MICHAEL MORTON RIEDEL V SECRETARY OF STATE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL MORTON RIEDEL,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2008
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 280048
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-083666-AL
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Smolenski and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals as of right from a circuit court order denying his petition for restoration
of his driver’s license on the basis that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We reverse
and remand, and decide this appeal without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
“Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court
reviews de novo.” Etefia v Credit Technologies, Inc, 245 Mich App 466, 472; 628 NW2d 577
(2001). We also review de novo the legal questions involved in statutory interpretation. Van
Reken v Darden, Neef & Heitsch, 259 Mich App 454, 456; 674 NW2d 731 (2003). “It is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that a clear and unambiguous statute warrants no further
interpretation and requires full compliance with its provisions, as written.” Northern Concrete
Pipe, Inc v Sinacola Cos—Midwest, Inc, 461 Mich 316, 320; 603 NW2d 257 (1999).
Our Supreme Court has broadly defined jurisdiction of the subject matter as a court’s
right to exercise judicial power over a given class of cases. Joy v Two-Bit, Corp, 287 Mich 244,
253; 283 NW 45 (1938). It concerns a court’s “abstract power to try a case of the kind or
character of the one pending,” “not whether the particular case is one that presents a cause of
action, or under the particular facts is triable in the court in which it is pending . . . .” Id. “A
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined only by reference to the allegations” contained
in a pleading or petition, “not the subsequent proceedings.” Luscombe v Shedd’s Food Products
Corp, 212 Mich App 537, 541; 539 NW2d 210 (1995). Regardless of the truth or falsity of the
allegations, “where it is apparent from the allegations . . . that the matter alleged is within the
class of cases in which a particular court has been empowered to act, subject-matter jurisdiction
is present.” Id. at 541-542; see also Fox v Martin, 287 Mich 147, 151; 283 NW 9 (1938)
(“Jurisdiction does not depend upon the facts, but upon the allegations.”), and Trost v Buckstop
Lure Co, Inc, 249 Mich App 580, 587; 644 NW2d 54 (2002) (observing that subject-matter
jurisdiction depends on the allegations pleaded, not the truth or falsity of a claim).
-1-
The relevant statute in this case, MCL 257.323, provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1)
A person aggrieved by a final determination of the secretary of
state denying the person an operator’s or chauffeur’s license . . . or revoking,
suspending, or restricting an operator’s or chauffeur’s license . . . may petition for
a review of the determination in the circuit court . . . .
(2)
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the circuit court shall
enter an order setting the cause for hearing for a day certain not more than 63 days
after the order’s date. . . .
(3)
The court may take testimony and examine all the facts and
circumstances relating to the denial, suspension, or restriction of the person’s
license under sections 303(1)(d), 320, or 904(10) or (11), a licensing action under
section 310d, or a suspension for a first violation under section 625f. The court
may affirm, modify, or set aside the restriction, suspension, or denial, except the
court shall not order the secretary of state to issue a restricted or unrestricted
chauffeur’s license that would permit the person to drive a commercial motor
vehicle that hauls a hazardous material. . . .
(4)
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in reviewing a
determination resulting in a denial, suspension, restriction, or revocation under
this act, the court shall confine its consideration to a review of the record prepared
pursuant to section 322 or 625f or the driving record created under section 204a
for a statutory legal issue, and shall not grant restricted driving privileges. The
court shall set aside the secretary of state’s determination only if the petitioner’s
substantial rights have been prejudiced because the determination is any of the
following:
(a)
In violation of the Constitution of the United States, the state
constitution of 1963, or a statute.
(b)
jurisdiction.
In excess of the secretary of state’s statutory authority or
(c)
Made upon unlawful procedure resulting in material prejudice to
the petitioner.
(d)
Not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on
the whole record.
(e)
Arbitrary, capricious, or clearly an abuse or unwarranted exercise
of discretion.
(f)
Affected by other substantial and material error of law.
The petition in this case did not specifically invoke § 323. But a review of the petition’s
request for relief plainly reveals that petitioner sought the relief provided for in § 323. Petitioner
-2-
averred that his recent driver’s license suspension had concluded, and that respondent
nonetheless refused to hold a hearing concerning license reinstatement. Petitioner urged the
circuit court to “terminate the suspension of his driver’s license . . . and reinstate his full driving
privileges, or, in the alternative, to modify his suspension to allow [him] to drive to, from, and
during the course of his employment.”
Respondent argued that pursuant to MCL 257.904(2) it had imposed an additional term of
license revocation through June 2012, and that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the revocation under MCL 257.323(3), which contemplated only court review of a “denial,
suspension, or restriction of the person’s license under sections 303(1)(d), 320 or 904(10) or (11)
. . . .” In a July 10, 2007 order, the circuit court adopted respondent’s analysis and also
characterized the petition as “deficient as it cites no law.” The next day, petitioner filed a reply
that cited as bases for relief §§ 323(1) and (4). Petitioner subsequently filed a 10-page motion
for reconsideration, which emphasized the statutory provisions he had mentioned in his reply
brief. The circuit court denied the motion, however, finding that petitioner had failed to
demonstrate any palpable error in its prior denial of the petition, and that he supplied no
authority “to support his position that he was entitled to file a Reply.”
The circuit court failed to recognize that in MCL 257.323(1), the Legislature clearly and
unambiguously has invested it with subject-matter jurisdiction to review a secretary of state’s
determination to deny, revoke, suspend or restrict a person’s license. With respect to enumerated
license denials, suspensions or restrictions set forth in § 323(3), the circuit court can conduct a de
novo hearing and may “affirm, modify, or set aside” respondent’s action. Respondent correctly
pointed out in its response to the petition that regardless whether one particular suspension of
petitioner’s license had concluded, additional facts that petitioner omitted, concerning multiple
revocation extensions, established that he had no entitlement to a license reinstatement. But
subject-matter jurisdiction rests on the allegations in the complaint or petition, not their truth or
accuracy, and because petitioner’s averments plainly sought relief cognizable under MCL
257.323, the circuit court incorrectly found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Trost,
supra at 587.1
1
Even had petitioner more accurately set forth his driver’s license history, the mere fact that this
history contained a revocation would not have deprived the circuit court of subject-matter
jurisdiction. As we have mentioned, § 323(1) unambiguously permits the court to review the
revocation of a license. And the plain language of § 323(4) reflects that when a license
revocation is at issue, the circuit court can review the enumerated records for “a statutory legal
issue” and set aside the revocation “if the petitioner’s substantial rights have been prejudiced” in
any of the manners set forth in §§ 323(4)(a)-(f).
-3-
Reversed and remanded for the circuit court to consider the merits of petitioner’s
allegations, and any further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
