RUDY LOZANO V DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RUDY LOZANO, Personal Representative of the
Estate of JON ALEXANDER JARZEMBOWSKI,
Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
December 2, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER and HARPERHUTZEL HOSPITAL, d/b/a HARPER
HOSPITAL,
No. 279087
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-504343-NH
Defendants,
and
DR. ALFREDO LAZO and DR. L. REYNOLDS
ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
Defendants-Appellants.
RUDY LOZANO, Personal Representative of the
Estate of JON ALEXANDER JARZEMBOWSKI,
Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER and HARPERHUTZEL HOSPITAL, d/b/a HARPER
HOSPITAL,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
DR. ALFREDO LAZO and DR. L. REYNOLDS
ASSOCIATES, P.C.,
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No. 279090
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-504343-NH
Defendants.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Jansen and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated interlocutory appeals, defendants appeal by leave granted the trial
court’s order that, among other things, required defendants’ expert witnesses to be available on
the first day of trial to testify in plaintiff’s case-in-chief. We reverse.
I. Background
Plaintiff alleged that defendant Dr. Alfredo Lazo negligently performed a coiling
procedure to treat a vascular aneurysm on plaintiff’s decedent, Jon Jarzembowski, which led to
Jarzembowski’s death. Plaintiff alleged that the other defendants were vicariously liable for Dr.
Lazo’s negligence. In preparation for trial, plaintiff subpoenaed defendants’ expert witnesses,
Drs. In Sup Choi, John Wald, and William Sanders, in order to secure their testimony for trial.1
Defendants filed motions to quash the subpoenas on the ground that plaintiff could not compel
by subpoena their expert witnesses to involuntarily testify on plaintiff’s behalf. Defendants
asserted that their expert witnesses held a proprietary interest in their own opinions and that the
experts could not be compelled by subpoena to disclose their opinions in court. The trial court
agreed and quashed plaintiff’s subpoenas. However, after defendants acknowledged that they
intended to call their expert witnesses at trial, the court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to call
defendants’ expert witnesses during his case-in-chief as adverse witnesses. It therefore required
defendants’ expert witnesses to be available on the first day of trial. The court later clarified that
it was not requiring that defendants’ experts be physically present on the first day of trial, only
that they be available to testify when called by plaintiff. This was particularly problematic for
Dr. Choi, who resided in Massachusetts.
When defendants questioned who would be required to pay for the experts’ time for
testifying during plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the trial court declined to impose any responsibility for
payment on plaintiff, reasoning that the situation would be no different than if the experts
testified only in defendants’ case-in-chief. The court further required that all examinations of
defendants’ experts, whether by plaintiff or defendants, would be conducted during plaintiff’s
case-in-chief. The court refused to allow any “bifurcation,” meaning that defendants would not
be permitted to separately call their expert witnesses in their own case-in-chief.
1
Drs. Choi and Wald are the expert witnesses for defendants Dr. Lazo and Dr. L. Reynolds
Associates, P.C. Dr. Sanders is the expert witness for defendants Detroit Medical Center and
Harper Hospital.
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II. Adverse Witness Statute
Defendants argue that the trial court erred by ruling that plaintiff could call defendants’
experts as adverse witnesses during plaintiff’s case-in-chief.
The adverse witness statute, MCL 600.2161, provides:
In any suit or proceeding in any court in this state, either party, if he shall
call as a witness in his behalf, the opposite party, employee or agent of said
opposite party, or any person who at the time of the happening of the transaction
out of which such suit or proceeding grew, was an employee or agent of the
opposite party, shall have the right to cross-examine such witness the same as if
he were called by the opposite party; and the answers of such witness shall not
interfere with the right of such party to introduce evidence upon any issue
involved in such suit or proceeding, and the party so calling and examining such
witness shall not be bound to accept such answers as true.
We review de novo questions concerning the interpretation and application of a statute.
Danse Corp v Madison Heights, 466 Mich 175, 178; 644 NW2d 721 (2002). Clear statutory
language is enforced as written. Fluor Enterprises, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 477 Mich 170, 174;
730 NW2d 722 (2007).
The purpose of the adverse witness statute “is to permit calling the opposite party, or his
agent or employee, as a witness with the same privileges of cross-examination and contradiction
as if the opposite party had called that witness.” Linsell v Applied Handling, Inc, 266 Mich App
1, 26; 697 NW2d 913 (2005). It is a mechanism through which a party can obtain the testimony
of a person who might not otherwise testify for the opposing party.
We agree with defendants that the plain language of the statute defines who qualifies as
an adverse witness and that defendants’ experts do not fit within any category set forth in the
statute. The statute allows a party to call as an adverse witness either an opposing party, or an
employee or agent of an opposing party. Defendants’ expert witnesses are not parties to this
action or employees of any defendant. Additionally, our Supreme Court has held that an
independent medical expert is not an agent of the party who hired him for the purpose of
obtaining his expert opinion. Barnett v Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151, 163 n 7; 732 NW2d 472 (2007).
This Court has repeatedly held that witnesses who are not party opponents or agents or
employees of a party opponent cannot be called under the adverse witness statute. See, e.g., In
re Forfeiture of $19,250, 209 Mich App 20, 28; 530 NW2d 759 (1995); Davis v Wayne Co
Sheriff, 201 Mich App 572, 587; 507 NW2d 751 (1993); Thompson v Essex Wire Co, 27 Mich
App 516, 530; 183 NW2d 818 (1970). Furthermore, it is well settled that an expert witness may
not be compelled to provide involuntary testimony pursuant to a subpoena. See Klabunde v
Stanley, 384 Mich 276, 282; 181 NW2d 918 (1970) (recognizing that an expert “has a property
right in his opinion and cannot be made to divulge it in answer to a subpoena”). Accordingly,
the trial court erred by ruling that plaintiff was entitled to call defendants’ expert witnesses as
adverse witnesses during plaintiff’s case-in-chief.
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III. MRE 611
Although the trial court did not cite MRE 611 as authority for its decision, plaintiff
asserts that this rule authorized the trial court to require defendants’ experts to testify during
plaintiff’s case-in-chief.
MRE 611(a) provides in relevant part:
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2)
avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or
undue embarrassment.
Under MRE 611, a trial court has broad power to control the manner in which witnesses are
called and the mode and order of interrogation. Phillips v Deihm, 213 Mich App 389, 402; 541
NW2d 566 (1995).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s ruling did not compel defendants’ experts to testify,
but simply changed the order in which their voluntary testimony was to be given, as permitted by
MRE 611. We disagree. Even if defendants’ experts had intended to voluntarily testify for
defendants, the trial court’s ruling did not merely allow defendants to call their witnesses out of
turn, but rather required the witnesses to testify as part of plaintiff’s own case-in-chief, for the
purpose of allowing plaintiff to attempt to satisfy his own burden of proof. Although MRE 611
provides the trial court with discretionary authority to control the order in which permissible
testimony is presented, it does not serve as a mechanism for allowing a party to secure testimony
that the party is not otherwise permitted to present. While plaintiff certainly would be entitled to
cross-examine defendants’ expert witnesses once called by defendant, he had no legal right to
compel the testimony of defendants’ experts as part of his own case-in-chief, see Klabunde,
supra at 282, or to call defendants’ experts as adverse witnesses. Accordingly, MRE 611 does
not provide a basis for upholding the trial court’s decision.
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order requiring that defendants’ expert
witnesses be available to testify on the first day of trial and permitting plaintiff to call those
witnesses as part of his case-in-chief. In light of our decision, it is unnecessary to address
defendants’ remaining arguments.
Reversed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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