PEOPLE OF MI V ALFONZO MONTELL GRIFFIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279438
Cass Circuit Court
LC No. 07-010023-FH
ALFONZO MONTELL GRIFFIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Smolenski and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to deliver less than 50 grams of
cocaine, MCL 750.157a and MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine,
and possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced
defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent terms of 48 months’ to 40
years’ imprisonment for each conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm, and decide
this appeal without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant contends that insufficient evidence at trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that he committed the charged crimes. We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence. People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 340; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Moorer, 262 Mich App 64, 76-77;
683 NW2d 736 (2004). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that
evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v Nowack, 462
Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000) (internal quotation omitted). A reviewing court must
“draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” Id.
Regarding the conspiracy conviction, MCL 750.157a provides that “[a]ny person who
conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an offense prohibited by law, or to commit
a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty of the crime of conspiracy . . . .”
A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes. The gist of the offense
of conspiracy lies in the unlawful agreement between two or more persons.
Establishing a conspiracy requires evidence of specific intent to combine with
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others to accomplish an illegal objective. [People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 481;
505 NW2d 843 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).]
“Conspiracy is a specific-intent crime, because it requires both the intent to combine with others
and the intent to accomplish the illegal objective.” People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 629; 628
NW2d 540 (2001). “[T]here must be proof demonstrating that the parties specifically intended
to further, promote, advance, or pursue an unlawful objective.” People v Justice (After Remand),
454 Mich 334, 347-348; 562 NW2d 652 (1997). Although a conspiracy involves an agreement,
“[d]irect proof of agreement is not required, nor is it necessary that a formal agreement be
proven. It is sufficient if the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties establish an
agreement in fact.” People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 311; 220 NW2d 465 (1974), overruled in part
on other grounds People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
Defendant insists that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that he “agreed to commit a
deliver[y] of cocaine and that he intended to commit or help commit that crime.” However, our
review of the record reflects that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
agreement and intent elements of conspiracy. Two undercover officers testified concerning their
January 10, 2007 purchase of crack cocaine from an Allen Street driveway in Dowagiac.
Detectives Philip Small and Susan Worley recounted that that evening, Robert Jordan1 signaled
their unmarked car, asked if they wanted to purchase drugs, and directed them to the driveway of
104-1/2 Allen. Small described Jordan, who expressed interest in a “pinch” of Small’s purchase,
as a “runner,” an individual who acted as an intermediary between a drug purchaser and a drug
dealer and in return “would want to pinch off a little bit of [the buyer’s] drugs so he could smoke
that for himself.” After Small had parked the unmarked car in a perpendicular fashion across the
driveway and given Jordan a $20 bill, the detectives watched Jordan walk to another vehicle
parked in front of them in the same driveway. Both detectives averred that they observed Jordan
engage in a hand-to-hand transaction with the sole apparent occupant of the other vehicle, who
sat in the driver’s seat. Jordan returned to the unmarked car and handed the detectives a baggie
containing a rock of crack cocaine. As described by Small, the detectives then observed the
other vehicle’s driver get out, approach the unmarked car and announce, “I just want to see who
you guys are. Are you the cops? . . . Turn on the lights.” Both detectives testified that after
Small illuminated their car’s lights, the other vehicle’s occupant looked directly in their window,
before advising that they were “cool” or “okay.” Small and Worley repeatedly and positively
identified defendant at trial as the other vehicle’s occupant.2
Although the record contains no direct evidence of any agreement between defendant and
Jordan, the detectives’ testimony concerning the conduct of defendant and Jordan amply
establishes that they had an agreement to unlawfully distribute drugs. A rational jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the detectives’ testimony that defendant
1
Worley testified that on January 10, 2007, she recognized Jordan from prior interactions with
him.
2
Worley also testified that she recognized defendant that evening from several previous contacts.
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possessed the specific intent to combine or cooperate with Jordan in the accomplishment of an
illegal objective, specifically the distribution of crack cocaine. Mass, supra at 629.3
With respect to defendant’s convictions under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), the prosecution
had to show that defendant delivered less then 50 grams of cocaine (Count 2), and that he
possessed less than 50 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver it (Count 3). “[T]o support a
conviction for possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, it is necessary
for the prosecutor to prove four elements: (1) that the recovered substance is cocaine, (2) that the
cocaine is in a mixture weighing less than fifty grams, (3) that defendant was not authorized to
possess the substance, and (4) that defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine with the intent to
deliver.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 516-617; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201
(1992). “Delivery” means “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from 1 person to
another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship. MCL
333.7105(1); People v Schultz, 246 Mich App 695, 703; 635 NW2d 491 (2001). “The cases are
well settled that the act of transferring a controlled substance is sufficient to sustain a finding of
an actual delivery.” Id. at 704.
Regarding the adequacy of proof of intent to deliver, this Court has noted the following:
Actual delivery is not required to prove intent to deliver. An actor’s intent
may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances, and because of the
difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is
sufficient. Intent to deliver can be inferred from the quantity of the controlled
substance in the defendant’s possession and from the way in which the controlled
substance is packaged. [People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 517-518; 583
NW2d 199 (1998).]
Similarly, “[p]ossession may be proven by circumstantial as well as direct evidence.” People v
Hill, 433 Mich 464, 469; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). Possession encompasses both actual and
constructive possession. Id. at 470. “[A] person has constructive possession if there is proximity
to the article together with indicia of control.” Id.
Defendant contests his delivery and possession with intent to deliver convictions on the
basis that he neither knowingly delivered cocaine nor knowingly possessed cocaine with the
intent to deliver it. But regarding delivery, the testimony of Small and Worley regarding their
observations of (1) defendant’s transfer of the baggie containing crack to Jordan in exchange for
the $20 bill received from Small, and (2) Jordan’s subsequent delivery of the crack to the
detectives, constitutes evidence from which a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant knowingly delivered the cocaine, with Jordan’s assistance. Schultz, supra
at 703-704.
3
To the extent that defendant suggests that the dark conditions caused the detectives to
incorrectly identify him as the individual dealing drugs, this Court will not revisit the jury’s
assessment of the detectives’ credibility. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 119; 605 NW2d 28
(1999).
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Defendant’s possession with intent to deliver conviction derived from later events.
Detective Small testified that as he had begun turning right onto the first street connecting with
Allen, he radioed to other officers that “the deal was done and that [defendant] was leaving the
area,” having just pulled out of the driveway and headed in the opposite direction, “eastbound on
Allen possibly heading north.” The testimony of Jared Bradford, a Dowagiac police officer,
revealed that when he heard Small’s request for assistance he was located well within a mile of
104-1/2 Allen Street, and that he pulled over a 1997 four-door Ford driven by defendant, whom
Bradford had met previously.4 Bradford recalled that “within seconds” of hearing Small’s
radioed request for assistance concerning “a green four-door sedan,” this green car came
northbound on Lowe Street, and I advised that I had an eye on the car and I could stop it,” which
Bradford did within about a mile of 104-1/2 Allen Street. Small and Worley arrived on the scene
within a few minutes and identified defendant as the crack seller. Bradford, Small, Worley and a
K-9 officer all described that after a police dog detected an odor of drugs within the green Ford,
the officers found secreted behind a panel on the driver’s-side foot well 18 individually packaged
rocks of crack. The detectives opined that the packaging used appeared consistent with the sale
of drugs because the rocks were measured for a specific dollar amount and easy to hide.
The testimony regarding the crack purchase at 104-1/2 Allen Street and the traffic stop
shortly thereafter amply supports the jury’s finding that defendant knowingly possessed the 18
baggies of crack with the intent to deliver them. The evidence as a whole established that from
the driver’s seat of the green Ford defendant had transferred crack to Jordan, and that within
seconds or minutes thereafter, Bradford stopped defendant driving the same green Ford and the
police recovered 18 additional baggies of crack hidden in close proximity to defendant. In
summary, the record permitted a rational jury to find that defendant constructively possessed the
crack hidden nearby in the green Ford, and that defendant intended to deliver the 18 individually
wrapped crack rocks. Hill, supra at 469-470; Fetterley, supra at 517-518.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
4
Defendant did not own the green Ford, which at the time of the traffic stop also contained a
female passenger, Loretta Brookins.
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