IN RE TEEMS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JUSTIN MICHAEL TEEMS and
MEGAN MARIE TEEMS, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 9, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 286484
Clinton Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-019305-NA
JANE FELDPAUSCH,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ROGER TEEMS,
Respondent.
In the Matter of JUSTIN MICHAEL TEEMS and
MEGAN MARIE TEEMS, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 286695
Clinton Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-019305-NA
ROGER TEEMS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JANE FELDPAUSCH,
Respondent.
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Before: Saad, C.J., and Fitzgerald and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent mother Jane Feldpausch and respondent father
Roger Teems appeal as of right from the order terminating their parental rights to the minor
children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
Both respondents argue that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the statutory
grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence.1 We disagree. A
petitioner is only required to establish a single statutory ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Powers, 244
Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). We review the trial court’s findings for clear error.
MCR 3.977(J); In re JK, supra at 209. Deference is given to the trial court’s special opportunity
to judge the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.
In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Respondent mother’s plea of admission established the conditions that led to the
adjudication for purposes of § 19b(3)(c)(i). Contrary to respondent mother's assertion, the family
assessment conducted by Dr. Andrew Barclay, in which he indicated that respondent mother had
the mental age of a ten-year-old, was not a new or different condition that could not be
considered for purposes of § 19b(3)(c)(i). A trial court is permitted to apprise itself of all
relevant circumstances. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 26; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). Further,
the plea was based on several additional conditions. Evidence that respondent mother failed to
adequately address the issue of domestic violence, thereby enabling the trial court to find that the
children would be at risk of harm in her home, alone supports the court’s finding that the
conditions that led to the adjudication had not been rectified. Although respondent mother
obtained a divorce while the children were in foster care, and also obtained a new apartment, she
continued to intermittently live with respondent father. This evidence demonstrates that the
safety concerns present at the beginning of the case still existed.
Further, while the reasonableness of the services provided to a respondent has a bearing
on whether the evidence sufficiently establishes a statutory ground for termination, In re Fried,
266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005), essential to any treatment plan is that the parent
benefit from services provided sufficient to provide a home in which the children will not be at
risk of harm. In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 677; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). Even a disabled
parent must be able to demonstrate an ability to meet a child’s needs before the child can be
returned to her care. In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 28; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). We find nothing
about the services offered to respondent mother, or her failure to timely engage in the referral
1
Although the trial court referred generally to subsection (c), petitioner did not request
termination under § 19b(3)(c)(ii), and there is no indication in the trial court’s decision that it
intended to rely on an unpleaded ground as a statutory basis for termination. Accordingly, there
being no indication that parental rights were terminated under § 19b(3)(c)(ii), it is unnecessary to
consider respondent mother’s argument regarding that statutory ground.
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made to the Families in Transition (FIT) program, that would preclude the trial court from
finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions that led to the adjudication
would not be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages. Considering all
the circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in finding § 19b(3)(c)(i) proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
The same evidence that supports the trial court’s finding that § 19b(3)(c)(i) was proven
also supports the trial court’s finding that § § 19b(3)(g) an (j) were proven by clear and
convincing evidence. At the time of the trial court’s decision, the mother’s progress had not
even reached a point where the court could find that the mother would be able to protect the
children from domestic violence. The mother failed to benefit from domestic violence
counseling, as is evident from her testimony that she continued to intermittently live with the
father, even after obtaining a divorce. She also demonstrated cognitive and other deficiencies
that affected her ability to parent children with special needs.
Further, we reject respondent mother’s challenge to the trial court’s findings regarding
the children’s best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5). The evidence did not clearly show that
termination of her parental rights was not in the children’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich
341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision terminating
respondent mother’s parental rights.
With respect to respondent father, we find no basis for disturbing the trial court’s findings
that he engaged in domestic violence. In re Miller, supra at 337. Respondent mother’s
testimony regarding domestic abuse was not so far impeached that it could not be believed by a
fact-finder or deprived of all probative value. See People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643; 576
NW2d 129 (1998).
Further, we find no clear error in the trial court’s findings that §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) were
each proven by clear and convincing evidence with respect to respondent Teems. We disagree
with respondent father’s argument that termination was premature because adequate services
were not provided. As indicated previously, the reasonableness of services relates to the
sufficiency of the evidence for a particular statutory ground for termination. In re Fried, supra at
541. This case is distinguishable from In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61; 472 NW2d 38 (1991),
in which there was evidence that the respondents were refused hands-on instructions to rectify
the physical conditions of their home before their parental rights were terminated on the basis of
the home conditions. In this case, the record does not reflect that respondent father was denied
services, although it was not until after Dr. Barclay completed the family evaluation that some
quantification of his mental age was made available to petitioner.
It is clear from the evidence that respondent father had an opportunity to participate in inhome services before the children were placed in foster care, but declined to participate in those
services. The evidence also reflects that he had an opportunity to participate in counseling and
other services after the children were placed in foster care, and that he was a party to the same
parent-agency agreement executed by respondent mother. Although caseworker Kerri Graham
later did not include respondent father in the FIT referral, Graham explained that the referral was
not made at that time because respondent mother was already receiving individualized
counseling. She stated that the FIT program begins with individualized counseling and moves
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toward more intensive services involving the children. She further testified that transitioning the
children into respondent father’s home was not an option because he did have his own housing.
Considering the evidence as a whole, including the services made available to respondent
father, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that there was a reasonable likelihood, based
on his conduct or capacity, that the children would be harmed if returned to his home. MCL
712A.19b(3)(j). As noted in In re Trejo, supra at 346 n 3, children may be subject to a risk of
harm in different ways, including harm to their physical health and mental well being. The
evidence here supported an inference that both risks would have been present if the children
were placed with respondent father, given his failure to benefit from domestic violence
counseling and his lack of suitable housing for the children.
Also, the trial court did not clearly err in finding, without regard to intent, that respondent
father failed to provide proper care or custody for the children and that there was no reasonable
expectation that he could do so within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages. MCL
712A.19b(3)(g). In addition to the unresolved domestic violence issue and the lack of suitable
housing, respondent father offered no plan for the children’s care independent of respondent
mother.
Because we conclude that §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j) were both established by clear and
convincing evidence, it is unnecessary to address whether § 19b(3)(c)(i) may serve as an
additional ground for termination with respect to respondent father. For these reasons, we affirm
the trial court’s decision terminating respondent father’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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