PEOPLE OF MI V MARSHALL JOHNSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 25, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272750
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-010804-01
MARSHALL JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Borrello and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and
possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for
the murder conviction, and 23 to 60 months’ imprisonment for the felon-in-possession
conviction, with those sentences to be served concurrently, but consecutive to a two-year term of
imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his murder
conviction, or alternatively, that his murder conviction is against the great weight of the
evidence.
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence issue, this Court reviews the evidence de novo
in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979); People v Oliver, 242 Mich App
92, 94-95; 617 NW2d 721 (2000).
A new trial may be granted on any ground that would support appellate reversal of a
conviction, MCR 6.431(B), including that a conviction is against the great weight of the
evidence. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 269; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). We review the
trial court’s decision denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on this ground for an abuse of
discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion will be found only where the denial of the motion was
“manifestly against the great weight of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Conflicting
testimony and questions of witness credibility are insufficient grounds for granting a new trial.
People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). “Unless it can be said that
directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it ‘was deprived of all probative value
-1-
or that the jury could not believe it’ or contradicted indisputable physical facts or defied physical
realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination.” Id. at 645-646 (citations
omitted).
To establish first-degree premeditated murder, the prosecutor must prove that the
defendant intentionally killed the victim with premeditation and deliberation. People v Taylor,
275 Mich App 177, 179; 737 NW2d 790 (2007), lv pending. Defendant argues that the evidence
failed to prove that he killed the decedent. We disagree.
Defendant was convicted for his involvement in the shooting death of Richard Morris.
The evidence at trial showed that defendant was driving a Jeep with three other passengers when
he observed Morris on the street. Defendant asked the passengers in the Jeep if they wanted to
“get” Morris, and then pulled the Jeep alongside Morris. According to the passengers in the
Jeep, defendant produced a gun and attempted to fire shots at Morris, but the gun did not
immediately fire. Defendant then tried firing again and was able to fire several shots. Another
passenger in the Jeep also had a gun and fired shots at Morris. Although Morris was shot several
times, only one bullet was recovered from Morris’s body, from inside his chest. The police
determined that the bullet was fired from the same gun that defendant had in his possession at the
time of his arrest. After he was arrested, defendant gave a statement to the police in which he
admitted that he shot Morris for revenge, intending to kill him.
Defendant argues that the evidence showed that Morris died from a gunshot wound to his
neck, which was inflicted before he fired any shots at Morris and, therefore, he did not cause
Morris’s death. However, codefendant Smith testified that defendant was the first person to
shoot Morris. The credibility of Smith’s testimony was for the jury to resolve. Abraham, supra
at 270. Further, the pathologist opined that the shot to the neck may not have been the first one,
because it would have caused Morris to fall and it appeared that Morris received his other
wounds while he was in an upright position. But regardless of whether defendant was the first or
second shooter, and regardless of whether defendant fired the fatal shot, the evidence supported
his conviction under an aiding and abetting theory.
To support a finding that a defendant aided and abetted a crime, the prosecutor must
show that (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the
defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and
(3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal
intended its commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement. An aider and abettor’s state
of mind may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
757-758; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
The evidence established that it was defendant who first suggested to the other
passengers in his car that they “get” Morris. Defendant also was the first person to produce a
gun and defendant pulled his vehicle alongside Morris, enabling a clear shot at Morris.
Defendant also admitted to the police that he intended to kill Morris. Even if one of the other
passengers in the car fired the actual shot that killed Morris, the evidence showed that it was
defendant who initiated the incident and assisted in its commission by pulling his vehicle
alongside Morris. Further, defendant’s statement that he intended to kill Morris shows that he
intended the commission of the crime. Thus, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder.
-2-
Additionally, defendant’s conviction is not against the great weight of the evidence and,
therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new
trial.
Next, defendant argues that his dual convictions for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony, violate
the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. But as
defendant concedes, our Supreme Court expressly considered and rejected this argument in
People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 452; 671 NW2d 733 (2003). Calloway concluded that the
Legislature intended to provide an additional penalty and sentence for possession of a firearm
during commission of a felony, even when a defendant is convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. We are not at liberty to reject Calloway. Accordingly, we reject this
claim of error.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the jury
in accordance with CJI2d 16.15. This Court reviews jury instructions as a whole to determine if
there is error requiring reversal. People v Wess, 235 Mich App 241, 243; 597 NW2d 215 (1999).
Jury instructions must include all elements of the charged crimes and must not exclude material
issues, defenses, and theories if the evidence supports them. People v Canales, 243 Mich App
571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). Defendant argues that because there was evidence that another
passenger in his car may have fired the shot that killed Morris, the trial court should have given
CJI2d 16.15, which provides that there may be more than one cause for a decedent’s death and that
in order for the jury to find that the defendant caused the decedent’s death, it must find that the
decedent’s death was the natural or necessary result of the defendant’s act. We disagree.
As previously explained, even if another passenger in defendant’s vehicle fired the fatal
shot, defendant properly could be convicted under an aiding and abetting theory because he
intended and facilitated the commission of the crime by suggesting that they “get” Morris, pulled
his vehicle alongside Morris, and produced a gun which he aimed at and attempted to shoot
Morris, eventually succeeding in doing so. The use notes for CJI2d 16.15 specifically provide that
the instruction is not to be used in cases, as here, involving aiding and abetting or concert of action.
While the use notes to the jury instructions are not binding authority (indeed, the standard criminal
jury instructions themselves are not binding authority, People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 277; 380
NW2d 11 (1985)), here we find the notes persuasive, and adopt them as our rule of decision on this
issue. Thus, the trial court properly denied defendant’s requested instruction.
Defendant next argues that his police statement should have been suppressed because he
was too intoxicated to knowingly waive his rights and voluntarily give a statement. We disagree.
A statement obtained from a defendant during a custodial interview is admissible only if
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the privilege against self-incrimination
protected by the Fifth Amendment. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 564; 675 NW2d 863
(2003). Whether a suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment
privilege depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s intelligence and
capacity to understand the warnings given. People v Daoud, 462 Mich 629, 636; 614 NW2d 152
(2000). A trial court’s findings concerning the circumstances surrounding the giving of a
statement are factual findings that are reviewed for clear error. People v Coomer, 245 Mich App
206, 218-219; 627 NW2d 612 (2001).
-3-
Although defendant argues that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege because he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs, the interrogating
police officer testified that defendant did not have any difficulty talking, did not slur his speech
or words in any way, answered questions in a coherent fashion, appeared in control of his
faculties, and did not exhibit any signs of being under the influence of alcohol or the effects of
narcotics. The trial court found that the quantity of drugs and alcohol that defendant claimed he
consumed was not credible, especially because defendant had an “exceedingly clear recall of
everything that occurred.” The totality of the circumstances supports the trial court’s conclusion
that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. Accordingly,
defendant’s motion to suppress properly was denied.
Finally, defendant asserts that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel,
because his appointed defense counsel was ineffective, by failing to object to the trial court’s
jury instructions. We disagree.
We begin, naturally, with the constitutional texts. The United States Constitution
provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” US Const, Am VI. Similarly, the Michigan Constitution
provides: “In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right . . . to have the
assistance of counsel for his or her defense . . . .” Const 1963, art 1, § 20. It is well established
that these provisions not only protect the right of an accused to hire counsel, but affirmatively
require the government to provide counsel for the defense of an indigent accused. In addition,
these provisions have been interpreted, under the common law of the constitution, to require that
the attorney provided by the government must provide “effective” assistance. E.g., Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); Schriro v Landrigan, 550 US
465; 127 S Ct 1933, 1939; 167 L Ed 2d 836 (2007).
A constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the standard
established in Strickland, which requires the defendant to show that, under an objective standard
of reasonableness, counsel made an error so serious that counsel was not functioning as an
attorney guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. People v Harris, 201 Mich App 147, 154; 505
NW2d 889 (1993). The right to counsel under the Michigan Constitution does not impose a
more restrictive standard than Strickland. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 318-319; 521 NW2d
797 (1994).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and defendant bears the burden of proving
otherwise. People v Rocky, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). To succeed on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that, but for an error by
counsel, the result of the proceedings would have been different and that the proceedings were
fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764
(2001). The defendant bears a “heavy burden” on these points. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590,
599; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance constituted sound trial strategy. People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 140;
659 NW2d 611 (2003). “This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding
matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.”
Garza, supra, at 255.
-4-
Viewed in context, the trial court did not instruct the jury that defendant caused Morris’s
death or that Morris died as a result of gunshot wounds. Rather, the trial court’s instructions
conveyed that these were issues that the prosecutor was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because the instructions were not improper, defense counsel was not ineffective for
failing to object. People v Darden, 230 Mich App 597, 605; 585 NW2d 27 (1998).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Stephen J. Borrello
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.