdiction over a public highway,” id. at 702, and argues that
this Court thus left open the possibility that such a case might arise. However, this Court’s
analysis of that issue begins with the statement, “In Michigan, school districts are not
governmental agencies with jurisdiction over public highways,” then proceeds through a survey
of various statutes in explaining its conclusion that “[a]n examination of the Legislature’s
limitations on the regulation of highways makes it apparent that school districts enjoy no
1
The school district filed a cross-appeal, but presents issues that, instead of calling for some
change in the result below, simply urge alternative bases for affirmance. The formality of a
cross-appeal was thus unnecessary in this instance. See Kosmyna v Botsford Community Hosp,
238 Mich App 694, 696; 607 NW2d 134 (1999) (“an appellee need not file a cross appeal in
order to argue an alternative basis for affirming the trial court’s decision, even if that argument
was considered and rejected by the trial court”); Zimmerman v Owens, 221 Mich App 259, 264;
561 NW2d 475 (1997) (this Court will not reverse when the trial court reaches the correct result
regardless of the reasoning employed).
-2-
independent jurisdiction over highway matters.” Id. The analysis ends with the statement,
“Defendant, a school district, is not liable for the design or maintenance of public highways.” Id.
at 704.
Richardson thus did not leave open the question of a school district’s jurisdiction over a
public highway for purposes of the highway exception to governmental immunity, but rather
conclusively determined that a school district had no such statutorily recognized jurisdiction, and
thus that the highway exception did not apply. The trial court thus correctly applied Richardson
in granting the defendant school district’s motion for summary disposition.
In light of our resolution of this case, we need not reach the district’s alternative
arguments for affirmance.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
