PEOPLE OF MI V EDDIE LEE FLOYD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279741
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-004926-FC
EDDIE LEE FLOYD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, two counts of felonious
assault, MCL 750.82, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant as a habitual offender, second offense, MCL
769.10, to concurrent prison terms of 12 to 30 years for the robbery conviction, one to six years
each for the assault convictions, and a consecutive two-year prison term for the felony-firearm
conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions, but vacate the portion of
the judgment ordering defendant to pay $2,250 in attorney fees and remand for consideration of
defendant’s ability to pay attorney fees.
I. Basic Facts
Defendant was convicted of robbing a Murray’s Discount Auto store in Warren on the
evening of October 12, 2006. A the time of the robbery, the manager and employee DW were
stocking and cleaning, while employee ES was in the “cash office” “counting out her till.” The
manager observed defendant “constantly pacing the back wall.” Shortly thereafter, defendant
brought a can of WD 40 and other items to the register and asked the manager about ratchets.
After walking to the ratchets and having a brief exchange, the manager and defendant returned to
the register. As the manager totaled defendant’s items, defendant reached into his waistband,
brandished a stainless steel semiautomatic gun, pointed it “right in [the manager’s] face,” and
said “you know what this is - - let’s start moving.” Defendant and the manager walked toward
DW and defendant ordered both men to proceed to the office. The manager unlocked the office
door with his key and the three men entered. Defendant “shoved” DW to the floor. Defendant
told ES not to look at him, pointed the gun at her chest, “grabbed” her shirt, and “threw her onto
the floor.” Defendant “moved” the gun back to the manager and ordered him to transfer the
money from the safe into the two bags defendant had provided. While the manager filled the
bags with approximately $3,000, defendant continued to hold the gun and watch all three victims
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to ensure they did not move. After the manager gave defendant the bags, defendant ordered the
manager to the floor. Defendant asked for the manager’s wallet and cell phone, and the manager
gave defendant his phone battery. Defendant took the tape from the store’s video camera and
pulled out the phone.
The police subsequently matched prints taken from a can of WD 40 found at the register
and from a phone with defendant’s fingerprints. The manager and DW identified defendant from
a photo array.
The defense presented a defense of alibi. Defendant presented his girlfriend and sister,
who testified that at the time of the robbery, defendant was with them at his mother’s house.
II. Motion to Quash the Information
Defendant first argues that the district court abused its discretion in binding him over for
trial on two counts of felonious assault. He argues that the evidence presented at the preliminary
examination was insufficient to establish that he had the requisite intent because only the store
manager testified, and therefore he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine DW and ES.
Defendant’s motion to quash the information in the circuit court was denied. The circuit court
concluded that testimony that defendant pointed a gun at ES and DW three times and ordered
them “to stay down” was “enough” to establish probable cause.
Generally, this Court reviews a circuit court’s decision to deny a motion to quash a felony
information de novo to determine if the district court abused its discretion in ordering the
bindover. People v Orzame, 224 Mich App 551, 557; 570 NW2d 118 (1997). But “[i]f a
defendant is fairly convicted at trial, no appeal lies regarding whether the evidence at the
preliminary examination was sufficient to warrant a bindover.” People v Wilson, 469 Mich
1018; 677 NW2d 29 (2004). Here, defendant’s argument fails because he does not argue on
appeal that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence at trial to sustain his convictions, and
there is no indication that he was otherwise prejudiced by the claimed error. People v Hall, 435
Mich 599, 601-603; 460 NW2d 520 (1990). We nonetheless note that, viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, sufficient evidence was presented at trial to enable a rational trier of
fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crimes. People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
The elements of felonious assault are “(1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and
(3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate
battery.” People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 8; 742 NW2d 610 (2007). An assault is “either
an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act which places another in reasonable
apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” People v Grant, 211 Mich App 200, 202; 535
NW2d 581 (1995). “An actor’s intent may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances,
and because of the difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial
evidence is sufficient.” People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 517-518; 583 NW2d 199 (1998),
lv den 459 Mich 866 (1998).
Defendant’s felonious assault convictions arise from his assaults of DW and ES.
Evidence was presented that defendant drew a gun, pointed it at the manager’s head, and ordered
the manager and DW to the cash office. DW testified that as they walked to the office, he was
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“afraid” because defendant “had a gun on [him].” While standing behind DW in the office,
defendant “told [him] to get on the floor, [and] shoved [him] to the floor.” Upon seeing ES in
the office, defendant said, “Don’t look at me, bitch.” Defendant pointed the gun “[r]ight at her
chest,” “grabbed” her shirt, and “threw [her] to the floor” “[b]y the hair and shoulder.” ES “hit
the cabinet first, then she landed on the floor.” ES testified that she was “fearful because [she]
thought [she] was going to die.” The manager and DW described ES as “absolutely hysterical,”
“broke down,” crying, “screaming,” and “petrified.” ES pleaded with defendant not to kill her.
Defendant then ordered the manager to withdraw the money from the safe. While the manager
followed defendant’s order, defendant continued to watch ES and DW while holding the gun.
As defendant left, he cautioned the victims not to move and pulled out the phone. This evidence
was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions of felonious assault. Because sufficient
evidence at trial supported defendant’s convictions and there is no indication that he was
otherwise prejudiced by the claimed error, defendant has failed to state a cognizable claim on
appeal regarding the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary examination.
III. Sentence
A. Scoring of Offense Variables
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in scoring offense variables
4 and 9 of the sentencing guidelines. Defendant did not object below to the scoring of OV 4 and
9. A party shall not raise on appeal an issue challenging the scoring of the sentencing guidelines
unless the party raised the issue at sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper
motion to remand. People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 309; 684 NW2d 669 (2004); MCL
769.34(10). However, plain error in the scoring of the guidelines can be raised and corrected on
appeal where “the trial court’s error resulted in a sentence that was not within the appropriate
legislative guidelines range.” People v Kimble, 252 Mich App 269, 276-277 n 5; 651 NW2d 798
(2002), aff’d 470 Mich 305 (2004).
“A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored,
provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v Endres, 269
Mich App 414, 417; 711 NW2d 398 (2006). A scoring decision “for which there is any evidence
in support will be upheld.” Id. (citation omitted).
The trial court scored ten points for OV 4. Ten points should be scored for OV 4 if
“[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim.” MCL
777.34(1)(a). In the victim’s impact statement, ES stated that she “was greatly affected” by the
crime, “no longer feels safe at work, nor any place she shops or visits,” “is constantly looking
over her shoulder and does not leave the house as much[.]” She is no longer employed at
Murray’s “because she felt uncomfortable and was unable to perform her duties,” and “it is a
struggle to provide for her to provide for her family.” She “is still enrolled in counseling.”
Because this evidence supports a score of ten points for OV 4, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in scoring OV 4.
The trial court scored ten points for OV 9. MCL 777.39 directs a score of zero points for
OV 9 if there are fewer than two victims, and a score of ten points if there are two to nine
victims. MCL 777.39(1) and (2). The instructions state that “each person who was placed in
danger of physical injury or loss of life or property” is to be counted as a victim. MCL
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777.39(2)(a). The evidence showed that the store manager, ES, and DW were present when
defendant, armed with a dangerous weapon, robbed the store. Because there were three persons
placed in danger of injury, OV 9 was properly scored at ten points.
B. Proportionality
Defendant further argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his sentences for
armed robbery and felonious assault are disproportionate. Defendant’s sentences of 12 to 30
years’ imprisonment for the robbery conviction and one to six years’ imprisonment for the
felonious assault convictions are at the lower end of the sentencing guidelines ranges of 126 to
262 months and 10 to 23 months, respectively. This Court must affirm a sentence within the
guidelines range absent an error in the scoring of the guidelines or reliance on inaccurate
information in determining the sentence. MCL 769.34(10); Kimble, supra at 310-311. On
appeal, defendant has not demonstrated that the guidelines were erroneously scored or that the
trial court relied on inaccurate information. Therefore, we must affirm his sentences.
C. Blakely v Washington
Defendant also argues that he must be resentenced because the facts supporting the trial
court’s scoring of the sentencing guidelines were not determined by a jury, contrary to Blakely v
Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). We disagree. In Blakely, the
United States Supreme Court struck down as violative of the Sixth Amendment a determinate
sentencing scheme in which the sentencing judge was allowed to increase the defendant’s
maximum sentence on the basis of facts that were not reflected in the jury’s verdict or admitted
by the defendant. Our Supreme Court has determined that Blakely does not apply to Michigan’s
indeterminate sentencing scheme, in which a defendant’s maximum sentence is set by statute and
the sentencing guidelines affect only the minimum sentence. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140;
715 NW2d 778 (2006), cert den ___ US ___; 127 S Ct 592; 166 L Ed 2d 440 (2006); People v
Claypool, 470 Mich 715, 730 n 14; 684 NW2d 278 (2004). Consequently, defendant’s argument
is without merit.
IV. Attorney Fees
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously ordered him to pay $2,250 in attorney
fees without inquiring into his current or future ability to pay. Because defendant failed to
challenge the imposition of attorney fees below, we review this unpreserved claim for plain error
affecting substantial rights. Kimble, supra at 312.
In People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240, 251-252; 690 NW2d 476 (2004), lv den 473
Mich 881 (2005), the defendant complained that the trial court failed to consider his ability to
pay attorney fees before entering an order imposing those costs. The Dunbar Court explained:
The crux of defendant’s claim appears to be that the trial court should
have made a specific finding on the record regarding his ability to pay. We do not
believe that requiring a court to consider a defendant’s financial situation
necessitates such a formality, unless the defendant specifically objects to the
reimbursement amount at the time it is ordered, although such a finding would
provide a definitive record of the court’s consideration. However, the court does
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need to provide some indication of consideration, such as noting that it reviewed
the financial and employment sections of the defendant’s presentence
investigation report or, even more generally, a statement that it considered the
defendant’s ability to pay. The amount ordered to be reimbursed for courtappointed attorney fees should bear a relation to the defendant’s foreseeable
ability to pay. A defendant’s apparent inability to pay at the time of sentencing is
not necessarily indicative of the propriety of requiring reimbursement because a
defendant’s capacity for future earnings may also be considered. [Id. at 254-255
(internal citations omitted; emphasis in original).]
Because defendant failed to challenge the imposition of attorney fees, the sentencing
court was not required to make formal findings of fact regarding defendant’s financial situation.
However, the sentencing court failed to indicate whether it considered defendant’s ability to pay.
At the sentencing hearing, the court did not refer to the employment and financial sections of
defendant’s presentence investigation report and made no mention of defendant’s potential future
ability to pay. Rather, the trial court merely imposed the fees without any discussion. We
therefore vacate the portion of the judgment of sentence ordering defendant to pay $2,250 in
attorney fees and remand for consideration of defendant’s present and future financial
circumstances. Id. at 255-256. The sentencing court has the discretion to base its decision to
award attorney fees on record evidence only and need not conduct a formal evidentiary hearing.
People v DeJesus, 477 Mich 996; 725 NW2d 669 (2007).
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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