RONALD WINFRED TOLBERT II V AUTUMN RAE TOLBERT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD WINFRED TOLBERT II,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 284517
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-272254-DM
AUTUMN RAE TOLBERT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Owens and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s judgment of divorce. On appeal, plaintiff
argues that the trial court erred in awarding the parties joint custody of their children and erred in
its division of marital assets. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts
The parties were married October 1, 2005. Their biological son was born January 25,
2003. Plaintiff adopted defendant’s older son on December 8, 2006. The older son was born on
August 19, 2000. The parties were separated in January of 2007, when plaintiff moved out of the
marital home. Plaintiff filed for divorce on January 10, 2007.
II. Established Custodial Environment
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that there was no
“established custodial environment” with either party. We disagree. Whether an established
custodial environment exists is a question of fact that this Court should affirm unless the trial
court’s finding is against the great weight of the evidence. MCL 722.28; Rittershaus v
Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 470; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). A trial court’s finding of fact is
against the great weight of the evidence when the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite
direction. Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008).
MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides:
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The custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the
child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline,
the necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of the child, the physical
environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to the
permanency of the relationship shall also be considered.
An established custodial environment “is both a physical and a psychological environment that
fosters a relationship between custodian and child and is marked by security, stability, and
permanence.” Berger, supra at 706. If there exists an established custodial environment, a party
seeking a change of custody is required to show by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the
child’s best interests. Id. at 710; MCL 722.27(1)(c). The trial court in this case concluded that
neither party had an established custodial environment.
Both parties currently live at their respective parents’ homes, although defendant moved
three times in the year following the separation. Both parties have apparently stable employment
and make enough money to provide basic necessities for the children. While the parties have a
parenting time agreement under which the children spend time with both parents, in the four
months preceding trial, defendant only had parenting time on the weekends. The trial court
concluded from this fact that plaintiff had established a more stable environment. However, the
court concluded that this stability was somewhat artificial because plaintiff had originally
removed the children from the marital home, changed their school registration, and restricted
defendant’s access to the children for three weeks until the parties reached a parenting time
agreement.
The children have been bouncing between the parties for the entire post-separation
period, with a notable lack of cooperation and communication from the parties. The postseparation period has been marked by considerable instability. Therefore, the evidence supports
the trial court’s conclusion that there was no established custodial environment.
III. Joint Physical Custody and Best Interest Factors
Plaintiff next challenges the trial court’s award of joint physical custody. Plaintiff argues
that the trial court erred in its consideration of multiple statutory factors used to make the
custody determination. We will consider the factors in turn.
MCL 722.26a requires the trial court to “determine whether joint custody is in the best
interest of the child by considering” a list of factors. MCL 722.26a(1). The court’s decision
regarding a custody award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Berger, supra at 705. “An
abuse of discretion exists when the trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative of
fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of
passion.” Id. Underlying findings of fact by the trial court shall be affirmed on appeal unless
they are against the great weight of the evidence. Id. A finding of fact is against the great
weight of the evidence when the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. Id.
Questions of law are reviewed for clear legal error. Id. at 706.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in its consideration of MCL 722.26a(1)(b):
“[w]hether the parents will be able to cooperate and generally agree concerning important
decisions affecting the welfare of the child.” Plaintiff argues that the parties’ difficulty with
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cooperation renders joint custody an untenable solution. In fact, the trial court did not make a
specific finding with regard to this issue, although its discussion evinces an awareness of the
factor. If the parties are incapable of cooperation, joint custody is not an option. Wright v
Wright, 279 Mich App 291, 299-300; ___ NW2d ___ (2008).
The parties have had considerable difficulty with communication and cooperation during
the post-separation period. In order to avoid conflict, the parties exchange the children at a
police station. Plaintiff refuses to take defendant’s telephone calls because he feels that “all [he]
get[s] back on the other end is negativity.” Defendant contends that she is willing to
communicate but that plaintiff “has made it impossible.” Defendant feels that plaintiff is trying
to alienate her from the children. The court stated in its opinion: “The boys need both parents
and both parents need to come to grips with that fact. Should either parent work to undermine
the [c]ourt’s determination, they shall do so at their peril in terms of continued joint custody.”
The court’s conclusion that, while the problems of communication are relevant, the best interests
of the children trump these difficulties does not, as plaintiff suggests, indicate that the court
failed to consider this factor. The court, while recognizing the difficulties, did not determine that
the parties are incapable of cooperation. This factor, however, must be weighed against the “best
interest” factors of MCL 722.23 in the court’s final discretionary decision, which we will discuss
infra. MCL 722.23a(1).
Plaintiff next challenges the court’s factual findings on a variety of the best interest
factors:
Factor (b) concerns “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the
child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or
her religion or creed, if any.” MCL 722.23(b). The trial court found this factor to be equal
between the parties, stating that both parties had “expressed their interest in religion and desire to
continue programs in which the children are involved.” Plaintiff argues that because defendant
has not been involved in the children’s school affairs since the separation, this factor should
favor him.
The trial court correctly noted that both parties have a desire to provide a good education
and religious upbringing for the children. The instability of the year following the parties’
separation notwithstanding, there is no evidence that defendant does not have the “capacity and
disposition” to provide these for the children. Wright, supra, at 300-301 (where father was only
acting as though he were interested in children). In fact, it appears that defendant was the
primary parent in charge of these concerns during the marriage. Thus, the trial court’s finding
was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Factor (c) concerns “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care.” MCL 722.23(c). The trial court
found the parties equal with regard to this factor. Plaintiff argues that because defendant has not
provided post-separation financial support for the children and has had multiple jobs recently,
this factor should favor him.
Both parties have had multiple jobs in the period since separation, but appear to have
stable employment now. Both parties live with their parents. While plaintiff may currently
make slightly more money than defendant, this difference is accounted for by the trial court’s
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child support order. There is no evidence that either party lacks the “capacity and disposition” to
provide basic care for the children. The trial court’s finding was not against the great weight of
the evidence.
Factor (d) concerns “[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.” MCL 722.23(d). The trial court
found this factor to be equal between the parties because, while the current environment is stable,
the stability is “maintained on an artificial basis to the extent [p]laintiff and his family are
blocking [d]efendant’s access to her children.” Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that plaintiff is creating instability in the children’s lives and maintains that defendant
has demonstrated an inability to provide a stable environment for the children.
Plaintiff took the children from the marital home because he thought defendant was
creating an unstable environment for the children. He blocked access to the children for three
weeks until the parties could reach a parenting time agreement . Defendant alleges that plaintiff
still attempts to maintain control over the children. The latest parenting time agreement gives
defendant parenting time on the weekends only. There remains considerable lack of cooperation
regarding parenting time and a lack of communication regarding the children. The trial court’s
conclusion that this is a “stable, satisfactory environment” is not supported by the evidence.
Moreover, this situation has only existed for a year. The court’s further conclusion that this
“stable” environment was artificially created by plaintiff’s actions is inapposite given our
conclusion that this was not a stable environment. Nevertheless, the evidence does support the
court’s final conclusion that factor (d) does not favor either party. The past year has been
marked mostly by instability.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant’s behavior during the end of the marriage and the
separation period is evidence that she cannot provide a stable environment for the children. We
observe that factor (d) concerns the stability of the children’s environment leading up to the
custody determination and is not a prediction of future stability, which is covered by factors (b)
and (c). This argument is unavailing.
Factor (e) concerns “[t]he permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.” MCL 722.23(e). The trial court found this factor to be equal
between the parties, noting, “Each continues to find their way in establishing their homes.”
Plaintiff argues that this factor should favor him because his parent’s home provides a clean,
spacious, stable environment for the children. The adequacy of plaintiff’s parents’ house is
irrelevant to the permanence of either home environment, especially because the adequacy of
defendant’s parents’ house has not been impugned. See Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 884;
526 NW2d 889 (1994) (distinguishing between acceptability and permanence of custodial
homes). There is no evidence upon which to conclude that the trial court’s finding was against
the great weight of the evidence.
Factor (f) concerns “[t]he moral fitness of the parties involved.” The trial court found
this factor to be equal between the parties because “neither [party] has acted overtly to the
detriment of the children.” Plaintiff argues that defendant committed numerous acts of bad
judgment that detrimentally affected the children. We note that: “[Moral fitness] . . . relates to a
person’s fitness as a parent. To evaluate parental fitness, courts must look to the parent-child
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relationship and the effect that the conduct at issue will have on that relationship.” Fletcher,
supra at 886-887.
Much of plaintiff’s argument relates to questions of credibility. It is the trial court’s
responsibility to resolve questions of credibility and this Court should not lightly call that into
question. Wright, supra at 299. Plaintiff argues primarily that defendant engaged in extramarital
affairs, introduced the children to her boyfriends, and socialized late into the night and came
home drunk. Defendant rebutted each of these contentions and the trial court was in the best
position to make a determination regarding the parties’ credibility and the weight of the
evidence. Moreover, there was no specific evidence of conduct by defendant that was directly
detrimental to her fitness as a parent.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant demonstrated moral unfitness by engaging in a heated
conflict with plaintiff’s father in front of the children. During an argument (one of many) about
the exchange of the children, defendant kicked plaintiff’s father’s van, shouted obscenities, and
hit him on the shoulder in the presence of the children. Unfortunately, conflict between the
parties with respect to the exchange of children seems to be commonplace. One instance of
defendant becoming verbally and physically aggressive, does not call into question her moral
fitness as a parent, generally. The trial court’s finding that factor (f) was equal between the
parties was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Factor (h) concerns “[t]he home, school, and community record of the child.” MCL
722.23(h). The trial court found that this factor favored defendant because “she was more active
with school projects, homework, and school functions.” Plaintiff argues that because defendant
admitted that she was not involved with the children’s schoolwork in the post-separation period,
this factor should favor him.
The evidence reveals that defendant was primarily responsible for support and
involvement in the children’s activities during the marriage but that plaintiff has taken the
majority of these responsibilities in the meantime. The court’s simple statement that defendant
has been more involved is inaccurate without clarification. What is more important is that both
parties have demonstrated, at least, “a sincere interest in each child’s well-being at home, in
school, and in the child’s other activities.” Wright, supra at 302-303. This factor does not
clearly favor either party and the trial court’s conclusion that the factor favored defendant was
against the great weight of the evidence.
Factor (j) concerns “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent
or the child and the parents.” MCL 722.23(j). The trial court found that this factor “heavily
favor[ed]” defendant because of plaintiff’s attitude and conduct toward defendant since the
separation. Plaintiff argues that the trial court ignored the motivation for plaintiff’s actions and
ignored the evidence that defendant failed to contain her own anger in front of the children
during the incident with Tolbert. Plaintiff contends that this factor does not favor either party.
The parties have a considerable amount of animosity between them and are not capable
of easily cooperating and communicating. The trial court focused on the fact that plaintiff took
the children without consulting defendant and he “assumed a superior posture to [defendant]
through the trial.” The trial court is in a better position to judge the attitude and behavior of the
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parties toward one another. Wright, supra at 299. Plaintiff did take the children and prevent
them from freely seeing defendant. While other evidence showed a mutually destructive
relationship between the parties, the evidence did not clearly preponderate against the trial
court’s finding.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that factor (k) was
inapplicable to this case. Factor (k) concerns domestic violence. MCL 722.23(k). The scant
evidence of the confrontation between defendant and plaintiff’s father does not reveal that it was
an incidence of domestic violence. The trial court did not err in judging this factor to be
inapplicable.
The trial court awarded joint custody despite the fact that the factors analysis slightly
favored defendant. We disagree on the extent to which the factors favor defendant because
factor (h) favored each party equally, but this slight difference does not render the trial court’s
discretionary custody determination “palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic.” Berger,
supra, 277 Mich App 705. In fact, the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., “is intended to
promote the best interests of the children, and it is to be liberally construed.” Id.; MCL
722.26(1). The trial court’s determination that “the boys need both parents and both parents
need to come to grips with that fact” comports with the goals of the Child Custody Act.
There only remains the question of whether the best interest factors should have been
outweighed by MCL 722.26a(1)(b), the cooperation and communication of the parties. Here,
again, the trial court relies on the interests of the children to determine that the past cooperation
problems of the parents should not preclude these children from having two custodial parents.
Both parents have expressed that they are willing to make an effort to cooperate and
communicate. Moreover, the trial court warned the parents that their future custodial rights are
dependant on their ability to follow through on that effort. The trial court’s ultimate custodial
determination is a discretionary ruling, considering all the factors. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion.
IV. Division of Marital Property
Plaintiff finally argues that the division of marital property was inequitable and based on
erroneous findings of fact. We agree.
Findings of fact by the trial court underlying the division of property and the existence of
a valid agreement are reviewed for clear error. 46th Circuit Trial Court v Crawford Co, 476
Mich 131, 140; 719 NW2d 553 (2006); Johnson v Johnson, 276 Mich App 1, 10-11; 739 NW2d
877 (2007). A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a firm and definite
conviction that a mistake was made. Johnson, supra at 11. This Court must decide if the trial
court’s dispositional ruling was fair and equitable in light of the findings of facts. Quade v
Quade, 238 Mich App 222, 224; 604 NW2d 778 (1999). The trial court’s ruling is discretionary
and should be affirmed unless this Court is left with the firm conviction that it was inequitable.
Id.
During the separation, plaintiff withdrew $6,000 from a savings account in his name to
pay off credit card debt in his name. Plaintiff argues that the court erroneously concluded that
the credit card debt was personal debt but the savings account was a marital asset, ordering
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plaintiff to reimburse defendant $3,000. Plaintiff testified the he paid the debts “because [he]
didn’t want that debt to go to anybody.” Defendant testified that her paychecks went into the
savings account but that she was “never allowed to have access to the credit card and never made
any purchases on the credit card.” This is a credibility contest between the parties. This Court
must defer to the trial court’s credibility determination and weighing of the evidence. Johnson,
supra at 11. The court’s conclusion that the savings account was a marital asset but that the
credit card was a personal debt was not clearly erroneous because it was supported by
defendant’s testimony.
Plaintiff next argues that he should not be required to pay the towing expenses for an
automobile that was abandoned by defendant. In fact, the court made no specific ruling on this
point; the court merely awarded the car to plaintiff. There was very little evidence regarding the
circumstances surrounding this car. Defendant claims plaintiff could have taken the car anytime;
plaintiff states that he was never informed of this fact and it was subsequently impounded. Both
marital cars were owned by plaintiff before the marriage. Defendant testified that during the
marriage she was the primary driver of the second car, which was not impounded. Both cars
were awarded to plaintiff. The cost of obtaining the impounded car was estimated to be $275.
The division of property should be equitable, but it need not be equal. Gates v Gates, 256 Mich
App 420, 423; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). In the face of this conflicting evidence, there is no basis
for concluding that the court’s determination to award plaintiff both cars, but without
consideration for their impound status, was inequitable.
Plaintiff next argues that because defendant failed to make back mortgage payments on
the marital home, as ordered by the court, she should bear the financial responsibility of the
subsequent foreclosure. Plaintiff wanted to sell the house after he moved out but defendant
resisted. Defendant did not appear at a motion hearing on this question and the court ordered her
to make over $6,000 in back mortgage payments on the house. She did not make these payments
and the house was subsequently foreclosed upon and sold. Defendant testified only that she did
not know about the order. The trial court did not address its previous order in its opinion, stating
only, “The [marital] home shall remain a joint asset to the extent a proprietary interest remains.
Plaintiff and [d]efendant will equally share any debt associated with the foreclosure and postforeclosure proceedings.”
We agree with plaintiff that the trial court erred in concluding that both parties should
bear the “debt associated with the foreclosure and post-foreclosure proceedings.” Plaintiff tried
to resolve this issue earlier in the proceedings and was thwarted by defendant’s inaction, a fact
that is clearly demonstrated by the court’s order to her to make the payments. The court ignored
this fact in its property division. Fault is a relevant factor in the equitable division of marital
property. McDougal v McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 89-90; 545 NW2d 357 (1996). The trial court
erred in failing to consider defendant’s fault on the issue of foreclosure debt.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant should not have been awarded 50 percent of his
401(k) because some of the funds might have been earned before the marriage. However,
plaintiff specifically stipulated at trial that the entirety of this account accrued during the
marriage. There is no other evidence to the contrary. This argument is without merit.
Finally, plaintiff also claims that defendant should pay for the Qualified Domestic
Relations Order, for purposes of dividing the 401(k). Plaintiff does not actually make any
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argument regarding why defendant should pay this fee. While the court does not explain its
decision to order plaintiff to make this payment, there is no basis for concluding that it was
erroneous.
On remand, the trial court should consider defendant’s failure to make the back mortgage
payments, as ordered by the court, in its allocation of the debt associated with the foreclosure of
the marital home.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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